Inaccurate performance data for BOB fighters in COD comparing to RL data

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by NZtyphoon

Blenheims were the only other aircraft known to have used 100 Octane fuel, albeit only in their outer wing fuel tanks, making things complicated for the poor pilots. (Warner, The Bristol Blenheim:A Complete History 2nd ed, page 100.)

This seems mighty unlikely during the 1940 timeframe given that it seems the two (or three) Blenheim Stations identified earlier were only supposed to be supplied with 100 octane. If there is no 87 octane in the Station just 100 octane, how they are supposed to tank up from both? This may have been true earlier, but certainly not in these Stations concerned.

Originally Posted by NZtyphoon

Merlin III & XIIs could still use 87 octane fuel, hence training flights and other secondary flight duties, such as delivery, ferry flights, etc could use 87 octane fuel instead of 100.[/i]

As well as operational Squadrons on combat missions of course.

Other aircraft known to have been using 100 Octane fuel were a small number of Beaufighters and PR Spitfires.

Source?

Nor did I say anywhere only 100 Octane fuel was issued.

Grand, then we agree that Fighter Command used both 87 and 100 octane fuel for its operational fighters.

And where are KF's primary and secondary sources? The main primary sources "presented" by KF are a mysterious Australian/Beaverbrook paper which no-one apart from KF and "Pip" can find (The Australian National Archives themselves cannot find it), and some pre-war planning papers.

I think you do disservice to your already marginal credibility by pretending things anyone can check by reading the thread.

I am afraid I have posted the 87 and 100 octane fuel consumption during the Battle, which is a primary source, the May 18 decision that explicitly says that 100 octane is not issued to all Fighter Squadrons, as well as the earlier decision in agreement that the plans were for 16 fighter and 2 bomber Squadrons, by September 1940. Of course the sour in your mouth about the other pre-war papers is that they note that British 100 octane fuel programme was fueled by fear that the Germans could much more easily produce great quantities via their synthetic process.

And yes I have also made reference to the paper Pips found, and yes you are lying when you say that "the Australian National Archives themselves cannot find it", and not for the first time.

Originally Posted by Kurfürst
The trend shown in the consumption of 87 octane and 100 octane fuel is, however intererting. It is clear that about 2/3s of the fuel consumed during the Battle was 87 octane (by all Commands) and 1/3 consumed was 100 octane (by Fighter and Bomber Commands).

All KF is saying is that large numbers of aircraft in other commands were using 87 Octane. Big deal.[/QUOTE]

You seem to have reading comprehension problems when you believe that when I write ALL commands I meant OTHER commands. But I agree, its not a big deal, everyone else but you seemed to get it.

Yup, there were things like training flights, delivery flights, ferry flights and other second-line duties which naturally increased at times when the frontline units were operating more intensively.

'Naturally'. Really? Whenever the RAF was battling the Luftwaffe in a frenzy, it automatically meant that suddenly bomber command flew more sorties, training units flew 10 times as much, and coastal command was flying more sorties too?

Or did Spitfires after landing at a fighter base quickly drain their tanks of 100 octane, refill with 87 octane to fly training flights, move between airfields, and then drained the tanks of 87 octane and refilled again with 100 octane?

If this happened, they surely made a big fuss in 1940 just to support some silly-ass speculation of a Spitfire-fan in 2012 didn't they.

Meaning FC switched to 100 Octane fuel for secondary as well as frontline duties? Seeing as no-one else apart from KF and "Pip" has seen this paper, and it is missing from the Australian National Archives I guess we have to take his word for it...

Or we should take the word of you, who has just lied that its 'missing' from the ANArchives...

[QUOTE][QUOTE]Originally Posted by Kurfürst
Its also completely in line with what an unquestionably reputable secondary source, Morgan nad Shacklady's ultimate Spitfire book, 'Spitfire: The History' notes about the initial uncertainity of 100 octane shipments (as all 100 octane had to be imported from overseas).

Convoys started operating in September 1939; the most important were the HX convoys which sailed from Halifax to (mainly) Liverpool. The first - HX.1 - sailed on 16 September 1939. Referring to http://www.convoyweb.org.uk/hague/index.html
The HX convoys incorporated cargo ships, some of which carried aviation fuel, and tankers: many of the latter had sailed from refineries in the West Indies and America. The BHX series sailed from Bermuda, starting in May 1940 (BHX.41), and joined the main HX convoys in Halifax. Some of the tankers from the HX convoys diverted to French ports, enough to supply the RAF fighters in France.

