Germany did not lose the Battle of Britain
 

New article by Heinkill:

While the British regard the Battle of Britain as an epic struggle which resulted in a resounding victory, there is evidence that it barely registered in German consciousness in 1940 and is still of only minor significance today.

The first thing that strikes you researching German language internet or published sources about the Battle of Britain, is how scarce they are.

Partly, this can be due to the old adage, “History is written by the victors”, but it also signals that this is a chapter in German history which German historians and even aviation enthusiasts, do not regard the same way British scholars do.

How can this be? Read more!

http://www.freewebs.com/heinkill/booksfilmssites.htm

I think that air superiority was attempted by the German high command, without the sucess being achived there was no sence to continue

“History is written by the victors”

yes this is right and most forget!
and many german documents lost at the end of the war!!

what remains is much propaganda and storys on both sides!

While the British regard the Battle of Britain as an epic struggle which resulted in a resounding victory, there is evidence that it barely registered in German consciousness in 1940 and is still of only minor significance today.

Epic struggle....yes. Resounding victory... no, unless you compare it to the spectacle of the years preceding it.

I'd have to add that what registered in the German consciousness back in that year was entirely what the Nazi party wanted to register and wasn't necessarily the whole truth.

Most of the Air Marshals, Goring, Harris, et al, were operating according to the maxim espoused in Douhet's book published in the 30s; to whit, a country could be brought to its knees by aerial bombardment alone. That philosophy prevailed almost throughout the war, but the truth is that it doesn't work unless you can follow up with armies on the ground. Only the advent of the A-bomb in 1945 brought Douhet's prophecy somewhere near the truth, though even that is contested.
In reality it was submarine warfare that prevailed, viz. the Americans ability to sink nearly every oil-tanker before it reached Japan, thereby cutting off the Japanese from that vital resource.

Had it not been for the British resisting the Luftwaffe's attempts to knock them out of the war, everything might have played out very differently in the following years. There is a very strong case for suggesting that the U.S. might never have involved herself in the European conflict if Britain had not hung on - and it's clear that the second front couldn't have been mounted without Britain as a springboard.

It'd be interesting to know where you get the notion of resounding victory from. While wartime British propaganda unsurprisingly hailed the conflict as a victory at the time, much research into the subject has been made since the war years and the overwhelming consensus is that it was "a damned close-run thing". Yet from that stubborn resistance came a glimmer of hope that grew in so many ways as to eventually overturn the Nazis' ambition towards total domination.

Maybe you're trying to see this history in little chunks - when a step back would reveal the whole ebb & flow.

B

"there is evidence that it barely registered in German consciousness in 1940 and is still of only minor significance today."

I would have to think that they reconsidered that on June 6th, 1944.

Just as much as Dunkirk is described in many British documents as a great military rescue operation against an overwhelming force. I saw very few British documents, that took note Hitler stopped his troops from crushing the British at the beach, hoping Britain would note this as a friendly act and strengthen the chances for a peace later on.

The germans definitely lost the Battle of Britain. The purpuse of the battle was to clear the RAF from the sky's and land forces on British soil. Neither was accomplished. Thats a loss. Losers generally don't write alot of articles extrolling the virtues of their loss.

I actually think it was a major turning point in the war.

The simple fact is that the German airforce suffered heavily during the whole of 1939 and 1940 with almost even attrition rates against inferior opponents. But, if Germany had managed to get England to make peace in '39 and had avoided bombing cities then it could have been a victory. It could even have one them the war.

But the failure of fascist sypathisers to consolidate power in the parliament, the failure to demoralise or destroy the RAF and the bombing of civilian targets prevented this. It was the greatest political (not necessarily military) defeat imaginable.

With England still in the war and the Commonwealth behind her and with the pro-fascist element relatively restricted in what they could do made German defeat inevitable (even if the United States stayed isolationist - which became less likely each day the U.K. held out).

