Quote:
Originally Posted by Pursuivant
One American fighter pilot who served in NG said that the main strike against the P-39 was lack of range, since the Allies had to cross the Owen Stanley Mountains in order to strike at the Japanese.
Additionally, by the time the P-39 got to NG, better fighters, such as the P-38 and P-47, were starting to become available. But, Army policy was that fighter squadrons didn't get newer fighters until the P-39s they had were unserviceable. Not surprisingly, U.S. pilots did everything they could to help that process along - such as bailing out of potentially salvageable aircraft.
I could also imagine that taking care of a relatively advanced plane like the P-39 in some of the most unforgiving terrain on earth was a nightmare for ground crews. Armchair historians tend to forget about boring logistical issues like maintenance intervals and serviceability rates.
Finally, the American pilots in NG in 1942/43 were still figuring out how to beat the Japanese, who were masters of the conventional turning dogfight. Part of the reason that they didn't have confidence in their planes is because they were blaming the planes for their own lack of tactical skill. It's telling that non-U.S. forces were able to take the same planes that the U.S. considered to be "dogs" and use them successfully. (Finns with the Buffalo, Soviets with the P-39, Australians with the Vengeance).
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Agreed completely! All of these factors shaped the American experience with the P-39 and that reputation has stuck with it in Western circles of aviation many decades later. I don't think it was until I started learning more about the Eastern Front did I reconsider the P-39... and then when I did some reading on the technical details things started to pop out that didn't fit the conventional historical narrative.