Inaccurate performance data for BOB fighters in COD comparing to RL data

[Glider]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

Well I tend to think you compensate for you lack of reading comprehension skills with a considerable amount of wishful thinking, but that's just my opinion.

At the same time, its such a pity that your theory about universal use of 100 octane by RAF FC lacks any documentary evidence that you manage to work up yourself when other people are not entirely convinced by R-R's ' load of P R crap' as you put it. Its a curious thing though that knowledge man on R-R's payroll were spending time on these PR articles about the disadvantages of direct fuel injection, and how less displacement is better, everyone went to direct fuel injection eventually, and R-R was working hard to finish the Griffon with a displacement similar to the DB and Hispano-Suiza engines.

Speaking of documentary evidence, have you got any at all, on anything? For instance that page of the Beaverbrook paper that you thought you might have.

Or any comments on the War Cabinet who clearly didn't decide to stop the roll out of 100 Octane as per the paper that the Australian Records cannot find?

[Kurfürst]

[QUOTE=Glider;394576]

Or any comments on the War Cabinet who clearly didn't decide to stop the roll out of 100 Octane

Source please.

[Glider]

[QUOTE=Kurfürst;394577]

Originally Posted by Glider

Source please.

I admit, I laughed out loud when I saw this.
The minutes of the War Cabinet, the minutes that are on line (all of them), the ones I gave you the file number to look up.

The same War Cabinet that Pips insisted stopped the roll out in May, that decided to make 87 octane the primary fuel.

Tragically for your case, the minutes don't mention these decisions at all.

As sources go, I would suggest that the official minutes of the War Cabinet are a pretty good source to prove or disprove that statement of Pips

PS I am still waiting for your comments about how the fuel reserves went up from May to August without any tankers getting through.

PPS I can confirm that the original paper papers from the War Cabinet are the same as the on line ones. I went through the originals before they were made avaialble on line

[Kurfürst]

[QUOTE=Glider;394588]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

I admit, I laughed out loud when I saw this.

The minutes of the War Cabinet, the minutes that are on line (all of them), the ones I gave you the file number to look up.

I don't recall you giving me file numbers. I have asked you again, and you haven't provided file numbers now either.

So I ask you for the third time: can you give us a source where you claim that "the War Cabinet who clearly didn't decide to stop the roll out of 100 Octane".

YES / NO.

So far your standpoint can be summerized as denial of, from a position of complete ignorance, the existence of a paper in the Australian War Memorial archives that was found and summarized by a researcher there, based on papers you have never seen in your life and completely unaware of their contents, but assume they say want you want them to say.

Originally Posted by Glider

The same War Cabinet that Pips insisted stopped the roll out in May, that decided to make 87 octane the primary fuel.

There are literally hundreds of those 'War Cabinet' papers, as anyone can confirm who took a peep in the search engine and you haven't seen their contents.

Tragically for your case, the minutes don't mention these decisions at all.

Tragically for your case, its entirely transparent that you haven't actually looked into those papers, and simply making your story up.

As sources go, I would suggest that the official minutes of the War Cabinet are a pretty good source to prove or disprove that statement of Pips

That I agree. So disprove the statement of Pips. Since you misrepresent his position, I put it forward to you in its originality:

This is from a researcher, researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives, from a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance. It was a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War.

The reason why it is included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF. McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report.

The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.

The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.

PS I am still waiting for your comments about how the fuel reserves went up from May to August without any tankers getting through.

Well anyone who reads Pip's words (and not your strawmen of them) can read: "The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August,".

I am sure tankers got through. And a large number of them were sunk, as noted by secondary sources. This seems to have been worrying the British somewhat, since by that time the Germans has sunk about 10% of the British tanker fleet, and twice as many tankers that was under construction (19) in Britain.

And I am still waiting for your comments as to wheter you found a decision that would say the whole of Fighter Command is to convert to 100 octane fuel.

A simple YES / NO will do, because you seem to be very keen on asking questions, excellent at making up stories, but absolutely terrible in answering the questions asked.

PPS I can confirm that the original paper papers from the War Cabinet are the same as the on line ones. I went through the originals before they were made avaialble on line

No, you haven't went through. Unless you want to tell us you have went through 10 000s of pages created by the War Cabinet's 200+ Committees.

[Glider]

Re the Minutes of the War Cabinet Minutes
On Post 305 I advised that these records were available on line,
On post 307 you asked for the link,
On post 308 Winny attached a link
On post 309 I gave you the file no and was willing to help if you had problems.

Re Yes or No
The reply is yes, the War Cabinet Minutes do not record any decision of this kind.

