Quote:
Originally Posted by Crumpp
I agree the 800,000 ton strategic reserve requirement be built up before any squadrons convert probably comes from a pre-war estimate.
If it is correct, then there is absolutely no chance a single operational squadron flew with the fuel during the Battle of Britain. England simply did not have enough 100 Octane fuel on hand to come close to that reserve requirement.
Again, that is just speculation on my part. Morgan and Shacklady just listed the two facts we know but they were not writing a book on the history of the Oil Committee and strategic reserves.
1. An 800,000 ton Strategic Reserve was required to be on hand before a single aircraft flew operationally.
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If your argument that the RAF needed to build up a reserve of 800,000 tons of 100 octane before releasing it for use is correct then the RAF
never released 100 octane, because their reserves never reached 800,000 tons right throughout the war. The 800,000 ton figure was a conservative pre-war estimate of what reserves should be built up in the event that America refused to supply 100 octane
It would be interesting to find the pre-war estimates for the reserves of other grades of aviation fuel and see how they match up with war-time reserves - has anyone got the pre-war estimates for other grades?