Bug 174 on 12lbs boost. Review please.

[NZtyphoon]

Originally Posted by 41Sqn_Banks

A.P. 3397 Maintenance (1954)

Brilliant! Where did you find this?

[Kurfürst]

What's the excitement, we know for some time that the first stations changed over to 100 octane in February, hardly any news in that..

[fruitbat]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

What's the excitement, we know for some time that the first stations changed over to 100 octane in February, hardly any news in that..

so you got any proof yet that any fighter in 11 group during BoB wasn't using 100 octane fuel yet........

and i mean proof, not your spam.

just one fighter report will do.......

are you ever going to rely on anything other than pre war documents, lol.

[Seadog]

Those years of research to make 100 octane commercially available paid off magnificently in historical significance during World War II. While aware of the superior quality of 100 octane as aviation fuel, Germany had neither indigenous petroleum Production nor a highly developed refining industry, and the possibilities of domestic production or storage on a large scale were limited. Indeed, when Hitler marched into Poland in 1939, the hydrogenation plant of Jersey's affiliate, Standard Oil of Louisiana, in Baton Rouge, was alone turning out more 100 octane gasoline than all the combined refineries and synthetic oil plank in Germany. Throughout the war, the Luftwaffe was forced to rely on aromatic types of synthetic fuels. The combat effectiveness of 100 octane was strikingly demonstrated initially in the Battle of Britain where Royal Air Force Spitfires and Hurricanes outfought the enemy. Germany lost 2,152 planes to Britain's 620.

The petroleum industry exerted a tremendous effort to keep the Allies supplied with 100 octane gasoline during the war years...
MJ Rathbone (President of Standard oil Company)Fuel for Flight, Flying Magazine Oct 1958, p37.

Funny how there's a complete lack of sources stating that RAF FC didn't exclusively use 100 octane fuel during the BofB...

[NZtyphoon]

More Oil...

[Crumpp]

Funny how there's a complete lack of sources stating that RAF FC didn't exclusively use 100 octane fuel during the BofB...

Except the original documents.....

I believe that by the time the battle ended by the German dates, the entire RAF FC was using 100 Octane.

Maybe, just maybe, if you end the battle in November or December 1940, the entire RAF FC had converted.

If you want to say in July thru September 1940 that the entire FC had converted you would be wrong. They were in the process of converting during that time.

You can line up all the evidence presented until July 1940 and it fits perfectly within normal convention phase testing for adaptation.

The Notes on a Merlin Engine portion of the Operating Notes are part of the airworthiness of the design and list the specified fuel for the aircraft. The conversion was important enough to publish a very clear instructions for ALL OPERATIONAL UNITS to use 100 Octane when Fighter Command converted. You do not see that in any Notes on a Merlin Engine prior to January 1942.

Boost override was available and authorized to be used by the Operating Notes. That calls into question any combat report which makes a reference to any over boost condition as being proof of 100 Octane fuel use.

The logistical documents are just that, logistics and not operational. Before the operational side of the house can do anything, they must have the logistics solved and the materials in hand. That they had the stuff is not proof of when it was used. It is only proof that they had it which is not in dispute.

The consumption reports do not show any 100 Octane being out at the airfields in useable quantity until the June thru July timeframe. In those months, it represents a small portion of the fuel used. In the October and beyond, 100 Octane consumption clearly shows a marked increase to reach some 34% of the Air Ministries fuel supply "forward of the railheads". In other words, not sitting in a tanker as part of the strategic reserve.

In other words, the developers of IL2 CLOD would be accurate in modeling both types of fuel not in modeling 100 Octane exclusively.

[Seadog]

Originally Posted by Crumpp

Except the original documents.....

I believe that by the time the battle ended by the German dates, the entire RAF FC was using 100 Octane.

Maybe, just maybe, if you end the battle in November or December 1940, the entire RAF FC had converted.

If you want to say in July thru September 1940 that the entire FC had converted you would be wrong. They were in the process of converting during that time.

You can line up all the evidence presented until July 1940 and it fits perfectly within normal convention phase testing for adaptation.

The Notes on a Merlin Engine portion of the Operating Notes are part of the airworthiness of the design and list the specified fuel for the aircraft. The conversion was important enough to publish a very clear instructions for ALL OPERATIONAL UNITS to use 100 Octane when Fighter Command converted. You do not see that in any Notes on a Merlin Engine prior to January 1942.

Boost override was available and authorized to be used by the Operating Notes. That calls into question any combat report which makes a reference to any over boost condition as being proof of 100 Octane fuel use.

The logistical documents are just that, logistics and not operational. Before the operational side of the house can do anything, they must have the logistics solved and the materials in hand. That they had the stuff is not proof of when it was used. It is only proof that they had it which is not in dispute.

