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#1
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#2
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There's a book out... 'Kursk'..cannot remember the author (might have been Anthony Beavor, from the other books).
Gives a very detailed account of the battle. Interesting in the book is that the Germans had no idea of the Soviet defenses - their intelligence was completely lacking, where as the Soviets had detailed info on the Germans, and built their defenses accordingly. There was also a 5-7 day period (schedule) that the Germans were supposed to have attacked, and it's speculated that they would have broken through had they done so, but Hitler's meddling caused an 'unknown' opportunity lost - The Soviets did not lose that opportunity to plug the gaps. Just before the attack a German general or two knew that their time had been lost and requested to cancel the attack and re-direct... Hitler refused. the rest is history.
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#3
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Forget about the books of Antony Beavor ! He's a ex British officer with an agenda given to him by his publisher, not very nice. If you want to find out what really happened, in somewhat dry but true words try John Erickson's " The road to Stalingrad" and the "The road to Berlin".
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#4
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![]() Quote:
The very idea of the Kursk offensive was strategically flawed, and was doomed to failure. Even if the Germans had won at Kursk, it would have only been a tactical victory, but strategically it would have been as big of a disaster as the defeat turned out to be, for it is arguable that after the battle the Germans would have been in no condition to continue with further offensives, or to repel the inevitable counterattack by Soviet forces who, at this stage of the war, were getting stronger, more numerous, and more competent all the time. Other than the straightening of a line occupied by depleted and exhausted forces, isolating and destroying the Kursk salient would have served no strategic purpose whatsoever. From the start it was a waste of manpower and resources, and never should have been embarked upon in the first place. Hitler's staff, particularly Model, Manstien, and especially Guderian, knew this, but of course he was having none of it, even after the numerous postponements, and was in no way aided by the indecision at OKW. |
#5
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So, dig in and wait for the Soviets to chose time and place for the attack? Would have been the worse choice, imho.
At the same time, at the west front, the Allies landed in Sicily, which lead to redeployment of some German core units, so we do not really know which value the German offensive could have had. |
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