Quote:
Originally Posted by 41Sqn_Banks
I absolutely agree with you that the case is in no way clear. However IIRC there is proof by combat reports and official squadron diaries (ORBs) that more than 16 squadrons used 100 octane before September 1940. Of course this doesn't mean that all squadrons used it. And this could also be caused by rotating the squadrons between the different groups.
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Perfect and logically well founded summary, dear Banks. As far as it stands, the trail of evidence seems to last until May 1940, when these memos and summaries we have seen state that select fighter and bomber stations were supplied with 100 octane. At its core, this is clearly the continuation of same policy as laid down in March 1939 (16 + 2 Sqns, ie. basically select Sqns but not all being effected).
How many Squadrons were effected is somewhat uncertain, but as you have noted the combat reports, orbs. etc. do give some insight. We do have accounts for some 30 Sqns (out of ca. 60..) or so using 100 octane
at one time or another, though as you noted Sqn rotation between stations makes it quite difficult to find out how many Sqns (stations) were using it simultaneously. There's of course this paper of 7 August that supposed to 'authorize' all Commands for using 100 octane, but the 100 octane consumption figures quite clearly refute that this happened or even started in August. There's clearly no increase in consumption of 100 octane or fall in consumption of 87 octane until the end of September 1940.
As Crumpp said, the above are the ascertainable facts from which a learned man would draw factual and logical conclusions.
Some good research would clear up the situation, but none is forthcoming, and the thread can be pretty much summarized as the speculation and wishful thinking of three fanatics against the weight of documentary evidence; the arguments are hollow or even absurd (lately it appears that its becoming focused on Russel's teapot analouge, i.e. since they could offer no evidence to their thesis, its up to everyone else to
disprove a yet unproven thesis), ad hominem and straw man arguments, or limited to spamming the thread over and over with unrelated papers of no value evidence. These three people do not even play the simulation and are alien to this community and its spirit, having been 'imported' from other discussion boards, with their credibility well worn and resulting in the use of multiple accounts, and apparently interested in nothing else but to push an old agenda and/or vent off their frustration at the developer (see lane's posts in the update threads) or posters.
As noted, the whole story ever increasingly reminds old participants of the 150 grade-fiasco of lane and co. The agenda of 'all the RAF fighter Command was using 150 grade' was pressed with the same fortitude, documents were manipulated and doctored for support the same, until documentary evidence become clear and it turned out that 'all +25 lbs Mark IXs using 150 grade' were in fact
but two Sqns on operational trials, the '+25 lbs Mk XIVs' lane was pushing for never existed due to technical troubles, those '+25 RAF Mustang IIIs of the RAF in 1944' were again just two Sqns who have seen the enemy about twice, once over France and once over the North Sea, were and proposed use of 150 grade in the 2nd TAF's IX units was recalled after a month of operation
in 1945 - a fact that lane still omits from his website articles.
The 100 octane story/agenda is the same, with the same old origins, methods and smokescreen - though I am sure its can be presented as better case than what turned out to be the truth about 150 grade (giggles). Its curious though that the reaction was the same when it become clear that the 150 grade agenda was lost - back then lane and co. was casting doubts about the use of MW 50 by the German side. Now they cast 'doubts' about the use of German 100 octane 'C-3' in 1940, even going as far as claiming that all the 100 octane fuel the Germans were using was in fact from captured British stocks!