The consumption reports do not show any 100 Octane being out at the airfields in useable quantity until the June thru July timeframe. In those months, it represents a small portion of the fuel used. In the October and beyond, 100 Octane consumption clearly shows a marked increase to reach some 34% of the Air Ministries fuel supply "forward of the railheads". In other words, not sitting in a tanker as part of the strategic reserve.

In other words, the developers of IL2 CLOD would be accurate in modeling both types of fuel not in modeling 100 Octane exclusively.

Again, this is your thesis, but you have not presented any evidence to support your contention that RAF FC was using both 87 and 100 octane during the BofB (by British dates, from July 10 onward). The facts are that documents from March 1940 indicate that all new Merlin engined aircraft were equipped to utilize 100 octane, and given the wastage rates of existing aircraft, production rates of new aircraft and the conversion program for older aircraft, there simply wouldn't have been sufficient numbers, if any, of 87 octane only aircraft for RAF FC to have retained 87 octane as a front line fuel. The idea that RAF FC would retain 87 octane when all its fighters were equipped to handle 100 octane is simply preposterous, and completely unsupported by the facts, and a complete dearth of supporting evidence for 87 octane fuel use. The increase in 100 octane consumption was a reflection of the fact that the RAF won the BofB and RAF FC and BC were expanding rapidly.

Some more supporting data:

Prometheans in the Lab: Chemistry and the Making of the Modern World, McGrayne: "Britain's petroleum secretary Geoffrey Lloyd said later, "we wouldn't have won the Battle of Britain without 100 octane..." "p103.

Two Historians in Technology and War, Howard and Guilmartin:

The importance of oil to the conduct and outcome of the Second World War extended well beyond quantitative, macro-economic considerations. High octane aviation gasoline gave British and American aircraft, particularly fighters, a critical performance boost not enjoyed by their Axis equivalents; indeed, some have gone so far as to attribute British victory in the Battle of Britain to 100 octane gasoline. Axis engineers were well aware of the performance advantages conferred by high octane, but the refining process was highly inefficient, many more barrels of crude being required per barrel of refined gasoline as octane increased. So long as their sea lanes stayed open, Britain and America could afford the inefficiency; the Germans, Japanese and Italians could not, and their fighter pilots entered combat at a significant handicap. p11.

Air Warfare: an International Encyclopaedia: A-L, Walter J. Boyne

On 9 August 1940, fighters available for combat in Fighter Command included 568 Hawker Hurricanes and 328 Supermarine Spitfires. Although the Hurricane I could not match the performance of the Bf 109E, it was easy to fly, could absorb much damage, and was quick to repair. The Spitfire was based upon an advanced elliptical wing design by Reginald Mitchell that featured maximum area, low wing loading, great strength, and as thin an airfoil as possible. The Spitfire proved a good match against the Bf IO9E. Visibility in the Spitfire was excellent. Both fighters were armed with eight .303-caliber machine guns and featured armor protection for the pilot and a bulletproof windscreen.

Both British fighters benefited from 100-octane fuel. German aircraft used synthetic gasoline of 87-89 octane. Use of 100-octane fuel in the English Merlin engines raised horsepower from 1,030 to 1,310 (the Daimler Benz engine in the Bf I09E was rated at I,175 hp). Consequently, the Hurricane was able to hold its own and the Spitfire gained an edge...p108

others:

The Most Dangerous Enemy: An Illustrated History of the Battle of Britain
By Stephen Bungay p56, 59

and another:

Sydney Camm and the Hurricane, Fozard, Foreword by Sir Peter G. Masefield:

...Sir Thomas Sopwith who, early on, had recognized Sydney's worth and with rare foresight and confidence on his judgement of the Hurricane's quality, took a financially hazardous decision in 1936 to authorize it's large scale production ahead of an Air Ministry order. Hence 400 extra Hurricanes were available for action in June of 1940; just sufficient to tip the balance of that "Narrow Margin" where, otherwise an overwhelming disparity of numbers could have had only one result. There was, too, the RR Merlin engine - the heart of Camm's Hurricane; and of Mitchell's Spitfire. Without the Merlin, and just in time, 100 octane fuel - there would have been no prospect of success...

Masefield's bio:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obit...Masefield.html

Why would Masefield say that "...without... "100 octane fuel" - there would have been no prospect of success"?

[Seadog]

and present their history prof with a thesis:

"RAF FC used 87 octane and 100 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain"

"An excellent thesis" says the prof, at the start of the term, "if you can prove it you will have altered our understanding of one of the most crucial battles in modern history."

A few months later they are called into the prof's office: "How are you two getting along with your paper? I expected something from you by now...but I'll let you have a few more days. By the way, what proof have you got? Remember, the term is almost over, and I expected a finished paper by now."

Crumpp and Kurfurst pull out a 1/2 dozen pages and place them on the prof's desk: "Well we have some papers dating from 1938 and we think that some aircraft manuals state that 87 octane was required."

