the raw numbers

[Furio]

Originally Posted by Igo kyu

I think that's quite possibly mistaken.

German losses in the west were higher per allied aircraft, because of superior western allied training and aircraft.

As it seems, Igo Kyu, we are comparing more feelings than actual number, but...
I wouldn’t say that Eastern front was so easy for Luftwaffe. According to German archives, cited by Yefim Gordon, Luftwaffe lost 3.827 aircraft during the first six month of war, the most favorable period for Germany. In the same period, VVS lost more than 20.000, but it was the least favorable period for Russia.
Possibly, you’re right about more losses in West than in East, but there are numbers that makes one think twice. Citing again Gordon, VVS lost one aircraft per 32 sorties in 1941, 1 per 72 in 1943 and 1 per 165 in 1945. Luftwaffe lost 1 per 25,5 in 1942, 1 per 22,5 in 1943 and 1 per 11 in the last months of war.

[csThor]

Losses per sortie are not exactly a viable reference size unless both air forces are not only equal but identical. The VVS often had the numerical superiority and that became more pronounced in 1942 (exceptions were local occurences and owed to combat losses, a concentration of Luftwaffe forces at the expense of other sectors and similar facts).

A total number is probably always going to end in "approximate losses". BC/RS 3 lists the following losses for the VVS and Luftwaffe for the timeframe July to November 1942 (page 224):

VVS

Lost in air combat: 7415
Lost to AAA: 1642
On the ground: 487
Total: 9544

Luftwaffe

Lost in air combat/to AAA: 1039
On the ground: 96
Total: 1135

Interesting is the relationship between losses in air combat (don't know if the numbers include missing aircraft as well) versus claims. In this timeframe the VVS claimed 4500 german aircraft (losses include losses to AAA, don't know exact number of losses in air combat; overclaiming of 4,33:1) and the Luftwaffe claimed 14153 victories in air combat (includes approximate number of claims for various german Jagdgeschwader so the number is probably not that accurate, though; overclaiming of 1,9:1).

[Igo kyu]

Originally Posted by Furio

As it seems, Igo Kyu, we are comparing more feelings than actual number, but...

I don't have all of the numbers, no, but the scores of the aces tell of a lot of destroyed aircraft. There were 35 German pilots credited with 6,849 kills. If they were over claiming by a factor of three, thats still over 2,000. On the first day, June 22 (according to Mike Spick in Luftwafe Fighter Aces, as was the figure above) the soviets admit 1,200 aircraft lost, 800 on the ground.

I wouldn’t say that Eastern front was so easy for Luftwaffe. According to German archives, cited by Yefim Gordon, Luftwaffe lost 3.827 aircraft during the first six month of war, the most favorable period for Germany. In the same period, VVS lost more than 20.000, but it was the least favorable period for Russia.
Possibly, you’re right about more losses in West than in East, but there are numbers that makes one think twice. Citing again Gordon, VVS lost one aircraft per 32 sorties in 1941, 1 per 72 in 1943 and 1 per 165 in 1945. Luftwaffe lost 1 per 25,5 in 1942, 1 per 22,5 in 1943 and 1 per 11 in the last months of war.

I tend to view all authors as potentially biased, as I am sure I am myself. The question is "which sources did a particular author see themselves, and which did they quote from other authors who claim to have seen original sources?".

[Avimimus]

What you guys need to do is break the war into years.

In 1941 very large numbers of Soviet aircraft were lost while on the ground or due to desperate tactics attempting to protect ground troops.

By 1943 the situation has changed with air superiority beginning to shift in Soviet favour, but with a massive increase in anti-aircraft guns on both sides.

In 1945 Germany is producing a tremendous number of aircraft (eg. look at bf-109 production in 1939-43 vs. 1944-1945) and a very large number of these aircraft are being destroyed on the ground, being given to very poorly trained pilots or being slaughtered while attempting to intercept allied bomber fleets.

So, if you want to compare Soviet and Western Ally effectiveness, then it would be could to study casualty rate in 1943 when Germany the situation was more comparable on both fronts.

But tallying up the total number of aircraft produced on each side during the war (especially when some of the late war German figures may only exist on paper), isn't going to cut it.

[Furio]

I agree with you, Aviminus. Forget about my numbers. My main point is simple: at the end of the war, all Luftwaffe aircrafts must be counted as “losses”, minus only those lost in non-combat related accident. Soviet aircraft captured by the thousands in 1941 by advancing German troops are rightly counted as losses, and the reverse is true also. Focusing on air combat only is, in my opinion, quite misleading.

