Quote:
Originally Posted by kendo65
This is from quite a way back now and a lot has been said in between.
I'm aware of the merits of taking an approach to judging historical events that uses recent research, previously unavailable documents from both sides, etc to attempt to reach something approaching neutral, objective truth (though many people doubt whether such a position can ever be truly reached)
From a present day perspective with access to both sides records we can get a more nuanced, detailed, objective picture of the events of 1940. One of the points I tried to make in my previous post was that this can have a downside too - there can be a tendency to use our knowledge of later events in the 41-45 period to construct conclusions that were in no way apparent back in 1940. Stern is doing this when he downplays the significance of the BOB for the ultimate outcome of the war. Such conclusions may or may not be correct - but they were in no way apparent back in Summer 1940.
In my last post I was trying to say that to understand the significance of the BOB in the British psyche you really need to understand what the picture looked like from these islands in 1940. It was viewed as a crucial fight for survival. Too much of Sterns and others comments read like 'after the event' rationalisations - and there is a certain 'meanness' in some of the conclusions that strike me at least as being wilfully unbalanced.
It is understandable that other nationalities may be somewhat bemused by the 'our finest hour' rhetoric. I think the only answer is to make more of an effort to recognise each other's different national perspectives. There may not be any ultimate settled truth to be agreed here.
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good post.
it does seem that the BoB was seen at the time as a barring of the door, a halting of the steamroller that had conquered much of europe in such a short period of time. we were fearfully aware of how ill-equipped our army was after it's narrow escape, even going to the extent of replacing armoured vehicles with flatbed truck and concrete. if seelowe had achieved it's stated aims (however implausible this appears to us after the fact, relying on the destruction of fighter cover over the channel, further degradation of the royal navy, good weather etc etc) then britain would have either been invaded or sued for peace (which elements of the commons were driving for during the battle). this could also have come to pass during the battle of the atlantic, which in fact was a more grievous threat to the nation than seelowe ever hoped to be. no britain - no aircraft carrier off the coast of europe for later use in the war. considering how instrumental russia was in actually defeating germany it may not have affected the ultimate outcome, but having to guard two fronts and divide what was essentially a tactical force (luftwaffe) cannot have helped barbarossa or future endeavours.