May's fascinating argument is that, had the Germans not been incredibly lucky and thrown a punch right where the French were least able to react effectively, the ponderous French system probably would have worked. His argument is simple, the German victory was not inevitable, but was a culmination of a "perfect storm" of factors conspiring to exaggerate the French systemic weaknesses, and exaggerate the effectiveness of the German thrust, which was scaring the wits out of the German higher headquarters as much as the Allied. In so many words, the Germans "got lucky" and hit the French right in the solar plexus putting them on the mat so fast even they were astonished. Mosier adds to this: the French confusion was turned to defeat by the defection of the British Army at Dunkirk. Had the British turned around and violently struck the thin Panzer corridor to the sea, the encirclement would have been broken. This has been the stuff of military college staff problems for decades. What all this means for us is that it is a lively, fascinating subject which has been ignored shamefully.
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