[Glider]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

Irrelevant.

I don't think so, its an error

What you think is irrelevant again. The RAF considered 800 000 tons of reserves necessary, they had about 220-294 000 by the spring of 1940, and supply was uncertain.

Pre war the RAF considered the reserve to be 800,000 tons of fuel which they never achieved at all at any time but it didn't stop us using this.

At 10 000 tons per month consumption the storage would be enough for 20 months, but this is with about 25% of the fighters and some bombers running 100 octane.

Nope, its 100 % of the fighters and all No 2 Blenheims

Complete conversion would have meant the reserves would not be enough for more than about 5-6 months, running out by October.

As already said this is not the case the conversion was made

Morgan and Shacklady in Spitfire the History also notes the concerns about supply, and the U boot thread. In fact up to that time about 300 000 tons of oil shipments were sunk by uboots and mines.

It was a concern, but more go arrived than was sunk and stocks rose.

David, can we see the post-May 18 decisions by the Oil Committee in their completeness?

I don't have them but will copy them next week as per my last posting, can you get a copy of the Pips paper?

So in end of April there were 294 000 tons, and some three months later in July there were some 40 000 tons more? What was the total monthly consumption again - 40-50 000 tons?

So in three months the equivalent of one months of supply arrived. Do we need to make even more clear why the British were concerned about a complete conversion to 100 octane?

Stock increase
27th February 1940 220,000 tons
31st May 1940 294,000 tons
11th July 1940 343,000 tons
31st August 1940 404,000 tons

Stocks went up in about 6 weeks by approx 50,000 tons (May - July)
and again in about 6 weeks by another 60,000 ish tons (July - August)

Over this time the consumption was about 30,000 tons (Ave figure June - August)

So imports over the period June to August must have been in the order of 140,000 tons (consumption plus increase in stocks).

Consumption therefore was approx 17.5% of imports which is an ample margin for safety and more than enought reason to allow the use of 100 Octane to be given to all operational aircraft in all commands. It also questions Pips statement and view that the stocks were under severe strain.
We need to know how he arrived at that assumption. If you want to accuse me of misrepresenting the figures and papers that I have put forward explain how you arrived at your figures and calculations.

Can I ask where you got your figures for stocks and consumption as they do not match the documents shown. Where on earth did 50,000 tons a month come from for consumption?

There's nothing wrong with it. Pips says the RAF emberked again to 100 octane conversion in late September 1940. Fuel consumption shows exactly that. Of course they made decision earlier, in August, but things seem to have take some time in the RAF. Just consider they made decision about supplying 18 squadrons with 100 octane in March 1939 - and when this was realized..? In May 1940...

As said before the RAF decided to use 100 Octane for all operational aircraft in all commands in August. This is what the consumption figures show. As we know the 18 squadrons was replaced whenwar broke out and plans were well in place by December 1939.

Noteworthy that the consumption remains pretty much the same between May (when select Fighter Squadrons converted) and late September 1940.

When all fighter command were converted

I should point out that all you comments are supported by misrepresentation of original documentation.

I supply the documents and let people decide for themselves