[JoeA]

Originally Posted by Furio

I agree with you, Aviminus. Forget about my numbers. My main point is simple: at the end of the war, all Luftwaffe aircrafts must be counted as “losses”, minus only those lost in non-combat related accident. Soviet aircraft captured by the thousands in 1941 by advancing German troops are rightly counted as losses, and the reverse is true also. Focusing on air combat only is, in my opinion, quite misleading.

No, I disagree completely. That can't be a measure of combat effectiveness and I'm sure you understand why. I really don't think you can discuss this question without numbers and by referring to "feelings."

[Furio]

Originally Posted by JoeA

No, I disagree completely. That can't be a measure of combat effectiveness and I'm sure you understand why.

Are you saying that captured on the ground aircraft shouldn’t be counted? Why not? Air, ground and sea forces fight the same war.
Even if we focus more on air combat, a thing is clear: if Luftwaffe were capable of winning the Battle of Britain, maintain air superiority over Russia, and defend oil fields by Allied bombing, then Germany would have won the war.
If we focus on fighters versus fighter combat, we forget that bombers were the real offensive weapons with a real impact on the battlefield. During war years, Luftwaffe bombers diminished constantly as fighters grew in number constantly, transforming an offensive arm in a purely defensive one.
War ended in April 1945, but Luftwaffe ceased to exist as an organized combat force probably in January, being thoroughly defeated. Almost all of its surviving aircraft were captured before Germany surrender.

[Igo kyu]

Originally Posted by Furio

Are you saying that captured on the ground aircraft shouldn’t be counted? Why not? Air, ground and sea forces fight the same war.
Even if we focus more on air combat, a thing is clear: if Luftwaffe were capable of winning the Battle of Britain, maintain air superiority over Russia, and defend oil fields by Allied bombing, then Germany would have won the war.
If we focus on fighters versus fighter combat, we forget that bombers were the real offensive weapons with a real impact on the battlefield. During war years, Luftwaffe bombers diminished constantly as fighters grew in number constantly, transforming an offensive arm in a purely defensive one.
War ended in April 1945, but Luftwaffe ceased to exist as an organized combat force probably in January, being thoroughly defeated. Almost all of its surviving aircraft were captured before Germany surrender.

If we are talking about the combat capabilities of the aircraft and pilots, then I don't see how ground captures at their home base enters into that. If the pilot lands at the wrong airbase by mistake, then that's a pilot error, but landing at the right base isn't an error that the pilot made, though it may be an error of a higher authority.

The Luftwafe wasn't even close to winning the BoB in hindsight, though it probably wasn't possible to see that at the time.

I'm not sure that the Luftwafe having complete air superiority over Russia would necessarily have resulted in a German win. Russian tanks were very good, and it is hard to destroy tanks from the air. In France, it was morale that the Stukas shattered, which was crucial, but what pecentage of the physical destruction was achieved by the Luftwafe isn't clear and may well have been low.

With the USA in the war, there was no way for Germany to match the overall allied production potential, the USA could have matched them alone, the USSR could have matched them alone, Britain alone might have struggled a bit to free Europe but there was no way a refought BoB in 1941 was anything other than a British win, and the Fleet was hugely powerful.

[Furio]

Originally Posted by Igo kyu

In the English translation of "Panzer Leader" Guderian is translated as writing:

Quote:
Meanwhile, the units that had remained in France were busy preparing for Operation Sea-lion. Even from the very beginning this operation was never taken seriously. In my opinion the lack of a sufficiently strong air force and of adequate shipping-not to mention the escape of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk-made it a completely hopeless undertaking. Those two weaknesses-air power and shipping-are surely the best possible proof that Germany had neither intended nor made any preparations for a war against the Western Powers. When in September the autumn storms set in, Operation Sea-lion, which was already dead, was finally buried.

In my opinion, we should deal with Nazis Generals words with the same suspicion we apply to Soviet top brass. After the war, surviving German commanders explained their defeats as a consequence of Hitler’s mistakes, of Goring incompetence, of Russian numerical superiority, of American industrial might and so on. It’s human and understandable, but sometimes misleading.

[csThor]

You're making it too easy for yourself, Furio. The collected war diary of OKW is out there, I have it, and it makes very clear that Sea Lion was nothing but a bluff, a threat to force Britain into caving in. The Wehrmacht as a whole didn't have the means of staging an invasion of the british isles at any time. It doesn't matter how well or how badly the Luftwaffe operated (it did not operate well in the BoB - it never bothered to coordinate its own efforts at all, it never called for a conference of all senior officers to lay down rules and prioritize targets) because the other parts of the Wehrmacht couldn't do what such an operation would have required of them. It was all a big bluster, because Hitler never wanted to see his forces "wasted" in an operation against the UK. He already spoke about a campaign against the USSR as early as June 1940 - before the BoB even had begun! This alone should be an indicator where Hitler's true interests were (and where they weren't).