After this point only a really major alteration to history like a fascist coupe in an allied country, a German attack on the Soviet Union in 1938-1939 (which the allies would have been sympathetic to), a giant U-boat fleet or a much stronger German air defense could have altered events.

Eventually, even if it took an extra year, the Great Patriotic War would end in Berlin.

Some quick comments:

brando - Even though Douhet was a diffuse "ideal" they sought to reach each and every higher Luftwaffe officer, except that fat fool Göring, was well aware that Germany didn't have the assets to wage a war Douhet had envisioned. It didn't have the aircraft and not the ammunition needed to pulverize a whole country from the air. One reason for the obsession for the Stuka idea was the problem of a lack of explosives and ammunition factories (most of which had been torn down after 1918 on behalf of the Entente). The Stuka could deliver a relatively small payload with a much greater precision than any level bomber could until the appearance of much more sophisticated bombsights such as Lotfe 7 or Norden.

Avimimus - I think you're overestimating the potential of the Empire without being backed by the US industry. I mean Great Britain bancrupted itself just to pay for the lend&lease material and it still took the massive effort of the Red Army in the East as well as the appearance of US forces to tip the balance in the Allies's favor in the west (before it had been pretty much a draw after 1940). Make no mistake - british and commonwealth forces bravely held the line until the war potential of the US industry had been brought up to speed and until the US armed forces entered the battle, but it still took this massive influx of men and material to tip the tide of battle. The russians could and would have done it on their own (for various reasons), but I don't see Britain walking all over Germany on its own. For that task its sources of power were just too far away and its supply lines being much too exposed to enemy interferance.

CSThor, I agree completely.

The economic strain of the war was devastating to the United Kingdom and most Commonwealth countries also racked up decades worth of debt. In comparison the United States barely felt the strain of the war (economically that is) and were certainly could allies to have.

My assumption is simply that if England made peace in 1939, cross-Atlantic trade might well resume with the continent. This would be a disaster. If England did not make peace it would be much harder politically for an Anglo nation to conduct large scale trade with Axis Europe.

Without the Eastern Front I have trouble imagining any of the western allies, let alone the Commonwealth by itself, "walking over Germany" (prior to Trinity/the atomic bomb anyway). In all of the scenarios I assumed that the war on the eastern front would start and would eventually end with a Soviet victory (barring Allied nations joining or supplying the German army).

Also amongst the German population was a strong 'denial' that there was such atrocities occurring at Aushwitz/Birkenau. Even today there are some diehards arguing this.

Hitler had a bigger problem.

Invading Russia

When German quit invading Britain, regardless of the reason it was a victory for Britain.

On a similar vein, I have heard that the Germans have their own very different story to tell about the disaster at Arnhem. Bridge too far and all that.

Where the Allies see it as one of those "military operation beset by unexpected difficulties" stories, what the Germans see is that the British dropped their Elite Paratroop force in a major surprise attack - and the local Volksjaeger troops managed to contain, isolate and then defeat them!

To put this into perspective, try to imagine German Fallschirmjäger units trying to capture a British coastal town in 1940 (Lowestoft bizarrely comes to mind), and being thoroughly trounced by Dad's Army. We would bloody well never forget.

I've no sources to back this up. And I'm drunk, so I really shouldn't be posting. If any Germans can elaborate on this I'd love to hear it though. :)

T.

The American commanders made Germans from communities local to the deathcamps tour and see the carnage in the camps. They were planning for the denials, no doubt.

Sure enough, even with millions of witnesses there will always be someone to deny it ever happened.

We don't ever want to forget what happened. It will always be a stain on the conscience of nations that knew and did nothing. It is a reminder to the rest of us, the barbarism of humankind can be horrendous--- unchecked.
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Everyone is watching Myanmar, sitting on their hands and the Hunta is prohibiting help. The Hunta may just be responsible for the deaths of additonal hundreds of thousands of people for not allowing other countries to provide humanitarian aid. Yet, no one wants to engage the Hunta militarily, which is probably long overdue.

