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Originally Posted by X
Well, to be honest, all three of those sources are less-than-rigorously-researched popular histories, rather stale, and, frankly, British
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I'm not going to disagree with you. None of these books cover the BoF in comprehensive detail, but what I've tried to do is to only provide factual quotations from the books and not to quote things that are clearly only opinions.
Can you say which of the facts are wrong?
Spears view of Gort "dithering" is an opinion not a fact.
Does Spears say on what facts his opinion is based?
To describe the attack by the BEF at Arras as "a pathetic stab" is perhaps a little unreasonable. Bear in mind that the tanks had already travelled 120miles on tracks to reach Arras and that to successfully assemble there at all under the constant watch of the Luftwaffe is no mean feat. The British had 16 MkII Matildas with 2pdr guns and a further 58 MkI's armed only with machine guns. There were also about 60 French Somua light tanks. What they lacked was proper infantry support. This was supposed to have been provided by the French 1st Army but the 2 inf divisions expected had not arrived by 2:30pm when the decision was made to attack without them.
This attack should have been part of a simultaneous assault from the south. Gamelin had issued orders to this effect on the 19th (Instruction No 12) but when Weygand took over he cancelled the orders to the French units while he assessed the situation. Although subsequently he still claimed to be planning such a joint attack there appears to be no evidence that the forces in the south were ever in position to attack.
After making initial gains against the German armour the BEF units were stopped by anti-tank guns, including 88's. Had the infantry been present these would probably have been overcome.
It seems unreasonable to seek to blame the BEF for the collapse of the allied defence, when they only provided a small percentage of the forces present.
The breakthrough was on the front covered by the French 1st, 9th and 2nd armies, and it was separation between these three French units which resulted in the collapse. The 1st Army, 9th Army and 2nd Army should have been able to close the gap without calling on the BEF whose initial position was on the left flank of the 1st Army, well north of the breakthrough point.
Was there a strategic reserve? If so where and why was it not brought into action? The French 10th and 6th Armies start arriving fresh on the Somme. How were they equipped? Why were these fresh units not used offensively?
The BEF seems to have shown considerable mobility by pulling back and moving onto the right flank of the 1st Army to launch the attack. But where was the infantry from the 1st Army which should have been in the attack at Arras? --- and what was the 9th Army doing. It should have been closing the gap with the 1st Army which it had allowed to open up. What was the 2nd Army doing to close the gap with the 9th?
Whilst all this was going on what was Weygand doing? What steps was he taking to close the gap which had opened up between the 1st, 9th and 2nd?
The BEF meanwhile was maintaining contact with both the Belgian Army on its left flank and the 1st Army on its right flank, despite great pressure the front held together here. The only failure seems to have been the inability of the 1st, 9th and 2nd armies to maintain the line.
What efforts did the 1st, 9th and 2nd Armies make to close up after 17th May? These three units should have been able to close the gap and trap the German panzer units.
If three French Armies are unable to stand against the German onslaught why is it considered reasonable that a single British army should be able to do that. It is likely that it never had any chance of success without French support but that support was not in place at the right time.
PS Bearing in mind where we are writing -- Any comments on the air war?
PPS The 16th May situation map seen above would make a good blueprint for a BoF Add On map. Roughly 1/3rd of the map will already be done for BoB. All the key areas are covered. Rotterdam down to just north of Paris and west to the mouth of the R Somme. Quite a compact battlefield, relatively speaking. Includes all the key bridges which were subject of air attack and goes deep enough to facilitate semi-strategic bombing missions.