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Originally Posted by John Vasco
I'd like to touch on the defence circle (or the 'attack' circle as some crews disparagingly called it). A couple of examples:
1. The Croydon raid of 15th August 1940 involving the Bf 110s of Stab, 1. & 2./Erprobungsgruppe 210. Going in to attack the airfield, RAF fighters were already seen. The simple tactic,therefore, upon releasing their bombs was to climb and form a defensive circle(s), which was done. None were shot down while in the circle. What had to happen next was on a command, those aircraft in each circle would break for home as an entity. Wolfgang Schenck (and I hate quoting this guy on a regular basis, but he had so much information and knowledge that it would have been foolish to ignore it) told me that when he rejoined his Staffel (1./Erpr. Gr 210, the old 1./ZG 1) on 4th September 1940, he had chatted with Martin Lutz about the loss of Rubensdörffer on this raid. Lutz told him that 'Rubs' had got the break from his 'Stab' circle all wrong, resulting in Rubs (CO), Fiedler (Adjutant) and Koch (TO) being shot down, and Willi Benedens (who was attached as supernumerary to the Stabsschwarm) getting back to Calais-Marck in a badly damaged Bf 110. For the other two circles, 1. Staffel lost one Bf 110 (Beudel) and 2. Staffel lost two Bf 110s (Ortner and Habisch), with recent evidence pointing to the likelihood that Habisch's Bordfunker, Elfner, inadvertently shot through the rear controls of his aircraft in trying to fend off RAF fighters, thereby shooting his own aircraft down. SO, for the two Staffeln who got the break from the circle correct, losing one aircraft each to 18 RAF fighters (9 each from 32 and 111 Sqdns.) seems to be pretty good damage limitation. And yes, I know you must factor in the Stab losses overall, I'm just pointing out what the situation was with a well executed circle and break for home.
2. The defensive circle set in place on 27th September by ZG 26 when Erprobungsgruppe 210 set out to attack the Parnall factory at Yate near Bristol. ZG 26 set up a holding circle near the coast to await the return of 210 from the target. Now I don't know how good Luftwaffe Intelligence was with regard to the placement and movement of RAF Squadrons, but 504 Sqdn moved to Filton OVERNIGHT and were in place wonderfully to head-off 210 as they approached their target. Perhaps Luftwaffe Intelligence believed there would be no RAF squadrons in the vicinity of the target, and so believed 210 could have a free run in on it, while ZG 26 waited near the coast where it was believed the real intervention would take place. Hence the ZG 26 position and holding circle, in place to protect and ferry the bombing 110s back across the Channel, and mix it with any RAF squadrons that rose to intercept. We know that 504 intercepted 210 in the Bristol area, which was probably not part of the Luftwaffe plan, and more RAF squadrons intercepted around the coastal area and further inland, with consequent losses to the 110 units.
The above are just two examples of how the circle was used in the 'so-called' Battle of Britain (mustn't offend some people who say it never took place...!!!)
Another point I would like to quickly touch upon which has been mentioned in this thread, is the deployment of the Bf 110 fighter force. From the many interviews Peter Cornwell and I (and I'm sure Chris Goss also from his own research) did with Bf 110 crews, all those in the pure fighter units said that their role was close escort to bombers (immer, immer Begleitschutz). When you then consider the speed of bombers, and a fighter being tied to close escort to them, you can then see the huge disadvantage they were at when attacked by RAF fighters who might only be flying at just above two-thirds of their maximum speed. In other words, a Spit or Hurricane flying at 250-280 mph going after a 110 at about 200 mph. That is one hell of a disparity in air speed, and ability to avoid a sudden attack. That then lends some credence to the view that they were deployed incorrectly, and is supported by the famous request from a famous 109 pilot who asked to be allowed to have his unit roam free to hunt down the enemy and not be tied as any kind of escort to bombers. The decision to tie the Bf 110s to close bomber escort was a death warrant for many young Bf 110 crews as a result. One 110 pilot told me also that too many pilots respected the advice they received, of not pushing their engines to the limit. His attitude was that once in combat or heading for home he would push both engines to the max, and didn't give a toss about the life of an engine - his primary concern was to get back to base and leave it to the mechanics to decide if he'd buggered an engine on his 110 and it needed replacement.
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