Re the Paper you quoteAs mentioned a number of times The Australian War Memorial Archives have not heard of it. I do not believe it exists. The actions you highlight were not made by the War Cabinet in May as proven by the Minutes which do not mention this decision, in turn puts a huge hole in the existance or if it does exist, the accuracy of the said paper.

100% of Fighter Command using 100 OctaneYes, all the evidence points towards it. I have always said the case for it was a good case but not a perfect case, however there is no evidence to say that any squadron was using 87 octane for combat missions.

Did I go through the whole file for the War Cabinet
Yes I did. The files I concentrated on were, The War Cabinet , The Oil Committee, The Chief of the Air Staff official papers. The private papers of the Chief of the Air Staff which mainly consisted of memos between him and Churchill, plus people who became involved in resolving Churchils questions and the Air Ministry committee papers.

It was very interesting and the detail that people of this level got involved with was unbelievable. I did get my hopes up when there was a file on the availability of tankers. Turned out Churchill had a conversation with a pilot officer on a visit who said that the squadron could turn around quicker if they had an extra tanker to refuel the aircraft. As you might guess the topic was not what I hoped. If anyone is interested the delay wasn't in refueling the aircraft it was in rearming them and the Chief of the Air Staff had to inform Churchill of the steps being taken to speed this up. The steps were to train guards and others on how to rearm the aircraft so if there was an emergency situation they could assist.

You can now see why I get a little frustrated that I have put quite a considerable amount of effort into researching this topic, and you haven't even tried to find the one paper that you base your case on.

Edit
For a detail set of comments on the Pips Paper (with supporting docs) refer to posting 141

Can you tell us where you get 200 plus committees?

[NZtyphoon]

This is from a researcher, researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives, from a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance. It was a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War.

The reason why it is included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF. McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report.

The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.

The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.

Time to answer this directly: I have read the relevant sections in "Australia in the War of 1939-45: Civil: War Economy 1939-42 by S J Butlin. (Petrol and Substitute Fuels 280-292)

http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listi...condition=used

1) There was no "Australian Military Commission" or any such organisation in Britain during WW 2.

2a) The Australian Government dealt directly with the oil companies when requesting stock of fuels of all types, including aviation fuels. "After the outbreak of war stocks continued to come from the oil companies and to be imported and distributed through their organisation...there were special features in the requirements of the forces: fuel oil for the navy; petrol for the army; and the special high grade aviation fuel for the air force. (p. 285): "Liaison with the oil companies had been maintained from before the war..."(p. 286):

b) Lord Beaverbrook and the Ministry of Aircraft Production had nothing whatsoever with deciding what types of fuels were supplied to Australia, nor how much. The Australian War Cabinet made decisions on aviation fuel supply and storage "In August 1940 the War Cabinet was asked for a decision on aviation spirit stocks....The suggestion therefore was that the Department of Supply should purchase 3,000,000 gallons and that three 1,200,000-gallon storage tanks be built. The Cabinet approved the purchase...(p. 287)

3) What did need to be co-ordinated with the British was the shipment, allocation of tankers etc. "Diversion of tankers to meet the special needs of the United Kingdom...(p. 28

The book should be available through libraries, second hand bookshops etc so anyone can check.

[41Sqn_Banks]

There is a document (97 pages) available in the National Archives of Australia that deal with the supply of 100 octane fuel for the RAAF that covers 1940 and 1941.

Fortunately they are available online:
A705, 164/1/975 (searching for this reference number doesn't return a result, search for "Supply of Octane 100 aviation gasoline" will give you the result)
RAAF - Directorate of Supply - Supply of Octane 100 aviation gasoline
http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/using/search/

You can also simply type "100 octane" in the search field, there are only 4 documents.

Maybe there can be found a evidence that

the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF.

Or there might be evidences that this was not the case, for example if there was enough supply on 100 octane fuel available there was no need to protest.

So far I didn't read through all the pages.


Interesting find page 97:

14th August 1940.
...
Brief survey of the engines likely to be available for aircraft that may meet Australian requirements indicate that fuel of 90 and 95 octane rating is called for.
...
Even these engines likely to disappear from serious production early 1941 and some of the new engines will require 100 octane. Understand that Great Britain now using at least the appropriate octane fuel in all engines that can benefit thereby and has probably standardized on 100 octane fuel for engines of this class.
...

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by NZtyphoon

Time to answer this directly: I have read the relevant sections in "Australia in the War of 1939-45: Civil: War Economy 1939-42 by S J Butlin. (Petrol and Substitute Fuels 280-292)

http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listi...condition=used

Let me translate what it actually.

NZTyphoon found the Second World War Official Histories, legally and freely available to anyone at the Australian Goverment's website at http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/second_world_war/

Instead of giving the link where everyone could check what the source said, he magnamiously shared an amazon link, where people can buy, what he could read for free. Of course nobody will buy the books, so he can 'quote' them in any way he see it to his liking. At wikipedia he often resorted to this, 'backing' his own ideas that he wanted to be included to the enrichment of the wider public with references to the works of respected authors, even though those authors never said anything like it.