From the HX series of convoys alone (HX 11, 13, 31, 33-35, 40, 43, 49, 55, 57-59, 64-68, 70, 73, 76) 44 tankers carrying AVGAS arrived in British or French ports; one tanker was destroyed by a mine in the Bristol channel. This contradicts the assertion in Shacklady and Morgan that ...large numbers of tankers were sunk by German submarines...

No, its just your spin on it.

Morgan nad Shacklady writes of concerning tanker losses, while you write of tanker losses in convoys (obviously a lot of them weren't travelling in one), and then further limited your 'research' to the HX convoys (obviously again not all tankers went through HX convoys), and then even further limited to scope to 'tankers carrying AVGAS' (obviously again a tanker capacity lost is a tanker lost - if it also carried some kind of fuel it was even worse, but a tanker sunk with ballast en route to America was just as painful for shipping space as a tanker lost inbound to Britain).

This is how tanker losses suddenly became 'tanker losses carrying avgas while travelling in convoys in the HX series convoys'. Its a classic straw-man argument.

Now, anyone who searches back in this thread will find the actual figures for British / Allied tanker losses in the period, they were quite serious indeed, iirc several hundred thousends of GRT worth. Mines, torpedo planes and bombers, uboots all took their toll. I don't bother to post them again.

Another reputable secondary source is "Oil" by Payton-Smith which, as noted, is the official war history. He notes that "...in the summer of 1940 there was a surplus of these ships (tankers) because of the incorporation into the British merchant marine of tanker fleets from countries over-run by Germany." pp. 128–130.

I believe Morgan and Shacklady are quite aware of Payton-Smith's book.

What seems to be at odds is Payton-Smith and Morgan-Shacklady, but your humble - and rather untrustworthy - interpretation and quoting of Payton-Smith vs. Payton-Smith's interpretation by rather distinguished British aviation historians.

This memo was a planning paper from 16 March 1939 , based on a pre-war assumption that US supplies would be denied to Britain in wartime, limiting the numbers of front-line units able to use the fuel.

I agree. So is there ANY documented evidence that it was amended? Anything at all?

In "Oil" (Official Second WW history) Payton-Smith said:

"By 1939...The prospects of securing sufficient supplies of 100-octane fuel in addition to the 87-octane petrol required for non-operational flying looked doubtful...(he goes on to state on page 57)...It was true that by 1939 it seemed increasingly unlikely that American supplies would be withheld. But to have accepted anything less than absolute certainty, to have depended on the goodwill of foreign suppliers to meet the essential needs of the Royal Air Force, would have been a radical break with traditions that had governed British oil policy since long before the First World War."

Meaning that the pre-war planning papers quoted by KF were being conservative in their estimates, as per a long held tradition.

Payton-Smith went on to say:

"...this problem (supply of 100 Octane aviation fuel) disappeared; production of the new fuel in the US, and in other parts of the world, increased more quickly than expected with the adoption of new refining techniques." pp. 259-260

Can you explain to me how Payton-Smith speaks one thing on page 59. - about the 1939 situation, when the British evidently seeked 'absolute certainity 'went on to say' on page 259-260

To me it seems you are cherry picking quotes out of the context and putting them together from two hundred page apart.

For example, what is the context "...this problem (supply of 100 Octane aviation fuel) disappeared on pg. 259? Does the second quote it even remotely related to 1939-1940, or you just frankensteined them together?

Interesting how KF resorts to pre-war planning documents to say what happened up to 16 months later, during the Battle of Britain, yet cannot provide primary documentation to prove that the
situations discussed up to two years earlier actually eventuated in 1940.

No, actually evidence was provided that the 1939 papers speak of partially converting Fighter and Bomber Command to 100 octane, and all the 1940 papers supplied so far also speak of partially converting Fighter and Bomber Command to 100 octane.

The March 1939 papers speak of 16 fighter and 2 bomber squadrons, the May 1940 papers speak of the fighter and bomber squadrons 'concerned'.

Not a single paper could be found or supplied that would say that or hint that all of Fighter Command is to be converted to 100 octane fuel.

Its quite clear to any reasonable man.

Proving nothing really, except that in wartime pre-war plans can change. There was still more than enough 100 Octane fuel consumed by FC, and some Blenheims during the Battle to allow all operational sorties to be flown on this fuel alone.

Of course pre-war plans can change. But did they?

