[Seadog]

Originally Posted by Crumpp

Except the original documents.....

I believe that by the time the battle ended by the German dates, the entire RAF FC was using 100 Octane.

Maybe, just maybe, if you end the battle in November or December 1940, the entire RAF FC had converted.

If you want to say in July thru September 1940 that the entire FC had converted you would be wrong. They were in the process of converting during that time.

You can line up all the evidence presented until July 1940 and it fits perfectly within normal convention phase testing for adaptation.

The Notes on a Merlin Engine portion of the Operating Notes are part of the airworthiness of the design and list the specified fuel for the aircraft. The conversion was important enough to publish a very clear instructions for ALL OPERATIONAL UNITS to use 100 Octane when Fighter Command converted. You do not see that in any Notes on a Merlin Engine prior to January 1942.

Boost override was available and authorized to be used by the Operating Notes. That calls into question any combat report which makes a reference to any over boost condition as being proof of 100 Octane fuel use.

The logistical documents are just that, logistics and not operational. Before the operational side of the house can do anything, they must have the logistics solved and the materials in hand. That they had the stuff is not proof of when it was used. It is only proof that they had it which is not in dispute.

The consumption reports do not show any 100 Octane being out at the airfields in useable quantity until the June thru July timeframe. In those months, it represents a small portion of the fuel used. In the October and beyond, 100 Octane consumption clearly shows a marked increase to reach some 34% of the Air Ministries fuel supply "forward of the railheads". In other words, not sitting in a tanker as part of the strategic reserve.

In other words, the developers of IL2 CLOD would be accurate in modeling both types of fuel not in modeling 100 Octane exclusively.

Again, this is your thesis, but you have not presented any evidence to support your contention that RAF FC was using both 87 and 100 octane during the BofB (by British dates, from July 10 onward). The facts are that documents from March 1940 indicate that all new Merlin engined aircraft were equipped to utilize 100 octane, and given the wastage rates of existing aircraft, production rates of new aircraft and the conversion program for older aircraft, there simply wouldn't have been sufficient numbers, if any, of 87 octane only aircraft for RAF FC to have retained 87 octane as a front line fuel. The idea that RAF FC would retain 87 octane when all its fighters were equipped to handle 100 octane is simply preposterous, and completely unsupported by the facts, and a complete dearth of supporting evidence for 87 octane fuel use. The increase in 100 octane consumption was a reflection of the fact that the RAF won the BofB and RAF FC and BC were expanding rapidly.

Some more supporting data:

Prometheans in the Lab: Chemistry and the Making of the Modern World, McGrayne: "Britain's petroleum secretary Geoffrey Lloyd said later, "we wouldn't have won the Battle of Britain without 100 octane..." "p103.

Two Historians in Technology and War, Howard and Guilmartin:

The importance of oil to the conduct and outcome of the Second World War extended well beyond quantitative, macro-economic considerations. High octane aviation gasoline gave British and American aircraft, particularly fighters, a critical performance boost not enjoyed by their Axis equivalents; indeed, some have gone so far as to attribute British victory in the Battle of Britain to 100 octane gasoline. Axis engineers were well aware of the performance advantages conferred by high octane, but the refining process was highly inefficient, many more barrels of crude being required per barrel of refined gasoline as octane increased. So long as their sea lanes stayed open, Britain and America could afford the inefficiency; the Germans, Japanese and Italians could not, and their fighter pilots entered combat at a significant handicap. p11.

Air Warfare: an International Encyclopaedia: A-L, Walter J. Boyne

On 9 August 1940, fighters available for combat in Fighter Command included 568 Hawker Hurricanes and 328 Supermarine Spitfires. Although the Hurricane I could not match the performance of the Bf 109E, it was easy to fly, could absorb much damage, and was quick to repair. The Spitfire was based upon an advanced elliptical wing design by Reginald Mitchell that featured maximum area, low wing loading, great strength, and as thin an airfoil as possible. The Spitfire proved a good match against the Bf IO9E. Visibility in the Spitfire was excellent. Both fighters were armed with eight .303-caliber machine guns and featured armor protection for the pilot and a bulletproof windscreen.

Both British fighters benefited from 100-octane fuel. German aircraft used synthetic gasoline of 87-89 octane. Use of 100-octane fuel in the English Merlin engines raised horsepower from 1,030 to 1,310 (the Daimler Benz engine in the Bf I09E was rated at I,175 hp). Consequently, the Hurricane was able to hold its own and the Spitfire gained an edge...p108

others:

The Most Dangerous Enemy: An Illustrated History of the Battle of Britain
By Stephen Bungay p56, 59

and another:

Sydney Camm and the Hurricane, Fozard, Foreword by Sir Peter G. Masefield:

...Sir Thomas Sopwith who, early on, had recognized Sydney's worth and with rare foresight and confidence on his judgement of the Hurricane's quality, took a financially hazardous decision in 1936 to authorize it's large scale production ahead of an Air Ministry order. Hence 400 extra Hurricanes were available for action in June of 1940; just sufficient to tip the balance of that "Narrow Margin" where, otherwise an overwhelming disparity of numbers could have had only one result. There was, too, the RR Merlin engine - the heart of Camm's Hurricane; and of Mitchell's Spitfire. Without the Merlin, and just in time, 100 octane fuel - there would have been no prospect of success...

Masefield's bio:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obit...Masefield.html

Why would Masefield say that "...without... "100 octane fuel" - there would have been no prospect of success"?