Inaccurate performance data for BOB fighters in COD comparing to RL data

[lane]

Originally Posted by JtD

I'm still very interested in seeing proof for use of 87 octane fuel in operational units. I'll keep checking the topic as long as it is alive.

Hi JtD.

Sorry, I've not found any operational use of 87 octane in Spitfires, Hurricanes and Defiants beyond spring 1940. There is quite a lot of documentation available on 100 octane use for Spitfires, Hurricanes and Defiants during the Battle of France, the Dunkirk evacuation and the Battle of Britain, however, to be found throughout this thread. The best I can offer is operational Lysanders and Battles using 87 octane during May 1940 - see links below. Sorry, but the Hurricanes were using 100 octane by then - also see links.

H.Q. A.A.S.F. 7 May 1940. Reserve Stocks of Aviation Fuel, Bombs and S.A.A. - Policy

H.Q. R.A.F. Component, 10 May 1940. Petrol and Oil requirements for R.A.F. Component on 15th May 1940.

[Crumpp]

Originally Posted by lane

Hi JtD.

Sorry, I've not found any operational use of 87 octane in Spitfires, Hurricanes and Defiants beyond spring 1940. There is quite a lot of documentation available on 100 octane use for Spitfires, Hurricanes and Defiants during the Battle of France, the Dunkirk evacuation and the Battle of Britain, however, to be found throughout this thread. The best I can offer is operational Lysanders and Battles using 87 octane during May 1940 - see links below. Sorry, but the Hurricanes were using 100 octane by then - also see links.

H.Q. A.A.S.F. 7 May 1940. Reserve Stocks of Aviation Fuel, Bombs and S.A.A. - Policy

H.Q. R.A.F. Component, 10 May 1940. Petrol and Oil requirements for R.A.F. Component on 15th May 1940.

*"That document is a calculation of projected needs written on 7 May 1940" Utter Rubbish Crumpp - READ IT PROPERLY; Paragraph 3 "Present Establishment of Aviation Fuels are..."

Estabilishment is not strength, it is only what is presently authorized or projected.

You are confusing a projection with what is one hand.

[winny]

Crumpp, why not present your full argument instead of the ridiculous nit picking of every minor detail, including just making stuff up without checking?

Go on, do it. Next post.

You're now clinging on to the pilot's notes.. is that it?

So hit me with the one bit of evidence thats so compelling that you still think FC were not using 100 oct during BoB

Or are we still doing this because you think that because your're an expert in flying/engineering, that just makes whatever you say right...?

I can go back through this thread and prove that there are lots of things that you've said that are simply wrong.

You show me your argument and then I (or one of the others) will show you ours.

I get the feeling you long since stopped arguing the point and are just arguing the man.. Why? What's your motivation?

[lane]

Context, timeline...lol, sure no problem, we'll start with these:










Emergency +12 lbs./sq. in. Boost Operation: Pilot's Notes, Merlin II, III and IV, 4th Edition, April 1940, page 6.



These documents relating to fuel requirments of the the Advanced Air Stiking Force and the Air Component, both in France during May 1940, give some idea of consumption, stocks, and how fuel requirements were calculated. As can be seen the Hurricanes used 100 octane, the Blenheim used a mix, while the Battle and Lysander used 87 octane, as did any transport, liason, visiting types etc.















To underscore the above documentation of Hurricanes using 100 octane fuel in France please note the following:

S/L J. O. W. Oliver, 85 Squadron, 10 May 1940


P/O John Bushell, 151 Squadron, 18 May 1940


S/L E. M. Donaldon, 151 Sqdn., 18 May 1940

F/O Paul Richey, 1 Squadron, 11 May 1940


F/O E. J. Kain, 73 Squadron, 14 May 1940


P/O D. W. A. Stones, 79 Squadron, 14 May 1940


Sgt. R. C. Wilkinson, 3 Squadron, 14 may 1940


P/O R. P. Beamont, 87 Squadron, 15 May 1940


P/O F. B. Sutton, 56 Squadron, 18 May 1940


F/Lt. I. R. Gleed, 87 Squadron, 18 May 1940


F/O C. F. G. Adye, 17 Squadron, 18 May 1940

F/O C. F. G. Adye, 17 Squadron, 19 May 1940

F/Lt. I. R. Gleed, 87 Squadron, 19 May 1940


Sgt. L. H. B. Pearce, 79 Squadron, 20 May 1940


Sgt. J. C. Harrison, 229 Squadron, 28 May 1940


P/O C. M. Simpson, 229 Squadron, 29 May 1940


P/O K. B. McGlashan, 245 Squadron, 28 May 1940

[fruitbat]

Great post lane

[bongodriver]

Yeah, section 3 subparagraph B that in your pipe and smoke it....

[RCAF_FB_Orville]

Originally Posted by bongodriver

Yeah, section 3 subparagraph B that in your pipe and smoke it....

I did all of my time in Special Operations. Started out in Rangers and then went to Special Forces.

"Special *bleepin* Needs" more like, on the evidence of this thread. *falls off chair laughing*

You'll find out in time that there is scarcely a subject matter on earth that Crumpp is not a World Authority upon (in his head). One would have thought that a Special Forces Soldier of the caliber of Crumpp would be cognizant of the fact that no plan survives contact (especially 18 month old provisional ones) and its well known that a modicum of common sense and ability to improvise and adapt to rapidly changing circumstances (IE BoB) are usually prerequisites for selection. Crumpp does not understand that red tape and SOP's are often overlooked or neglected in times where it is efficacious, necessary, and prudent to do so.

