Quote:
Originally Posted by Kurfürst
Almost got it correct, but just like Mike, you seem to have missed a small detail mentioned in those "official records in the NA".
And that is all the papers talk of select fighter and bomber stations. I am sorry, I know you would like to forget that part, but that seems to be a major fly in the ointment of your whole thesis.  |
What Kurfurst and Crumpp have both conveniently missed is that the March 1939 plan for 16 Fighter Squadrons and 2 bomber was
provisional: right down the page para 8 says:
"A.M.D.P asked that D.D.C(3) should keep him informed of the rate of output of 100 octane fuel in order that the
rate of change-over of squadrons to this fuel could be kept under review in the light of any [I]diminution or acceleration in supplies.[/U]" (attachment 1) Should the rate of fuel supply increase, the rate and numbers of squadrons changing over to its use could increase as well.
Supplies of 100 octane fuel continued to
increase from 202,000 tons in December 1939, which was the time specified for the change over.
By November 1939 it was considered that there were "adequate reserves" of 100 octane fuel to go ahead with the modification of all Hurricane and Spitfire Merlin engines to use 12 lb boost.
Squadrons did not, and could not hold their own fuel supplies, to require them to do so would be an operational and logistical nightmare: it was
airbases that were supplied with fuel, not individual squadrons. In the 6 May 1940 paper (Item 9 7th Meeting Summary...) "Units concerned" cannot be talking about individual squadrons, it is referring to bases which, depending on their importance, (eg; Sector Station) hosted up to three squadrons. 18 squadrons = 8-10 airbases.
The December 7 1939 letter, which sets out a process for supplying 100 Octane fuel starts:
"I have the honour to refer to my letter...dated 27 October 1939, regarding the issue of 100 Octane Fuel
for use in Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft in this Command." (attachment 2)
25 Fighter Stations were listed as requiring 100 octane fuel "in the first instance", including non-operational Kenley, Usworth and Hendon, with a further 17 non-operational bases which required supplies for visiting aircraft, but "
which have no Hurricane or Spitfire aircraft at the moment."
Squadrons that were to use 100 octane fuel were not selected by Squadron number but by the
type of aircraft used. Bases that hosted these aircraft types were accordingly supplied with 100 octane fuel. Same for the Bomber squadrons, namely Blenheims. The only Blenheim capable of using 100 octane fuel was the Mk IV the first of which emerged in March 1939. The Defiant was not listed in December because it was not yet operational.
All of the 11 Group Sector stations were listed, plus Filton which, in June 1940, became part of the new 10 Group; 4 out of 5 12 Group sector stations, 2 out of 5 13 Group sector stations, and 11 other airfields, including 6 of 11 Group were listed.
The May 18 1940 memo expresses satisfaction that the units concerned - viz Hurricane and Spitfire Squadrons - had "NOW been stocked with the neccesary 100 octane fuel."
In May 1940 stocks of 100 Octane fuel were 294,000 tons, while stocks of "other grades" were 298,000 tons (attachment 3). Far from there being a crisis in the supply, of 100 Octane preventing a continued change over of units (according to the famous Pips document) for the next two months, 100 Octane fuel was becoming the dominant fuel type being stocked; by August 404,000 tons was being held, cf 230,000 tons of "other grades". Between December 1939 and December 1940 the overall increase in 100 Octane stocks was 297,000 tons, in spite of the fact that some 93,000 tons had been consumed between June and December 1940.
Fact is
Luftwaffe fuel stocks were lower or
almost the same in 1940 as those of the RAF
It would also seem that the Luftwaffe had
provisional pre-war plans for fuel stocks which changed once war had been declared:
Quote:
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Even as late as October, 1938, the Germans apparently had not expected to need reserves of oil until much later. A captured plan dated 30 January 1939 shows that the Luftwaffe then foresaw a relatively small increase (between 270,000 and 420,000 tons per year) in its consumption of aviation gasoline in the autumn, presumably to cover the Polish campaign. A tremendous increase, to 2,600,000 or even 5,200,000 tons per year, was not scheduled to occur until 1 October 1940, when the real war presumably was to have begun.
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Kurfurst can stick to the phrase "selected" as much as he likes - it is a purely
provisional phrase in a pre-war plan, and the 16 + 2 squadrons was
conditional based on fuel supply. This was all explained long ago but completely ignored by Kurfurst and Crumpp.