I'd be very careful with the country bashing or country praising.
The unpleasant truth is, with the experiences gained in Spain, Poland, Norway and France, the Luftwaffe was as prepared as they could possibly be, despite the losses in previous campaigns. In addition, they had the abolute advantage in numbers and what's much more important the initiative.
What spoiled it for Hitler, Goering, etc. were three factors:
a.) The abysmal intelligence service of the OKL. Their CO Oberst Beppo Schmidt reported on 19.July 1940 that the 110 and the 109 were both much superior to anything the RAF could and would field during the upcoming campaign. In addition, his report doesn't underestimate the effect of radar, it didn't even mention it!
b.) British Air Defense and Early Warning Systems. While the Few had to face desperate odds as far as numbers go, just imagine what would have happened if they had to fill slots on standing patrols 24/7 during the BoB. The sophisticated combined system of OC and Radar was indeed a dealbreaker for Goerings praised (and overrated) Luftwaffe.
c.) Strategical/Tactical Errors. Intially, the Germans did pick their targets well in accordance of their goals for the campaign (radar, airfields, etc.), however they did not learn from their mistakes during the inital stages and grossly underestimated the true strength of the RAF. During the early days of September 1940, Goering and Kesselring both overconfidently claimed that the RAF is on it's knees and that it's time to deal the final blow, this time to the people of Britian. While losses remained high on both sides, that was the final and capital error in Germany's strategy. One can only imagine what could have happened if it (thank god) wasn't for Hitler's and Goering's stupidity. Here's personell loss percentages for both sides during the BoB (Fighter Command and Jagdwaffe):
RAF: July 10%
August 26%
September 28%
LW: July 11%
August 15%
September 23%
An interesting aspect worth mentioning is also how little was learned from the experiences in the BoB during the later stages of the war within the RAF and the USAAF. Both thought long range fighter escort unneccesary and attributed German losses to poor discipline, inadequate equipment and low combat altitude. Two attacks on Schweinfurt in '43 had to proove them wrong.
If you want to do some good reading on the subject, I'd recommend Williamson Murray's "War in the Air 1914-45" for starters, that goes a long way further than just comparing numbers, but also elaborates on the doctrines of the mid-war years that led to what was happening in those fateful months of 1940.
Let's also not forget that this should be about history, not about which country is better or worse than the other.
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