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IL-2 Sturmovik: Cliffs of Dover Latest instalment in the acclaimed IL-2 Sturmovik series from award-winning developer Maddox Games. |
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#14
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![]() You don't by the way, even quote directly from Bergstrom's book, we have 2nd hand account... typical. In any case, Bergstrom's comments and facts are to be taken with a large grain of salt. There were 224 serviceable on strength 110's at the start of the Battle, the Germans lost 196... not a good ratio. You point to the fact the British lost a higher percentage of their starting fighter force. There are some very good reasons for that, number one they were heavily outnumbered. According to the official RAF Battle of Britain site there were the following serviceable daylight fighters available on August 10th: Spitfire - 245 Hurricane - 382 Defiant - 22 Gladiator - 2 Total - 651 These aircraft were distributed all over Britain, they could not abandon the midlands or the north, only some 450 were based southern England ready to meet the Luftwaffe. Against them on August 10, according to the original Luftwaffe reports, there were serviceable aircraft amounting to: 109: 805 110: 224 Heinkel, Dornier, Ju-88: 998 Ju-87 - 261 Total: 2288 aircraft The RAF was outnumbered by more than 4-1 in the main battle area. And the RAF's fighters main task was to shoot down German bombers, not fighters. This was not a case of fighter versus fighter matchup, it was a case of the heavily outnumbered RAF going for the bombers, while having to fight off greater numbers of German fighters. What were the losses? In total the British lost 1,023 fighters, including the two seater Defiants. The Germans lost 873 fighters and 1,014 bombers destroyed in the daylight phase of the battle. 1887 aircraft. They also lost a number of coastal aircraft and recon. In addition, the British lost 376 bombers and 148 aircraft from Coastal Command, but the bombers and coastal command aircraft were almost entirely lost at night during the strategic bombing of German industrial targets, and the bombing of the channel ports at night, not due to Luftwaffe dayfighter action. Conversely, when the Germans began their night bombing 'Blitz', which ran from Mid September '40 to May of '41, they lost approx. 600 bombers. Total loss comparison was therefore 1.84 to 1 in favour of the British during the daylight battles, despite the fact they were heavily outnumbered. If Kurfurst wants to try to set up loss ratios without taking into account the total loss figures and strength comparisons, he is welcome to do so, but his conclusions are not going to have any serious credibility. Last edited by *Buzzsaw*; 04-12-2011 at 09:52 PM. |
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