Interesting to note that Merlin engines using 100 Octane fuel were being built in 1938, as well as C.P propellers

http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchi...0-%203453.html

Yes, though I would not necessarily equate 'quoting figures on the Rolls-Royce stand for the Merlin R.M. 2M rated on 100 octane fuel' to 'being built'. While Rolls-Royce was quoting figures, DB 601 powered Heinkels and Bfs using 100 octane were setting records anyway. :p

[Al Schlageter]

http://www.wlb-stuttgart.de/seekrieg/konvois/hx-39.htm

Ships lost in 1939 and 1940 for SC and HX convoys > 85

HX convoys originated from Halifax (9-knot convoys for ships of sustained speeds less than 15 knots)
SC convoys originated from Sydney NS (7-knot convoys of eastbound ships too slow for the 9-knot HX convoys)

HX
Year: Convoys / Ships / Lost
1939: 22 / 431 / 1 (0.232%)
1940: 91 / 3424 / 54 (1.577%)

SC
Year: Convoys / Ships / Lost
1939: * / * / *
1940: 16 / 508 / 30 (5.905%)

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)

Date: patrols/lost/aborts

Aug39 19/2
Sep39 3/0
Oct39 13/3
Nov39 10/1/1
Dec39 5/1/1

Total 1939: 50/7/2 (an average of 10 patrols per month and 14% lost)

Date: patrols/lost/aborts

Jan40 8/2
Feb40 10/3
Mar40 10/2
Apr40 19/3
May40 8/0/2
Jun40 18/3/1
Jul40 4/0
Aug40 16/2/1
Sep40 12/0
Oct40 13/2
Nov40 14/1
Dec40 6/0

Total 1940: 138/18/3 (an average of 11.5 patrols per month and 13% lost)

The only one putting a spin on anything NZTyphoon is Barbi.

[NZtyphoon]

This seems mighty unlikely during the 1940 timeframe given that it seems the two (or three) Blenheim Stations identified earlier [u]were only supposed to be supplied with 100 octane.

If there is no 87 octane in the Station just 100 octane, how they are supposed to tank up from both? This may have been true earlier, but certainly not in these Stations concerned.

Because clearly Blenheim stations were supplied with both grades. Source Warner The Bristol Blenheim: A Complete History (2nd ed) - as definitive a book on the Blenheim as Morgan and Shacklady is on the Spitfire.

P.100 "But the introduction of 100 octane fuel caused further problems for Blenheim pilots...Blenheims were adapted to carry it only in the outer tanks, with 87 octane in the inner tanks.

P.136 (September 1939) "Further difficulties and complications arose as working parties in the hangers of several squadrons were still involved in a hectic programme of bringing up to specification those aircraft that had not been modified to full Mk IV standard, by installing the new outer fuel tanks for 100 octane petrol, plumbing the jettison systems, changing the engines to Mercury XVs....the modifications were all completed by 7 October."

Now, anyone who searches back in this thread will find the actual figures for British / Allied tanker losses in the period, they were quite serious indeed, iirc several hundred thousends of GRT worth. Mines, torpedo planes and bombers, uboots all took their toll. I don't bother to post them again.

Nope, I have checked through all of this thread and nowhere has Barbi, or anyone else, posted figures on tanker losses until AL Schlagater's posting at 8:41 am today. Barbi makes mention of the mysterious "Pip's" paper with some vague stuff about increasing tanker losses, but no other evidence to support his claims...

The Germans were sinking British tankers at an increasing rate, and all 100 octane fuel was coming in those tankers....but this was increasingly uncertain as Uboot took their toll on the tankers, and, during May and June, until the French capitulation, with 25% of their fighters and some of their bombers running on 100 octane the British consumed 12 000 tons of 100 octane and 42 000 tons of other (87) grades, or 54 000 ton of avgas at total - and there was no tanker running in with 100 octane until August 1940.

No "actual figures" and no evidence that there was "no tanker running in with 100 octane until August"

I believe Morgan and Shacklady are quite aware of Payton-Smith's book.

If they are, it isn't listed in their bibliography, nor do M & S refer to it in the text, so how can Barbi make such a leap?

Can you explain to me how Payton-Smith speaks one thing on page 59. - about the 1939 situation, when the British evidently seeked 'absolute certainity 'went on to say' on page 259-260

For example, what is the context "...this problem (supply of 100 Octane aviation fuel) disappeared on pg. 259? Does the second quote it even remotely related to 1939-1940, or you just frankensteined them together?

