Quote:
Originally Posted by Crumpp
Interesting but you cannot answer operational questions with logistical answers.
If you compare the fuel at the airfields in September 1939 with the strategic reserves of 87 Octane you can get an idea of the ratio's they used.
Usually it is about 40:1 between Strategic Reserves and point of use. 16,000 tons at the airfields in September thru November 1939 leaves us ~8,000 tons per month.
Strategic Reserves of 87 Octane from 31 August 1939 to 7 December 1939 is (323,000 + 309,00)/2 = 316,000 tons
316,000 tons / 8,000 tons = 35.5
Now, they will maintain that ratio as best they can. It represents the 18 weeks of fuel in reserve.
So with 146,000 tons of fuel, roughly 3825 tons was usable. Now that 8,000 tons per month is training and administrative flying, not operational. When the war starts, 3825 tons is less than a quarter of the fuel required to conduct operational, training, and administrative flying.
Anyway, it is interesting but not applicable because it is logistical documentation and not operational.
|
Absolute rubbish. I posted these documents in response to the repeated claims made that there was a shortage of 100 octane fuel. There wasn't.
So, you're saying that the British sat on over 100,000 tons of fuel because they needed a reserve? When the threat of invasion was looming...?
.
For operational documentation see the combat reports.