[NZtyphoon]

Originally Posted by Crumpp

Of course and this is same note appears in the 1939 Operating Notes.

The fly in the ointment is the January 1942 Operating Notes clearly state, OPERATIONAL UNITS-100 OCTANE ONLY.

January 1942, Pilots Operating Notes, Spitfire Mk I:



That is definative and it is a fact all operational units flying a Spitfire are using 100 Octane in January 1942.

Before the January notes, the only mention of 100 Octane is "100 octane may be used, if the engine has been suitable modified" That "may be used....IF" is definative as well. All operational units flying a Spitfire Mk I were not using 100 Octane in June of 1940...for a fact.

Then back up your "facts" with something substantive:

Explain how 16 Squadrons consumed 52,000 tons of 100 Octane fuel in just 3 months (Jul - October) with documentation.

Explain which squadrons were selected for your "intensive operational trials" and explain how the RAF ensured that only the selected units were supplied, with documentation.

You insist that the RAF needed to have 800,000 tons of 100 octane in reserve, based on pre-war papers, yet you have never explained why the RAF was using "Other Grades" when the reserves of those were falling below the reserves of 100 Octane as the battle progressed; if, as you state

Originally Posted by Crumpp

Winny,
That does not necessarily mean aircraft were feeling a shortage. It does mean the strategic reserves are short. Remember, they originally wanted 800,000 tons in reserve before a single operational aircraft used the fuel.

Yes, there was a shortage because the Strategic reserve to production ratio is just not where it should be.

I repeat, the "reserves to production ratio" of "Other Grades" of fuel was falling below that of 100 Octane; taking that hypothesis to its logical conclusion the RAF would not have been using any fuel.

But, wait, there's more, "That does not necessarily mean aircraft were feeling a shortage"...really hedging your bets there Crumpp.

You then go on to state:

Originally Posted by Crumpp

Great example of why looking at strategic logistics is a horrible method to predict operational conditions is the German late war fuel situation on the western front. Strategically, Germany had plenty of fuel in their reserves. The shortage was at the operational side due to main supply route bottlenecks caused by allied airplanes shooting up the stockyards, railheads, and trucks!

A poor comparison because the RAF's supply system was not put under the same strain and the RAF was able to supply its airfields throughout the battle.

All this means is that you want things both ways - first you insist the reserves were inadequate, and have spent ages pushing that position - now you insist weeell it doesn't matter anyway.

One or t'other - did the RAF have enough reserves of 100 Octane fuel to potentially supply all frontline fighter squadrons throughout the battle - yes or no?