The Battle of Britain Was The First Defeat For The German Luftwaffe.

[ATAG_Dutch]

Originally Posted by DD_crash

I bet that the Luftwaffe wouldn't put the radar sites low on their priories this time

And Erprobungsgruppe 210 would be a whole Luftflotte.

[Al Schlageter]

http://www.uboat.net/index.html

graph and other info on U-boat numbers

[senseispcc]

World war two was a victory for the Marsians....

[kendo65]

Originally Posted by Sternjaeger II

man, I can only talk for myself here. First of all you're still looking at sides, I'm personally on neither side, I'm looking at it from bang in the middle. You, on the other hand, and for well understandable nationalistic standpoints, give the impression of still looking it from the British point of view, but there's more to keep into consideration than that.

You make some good points, but I get a little annoyed when you constantly seem to imply that everyone else is unable to rise above their partial standpoint while your viewpoint is unimpeachably neutral and objective.

It is probably impossible for anyone to attain complete objectivity - too often the conclusions reached are dependent on starting assumptions, etc, and it's very difficult for many people to rise above the cultural and societal baggage they have inherited.

But, I would respect your opinion more if you could accept that your position is just as prone to assumptions and sometimes self-serving beliefs as many other people on this forum. You come across as somewhat elitest, especially when you ascribe those who genuinely disagree with your personal views as having been duped by propaganda.

The way to get us to change our minds is to supply overwhelming evidence. You haven't been able to do that (so far!). Your views appear just as partial and agenda-driven as any other poster in this thread.

[Rattlehead]

Originally Posted by Dutch_851

I was also thinking how fantastic it would be if one day using some sort of online computer sim, maybe even CoD, the invasion could actually be attempted virtually, complete with Naval forces etc.

What a cracking fantasy!

Would be nice, but even then, the objectivity of the coders who created the sim would be called into question by the losing side.
Someone, somewhere, is always going to raise objections, no matter what.

[RCAF_FB_Orville]

In my considered and (in as far as is possible, notwithstanding the apparently unavoidable subconscious and insipid subliminal influence of 'rabid Patriotism' lol) entirely objective opinion, based on an assessment of the facts, the Kriegsmarine did not stand a snowballs chance in hell against the Royal Navy; echoing the sentiments of one Grossadmiral Donitz, with air superiorty or not.

Royal Navy:

5 capital ships
11 cruisers
53 destroyers
23 destroyers on convoy duty

Kriegsmarine:

1 capital ship
1 cruiser
10 destroyers
20-30 U-boats *Ineffective and at extreme disadvantage in the shallows of the Channel. Many ships also with unrepaired extensive damage from the Norwegian campaign*

Not only vastly outnumbered, but outclassed too.

Add to the RN mix a countless legion of auxilary craft, , adapted trawlers and sloops, minesweepers and motor torpedo boats . The MTB 102 alone for example was capable of 48 knts fully laden, and could be equipped variously with machine guns, depth charges, and the Swiss Oerlikon 20mm AA cannon. Nasty little bumblebee with quite a sting, small and extremely maneouvrable,.....Have fun 'precision bombing' or strafing those. In a barge vs 102 battle, I really don't fancy the barges chances.

Interestingly, no mention has been made of the fact that the RN need not have fired a single shot in order to sink the rag tag German barge Armada (appallingly ill prepared and trained with no experience of amphibious assault). The mere proximity and wake of a destroyer, never mind a Capital Ship would be enough to capsize the craft. In fact, Mother Nature (with a strong channel current) could very easily do that too. Barges are designed for Rivers. I wouldn't like to be on that barge at night.

Dunkirk (and to an extent the Norwegian Campaign) shows demonstrable precedent that air superiority alone cannot be a guarantor of operational success. Despite the immense tonnage of bombs dropped by the Luftwaffe at Dunkirk, against targets which were stationary for long periods of time, and at best extremely restricted in movement by the harbour.......a paltry 4 destroyers were sunk. This was a resounding Luftwaffe operational failure in terms of meeting an express military objective no matter which way you cut it; namely to prevent the evacuation of some 300,000 men, which they failed quite miserably to do. You can either hit a stationary or moving target or you can't.....an underwhelming performance to say the least, with substantial Lufwaffe casualties incurred too ( some 30 aircraft, with many more damaged). Ships are indeed vulnerable to aerial attack, but not entirely defenceless themselves.