Then of course countries know if they send the aid without providing distribution of the materials the Myanmar Hunta will just make their own people pay for the aid... or die.

Is this any less worse than letting Eichman and his murders systematically exterminate people? The people will be just as dead, regardless of the method.

"Everyone is watching Myanmar, sitting on their hands and the Hunta is prohibiting help. The Hunta may just be responsible for the deaths of additonal hundreds of thousands of people for not allowing other countries to provide humanitarian aid. Yet, no one wants to engage the Hunta militarily, which is probably long overdue...."

Whether or not anyone wants to engage the Hunta militarily is a moot point, but it's pretty clear that no nation wants to a) start another war in this region, or b) wage war against a nation that is struggling to survive the aftermath of a natural disaster. It's not as though anyone could launch a pinpoint strike that would remove the military junta without a massive amount of collateral damage among the innocent.

We're getting a long way from the Battle of Britain.

B

Revisionist history is often incapable of supporting itself. This is but another example of that

Did Germany lose the Battle of Britain?

Yes. Unless my memory has completely failed me, the criteria for launching Operation Sea Lion had two main facets:

1) elimination of the Royal Navy as a threat to the operation
2) elimination of the Royal Air Force as a threat to the operation

I don't have to cite History for evidence that Operation Sea Lion did not occur. We all know this. But completely apart from the invasion of England, it is very easy to explain why Germany lost the Battle of Britian:

It was the first time they faltered in Europe. They quite obviously tried to win the aerial fight over Britain in 1940

They failed. They lost the Battle. No amount of cutesy revision will sponge that away. making soft excuses like "it barely registered in the German consciousness" is nothing more than a way to introduce a gray area into the argument; it admits defeat by association and admission of something less than what was attempted. I'm sorry, but those are the facts. You can't call a defeat a victory by skewing the events 70 years later, so that it can be looked at in a 'certain point of view'. Germany demonstrably failed to achieve their goals in the Battle of Britain

Failing to achieve your goals in battle never results in your victory. Never.

if you can explain to me just how Germany's goals were achieved in the Battle of Britain, then I will agree with your standpoint. Until then, I will simply tell you that the entire reason Hitler sent planes over England in the summer of 1940 was not so that his young men and Churchill's young men could have a little football match- Germany's goals were not met, and not meeting your goals in battle is the definition of "defeat"

Thank you Mr. Older.

I really fear for the generations younger than myself, as they can so easily fail to grasp the obvious, and hence are manipulated by those who indeed would change history for their benefit.

Well said.

Germany's goals were not met, and not meeting your goals in battle is the definition of "defeat"

I agree wholeheartedly. There is no 'grey' in what happened. It was a defeat because of all the reasons you have laid out. Any other way of looking at is pathetic. If you follow the other side of this argument, you might soon be saying, Germany did not lose the war.

Salute

Amazing what revisionist nonsense there is out there.

Fact: Hitler issued a directive that plans be drawn up to invade and force the surrender of Britain. OPERATION SEELOWE As part of this plan, huge land forces were assembled on the English channel, complete with invasion barges, naval forces, etc. The invasion plans involved two German Army Groups, and hundreds of thousands of troops.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...one-marino.PNG

Fact: Hitler ordered Goring, the leader of the Luftwaffe, to lay the groundwork for a successful invasion by gaining air superiority over the English Channel and southern England. The means to this end was the defeat of the RAF.

Fact: After approximately 2 months of continuous aerial combat on a massive scale, greater than ever seen before in the history of the world, and after failing to gain air superiority, and suffering nearly twice as many losses in aircraft as the RAF, Hitler ordered OPERATION SEELOWE to be posponed indefinitely.

