Quote:
Originally Posted by Theshark888
I don't know...Hitler's orders to hold in the winter of 1941 probably stabilized the front. Sometimes it MAY be better for a non-mechanized army to hold in place.
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I understand this is sometimes correct and that opinion is divided about Moscow '41. The broader context needs be taken into account as well, however.
Hitler was given repeated warnings by his Marshals that, in spite of the fact that they were still moving forward, thing's had already changed from dangerous to critical in the weeks before the launch of the Soviet counter-offensive. It was Hitler's idea to keep pressing on to the point where the German forces were obviously over-exposed and logistics had broken down.
As with Napoleon Hitler had plenty of supplies, including winter clothing -- hundreds of miles away in Poland.
1941 was the year when Hitler's megalomania reached full bloom. In March '42, Goebbels recorded in his diary Hitler's remark that if it wasn't for his "iron will" the front could easily have fallen apart -- not only was their no contrition for his contribution to the disaster, one from which the German army would never fully recover, the Grofaz who had never once visited the front accorded his own determination primary credit for stabilising matters from the comfort of his Berlin chancellry almost a thousand miles away.
For the '42 campaign, army groups Center and North were enfeebled. Their infantry divisions were well below strength and stripped of motor transport and many new recruits inadequately trained. Their tank and motorised divisions had been 'de-motorised', i.e. their support and logistical arms had their motor transport taken away so that they no longer possessed operational mobility. Only AG South had been restored near to full strength.
I'm insufficiently familiar with matters to assess the correctness of the "stand or die" order. It can't be viewed in isolation, however. The gross errors by the General Staff and by Hitler that lead to it must be taken into account.
dduff