The book is not entirely about aviation fuel - it deals with all aspects of oil supplies to wartime Britain. The first chapter on Aviation fuel dealt with the pre-war situation when Britain had to plan for the possibility that America would bar fuel supplies to combatant nations.

""By 1939...The prospects of securing sufficient supplies of 100-octane fuel in addition to the 87-octane petrol required for non-operational flying looked doubtful...(he goes on to state on page 57)...It was true that by 1939 it seemed increasingly unlikely that American supplies would be withheld. But to have accepted anything less than absolute certainty, to have depended on the goodwill of foreign suppliers to meet the essential needs of the Royal Air Force, would have been a radical break with traditions that had governed British oil policy since long before the First World War."

Meaning that the pre-war planning papers quoted by KF were being conservative in their estimates, as per a long held tradition."

After this chapter came several others on other issues - civilian oil supplies, shipping etc. Then came another chapter on Aviation fuel which deals with the situation from the declaration of war through to 1942, in which P-S notes that late in 1939...

"...this problem (supply of 100 Octane aviation fuel) disappeared; production of the new fuel in the US, and in other parts of the world, increased more quickly than expected with the adoption of new refining techniques." pp. 259-260

[Glider]

Re the statement
The Germans were sinking British tankers at an increasing rate, and all 100 octane fuel was coming in those tankers....but this was increasingly uncertain as Uboot took their toll on the tankers, and, during May and June, until the French capitulation, with 25% of their fighters and some of their bombers running on 100 octane the British consumed 12 000 tons of 100 octane and 42 000 tons of other (87) grades, or 54 000 ton of avgas at total - and there was no tanker running in with 100 octane until August 1940.

If there weren't any tankers coming in can someone explain how the reserves went up, in particular the 49,000 tons in the six weeks between 31st May and 11th July .
I think we can rule out air freight or submarine cargo

Stocks of 100 Octane
30th September 1939 153,000 tons(b)
27th February 1940 220,000 tons(b)
31st May 1940 294,000 tons(a)
11th July 1940 343,000 tons(b)
31st August 1940 404,000 tons(a)
10th October 1940 424,000 tons(c)
30th November 1940 440,000 tons(a)

PS remember these are reserves total inports would have to cover usage as well

[VO101_Tom]

Originally Posted by Glider

If there weren't any tankers coming in can someone explain how the reserves went up, in particular the 49,000 tons in the six weeks between 31st May and 11th July .

Because they not used it with the Spits!
(sorry, i can't resist )

[Glider]

Like it, it was an open goal

[NZtyphoon]

Originally Posted by VO101_Tom

Because they not used it with the Spits!
(sorry, i can't resist )

Damn Brits, all that 100 octane coming in, so they just hoard it like squirrels...

[NZtyphoon]

Oh, and as for that Australian paper used so extensively by Barbi, here is its title, as used by Barbi as a reference in a Wikipedia article:

"Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War, February 1941, Australian War Memorial Archives."

This came from:
Revision as of 08:39, 16 July 2008 (edit)
Kurfürst (talk | contribs)
(Revised section on 100 octane fuel with more reliable and referenced information; noted fact that the German Air Force also used 100 octane fuel in the Battle. Better sectioning. Added armament info.)

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?...ldid=225978800


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Ai...00_octane_fuel

Barbi's explanation of the origins and importance of this paper:

"The document which relealed the details of 100 octane use in the BoB by the RAF was a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance. Its a British-made document, prepeared for the highest circles. McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report." Kurfürst (talk) 10:53, 19 July 2008 (UTC)

Now, in 2008 I inquired of the AWM whether they had such a paper, giving this specific title, referencing Beaverbrook, Rolls-Royce, the Australian Military Commission etc etc...The AWM's response was that they had no such paper.

Just googled, yahooed, binged "Australian Military Commission England WW2" nada - no such organisation appeared to even exist, but I'll cross reference with Australia's Official War Histories to see if there is mention of it there.

I've also just submitted a search inquiry to the AWM:

"I am making an inquiry as to whether the AWM Archives have a paper entitled:

"Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War, February 1941'

This was a paper written by Rolls-Royce and used by Lord Beaverbrook to address the supply of aviation fuel to Australia via the Australian Military Commission in Britain in February 1941.

I am sorry that there appears to be no AWM reference number, so, hopefully, the title and key references will help."

(Question # RCIS34105
Request type Reference Other
Question )

I am sanguine that they will indeed find this paper and clear this matter up.

[ACE-OF-ACES]

wouldn't be the first time