Fact: Because Britain did not fall, and the Germans were unable to invade, they were forced to maintain large forces on the English Channel during 1941, as well as being forced to commit troops in Yugoslavia, Greece, and in North Africa to counter British moves in those areas. The fact they were forced to waste time conquering Yugoslavia and Greece, and therefore forced to start their invasion of the Soviet Union one month late, has been pointed to as a major reason for the failure of Nazi Germany to defeat Russia in 1941, and hence a major reason why they ultimately lost the war. They ran out of good campaigning weather, and were fatally slowed by mud, then caught in the Russian winter. And of course, beyond their failure to defeat the Soviets, they then had a resurgent Britain, with the addition of the U.S., who were then able to invade at Normandy from the British island base, (impossible to invade from mainland USA) as well as devastating German industry with Allied bombers based in Britain, as well as convoys carrying lendlease to the Soviets originating in Britain. Without the victory of the RAF in the Battle of Britain, thus allowing the island of Britain to remain free, none of this was possible.

One could just as easily say that the North American obsession with having houses twice as large as those in the 1950s while we refuse to divert a small amount of our wealth to providing basic universal wellfare and primary education across the globe. Not only is it feasible to solve these problems but the inconvenience, to say the least, is much less than joining the resistance would have been for the average German. More people will die than in Burma, less (in the short term) than died in the Holocaust and they will all be just as dead. It still horrifying. So, whats your point?

What is important about the Holocaust is it shows us how easily we can do what is convenient and how easily a large part of the population (across Europe) was able to turn against a number of very small minorities and wipe them out. This is an instance that should be treated with special care, studied and taught carefully. It is also a legacy that is very much with us.

So, now that your done trolling and I'm done falling for it can we return to topic?

I agree with the point. Although it is highly unlikely that Sea Lion could have ever taken place. Air superiority was just out of reach and naval superiority would have been even more difficult. Only a psychological or political victory could have actually worked (despite the dreams of the Nazi leadership).

If you can find a scenario where it could have come about, I'd be very happy for the "beachhead defense" Lysander fieldmods.

This statement is clearly flawed. This isn't directed at you sir, but at the whole room as many may share you're opinion. I might even say it is naive and dangerous. For one thing one doesn't always know what the prerequisites for or impact of a victory may be. In the second Iraq war we recently achieved our goals and it did not bring victory, in Vietnam we achieved goals for body count numbers and those goals did not bring victory.

Lets take one example: If Germany had failed in the battle of France it is much more likely that the Allies could have made peace. If the Allies had done this than Nazi Germany could have continued trading with the United States, and, even if an embargo appeared, traded directly with smaller supplying countries. There would even have been a strong group of sympathisers for the fight against the Bolsheviks. Such a position would have moved Germany much closer to victory once the Great Patriotic War started.

So one can go from an apparent strategic failure to a strategic victory (if one doesn't understand or can't control for all of the factors this is always possible). There are certainly many other cases of tactic failures leading to strategic victories.

Lets take one example: If Germany had failed in the battle of France it is much more likely that the Allies could have made peace. If the Allies had done this than Nazi Germany could have continued trading with the United States, and, even if an embargo appeared, traded directly with smaller supplying countries. There would even have been a strong group of sympathisers for the fight against the Bolsheviks. Such a position would have moved Germany much closer to victory once the Great Patriotic War started.

No offence, but I find this statement both highly unlikely and faintly ludicrous. The world had already been alarmed by Germany's move to Nazism in the 20s and 30s and, although there was some support for Adolf Hitler's social policies (full employment, national identity, anti-communism) among the upper classes, there was a much greater groundswell of support for Communism amongst the working classes in France & Great Britain. In hindsight we can see that both opinions were delusive as far as the reality was concerned, but it's hard to imagine that any assault on Russia would have been supported even by the Americans.

It's necessary to look at what was going on with regard to Hitler's other policies especially the eradication of Jewry and anyone else who didn't fit into his crazy notions of racial purity. If the German army had been beaten at the French border then more than peace would have ensued; the Allied nations would have fully mobilised and invaded Germany, and the conditions of the Versailles Treaty would have been enforced again. The sinister side of Nazism would have been revealed in that process and I cannot believe that America would have failed to act on those revelations.

