VVS
Lost in air combat: 7415
Lost to AAA: 1642
On the ground: 487
Total: 9544
Luftwaffe
Lost in air combat/to AAA: 1039
On the ground: 96
Total: 1135
I have another interesting source regarding above overclaims: here it goes...
By Andrey
Some times ago there was discussion about fighters in WWII
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forum...=&threadid=618
I used here some data about Soviet Air Forces in WWII and I decided to repeat some this data here because it is possible that someone will be interesting it but it is not so easy to find it in original article.
Here is my translation (non complete) of G.Korniukhin’s foreword article (24 pages) to Russian edition of "Aces of Luftwaffe" of Mike Spike.
Read it and make own conclusion is his opinion correct or incorrect.
Part 1
“…Mike Spike couldn’t avoid from using of stamps of “cold war” time, which was usual for Western authors of that time. Book of Tolliver and Constebl “Erich Hartmann – blond knight of Reich” is example of such “literature”. It is dirty lampoon on USSR and on Soviet people. Main distinctive feature of this opus – opposition “gentlemen” and “knight” of Viermacht and Luftwaffe to drunken savage horde of Russians and Asians which fought under the Stalin’s lash.
To Spike’s credit be it said that Spike tried to write not such book but his book couldn’t avoid many imperfections.
Mike Spike tries to show that German fighter-pilots were not like pilots of bombers which are guilty in barbarian air bombings. He tries to show German fighter-pilots like noble “knight”.
German Air Forces were united and carried out policy of Nazi system in Germany. If battles in West were restricted in some scale by military laws that battles in Eastern front were hard-edged battles for total destruction of enemy. So “blond knights” of German fighter aircraft were very well known in USSR. Exactly Bf109 shot columns of refugees in roads from low altitudes; they try to shot even single human. They hunted for trains and ambulance trucks. Especially they attended for destruction of Soviet pilots which survived after destruction of their planes. They often shot Soviet pilots which were parachuted. For example, Pokryshkin writes in his memoirs that his good friend Ostrovskiy was parachuted during combat but was shot by German fighters. Sometimes they tried to destroy Soviet pilots even in land. For example, pilot of IL-2 V. Emelianenko writes in his memoirs that one of pilots of his regiment, N.Smurygov, after emergency landing had to run around nearest house for life-saving from fire of pair of Bf109.
So attempt of Spike to show air war like knight tournament not stands up to criticism. Honest knight tournaments are only in tales, air combat in nice only for observing it from land. And it is very true about German aces. “Experts” (German term “ace”) of Luftwaffe even according Spike as a rule didn’t want to take part in open combat, they preferred to increase amount of victorues with help of sudden attacks from direction of sun or during actions against enemy planes during takings off and landings.
Opinion of author about amount of victories of German pilots is very doubtful. Fantastical digits of shot down planes can not be confirmed by both sides and are reason of disputes between historians even now…
It is possible to say some words about trustworthiness of counting of victories of German aces. In all probability there is merit of Hoebbels propaganda service in large amount of planes which were shot down by German pilots. Reich needed in heroes for maintaining of morale in troops especially in time of defeats and retreats and such heroes were made. Images of brave “experts” were infinitely repeated in newsreel, magazines, newspapers. There was necessary only one thing for making of image of striking aces – only some privilege during confirming of their victories.
Victory of German pilot was counted on base of his own report, photos of photo machine gun and reports of witnesses in air and on land. But participants of combat are interested party. Photos of photo machine gun confirmed only hitting in enemy plane, not destruction of this plane. Low resolution of these photos didn’t let to estimate scale of damage of enemy plane and photo machine gun was mounted not in every fighter-plane of Luftwaffe. So land confirmation was most significant but during WWII requirement of land confirmation became fiction. If during advance operations in Poland and France counting of Hitler’s aces was small – their victories could be checked easily – that amount of victories of Luftwaffe “experts” became to increase very quickly already during “Battle for Britain” when aerial combats occurred over enemy territory and when Luftwaffe got first defeat. British casualties were top-heavy in 3 times because of interference of Hering who let for pilots to have confirmation of their victories on their conscience. Such situation was in more scale and in Eastern Front. Spike correctly said that there was real competition for amount of victories here.
