Quote:
Originally Posted by Crumpp
Winny,
It is a fact Dowding rotated and rested his squadrons.
It is not speculation or assumption, the squadrons were rotated and rested. It was very contraversial and that argument is covered in some detail in the official RAF History. I personally believe it was an essential part of the RAF victory.
Keep in mind that tactically, the RAF SE fighters took a pasting from the Luftwaffe SE fighters with the exception of July 1940. Very good pre-war planning, good leadership, most significantly brave men and women all allowed the RAF to increase its strength during the battle to ultimately prevail.
For the Luftwaffe, it is an example of tactical success ending in a defeat in the campaign.
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I'm sorry but..
I said I know he rotated squadrons I have 42 books on the subject of the BoB. I know a lot about the subject.
It seems that you are failing to understand the difference between rotated and withdrawn.
The reason I brought it up was because..
You said "
If logistics said I only had enough fuel for 16 squadrons by September then you can bet when a squadron rotated out for rest and refit, they would go back to 87 Octane and their replacement would come from that pool of converted units.
"
There was no pool of converted units - all of the RAF's FC squadrons were active.
I'm saying that to suggest that they forced pilots back onto 87 octane when they moved to a different group does not stack up.
100 octanes only real advantage was in rate of climb. All groups were operational and all groups were involved in combat.
The RAF at the beginning had around 2,200 aircraft IN TOTAL FC, BC ,CC and transport. FC had around 6-700 aircraft. This is where the focus for 100 octane was placed.
EDIT: And you also said
"I highly doubt the Air Ministry had 100 Octane fuels in any substantial quantity in 1938"
So I post the original documents which show they did have large stocks and you come back that 'logistical has nothing to do with operational" or words to that effect.