B

Good link planespotter :D

Terrible name for the thread though :( Someone is kidding themselves :roll:

Agreeing with Mr former Older, I would just like to add that there is no guarantee that the USSR would have beaten the Germans if the UK had made peace and the US never entered the war. After all, the Germans did defeat the Russian Empire in the 1914-18 War, even with the UK and France still fighting in France. Horrible conditions then eventually caused Russian military morale to collapse and social revolution.

While Stalin and the Communists were much better at repressing their population than the Tzar it is possible that a German effort unencumbered by the need to deal with UK efforts in the channel and balkans would have had just enough impetus to take Moscow, which could have caused the Soviet regime to collapse. Especially if Hitler had harnessed eastern european anti-russian nationalist feeling: as opposed to just oppressing everyone.

I am not under-rating the morale or skill of the Red Army, but the great offensives it carried out in 1943-45 would have been impossible to sustain without western aid, especially in the thousands of US made trucks needed for logistical support, (the tanks, aircraft etc less important IMHO).

So if the Luftwaffe had gained air supremacy and forced a negotiated peace on the UK guaranteeing Hitler access to middle eastern oil, is is quite possible (note I am not claiming certain) that Hitler would have succeeded in the conquest of the USSR, with who knows what consequences.

So the BoB was a vital defeat for the Germans, along with Moscow 1941 and Stalingrad, because of its strategic implications.

Your use of "sir" combined with your general tone tells me something here. Please remember that I am replying to your comments and that I did not initiate this exchange; you desired to call me out on "dangerous and naive" comments, so this is not my doing, OK?

I said quite clearly "Failing to achieve your goals in battle never results in victory", and I am quite clearly restricting ALL my statements on the matter to the topic of discussion, which is ONE battle, not all of WWII

I did not say "You must win every battle to win a war", which are the words you are attempting to cram down my throat. You are skewing my words to alter my meaning, and you are attempting to expand the subject FAR in excess of the topic my statements were made about. You desire to make me have said "Losing a Battle means you lose the war or a campaign", when you know I was specifically commenting on the issue at hand: The Battle of Britain. Not WWII as a whole or even Hitler's European campaign

You know quite well that we are talking about ONE battle, and my words are in reference to that ONE battle. I did not expand the discussion to include how a tactical failure today can or cannot lead to a strategic victory tomorrow- YOU have just introduced that aspect. I am commenting on the Battle of Britain, not the whole of WWII.

On one hand, it's quite insulting to everyone in the discussion since you decided to paint everyone with all the same brush, and on the other, it's quite a negative comment on me personally in regards to my intellect. Obviously you can see I'm a little aware of myself and what's going on so please consider your comments more carefully when you try to show me how dumb I am in the future, and think twice before you try to put words in my mouth

Far from being a "naive and dangerous" statement of mine, you have taken my words not only out of my intended context, but even out of the context of the discussion. I can't quite see how everyone else here knows exactly what was said but you don't, but I'll try to clarify for you:

I did not say:

Failing to achieve your goals in battle never results in winning a war. Never. [future tense]

I DID say:

Failing to achieve your goals in battle never results in your victory. Never. [present tense]


Is that clear as crystal yet? Are my statements now beyond distortion? I didn't say that once you lose a battle, the war is lost. That is a simplistic and wooden-headed statement you are trying to attribute to me and I'd appreciate it if you would stop putting words in my mouth

"Tactical" and "Strategic" victories and how they effect the course of the war is not the topic. I am not here talking about the outcome of the war as affected by the dynamic influence of a series of campaigns. So my statement stands regardless of how you intend to twist and pervert it. You can't take what I said hours ago, change the topic to what YOU want to talk about, and then tell me how wrong I am. If you want to discuss how losing a battle can result in winning a war I will not disagree with you, but that is not what I and everyone else here are discussing

Please explain to me how the failure of Germany to secure their goals during the Battle of Britain resulted in their Victory in the Battle of Britain

