Quote:
Originally Posted by Crumpp
It is a little more complicated than that seadog. The RAF correctly plans for their logistical train to be interupted by the enemy.
Therefore, they correctly plan to emplace several weeks supply at the aerodrome, supply the emergency fields the aircraft might have to land at, and keep several more weeks of fuel dispursed around the log train earmarked for that unit.
If you just plan to have enough fuel on hand for what you are going to fly, then you will be in real trouble when the enemy bombs your airfield storage tanks, shoots your trucks up on the road, or hits the railyard. You will be out of the game in one enemy attack.
Read the logistical plan if they had to supply the 4 squadrons in France. That is the amount of fuel in the system earmarked for those squadrons to fly for just ONE WEEK.
If they want to continue to fly operationally and resupply their unit after an enemy attack, the RAF is planning to have some 8 weeks worth of fuel on the ground and available at short notice.
Don't you think that makes sense given the fact the Luftwaffe was targeting the airfields during the BoB?
So when you do your simplistic calculation for one week of flying, keep in mind, there is 8 weeks of fuel required to be available for that one week in the air.
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Not forgetting that Crumpp has previously stated that "
Making the conclusion Hurricanes were using 100 Octane in the Battle of France based off some logistical projections for future war is amatuerish and clumsey. It is a paper tiger. That document is a calculation of projected needs written on 7 May 1940. The British Expeditionary Force was on the Beaches of Dunkirk 18 days later.
How much of those calculation and projections for future war do you really think became ground reality in 18 days? "
http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showthr...213#post416213
A lot of nonsense, of course but just a reflection of how much Crumpp tries to twist things to suit his own POV.
So, there was enough 100 Octane stored in France to supply all Hurricanes and Blenheims with 8 weeks worth of fuel. As can be seen in just one WOPR (33rd 23 April 1940) there was 7,600 tons of 100 Octane fuel in the only logical location West of Suez ie; France
It also means that the RAF provided all of its frontline Merlin engine FC squadrons in France with 100 Octane in May 1940, which make's Crumpp's continued assertions that only 16 squadrons of its frontline fighter squadrons in Britain were supplied look very suspect. 192,151,000 gallons or 61,000 tons was used between June-end October
Quote:
Originally Posted by robtek
When i read 192151000 gallons for 150 days for about 700 fighters at about 75 gallons/h i calculate 24,2h flight time a day. Confusing!
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Al Schlageter
150 days?
10 July – 31 October 1940 = 114 days
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More than enough to supply all frontline FC fighters with plenty to spare.
So tell us again Crumpp, how did the RAF ensure that just a few squadrons used 100 Octane, while the rest went without? How was this allocated?
What were the logistical arrangements used toe ensure only 16 squadrons used 100 octane.
How were the pilots briefed "Sorry chaps X Y and Z squadrons get the 100 Octane today, the rest of you stick with 87"?
How about Crumpp provide some documentary evidence showing that frontline fighter squadrons were using 87 octane fuel on a consistent basis throughout the battle. He has been asked time and time again but has provided nothing.