Yes, it is true to say that unfavourable weather played a part, (particularly the 27th and 30th May) but if perfect conditions and visibility are a prerequisite for effective bombing then circa Sept 1940.....you are out of luck. No Meteorologist, but Blighty is not exactly renowned for its blue skies, and 50% of the time we are shrouded in quite dismal overcast. If the 3rd Reich were in possession of some occult voodoo type 'sun dance' it could have swung the balance, but....Nah. It does provide a creative spark for the miserablist majesty of great bands like The Smiths and Radiohead though, so it has its perks.

Much has been made of the 'mine screen' tactic and their 'interdictive' deployment strategy, with no mention of the fact that the Channel had already been heavily mined by the RN (it's called the 'English Channel' for a reason) and thus would require their laborious and time consuming removal; further shortening the very brief 'window of opportunity' that seelowe had.

The practice of 'Degaussing' ships hulls has received no consideration; the entire Dunkirk evac fleet including civilian ships underwent this process very swiftly, rendering them essentially impervious to magnetic mines. Not a single ship was lost to German mines. This could be done very swiftly, with a more thorough process resulting in a ship hulls demagnetisation for months at a time.

The Kriegsmarine, as Donitz's testimony itself agrees, were on a hiding to nothing....air superiority or not. Seelowe was a terribly ill conceived 'plan' (used in the loosest sense of the word), with more holes than a collander, and more flaws than a teenagers pimpled face.

Late in Blighty and I've had a few jars, but might come back to this one. I like a good debate, but for me personally (and I hope without prejudice lol ) this case is closed. The vast majority of historians agree that it would have resulted in catastrophic failure, and I entirely concur. You are of course welcome to draw your own conclusions, but in my opinion the end game is a logistical-supply nightmare for Germany (given the extremely unlikely hypothetical event of establishing an effective beach head) and the final result is comprehensive and emphatic defeat. Not to say there would not be RN casualties (there most certainly would), but the final outcome was quite inevitable.

Cheers.

[trashcanman]

An account of the 1974 Sandhurst wargame of Operation Sealion.

Operation Sealion - summary of an exercise held at the Staff College, Sandhurst in 1974.

The full text is in 'Sealion' by Richard Cox. The scenario is based on the known plans of each side, plus previously unpublished Admiralty weather records for September 1940. Each side (played by British and German officers respectively) was based in a command room, and the actual moves plotted on a scale model of SE England constructed at the School of Infantry. The panel of umpires included Adolf Galland, Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher Foxley-Norris, Rear Admiral Edward Gueritz, General Heinz Trettner and Major General Glyn Gilbert.

The main problem the Germans face is that are a) the Luftwaffe has not yet won air supremacy; b) the possible invasion dates are constrained by the weather and tides (for a high water attack) and c) it has taken until late September to assemble the necessary shipping.

22nd September - morning
The first wave of a planned 330,000 men hit the beaches at dawn. Elements of 9 divisions landed between Folkestone and Rottingdean (near Brighton). In addition 7th FJ Div landed at Lympne to take the airfield.

The invasion fleet suffered minor losses from MTBs during the night crossing, but the RN had already lost one CA and three DDs sunk, with one CA and two DDs damaged, whilst sinking three German DDs. Within hours of the landings which overwhelmed the beach defenders, reserve formations were despatched to Kent. Although there were 25 divisions in the UK, only 17 were fully equipped, and only three were based in Kent, however the defence plan relied on the use of mobile reserves and armoured and mechanised brigades were committed as soon as the main landings were identified.

Meanwhile the air battle raged, the Luftwaffe flew 1200 fighter and 800 bomber sorties before 1200 hrs. The RAF even threw in training planes hastily armed with bombs, but the Luftwaffe were already having problems with their short ranged Me 109s despite cramming as many as possible into the Pas de Calais.

22nd - 23rd September
The Germans had still not captured a major port, although they started driving for Folkestone. Shipping unloading on the beaches suffered heavy losses from RAF bombing raids and then further losses at their ports in France.

The U-Boats, Luftwaffe and few surface ships had lost contact with the RN, but then a cruiser squadron with supporting DDs entered the Channel narrows and had to run the gauntlet of long range coastal guns, E-Boats and 50 Stukas. Two CAs were sunk and one damaged. However a diversionary German naval sortie from Norway was completely destroyed and other sorties by MTBS and DDs inflicted losses on the shipping milling about in the Channel. German shipping losses on the first day amounted to over 25% of their invasion fleet, especially the barges, which proved desperately unseaworthy.