Part 2
In Soviet aircraft in first time of war air victories were counted for Soviet pilots only on base of written reports of land troops. In result enemy planes which were shot down over enemy territory, in enemy rears were not counted completely. For example, 10 victories of Pokryshkin were not counted in result of this reason. Only from 1943 air witnesses could confirm air victories but even in this case they had without fail to mark on map place of crash of enemy plane. Situation was opposite in Luftwaffe. Pilots of Luftwaffe which operated over territory of own troops had no large success, but “free hunters” which flew far in enemy rear increased list of their victories up-tempo. All their victories were confirmed by their second wingmen mainly.
There was case in Northern Africa when flight of “experts” under command of commander of squadron 4/JG 27 ober-leitenant Fogel shot down 65 enemy planes for less than month in August of 1942. Their actions were very simple – 4 planes flew in mission, fired ammo in sand and reported about “shot down” enemy planes after landing. In any other world army such “victories” could be reason of trial in military tribunal but in Luftwaffe situation was other. When actions of pilots were exposed pilots were only transferred in different units and “victories” which were approved in Berlin were not canceled and stayed in pilot’s lists of victories. So usual upward distortions of victories by “experts”-hunters were like childlike entertainment according opinion of Luftwaffe Command.
Not accidentally those pilots who served in Luftwaffe units which were used for “free hunt” had most amounts of shot down enemy planes. Those units of Luftwaffe which had to cover bombers and land objects had heave casualties instead of them; pilots of these units had to take part in aerial combats in horizontal and to risk their life. And such units almost had no “experts”. Also Luftwaffe didn’t use terms “group victory” and “damaged plane”. All these planes were counted mainly in list of victories of German leading plane’s pilot. Second wingmen flew hundreds of battle flights, worked for their commanders and practically had no own list of shot down planes. Not accidentally much-vaunted sniper and master of flying Erich Hartmann flew as second wingman and had only 8 victories for 110 battle flights for more than half of year. Second famous German ace – Gerhard Barkhorn – flew 120 battle flights before first air victory. Amount of their victories began to increase up-tempo only when they became leading plane’s pilots of pair or, better, of flight. Single pilots, flights (example – flight of Novotny) and even squadrons worked for recognized “experts”. Such situation was very well known in Eastern Front during hard aerial combats for supremacy in air. Usual pilots of Luftwaffe risked their life when they began air combat and were bait for Soviet aces. And it was made only in order to “expert” could increase without problems his list of air victories.
For actions in Eastern Front only JG 52 counted 10,000 air victories. It is approximately one fourth part 46,000 Soviet planes which were shot down in WWII. At that most part of their victories German pilots had from end of 1942 i.e. exactly from that time when confirmation of these victories became very difficult in result of German retreat. Large successes of “experts” in Russia became reason of changing of quotas for awarding of fighter-pilots in different fronts. Doubts of Command of Luftwaffe in correctness of amount of victories in East became apparent in increasing of amount of shot down enemy planes which was enough for awarding by Knight Cross. If in first period of was pilot had to get this award for 40-50 destroyed planes that in 1943 this amount was increased to 150 planes.
In Western front Luftwaffe mainly repelled air raids of allied bombers and it was not so easy to manipulate with amount of air victories because practically all shot down planes crashed on German troops territory and could be easy counted. Probably, it is reason that Luftwaffe pilots in Western Front had not so many air victories that pilots of Eastern Front but Spike supposes that it is base for opinion that victories in Western Front were more difficult that victories in Eastern Front. And, probably, it is reason that successes of Eastern Front “experts” became worse when they were transferred in Western Front. Command of Luftwaffe decided to not offend pilots of anti-aircraft system of Reich and began to use special system of marks for them in 1943 – they could get Knight Cross for 40 one-engine planes like earlier or for 10 four-engine bombers. It was well-founded by difficulty of fight with solid battle orders of heavy planes, which were defended by many machine gun and gun points and which had powerful escort of fighters.
