Quote:
Originally Posted by bongodriver
Bring whatever factors into it you like...the outcome of the conflict was due to how it was managed by both sides.
lets make a hypothetical boxing match between matched opponents, one guy looses ballance....at that instant he is disadvantaged, the other guy isn't guaranteed a victory, he might also slip attempting the deciding blow.....you can see what I'm trying to say can't you.
|
well, I do, but it's not entirely pertinent to the Northern Africa Campaign scenario.
Let me give you a better example and see what you think about it: Russian generals like Zhukov didn't win their battles because they were fine tacticians, they simply poured millions of soldiers and hundreds of thousands of vehicles onto the battlefield, crushing everything on their way. 20 million deads for the Great Patriotic War as they call it is a mind boggling number, but that's the price they were ready to pay for victory. Does this make them good generals?
Patton's and Monty's advance into mainland Europe was highly dependent on fuel availability, so much that they often strongly argued about who should get it first and even air bridges struggled to keep up with it.
Then more than ever, mobility of logistics was the key to victory. Germany was quite good at it, but as resources diminished, so did the fighting capability, so that's the scenario that developed in Africa, exacerbated by the strong weather factors.
Quote:
it's not a case of saying you are completely wrong, it's just a case of saying you are wrong for saying everyone else is.
|
LOL
I'm sorry if it comes out as a "I'm right, you're all wrong", but it surprises me how things that I give for granted in history (especially considering that I've done most of my history studying at a British university, and had a lot of work done on area bombing for a mega-presentation) are often either ignored or not considered valid, and put against non factual arguments, but usually national pride (and there's nothing wrong in national pride, it just doesn't have to get in the way of an objective observation of history).