23rd Sept dawn - 1400 hrs.
The RAF had lost 237 planes out 1048 (167 fighters and 70 bombers), and the navy had suffered enough losses such that it was keeping its BBs and CVs back, but large forces of DDs and CAs were massing. Air recon showed a German buildup in Cherbourg and forces were diverted to the South West.

The German Navy were despondant about their losses, especially as the loss of barges was seriously dislocating domestic industry. The Army and Airforce commanders were jubilant however, and preperations for the transfer of the next echelon continued along with the air transport of 22nd Div, despite Luftwaffe losses of 165 fighters and 168 bombers. Out of only 732 fighters and 724 bombers these were heavy losses. Both sides overestimated losses inflicted by 50%.

The 22nd Div airlanded successfully at Lympne, although long range artillery fire directed by a stay-behind commando group interdicted the runways. The first British counterattacks by 42nd Div supported by an armoured brigade halted the German 34th Div in its drive on Hastings. 7th Panzer Div was having difficulty with extensive anti-tank obstacles and assault teams armed with sticky bombs etc. Meanwhile an Australian Div had retaken Newhaven (the only German port), however the New Zealand Div arrived at Folkestone only to be attacked in the rear by 22nd Airlanding Div. The division fell back on Dover having lost 35% casualties.

23rd Sept dawn - 1400 hrs.
The RAF had lost 237 planes out 1048 (167 fighters and 70 bombers), and the navy had suffered enough losses such that it was keeping its BBs and CVs back, but large forces of DDs and CAs were massing. Air recon showed a German buildup in Cherbourg and forces were diverted to the South West.

The German Navy were despondant about their losses, especially as the loss of barges was seriously dislocating domestic industry. The Army and Airforce commanders were jubilant however, and preperations for the transfer of the next echelon continued along with the air transport of 22nd Div, despite Luftwaffe losses of 165 fighters and 168 bombers. Out of only 732 fighters and 724 bombers these were heavy losses. Both sides overestimated losses inflicted by 50%.

The 22nd Div airlanded successfully at Lympne, although long range artillery fire directed by a stay-behind commando group interdicted the runways. The first British counterattacks by 42nd Div supported by an armoured brigade halted the German 34th Div in its drive on Hastings. 7th Panzer Div was having difficulty with extensive anti-tank obstacles and assault teams armed with sticky bombs etc. Meanwhile an Australian Div had retaken Newhaven (the only German port), however the New Zealand Div arrived at Folkestone only to be attacked in the rear by 22nd Airlanding Div. The division fell back on Dover having lost 35% casualties.

Sep 23rd 1400 - 1900 hrs
Throughout the day the Luftwaffe put up a maximum effort,
with 1500 fighter and 460 bomber sorties, but the RAF persisted in attacks on shipping and airfields. Much of this effort was directed for ground support and air resupply, despite Adm Raeders request for more aircover over the Channel. The Home Fleet had pulled out of air range however, leaving the fight in the hands of 57 DDs and 17 CAs plus MTBs. The Germans could put very little surface strength against this. Waves of DDs and CAs entered the Channel, and although two were sunk by U-Boats, they sank one U-Boat in return and did not stop. The German flotilla at Le Havre put to sea (3 DD, 14 E-Boats) and at dusk intercepted the British, but were wiped out, losing all their DDs and 7 E-Boats.

The Germans now had 10 divisions ashore, but in many cases these were incomplete and waiting for their second echelon to arrive that night. The weather was unsuitable for the barges however, and the decision to sail was referred up the chain of command.

23rd Sep 1900 - Sep 24th dawn
The Fuhrer Conference held at 1800 broke out into bitter inter-service rivalry - the Army wanted their second echelon sent, and the navy protesting that the weather was unsuitable, and the latest naval defeat rendered the Channel indefensible without air support. Goring countered this by saying it could only be done by stopped the terror bombing of London, which in turn Hitler vetoed. The fleet was ordered to stand by.

The RAF meanwhile had lost 97 more fighters leaving only 440. The airfields of 11 Group were cratered ruins, and once more the threat of collapse, which had receded in early September, was looming. The Luftwaffe had lost another 71 fighters and 142 bombers. Again both sides overestimated losses inflicted, even after allowing for inflated figures.