Let's see now some examples.

1) There was no "Australian Military Commission" or any such organisation in Britain during WW 2.

Says NZTyphoon - the 'ustralia in the War ' official histories of course make no such statement. But, as we are all aware, NZTyphoon have told us recently with equivalent certainty that British tanker losses were marginal, then it was shown that they've lost 600 000 GRT worth of tankers in the year under question according to the records.

2a) The Australian Government dealt directly with the oil companies when requesting stock of fuels of all types, including aviation fuels. "After the outbreak of war stocks continued to come from the oil companies and to be imported and distributed through their organisation...there were special features in the requirements of the forces: fuel oil for the navy; petrol for the army; and the special high grade aviation fuel for the air force. (p. 285): "Liaison with the oil companies had been maintained from before the war..."(p. 286):

Only the bottomline is missing from the quote - see below. Yes Australia contact various oil companies for supply. For various reasonons detailed below, the companies could not get the oil to Australia.

b) Lord Beaverbrook and the Ministry of Aircraft Production had nothing whatsoever with deciding what types of fuels were supplied to Australia, nor how much. The Australian War Cabinet made decisions on aviation fuel supply and storage

This is a classic strawmen arguement. Strawmen arguements are about deliberately misrepresenting the other's actual position, and then 'disproving' that distorted position, and therefore 'winning' the argument.

In reality however, nobody said or claimed that it was Lord Beaverbrook and/or the Ministry of Aircraft Production were deciding what types of fuels were supplied to Australia, nor how much.

The context in what Beaverbrook's name came up was that Pips found a paper, that says that British were worried about 100 octane fuel position for the future, and decided to halt further 100 octane conversions until the supplies could be secured.

The paper wan copied by the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, [b]by[b] Roll Royce [b]to[b] Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War.

As you can see, Beaverbrooks name came up in a different context, and nobody said Beaverbook decided in the question.

"In August 1940 the War Cabinet was asked for a decision on aviation spirit stocks....The suggestion therefore was that the Department of Supply should purchase 3,000,000 gallons and that three 1,200,000-gallon storage tanks be built. The Cabinet approved the purchase...(p. 287)

And this is classic selective quoting. NZTyphoon wishes to create the impression that Australia was fully autonomous in fuel suppy, that they had no contract whatsoever with the British in that regard etc. He wants people to believe that the background of the papers has been fabricated, the Australian goverment was in such an excellent position with regard of fuel, that discussions with the British about fuel supplies is a surreal idea.

This has been not the case, however. The bits on pages 288-289 tell a whole lot more of the story, which is I believe why NZTyphoon was careful not to share his source in the first place. You can't cherry pick qoutes if anyone can find it out in a minute, now can you?

Pages 288-289 in full:

In August 1940 the War Cabinet was asked for a decision on aviation
spirit stocks . Before the war the plan had been for a reserve of 6,400,00 0
gallons (that is, the requirements of nineteen squadrons) and although
this had not been achieved (approximately 5,500,000 was the holding )
it did not matter so much because a force of nineteen squadrons had no t
been achieved either. When the Empire Air Training Scheme requirement s
could be calculated the companies had agreed to increase their holding s
progressively, but now plans were afoot to expand the force to thirty-tw o
squadrons, the present contract was to expire on 31st December, and i t
was "not considered reasonable that the present contractors should b e
requested to further increase their stocks without some assurance of continuance
of business for a reasonable period " . 2 The suggestion therefor e
was that the Department of Supply should purchase 3,000,000 gallon s
and that three 1,200,000-gallon storage tanks should be built .

The Cabinet approved the purchase and sent the storage problem to the Commonwealth
Oil Board. The board recommended six 200,000-gallon tanks—two each
in three centres, to be approved by the Air Staff . But by March 1941
the three centres were revised to twelve and the total capacity was no w
4,030,000 gallons .

There might be grounds for satisfaction with these attempts to provide
extra storage tanks ; there could be none over the provision of the petrol
they were intended to hold . After the reduction of the ration which came
into force on 1st April 1941, the Supply Minister in the middle of that
month placed before the full Cabinet comparative sales figures for six
months. 3 "The effect of rationing and of all other inducements to reduced
consumption," he submitted, "may therefore be estimated at a figur e
of 16 per cent (that is, consumption has been reduced by 16 per cent) . "
Diversion of tankers to meet the special needs of the United Kingdom, side
by side with the persistently high sales, had reduced stocks to 82,000,00 0
gallons, "with no immediate prospects of restoring stocks even to thei r
former level" .

