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#1251
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That is exactly what I said I believed happenend. Both the Operating Notes and Table II showing fuel at the airfields point to that same conclusion. For the last 20 pages I have been called every name in the book for stating that!! |
#1252
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Honestly, a "simulation" would not be very much fun of this stuff. Ask the survivors how much fun they had in it. |
#1253
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you will not see technical orders that are applicable to operational units that do not make it into the new edition. Wrong - as long as the engine was originally designed and rated for 87 Octane fuel the Pilot's Notes did not incorporate anything else until 1943. Any amendments to the engine's ratings continued to be issued as supplementary slips. The Hurricane notes of 1943 say 100 Octane because the Merlin XX was designed to use 100 octane. The Pilot's Notes General 2nd ed printed in April 1943 dropped the convention because most engines which were originally designed to use 87 octane fuel were well out of frontline service. Last edited by NZtyphoon; 04-23-2012 at 09:17 PM. |
#1254
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I know that when I used pilots notes I didn't give a damn about when a change had been used, I just wanted to make sure that the notes and its updates matched the plane I was going to fly in. Either way the date of the notes is clearly not a given as to accuracy of the implementation of the change. I am confident that your notes dated June 1940 are not for the varient of the Spitfire I with the updates CSP, Armour, Tank protection and so on, in service in June 1940. Your 1942 notes saying all operational units is another example, show me a Spitfire Unit operational in June 1942 flying the Spit I. You have done nothng to prove your theory of 16 squadrons, or the bases that would have held the fuel. You have no evidence of any fighter combat using 87 octane apart from some I gave you iro OCU units who woldn't have had 100 octane. There is no evidence from any participant or historian to support your theory. You have no evidence to support your theory from the oil committee who would have been involved in the disribution of said 100 octane fuel, unless you believe that we fought the entire war with 16 squadrons on 100 octane in the UK. I say this as after May 1940 there is nothing more in the papers about increasing or extending the roll out of 100 octane at any time. There is no suggestion from any report or status paper from any source, be it Cabinet Meetings, Oil Committee or Air Ministry to support the idea that there was a shortage of 100 Octane fuel, again apart from my finding that there was a shortage in May 1944. Your faith that a pre war proposal was maintained despite war starting and despite everything else we have shown is almost desperate. I have asked before that you find any pre war plan, on any topic from any nation that remained unchanged when the firing started. Last edited by Glider; 04-23-2012 at 09:15 PM. |
#1255
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#1256
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By Convention, improperly installing a cylinder head or misadjusted valves will effect powerplant operation and is a major repair by itself. Glider, I am not argue with you anymore. The facts are plain. Quote:
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#1257
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Crumppquote: you will not see technical orders that are applicable to operational units that do not make it into the new edition.
Wrong - as long as the engine was originally designed and rated for 87 Octane fuel the Pilot's Notes did not incorporate anything else until 1943. Any amendments to the engine's ratings continued to be issued as supplementary slips. The Pilot's Notes General 2nd ed printed in April 1943 dropped the convention because most engines which were originally designed to use 87 octane fuel were well out of frontline service. |
#1258
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Rubbish The major work is already covered in the new production engines or in routine maintanence. What is left is minor and easily done. How many front line aircraft wouldn't have been maintained in the three months from March to June?
You say you have experience in this field but I must say I seriously doubt this. I strongly urge you to show some of the engineers you have worked with the paper outlinging the changes and ask them how long it would take to drill two holes and reassemble the piece as described. . Quote:
i.e. I agree You have done nothng to prove your theory of 16 squadrons, or the bases that would have held the fuel. You have no evidence of any fighter combat using 87 octane apart from some I gave you iro OCU units who woldn't have had 100 octane. There is no evidence from any participant or historian to support your theory. You have no evidence to support your theory from the oil committee who would have been involved in the disribution of said 100 octane fuel, unless you believe that we fought the entire war with 16 squadrons on 100 octane in the UK. I say this as after May 1940 there is nothing more in the papers about increasing or extending the roll out of 100 octane at any time. There is no suggestion from any report or status paper from any source, be it Cabinet Meetings, Oil Committee or Air Ministry to support the idea that there was a shortage of 100 Octane fuel, again apart from my finding that there was a shortage in May 1944. Last edited by Glider; 04-23-2012 at 10:33 PM. |
#1259
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Changing the Cylnder head in this case is not classed as a 'repair'. It was completed as part of the Merlin engines service maintenance.
To me this implys that the cylnder head modification would have already been performed on aircaft scheduled for that service before the change over. This would have sped up the conversion process conciderably. ![]() Luckly the RAF had very competent and well trained mechanics and maintenance personel to perform the task. Cheers! Last edited by Skoshi Tiger; 04-23-2012 at 11:46 PM. |
#1260
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There were meetings held in '39 that were specifically held to secure and produce 100 octane without having to rely on the USA. In 1939 the government spent the most amount of money on any single production facility for the entire war when they contracted TRIMPELL to build the Heysham iso-octane plant, who's specific purpose was to convert 87 into 100. Why would they do this if they were expecting the total consumption to be 10,000 tons per annum, as Morgan and shacklady say, when they already had 100,000 tons in stock.. 10 years supply according to that meeting. See next point. Morgan and shacklady states that the same meeting decided that the change over would result in "consumption of 10,000 tons per annum" the reserve of 800,000 tons was, if you look at the relevant documents already posted in this thread, for the entire RAF as projected for 1943. I noticed you gloss over the fact that Deere, Wellum, Brothers, Hillary, Lane, Viggors, Page, Malan and a few others mention in their memoirs that the changeover happened in the Spring of 1940. At the end of the day I don't give a shit what you think. I value people who were there, and who were writing diaries at the time over your desperate clinging to a meeting that was held when Britain was in the process of re arming for a war they were expecting in 2 or 3 years. I mean.. Who exactly are you? Actually don't answer that, I don't care. |
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