If you can do that, I'll agree with you


(I apologize for the edits- I just got a new PC with a new low-profile keyboard and I'm mis-typing a lot of things)

Me trolling... More of the US sharing the wealth. LOL Eastern European and Soviet countries have gotten a belly full of Communism over the past 60 years. The European Union has turned Europe into one of the most prosperous regions in the world. The Euro is trading at all time highs... so maybe instead of Europeans coming to America to buy our real estate cheap they should buy up the real estate in the less prosperous regions of Europe and the ex-Soviet block countries. There are plenty of bargains there and they would be helping their fellows. The thing is... they want their investments protected and they know their investment in American real estate is protected by a legal system that will preserve their interests.

Until Europeans trust and protect each other's interests they'll keep complaining about what the US should be doing. LOL

As an American I expect to see the European Union collapse. Not because it isn't a viable concept, but because there hasn't been any lasting peace in Europe for 2,000+ years. In America, it doesn't bother us for our government to spend and vitalize areas like Montana, and Wyoming that are huge geographic areas with miniscule populations and their tax contributions are for the most part pretty well worthless in the scheme of running America. Europeans won't tolerate that kind of thing.

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What I was saying is... The Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, Czechs, Romanians, etc stood by and let the Axis armies build and run extermination camps. The people knew what was going on, are they guiltless?

Are we, the countries of the World guiltless when we know 100,000+ people will probably die in Myanmar? That is a reality. At what point do countries and organizations go beyond chit chat to do what should done?

Lame excuses about national soverignty will not save those people, Only food, medical and aid will do what is needed. The Myanmar Hunta is fearful the world might just kick their butts outta power, if they allow outside help into the country.

So... the world is going to respect the Sovereignty of the Hunta and as far as the people of Myanmar are concerned... "time to die".

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Agree completely!

Achieving goals and not being victorious is one thing. NOT achieving goals and being victorious is something completely different. Both examples you provided (that are quite the opposite of what Former_Older said) could lead to several pages of discussion about who won/lost depending on the point of view, but that's another topic.

While there may be cases where you can fail certain goals and still be victorius (extreme example: if winning a war implies being victorious and the goal is to have less than X casualties in said war, you can fail that goal and still "win") it is not the case for Former Older's post!

Well get over it more or less they lost it,
Losing air superiority they wouldn't find it very smart going in with ground forces since they'd be pretty much raped before they could settle inland and get camps n stuff up.

French did not lose the Battle of Waterloo.

West Ham United did not lose the 2006 FA Cup final.

These things are self-evident.

My apologies

1. You treat me as being far too clever than I am. I didn't twist the topic around to another one, I really believed we were talking about another one from the very beginning. I take it your goal was simply to dismiss any arguments that the Germans didn't fail to achieve their goals for the Battle of Britain. At the same time I simply assumed that discussing any past campaign (despite having 20/20 hindsight) is essentially similar to discussing a present or future campaign.

In my mind you can't simply demonstrate what happened or why what happened was inevitable. Instead one must consider the full range of decisions that could have been made, their implications in the complex military/civilian environment, the failures of the command staff's understanding and a variety of scenarios (including counter-factual ones). This is a very different goal.

So, I was thinking about all of the long term implications that the battle of Britain could have had on the outcome of the war (as opposed to the the extensive failure to achieve the goals set by the German high command for the operation).

2. The key point is confusion over the term "Victory". I generally equate it with a long-standing sustainable success. It is the outcome of a war or a major part of a war that later has long term positive impacts on civilian policy. This is how I've always used the word and seems to be the main source of confusion.

3. This particular the phrase was also important: "Failing to achieve your goals in battle never results in your victory. Never."
This seemed to be a generalisation to all wars, past, present and future. Doing such would require not viewing a military action in the context of the larger, complex chain of events or civilian goals is indeed dangerous and naive. I suspect that you would agree with this.