Large overshoot of amount of victories of “experts” of Eastern front (very likely, in 2-3 times) doesn’t mean that German aces were not dangerous enemy. They had excellent planes, high professional level and experience of combat actions indifferent countries of Western Europe so many German pilots could exceed Soviet aces in amount of shooting down planes. They easy shot down alone damaged planes, which remained behind their group, inexperienced and heedless pilots using brilliantly tactics of combat in vertical “shoot and run away”. They effectively attacked planes which were in edge of formation and estimated training level of Soviet pilots. If Soviet pilots were irresolute or became to panic so pair of Bf109 could break up even squadron’s order. If “experts” saw that they had strong enemy so they prefer to run away on afterburning. In thus case they had no time to fix victories – victories were counted approximately. Bombers and IL-2 which had no escort also were victims of German “hunters”. Also “hunters” liked to operate near Soviet airfields.
Soviet aircraft began to use “free hunt” only in middle of 1943 but it became widely used only one year later. Before this time fighters operated in the interests of land troops, they covered land combat area and escorted bombers so they were in admittedly unprofitable conditions for air combat. And amount of victories was not main task of Soviet fighter-pilots…
Mike Spike and other Western authors very unwillingly use statistics data which often show real picture of WWII actions. And sometimes they give wrong digits. For example, Mike Spike approximately correct estimates amount of Soviet planes but he gave wrong digits about amount of Axis planes in June, 22nd of 1941. Former DDR historian Olaf Groeler speaks that it is very easy to know truth – it is enough to visit German military archive in Freiburg.
According his data on June, 21st of 1941 Luftwaffe had 70% of planes in border of USSR. They had 953 bombers, 1025 one-engine fighters, 93 two-engine fighters, 306 diving bombers, 716 recon planes, 190 messenger planes, 33 sea planes, 256 transport planes, total – 3571 planes. Also German Allies sent planes for struggle against USSR – Romania (423 planes, inc. 170 fighters), Finland (307 planes, inc. 230 fighters), Hungary (app. 100 planes), Italy (app. 100 planes), Croatia (app. 60 planes) and Slovakia (app. 50 planes). So forces of Hitlers coalition contained not 2000 planes like Spike writes but near 4700 planes, including approximately 1600 fighters…
Training level of Soviet pilots in June of 1941 was not so bad like Spike supposes… Commonly resistance of Soviet air forces in June, 22nd was very considerable. In this day JG 27 lost in combat against I-153 of 127th IAR it’s commander, veteran of legion “Condor”, cavalier of Knight Cross, Volfgang Shelman. His first battle flight in Eastern Front became his last one. JG 53 lost commander of second group, cavalier of Knight Cross, Heints Bretnutz, which was shot down by rear gunner of Soviet SB bomber. In total Luftwaffe lost more 70 planes on June, 22nd (according Soviet data – near 200). Only once before, during “Battle of Britain”, Luftwaffe had such scale losses for one day. For example, in bomber unit KG51 more than 50% of planes were damaged, near 20 planes were destroyed. Officially Germans confirmed destruction of 35 planes, in propaganda purposes real digit was decreased. They repeated this trick and later. So it is wrong to speak that Soviet data about shot down planes is not confirmed by German sources. Staffs of Luftwaffe formations became very “experienced” in counting own casualties. They didn’t counted as destroyed that planes which were missed in action and which crashed during emergency landing on German territory. Final digit was decreased and was noted in day report, planes which were excluded from final digit were added to digit of casualties of later days or even months. It was made for making casualties level “acceptable”. In result of suchtricks amount of lost planes decreased in some times. It was possible to find truth only on base of analysis of statistics of planes, which left the ranks for month, quarter or year if to add every Luftwaffe days report. And this was not possible always.
According approximate estimations Luftwaffe lost approximately 100,000 planes during WWII. There are known data of staff of Luftwaffe only for period from September, 1st of 1939 to December, 31st of 1944 that Luftwafe lost in combats 91,925 planes in all fronts.
