Quote:
Originally Posted by JtD
Really can't be bothered to reply to all of your chitchat here horseback, as most of them are unrelated to what I said anyway, but as you mention JG 26 as the unit who "easily won" the air war in the west in 1943, JG 26 had to write off 400% of their average operational strength in 1943. And as losses are not the only thing indicative of winning, lets look at other aspects as well:
- it was tasked with protection of Germany and territories against bombing raids, which were conducted more frequently and more destructively by the end of 1943 than at the beginning of 1943
- it was tasked with the destruction of the enemy air forces, which by the end of 1943 were a lot stronger than they were at the beginning of 1943
Those are the facts. "Winning easily" looks different. By any rational standard.
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You’ll want to explain all that to the men of the 91st, 96th and 100th Bomb Groups, each of which suffered over 400% casualties over Europe from spring 1943 to VE Day (there were 48 bombers in a Group). There were about 20 Heavy Bomb Groups in the 8th AF that suffered a minimum of 200% casualties and several among that number had around 300% casualties. The groups that took the highest casualties lost most of their numbers at a disproportionate rate in 1943. What the JGs and ZGs in the West prior to the spring of 1944 were doing looked an awful lot like ‘winning easily’ to
them.
I tend to differ with you about the tasking of the JGs on the Channel Front; I used JG 26 as a well-known
example, but let’s examine the war aims of the two sides. My contention of the LW’s campaign being easily successful at the end of 1943 is based on the understanding that the German leadership at that point in the war believed (regardless of whether it was rational to do so) that once the Allies got tired of banging their collective heads against the Atlantic Wall, they would at worst, recognize Germany’s hegemony/de facto control of Europe and go the hell away, or at best, join Hitler and the
volk in the effort to crush the Communist threat embodied in the Soviet Union (somewhere in the middle of all that they were hoping for at least the suspension of Lend Lease to Stalin). They believed that the Casablanca declaration that the Allies’ primary war aim was unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers was all show.
On that basis, the goal of the LW in the Channel was to continue to do what they had been doing very well in the second half of 1943—bleed the American and British air forces as they crossed into Europe and hammer the bombers once their escorts had to turn back from lack of fuel. Inflicting maximum casualties on the enemy meant that their weak and effete democratic system would eventually turn on Roosevelt and Churchill and the new elected leaders would sue for peace. For Hitler and his followers, it was a classic demonstration of German
will and that was how they sold it to the German people.
"Just hang on a little bit longer, and they will give up and go back to making refrigerators and razor blades. Once we've settled with Stalin and consolidated our holdings in Europe, then we'll deal with them on
our terms," they were saying.
On the other side, the requirement for unconditional surrender was
not show,
but they were working to a schedule; FDR and Churchill were committed to opening a ‘Second Front’ in Europe in 1944, which meant a major amphibious assault on the French coast, and the best time for amphibious operations is when the weather is reasonably good and the tides are low near dawn. That meant no later than August, and if they needed a moonless night before the morning of the invasion in order to maximize the effectiveness of airborne assault to ‘prep’ the area behind the beachhead, you only had early June.
All of that required (according to the Admirals whose ships were going to be stuck close to an enemy held coast and the Generals whose soldiers and equipment were going to be bottlenecked on the beachhead for the first couple of days) that the Luftwaffe be seriously cut down in size and effectiveness, and that was the responsibility of the Allied air forces. In late 1943, there was serious doubt that they could accomplish that task.
The heavy bombers had been expected to be able to protect themselves and to penetrate Germany’s airspace to bomb German aircraft production out of existence; there were other industries targeted but aircraft production was the main target. It turned into a massive failure, because the bombers were taking unacceptable losses in the absence of effective fighter escorts. Heads rolled at 8th AF Command and in its Fighter headquarters in late 1943 as a direct result, and major efforts to get the new Mustangs under 8th AF command were made. It is a fact that all Merlin Mustang production not committed to the RAF went to the 8th Air Force (or its control) until late spring of '44, when production finally allowed for groups outside the ETO to transition into the type.
That's why I said what I said.
cheers
horseback