Crumpp is also a renowned expert on explosives, Air Combat Manoeuvres, Modern history, Physics, Engineering, Aerodynamics and Mathematics. Wunderkind. Nietzsches 'Overman'. He even finds the time in his hectic schedule to obsessively stalk computer game forums of games he apparently doesn't even play, to put all of us simpletons to rights with the irrepressible power of his ferocious intellect. Fear him!

Great post Lane. I think that's what we in the trade call a "definitive, catastrophic smackdown". Not that this thread has not been full of them. Not that this will stop Crumpp. Think "T-1000". He cannot be stopped!

Still waiting for all the reams of 87 octane combat reports circa the battle of Britain, a list of the 16 squadrons, and details of their supply. Still waiting for a certain party to understand the basic requirement of qualifying a statement with actual evidence. Should be an absolute cinch, given the alleged predominance of 87 octane! Where are they? Why can't they be found? Hmmmm, its a tough one.

Carry on, out.

[Crumpp]

Originally Posted by lane

Context, timeline...lol, sure no problem, we'll start with these:










Emergency +12 lbs./sq. in. Boost Operation: Pilot's Notes, Merlin II, III and IV, 4th Edition, April 1940, page 6.



These documents relating to fuel requirments of the the Advanced Air Stiking Force and the Air Component, both in France during May 1940, give some idea of consumption, stocks, and how fuel requirements were calculated. As can be seen the Hurricanes used 100 octane, the Blenheim used a mix, while the Battle and Lysander used 87 octane, as did any transport, liason, visiting types etc.















To underscore the above documentation of Hurricanes using 100 octane fuel in France please note the following:

S/L J. O. W. Oliver, 85 Squadron, 10 May 1940


P/O John Bushell, 151 Squadron, 18 May 1940


S/L E. M. Donaldon, 151 Sqdn., 18 May 1940

F/O Paul Richey, 1 Squadron, 11 May 1940


F/O E. J. Kain, 73 Squadron, 14 May 1940


P/O D. W. A. Stones, 79 Squadron, 14 May 1940


Sgt. R. C. Wilkinson, 3 Squadron, 14 may 1940


P/O R. P. Beamont, 87 Squadron, 15 May 1940


P/O F. B. Sutton, 56 Squadron, 18 May 1940


F/Lt. I. R. Gleed, 87 Squadron, 18 May 1940


F/O C. F. G. Adye, 17 Squadron, 18 May 1940

F/O C. F. G. Adye, 17 Squadron, 19 May 1940

F/Lt. I. R. Gleed, 87 Squadron, 19 May 1940


Sgt. L. H. B. Pearce, 79 Squadron, 20 May 1940


Sgt. J. C. Harrison, 229 Squadron, 28 May 1940


P/O C. M. Simpson, 229 Squadron, 29 May 1940


P/O K. B. McGlashan, 245 Squadron, 28 May 1940

Lane,

Even if we took every shred of evidence you have as gospel, it is not all operational units. That is the claim being made. The RAF had not converted to 100 Octane even in July 1940. There is not any 100 Octane in any quantity at the airfields until that then. That is the big logistical constraint noted in the very first memo you post.

You have a handful of Hurricane squadrons, most of them taken from sources that belong alongside "First and the Last" by Adolf Galland. I have no doubts in May of 1940, the RAF was heavily into Phase IV testing.

You have an order to convert with a huge logisitical constraint placed upon it. Fuel has to be at every airfield in quantity to support operations before any aircraft are converted.

You also are using a projected calculation of fuel needs required to fight a future war that did not occur. Estabilishment is a logisitical term for quantity authorized. It has nothing to do with supplies on hand or available fuel.

Here is estabilishment vs strength for RAF personnel:

http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/...03-10c.54882.h

When I get my computer back and get off this laptop, I can post the Estabilishment vs Strength for the RAF in the Battle of Britain.

Lastly, the Operating Notes is definative. It is part of the aircraft airworthiness and is followed as instructed. The Notes on the Merlin Engine clearly documents when all operational units converted to 100 Octane.

You can call me every name in the book, post whatever cartoon's you like but it does not change that fact.

[Crumpp]

Emergency +12 lbs./sq. in. Boost Operation: Pilot's Notes, Merlin II, III and IV, 4th Edition, April 1940, page 6.

Which pilot notes?

FYI, The engine manual is not the aircraft installation. Just because an engine is approved does not mean an aircraft is approved. Each installation is unique.

That is why the RAF throughly tested all of the airframes using the Merlin engine when they made the conversion.

The instructions for boost cut out would have been published as part of Phase IV testing. In fact, that is one of the main purposes of Phase IV testing to publish instructions, manuals, and conduct operations.

A good example of that is auto fuel STC's. Just because the engine can run autofuel does not mean an airframe that mounts that engine can use autofuel.

[Crumpp]

Operating Notes are definative. They carry the weight of law.

This pilot might face criminal charges. Why? In the Operating Handbook for the AH-64 Apache, it notes all the precautions for high altitude operation. He violated those precautions. If they do get charged after the investigation, that will be the legal basis used to bring UCMJ.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BcTDwJcO_os