"Hmmm..." says the prof, staring at the meagre number of pages: "You mean to say that's all you've got? I think you need to go the library, the archives, and the even the web, and dig up some solid evidence for 87 octane use during the actual battle...after all there's numerous sources that state that 100 octane fuel was used during the battle. You are now making an 'extraordinary claim' which is all well and good but as you well know, extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof, and I'm sorry gentleman, but I don't see any such proof in the rather sparse data that you've presented.

Crumpp and Kurfurst look downcast and stare at their feet: "We have looked high and low and this is all we can come up with."

"Oh my" says the prof... he pauses for a few moments, moves back to marking papers and then glances up and states: "No problem gentlemen; you have a few more days...just make sure that your paper states that you conclude that your thesis is false, based upon the lack of any direct evidence for 87 octane fuel use, and the mass of contradictory evidence stating that 100 octane fuel was in universal use. Good day"

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by Seadog

Two Historians in Technology and War, Howard and Guilmartin:

The importance of oil to the conduct and outcome of the Second World War extended well beyond quantitative, macro-economic considerations. High octane aviation gasoline gave British and American aircraft, particularly fighters, a critical performance boost not enjoyed by their Axis equivalents; indeed, some have gone so far as to attribute British victory in the Battle of Britain to 100 octane gasoline.

Evidently the authors are wrong. Germans were using 92/110 grade (later 96/145 grade) fuel through the war for their fighters, from the start of the Battle of Britain.

Originally Posted by Seadog

Axis engineers were well aware of the performance advantages conferred by high octane, but the refining process was highly inefficient, many more barrels of crude being required per barrel of refined gasoline as octane increased. So long as their sea lanes stayed open, Britain and America could afford the inefficiency; the Germans, Japanese and Italians could not, and their fighter pilots entered combat at a significant handicap. p11.

Evidently the authors are wrong in this as well. The Germans did not rely on crude oil to produce their high own high octane aviation fuel, but on the synthetic oil produced from coal. Both their high and normal octane aviation fuels had the same composition, expect for additional aromatics in their high octane fuel, which was produced by getting the normal grade fuel through an extra chemical process.






Air Warfare: an International Encyclopaedia: A-L, Walter J. Boyne

Both British fighters benefited from 100-octane fuel. German aircraft used synthetic gasoline of 87-89 octane.

Evidently Boyne's research was sloppy too. The Germans were using synthethic 92/110 octane fuel for their Me 109s, Me 110s and Ju 88 during the Battle of Britain. In early 1941, practically all of the Luftwaffe se fighters converted to 100 octane (109E-7/N, F-1, F-2).



Sydney Camm and the Hurricane, Fozard, Foreword by Sir Peter G. Masefield:

Why would Masefield say that "...without... "100 octane fuel" - there would have been no prospect of success"?

Because he overstates technical aspects over operational aspects. BTW loss rates of RAF fighters to German fighters is sobering - it ran around 2:1 in the German's favour during the Battle. RAF Fighter Command lost over 100% of the force it started the Battle within four months.

[Seadog]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

Evidently the authors are wrong. Germans were using 92/110 grade (later 96/145 grade) fuel through the war for their fighters, from the start of the Battle of Britain.

Because he overstates technical aspects over operational aspects. BTW loss rates of RAF fighters to German fighters is sobering - it ran around 2:1 in the German's favour during the Battle. RAF Fighter Command lost over 100% of the force it started the Battle within four months.

Again, with the 1938 documents, which have no bearing on the BofB... Contemporary 1940 documents clearly establish that more than adequate supplies of 100 octane fuel were in stock and under production during the battle. If you have no evidence of RAF FC use of 87 octane, why don't you simply state that?

German use or not, as the case may be, of hundred octane fuel, has no bearing on RAF FC use of said fuel during the BofB. Again, you have no evidence for RAF FC use of 87 octane fuel, yet there is abundant sources and direct evidence for the production, and use of 100 octane fuel by the entire RAF FC from July 10 1940 onward, while no evidence for even a single RAF FC frontline Hurricane/Spitfire combat sortie during the BofB, has ever been produced, despite the logistical nightmare that this would have created for RAF FC, not to mention the morale effect of having only select units using 100 octane fuel, when every fighter in RAF FC was capable of using it.

RAF FC was tasked with destroying Luftwaffe bombers, and it did this in large enough numbers to win the battle, and achieve an overall kill ratio superiority during the BofB. The Luftwaffe lost the battle and it's Commander in chief, went on to accuse his own fighter pilots of cowardice; why?

BTW, how many French Channel based Me109s were using 100 octane on July 10 1940? On Aug 1 1940? On Sept 1 1940? On Oct 1 1940? How are 1944 documents relevant to this discussion?