Maybe a bit got lost in translation here: of course Schmidt, Goering and the LW were aware of radar, that's why they initially focused their raids on those as well.
What they did underestimate was the effectiveness of the RAF as long as they could fly intercept missions only and did not have to waste fuel and their pilot's strenght by sending up patrol after patrol in anticipation of the big one.
In addition, the LW didn't seem to be aware what they had to do in order to keep radar down.
Back OT, I do not think that the Germans learned much from their Gotha and Zeppeling raids on Britain, except (as pointed out by Blakduk) the need for targeting systems to increase precision of navigation and bombing.
What they did not learn is that in order to keep up a strategic bombing campaign you will have to find a cure for the disease, not the symptoms. That means you can not excpect to win such a campaign by only bombing airfields and forcing the enemy to fight it out, that's when the airwar is starting to resemble the worst battles of attrition in the trenches of WW1.
What the USAAF and Bomber Command did very well during the later stages (despite bombing the cities) was their choice of targets. A/C factories, fuel depots, training facilities etc..
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