In my considered and (in as far as is possible, notwithstanding the apparently unavoidable subconscious and insipid subliminal influence of 'rabid Patriotism' lol) entirely objective opinion, based on an assessment of the facts, the Kriegsmarine did not stand a snowballs chance in hell against the Royal Navy; echoing the sentiments of one Grossadmiral Donitz, with air superiorty or not.
Royal Navy:
5 capital ships
11 cruisers
53 destroyers
23 destroyers on convoy duty
Kriegsmarine:
1 capital ship
1 cruiser
10 destroyers
20-30 U-boats *Ineffective and at extreme disadvantage in the shallows of the Channel. Many ships also with unrepaired extensive damage from the Norwegian campaign*
Not only vastly outnumbered, but outclassed too.
Add to the RN mix a countless legion of auxilary craft, , adapted trawlers and sloops, minesweepers and motor torpedo boats . The MTB 102 alone for example was capable of 48 knts fully laden, and could be equipped variously with machine guns, depth charges, and the Swiss Oerlikon 20mm AA cannon. Nasty little bumblebee with quite a sting, small and extremely maneouvrable,.....Have fun 'precision bombing' or strafing those. In a barge vs 102 battle, I really don't fancy the barges chances.
Interestingly, no mention has been made of the fact that the RN need not have fired a single shot in order to sink the rag tag German barge Armada (appallingly ill prepared and trained with no experience of amphibious assault). The mere proximity and wake of a destroyer, never mind a Capital Ship would be enough to capsize the craft. In fact, Mother Nature (with a strong channel current) could very easily do that too. Barges are designed for Rivers. I wouldn't like to be on that barge at night.
Dunkirk (and to an extent the Norwegian Campaign) shows demonstrable precedent that air superiority alone cannot be a guarantor of operational success. Despite the
immense tonnage of bombs dropped by the Luftwaffe at Dunkirk, against targets which were stationary for long periods of time, and at best extremely restricted in movement by the harbour.......a paltry 4 destroyers were sunk. This was a resounding Luftwaffe operational failure in terms of meeting an express military objective no matter which way you cut it; namely to prevent the evacuation of some 300,000 men, which they failed quite miserably to do. You can either hit a stationary or moving target or you can't.....an underwhelming performance to say the least, with substantial Lufwaffe casualties incurred too ( some 30 aircraft, with many more damaged). Ships are indeed vulnerable to aerial attack, but not entirely defenceless themselves.
Yes, it is true to say that unfavourable weather played a part, (particularly the 27th and 30th May) but if perfect conditions and visibility are a prerequisite for effective bombing then circa Sept 1940.....you are out of luck. No Meteorologist, but Blighty is not exactly renowned for its blue skies, and 50% of the time we are shrouded in quite dismal overcast. If the 3rd Reich were in possession of some occult voodoo type 'sun dance' it could have swung the balance, but....Nah.
It does provide a creative spark for the miserablist majesty of great bands like The Smiths and Radiohead though, so it has its perks.
Much has been made of the 'mine screen' tactic and their 'interdictive' deployment strategy, with no mention of the fact that the Channel had already been heavily mined by the RN (it's called the 'English Channel' for a reason) and thus would require their laborious and time consuming removal; further shortening the very brief 'window of opportunity' that seelowe had.
The practice of 'Degaussing' ships hulls has received no consideration; the entire Dunkirk evac fleet including civilian ships underwent this process very swiftly, rendering them essentially impervious to magnetic mines. Not a single ship was lost to German mines. This could be done very swiftly, with a more thorough process resulting in a ship hulls demagnetisation for months at a time.
The Kriegsmarine, as Donitz's testimony itself agrees, were on a hiding to nothing....air superiority or not. Seelowe was a terribly ill conceived 'plan' (used in the loosest sense of the word), with more holes than a collander, and more flaws than a teenagers pimpled face.
Late in Blighty and I've had a few jars, but might come back to this one. I like a good debate, but for me personally (
and I hope without prejudice lol ) this case is closed. The vast majority of historians agree that it would have resulted in catastrophic failure, and I entirely concur. You are of course welcome to draw your own conclusions, but in my opinion the end game is a logistical-supply nightmare for Germany (given the extremely unlikely hypothetical event of establishing an effective beach head) and the final result is comprehensive and emphatic defeat. Not to say there would not be RN casualties (there most certainly would), but the final outcome was quite inevitable.
Cheers.