On the ground the Germans made good progress towards Dover and towards Canterbury, however they suffered reverses around Newhaven when the 45th Div and Australians attacked. At 2150 Hitler decided to launch the second wave, but only the short crossing from Calais and Dunkirk. By the time the order reached the ports, the second wave could not possibly arrive before dawn. The 6th and 8th divisions at Newhaven, supplied from Le Havre, would not be reinforced at all.

Sep 24th dawn - Sep 28th
The German fleet set sail, the weather calmed, and U-Boats, E-Boats and fighters covered them. However at daylight 5th destroyer flotilla found the barges still 10 miles off the coast and tore them to shreds. The Luftwaffe in turn committed all its remaining bombers, and the RAF responded with 19 squadrons of fighters. The Germans disabled two CAs and four DDs, but 65% of the barges were sunk. The faster steamers broke away and headed for Folkestone, but the port had been so badly damaged that they could only unload two at a time.

The failure on the crossing meant that the German situation became desperate. The divisions had sufficient ammunition for 2 to 7 days more fighting, but without extra men and equipment could not extend the bridgehead. Hitler ordered the deployment on reserve units to Poland and the Germans began preparations for an evacuation as further British arracks hemmed them in tighter. Fast steamers and car ferries were assembled for evacuation via Rye and Folkestone. Of 90,000 troops who landed on 22nd september, only 15,400 returned to France, the rest were killed or captured.

The whole concept of any battle being a draw is laughable.
By its very nature a battle is, in military terms, a conflict of opposing objectives. Therefore it has inherent success and failure criteria.

Midway is an excellent parallel to the Battle of Britain.
Japan used its attempted invasion of the island as a way of bringing the USN to battle and destroying it and therefore acheiving a strategic victory in both political and military terms.

Japan failed in this objective and therefore lost the battle.

Germany attempted the same in 1940 and lost the battle.

If one side was defeated, by definition the other side won.

[blackmme]

Originally Posted by trashcanman

Midway is an excellent parallel to the Battle of Britain.
Japan used its attempted invasion of the island as a way of bringing the USN to battle and destroying it and therefore acheiving a strategic victory in both political and military terms.

Japan failed in this objective and therefore lost the battle.

Germany attempted the same in 1940 and lost the battle.

If one side was defeated, by definition the other side won.

Thanks for picking up on Midway Trashcanman. I asked Stern for his view on that battle and he decided American victory. I then heard a twanging sound that I believe was his logic snapping

Regards Mike

[Sternjaeger II]

Originally Posted by blackmme

Thanks for picking up on Midway Trashcanman. I asked Stern for his view on that battle and he decided American victory. I then heard a twanging sound that I believe was his logic snapping

Regards Mike

mmmh, I think it was more the sound of your point bouncing over my explanation

Midway was a turning point and a victory because of the changes and short term consequences that came right after the clash.

There were NO changes whatsoever to the tactical situation or strength of the Luftwaffe, you just pushed them back as much as you could, and not fully anyway, since they dropped tons of bombs over Britain.

They didn't stop because your opposition crippled them, they stopped cos it was a half-hearted, badly conceived and worst executed plan, and suddenly Barbarossa was more important for obvious resources reasons (and it's not like they stopped bombing you straight away anyway). Either you fail to understand the German logic about it, or you're in denial.

[Sternjaeger II]

Originally Posted by kendo65

You make some good points, but I get a little annoyed when you constantly seem to imply that everyone else is unable to rise above their partial standpoint while your viewpoint is unimpeachably neutral and objective.

It is probably impossible for anyone to attain complete objectivity - too often the conclusions reached are dependent on starting assumptions, etc, and it's very difficult for many people to rise above the cultural and societal baggage they have inherited.

But, I would respect your opinion more if you could accept that your position is just as prone to assumptions and sometimes self-serving beliefs as many other people on this forum. You come across as somewhat elitest, especially when you ascribe those who genuinely disagree with your personal views as having been duped by propaganda.

The way to get us to change our minds is to supply overwhelming evidence. You haven't been able to do that (so far!). Your views appear just as partial and agenda-driven as any other poster in this thread.

First of all thank you for seeing that some of the points I make are good. Second thing, have you ever heard me mentioning the might and power of the Luftwaffe or RAF (or other similar barking) or a "we won" "we lost"?

I talk about the two enemies in third person, I don't have this "faction approach", which others do and betrays an innate (and understandable) bias, but of little or no help for the sake of a fair appraisal of historical events.