No one familiar with military history could possibly maintain the position you seemed to be given the complexities of outcomes of decisions in warfare (no plan surviving contact with the enemy &C). I actually realised that it was very unlikely that you maintained such a position, but I was unable (for unrelated reasons) to return to the computer to reread what you wrote and to correct my post.

So, certainly the following statement is one I would agree with: "Failing to achieve your goals in battle never results in your achievement of your goals in the same battle. Never."

We probably are in agreement on most if not all points and this was simply due to a difference in the use of language and a couple mistakes in how the arguments were made (in particular my use of the word naive).

S!

I should say sorry too for being a little too...confrontative. I do think though that you should use my comments in the context for which they were uttered :)

Thank you, but I was the one who made the biggest mistake in the language I used. It serves me right for writing a message at two in the morning. I certainly didn't mean to offend anyone or derail the thread - I just wasn't thinking clearly.

Thanks, to amend my point: "Any action in warfare can have unintended and unforeseen consequences and implications, even to the extent that a victory could look like a defeat and a defeat could look like a victory". That is what I should have written and it is a relatively obvious point.

Germany lost the Battle of britain.
I can't see how you can argue otherwise.

Germany slunk away having lost, but was able to largely hide the fact for a number of reasons.

Understanding German indifference to the outcome is different to saying that they won it.



People prefer to discuss and research battles they won, or defeats that are seen as 'heroic' like Stalingrad. BoB was an embaressing defeat - they were expected to win, but didn't. Harder to come to terms with than an defeat by overwhelming odds.

It was 'somewhere else' not a war at home, like the air defense of the Reich.
No impact on the people, so of little concern.

No ground troops were involved so no reports of ground battles lost that would equate to obvious defeat. Defeat of an arial campaign not being really understood by the public at that point.

Events of greater importance soon overshadowed it (Russia and the defense of the reich) making it of less emotive power to the Germans.

So it was an embaressment the Germans wanted to forget, and one that affected few in Germany itself making it easy to gloss over, and given later events marginalise to further push it from their minds.

History may be written by the winners, but the loosers have a habit of glossing over the embarassing bits in their books.


It's big in Britain because we won.
It's big in the scheme of the war because it stopped the Nazi juggernaut.
It may be overshadowed in numbers by later battles, but was still a significant victory.

Salute

People who dismiss the Battle of Britain as being insignificant are suffering from a complete lack of Strategic understanding.

Germany made the same mistake in both World Wars: They fought on two fronts at the same time, forcing them to divide their strength and fatally weakening their tactical options.

In World War I, Germany was able to finally beat one of their opponents, Czarist Russia, but by that time, America had entered the war, and their strength had been weakened too much by the three previous years for them to finish the British and French in the Spring of 1918 before the Americans arrived in strength.

In World War II, Hitler and Ribbentrop had brought off the brilliant coup of taking the Soviet Union out of the equation by signing the Nazi-Soviet Non Aggression Pact, and dividing up Poland. Germany was then faced with the much easier task of fighting a one front war, and of beating the French and British. After France fell, and the majority of the British land forces were destroyed as a fighting force, (Dunkirk only saved the men, not the equipment) the Germans were in a completely dominant Strategic position, facing a British Empire nearly fatally wounded. All they needed to do was get across the 20 miles of the English Channel, and the war against the West would be won. The British Army was in no position to fight back, there was only one division on their OOB, (the 1st Canadian) which was fully equipped and ready to fight. If the Germans could land their Wehrmacht divisions in England, the ground battle would be a forgone conclusion.