It is very difficult to count amount of German planes, which were lost in Eastern Front but in any case it is not less than 2/3 of all destroyed German planes. For example, only in 1941 Germans lost in USSR 3827 planes or 82% of total casualties…
According Soviet data Germans lost 3700 planes in Kursk battle (in Kursk defense operation and in counter offensives in Orel and Belgorod directions)…
Part 3
1943 was rotating point in battles of Eastern Front. Like large meat grinder Eastern front grinded new and new German units including aircraft. Large amount of “experts” were killed or became POWs. Even caution and prudence in air combats didn’t help them. They tried to not come in combat if they had no supremacy in forces. There were cases when German fighters let for Soviet bombers to bomb their target and attacked them on the way back – they had hope that Soviet pilots are tired and shot most part of ammo, some planes were damaged by fire from land. In combats “experts” used ruse: run away in direction of sun, imitated smoke of damaged plane, used forests during low altitude flights and clouds for camouflage. During air combat two or four “experts” came out from combat and flew over combat area, they waited when alone Soviet plane will separated from main combat group and attacked this plane…
In 1941-43 Luftwaffe lost near 15,000 fighters, only 2581 were lost over Germany and Western Europe. Most part of them was destroyed in USSR. Only from 1944 German air forces became equal i8n Eastern and Western fronts. From this time Germans had to increase anti-aircraft defense of Reich but even in that time more than 1/3 of all German forces were in Eastern Front – and these forces were renewed literally every month…
If to suppose that Germany lost 100,000 planes and 2/3 of these casualties were in Eastern Front so it is possible to estimate that Germany lost 70,000 planes in Eastern front. If to suppose that non-combat casualties were 30% of common one’s so Germans lost in combats 49,000 planes which were destroyed by Soviet pilots. Commonly it is equal with digits of military historians of USSR…
Soviet aircraft lost 106,000 planes for 1941-45, only 46,000 were lost in combats (high level of non-combat casualties was result of more low initial training level of novice pilots than in other countries).
In result of these digits (49,000 German planes against 46,000 Soviet planes) it is apparently that German aces didn’t cause horrific losses to Soviet Air Forces. And vice versa, from middle of 1943 Luftwaffe lost much more planes that Soviet Air Forces. For example, 112 pilots of JG 54 left the ranks only in 1943, it means that personnel of JG 54 renewed practically completely. Only 4 of JG 54 pilots who took part in first combats in Eastern Front lived to see end of war in 1945.
It is impossible to agree about difficulty of victories in different fronts. His opinion is based only on large amount of victories of German “experts” in Eastern front. If to believe for Spike most part of Luftwaffe pilots wanted first of all to come in Eastern Front for shooting one-two hundreds of enemy planes, that in Northern Africa and only as punishment that were sent in Western Front. Of course, probably it was more difficult for German “expert” of Western Front who lived in comfortable conditions and flew one battle flight for week to shoot down enemy fighter than for his unshaven colleague from East who was exhausted morally and physically but it is more possible that situation was completely another…
Even after June of 1944 amount of lost planes was approximately equal in Western and Eastern Fronts.
Of course, it was difficult for German pilots to shoot down American “Flying fortress” which was moving in solid formation. German paid 3 fighters for every shooting down “B-17”. But and in Eastern Front in 1944 Germans lost 2-3 planes foe every one Soviet plane – otherwise casualties Air Forces had to outnumber German casualties in large scale. Erich Hartmann commented list of lost pilots of JG 52: “This list of casualties helps to destroy myth that it was easier to fight against Russians. Especially it is true about actions in 1943 and later. It is interesting but famous German aces which fought in the West and were transferred in East were killed or became POWs very soon. Remember, for example, such “experts” like Hans Han, Zigfrid Shnell, Gerhard Homut, Erich Leye…”
The later the war the more difficult it was for German “experts” to win. In 1943 and especially in 1944 and 1945 Soviet Aircraft became to use widely land guidance stations and echelonment of fighters in different altitudes. Soviet fighters became to fly “free hunter” missions so they become to operate near German airfields. Large amount of planes and experienced pilots let for Soviet Command to begin constant patrol over Soviet airfields
In the end of war fighter aircraft of USSR was powerful force. New “La” and “Yak” planes were not worse that best planes of other countries. But combat experience of Soviet pilots was much more than experience of US and British pilots. For 4 years of combats Soviet Air Forces got set of excellent aces. First ten pilots of USSR shot down 568 enemy planes, ten best British pilots shot down 310 planes, ten best US pilots – 279. Best US ace, Richard Bong, shot down 40 enemy planes, best British one, Johnny Johnson, - 38. In Soviet aircraft 45 fighter-pilots had more than 40 victories for everyone…”
The end
Sorry guys for such long post, but it worth reading ^^