[b]By the beginning of May he reported "the prospective stock position
has deteriorated so much and the prospects of tankers are so uncertain
that I feel bound to report the matter to Cabinet ". He complained about
inability to get information from the United Kingdom authorities despite
attempts by the Prime Minister and another visiting parliamentarian. The
Government had protested about "our insecurity" with reference to tankers
and had been promised a tanker programme which, if maintained, woul d
bring stocks at the end of June to about 65,000,000 gallons . 4

Meantime on 2nd May the minister sought and received permission to
reduce use of private cars and cycles to 2,000 miles a year and to make
varying percentage reductions in other classes to fulfil the one-third cu t
"recommended by the original rationing board about twelve months ago" .


BTW, did anyone notice that despite I and others have asked him many times to post the alleged text in its full context from Payton - Smith, he always evades that request?

3) What did need to be co-ordinated with the British was the shipment, allocation of tankers etc. "Diversion of tankers to meet the special needs of the United Kingdom...(p. 28

Again, the quoting is selective and out of context; reading the full text reveals that aviation fuel reserves could not be met, despite previous contacting with various companies. The reasons were two-fold: the British were buying up much what was available in the (American) market, which had finite amounts of 100 octane to offer. Indeed this is a returning subject in all British papers, can sufficient amount of American supply secured?

Secondly, Australia had no sea-going tanker capacity worth to mention - all oil had to be imported in British-owned tankers.

In short, the context of the Australian Military Commission's mission to Britain about getting 100 octane was that the Australians tried to build up large reserves, constructed tanks to hold it, but they couldn't buy enough on the market, and couldn't transfer it to Australia, because - despite NZTyphoons's claims that the British had no tanker capacity problems whatsoever, everything was green and nice - the Brits who controlled the whole Commonwealth tanker capacity suddenly decided to use the whole to their own purposes.

This left the Australians in an unenviable position, their reserves were dropping, and had to introduce severe rationing of fuel to the civilian sector to ensure sufficient reserves for the military.

The Page 288:

The army's figures were repeated in a submission by the Minister fo r
Supply to the full Cabinet on 11th June 1941, in which he reported tha t
the new ration scale to bring consumption to a figure of 20,000,000 gallon s
a month was now in force . But news of future tankers was poor. In an
endeavour to bring aviation spirit reserves up, only 7,000,000 gallons o f
motor spirit would come in in June ; quantities for July were uncertain .
The minister recounted at length the sorry story of the delay in rationing
and that "it resulted in only half the saving in consumption that had been
forecast by the motor trade whose advice had been accepted by the
Government in August". He reiterated the statement that no warning was
given by the United Kingdom of any alteration in the tanker position an d
only early in 1941 was it known that diversions, thought to be temporary ,
would become pronounced.

He concluded :
It is open to question whether severe rationing of the order I am now bound t o
suggest should be conducted by the civil authorities on their own account or unde r
the authority of the army . The army in association with my Controller of Liqui d
Fuels has evolved a mobilisation petrol scheme which would be operated by my
department. I gather that the army would prefer the rationing to be conducte d
entirely under the authority of my department .
In view of the opinion expressed by the Oil Board, strongly supported as it is
by the Department of the Army, I have no option but to recommend that I be
authorised to reduce the monthly consumption of motor spirit for civil purposes
to a level of 12,000,000 per month as soon as that may be practicable . If necessary
the use of private cars other than for business purposes could be stopped as from
the beginning of next month and certain other classes could be reduced at the sam e
time . The full scheme could not be introduced, unless the Army Mobilisation System
were brought in, until August . ?

Such proposals were drastic ; but the Cabinet deferred only long enough
to ask the Minister for Supply to present two schedules, one with, an d
one without, private cars (that is, class 2 in the rationing schedule) ,
designed to bring consumption to the required 12,000,000 gallons . 8 The
decision was to keep private cars on the road, but to allow them 1,00 0
miles a year only . The following evening, 17th June, the Prime Ministe r
announced the reductions which would begin with the August issue o f
ration tickets .

The shoe was beginning to pinch . If further restrictions were needed—
and no one could say that they would not be—some thought would have
to be given to other ways of economising : rationalising delivery services ,
zoning, transport pools . In effect, for the future, the petrol problem was
not just one of simple restriction. Like so many other problems it could
no longer be dealt with in isolation, and indicative of the Government ' s
realisation of the need to relate problems one with another, the Prime
Minister included in his reorganised....

The book should be available through libraries, second hand bookshops etc so anyone can check.

Or at the Australian Goverments website, where you have found it yourself while researching the Australian online archives, should you bothered to give a link to it.

http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/second_world_war/

The pages I have provided the full quote can be found here: http://www.awm.gov.au/collection/rec...l-vol3-ch8.pdf