I don't want to speculate what a defeat would have caused for the RAF, but I am absolutely convinced that Hitler would never have ordered Sea Lion to be started, because the Kriegsmarine had repeatedly and resolutely protested against any ideas of the Heer for a landing operation. The ships available would - perhaps, the KM leadership was sceptical even of that (!) - have been enough for landing a small unit (something around a division or so) in the Pas de Calais area, but the KM was absolutely convinced it wouldn't be able to supply even such small a force over an extended timeframe, let alone transport the tanks and heavy weapons across the channel. The Heer instead planned for a Channel crossing 250 kilometers wide, with two full Army Groups!
There are several indicators for the bluff character of the whole affair - namely the total lack of coordination between the Wehrmacht's branches and within the branches themselves, the total lack of communication between Hitler and the commanding officers of Heer, Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine plus the steady (and sometimes quite fierce) arguments between OKW, OKH and OKM about the operation as a whole. If you add that Hitler revealed his true focus (the USSR) even before the Luftwaffe had begun to bomb Britain in earnest the impression of being nothing but bluff and bluster increases even more.
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