[Crumpp]

Originally Posted by Glider

To support that you need to give some awnsers to the questions you have avoided for the following reasons

Personally I would like to see any evidence of :-
a) a shortage of fuel
If there was no shortage then there would be no need to reduce the roll out

The first plant to be able to produce 100 Octane fuel cheaply and quantity did not come into operation until right before the war started. There was a shortage of 100/130 grade through most of the war that is discussed in Allied Oil Committee meetings. Specifically it is mentioned in a 1944 meeting on adopting a higher octane grade as a limitation to the production of the more powerful fuel. The refineries cannot meet the current requirements and have never been able to meet them with the exception of a few short months in 1943. Therefore they do not want to devote any refinery capability to production other than the amount required for testing purposes.

That shortage of 100 Octane is why domestically, the United States used 91 Grade CONUS and the RAF used 87 grade for non-operational purposes for most of the war. 100 grade was in short supply and reserved for operations.

b) of 16 squadrons
Which squadrons or if you go down the it was 16 squadrons at any one time

c) of which squadrons or bases
This brings the difficult questions
i) If 100 octane was in short supply when did Drew a small satellite station in Scotland have 100 octane when the priority stations in the South East didn't
ii) At one point in the BOB Duxford had the big wing of five squadrons. Are you really saying that almost a fifth of the RAF supply was in one 12 group station?.

Glider, the document you post from December 1938 very clearly states that all stations will recieve an adequet supply of 100 Octane before the first aircraft is converted. If stations were not getting fuel then that is proof the operational adoption did not occur until all stations had it. Think about it, it just makes sense. You cannot easily switch fuels back and forth. If you add a lower knock limited performance fuel to the tanks, you must use lower operating limits or you will experience detonation which can end a flight very quickly.

This is the kind of thing that undermines the credibility of the posters in this thread.

All one needs to do is look the immaturity exhibited in this thread. Do you really think the evidence has been sifted through with a mature outlook and placed in context? I certainly don't think so at all. More effort has been devoted to finding cartoons and taking opinion polls than looking objectively at the evidence.

If you are going to use logistical documents, then you better have a good understanding of the logistical system and how the accounting process works. One should understand things like "Estabilishment vs Strength", how a fuel becomes specified, how does the testing process work, and what are the constraints.

All one has to do is look at the projections for fuel requirements for a week of operations in the 18 May 1940 document in order to support just four squadrons. You need almost 3000 tons of fuel in the tanks forward of the logistical node to support a week of operations!! That is to burn ~230 tons a week in their fuel tanks.

Compare that with Table II fuel at the airbases for June thru August of 10,000 tons.

d) why this isn't mentioned in any official document, book, history
Simple request, why in the most documented air battle in history has no one picked this important factor up. Support your theory with some supporting documentation, not an off the wall conspiracy theory

What are you talking about? Glider, I use the documents provided in this thread. I just don't read into them and fit them in the context of how things work.

I just read what the document says.......Establishment vs. Strength.....All stations have to receive an adequate supply of 100 Octane before the first unit is converted....

Now, I believe that constraint of all stations receiving 100 Octane as applying to operational adoption and not Phase IV testing. Phase IV testing would continue using the provisional specified fuel. It is impossible to move forward with operational adoption if Phase IV testing is not complete. In Phase IV testing, you would see handfuls of squadrons using the fuel in order to fulfill the requirements of that test phase. You do realize that the fact we only see a few squadrons using the fuel before September very much supports that notion. Occam’s razor, Glider....

e) of the process in delivering the fuel
As there is no mention of a any limitation in the distribution of 100 octane fuel in the Oil Committee papers who distributed it

Sure there is and the language is "units concerned". That tells us there is a limitation. We don't know if it is self-imposed as part of Phase IV testing or a supply issue. It really is irrelevant though in determining if all operational units were using the fuel in July 1940 as the fact remains there was a limitation in place. The Oil Committee was aware of it.

f) when the rest of FC were transfered to 100 octane
As (e) there is no mention of any further roll out of 100 Octane in the Oil Committee papers so when was it done?

When did FC fully convert? That is question we are trying to answer. The evidence seems to suggest sometime after October 1940. I think it is very likely there is another edition of the Operating Notes for the Spitfire Mk I and Hurricane series we don't have at the moment.

It is a fact that in July 1940, all of FC was not using 100 Octane.
The rotation of squadrons does put a restraint on the ability to determine just how many squadrons were using it at one time without a timeline and further research.