Hitler gave Britain a little less than a month to surrender, while he massed his forces on the Channel coast and accumulated supplies and equipment. He then drew up his plans. For a detailed look at those plans, take a look at my previously posted map, and look here:

http://www.kretsen.nu/bytebattler/do...LION%20OOB.pdf

(note the comments about the S.S. 'Special Action Groups', or Einsatzgruppen, who were tasked with arresting and liquidating all members of British society deemed potential opponents, Churchill was slated for immediate execution)

The key to a successful invasion was command of the air over the channel. Without air superiority, the Royal Navy would sortie from the ports further up in the North Sea, and make short work of the invasion fleet. The German Kriegsmarine was nowhere near strong enough on its own to deal with the Royal Navy. During the invasion of Norway, the German Navy was seriously damaged in its clashes with the Royal Navy, and unable to support its troops landed in the north. In the event of an invasion of Britain, the Royal Navy would have isolated the first wave of German troops, which would have been lightly armed and without heavy artillery and tank support, and cut the supplies and reinforcements crucial to a successful consolidation and advance.

Of course, even if the Germans obtained air superiority over the channel, the Royal Navy would have still sortied, but its chances of prevailing would have been much reduced. A Stuka might be a sitting duck when intercepted by a fighter, but when it was operating free from aerial interference, it became a terrifyingly effective anti-shipping weapon.

Everything depended on the battle in the air. With Aerial Superiority, the all powerful Werhmacht stood a very good chance of crossing the channel and landing successfully, without it, its chances were not good.

The failure of the Luftwaffe to defeat the RAF meant the chances of a costly defeat for the invading forces were too great for the Germans to risk. So they called it all off.

At that point, Hitler could have continued his neutrality policy with Soviet Union, but instead, he made his greatest mistake, and opted to begin an invasion, a two front war, with Britain still undefeated.

His original plan was for the invasion to begin on May 15th 1941, but this was delayed by British operations in the Balkans.

First, the Italians were bogged down in their war with Greece. The British compounded this by reinforcing the Greeks with British divisions and RAF units, threatening to throw the Italians out of Albania.

Then, British supported factions in Yugoslavia overthrew the German controlled government there, planting a hostile entity on the German southern flank.

Hitler reacted by posponing the invasion of the Soviet Union, and sending his Panzers south. Even though the Nazis overran Yugoslavia and Greece, and decisively defeated the British, the time lost during these campaigns meant OPERATION BARBAROSSA, the plan to invade Russia, was postponed till June 22nd, much later than the Werhmacht planners had hoped for. If the British were no longer an entity, none of this would have happened.

And even though the invasion initially went well, with much of Western Russia being overrun, the advent of the rainy season in October of 1941 saw the Wehrmacht still far short of achieving its goal of capturing Moscow. For nearly three weeks, till frost set in, the advance slowed to a crawl in the mud, giving the Soviets time to build defences, and most importantly, to bring the battle seasoned troops from its Siberian Army, (fresh from their victories over the Japanese at Khalkin Gol in 1939) into position in front of Moscow. The Germans then had a few good campaigning weeks in the November frosts before the snows came, but it wasn't enough, they fell just short of capturing Moscow. With the snows, came the Soviet Winter counteroffensive, led by the Siberians, and the first substantial defeat of the Wehrmacht. It wasn't till the next summer that the Germans were able to resume their attack, and by then the Soviets had grown in strength and tactical skill, and the attack led only to defeat at Stalingrad.

The events of the Second World War are not isolated instances, each battle affects the next one, and the Battle of Britain was a crucial link in the chain of failures which led to the defeat of Nazi Germany.

Actually I think many posters didn't read the original article, or that it is poorly written:

http://www.freewebs.com/heinkill/booksfilmssites.htm

He isn't actually saying that Germany didn't lose the battle of britain

He is saying that Brits venerate it, and Germans seem to have forgotten/ignore it (perhaps because from their point of view, because they never felt that they lost it.)

It's a different question than one about whether Germany did or didn't lose the BoB - the question is why does it mean so much to Brits, and so little to Germans.

Hi

Your topic name is "Germany did not lose the Battle of Britain". The reason so many people are discussing that topic and not the topic you linked to, is because you made the topic about Germany not losing the battle of Britain...it is the name of your topic that has turned the discussion away from your intention...how can I know that your intent is to illustrate something else when you appear to be using this linked article to back up your topic, which is "Germany did not lose the Battle of Britain"?

I think it was because pretty well no-one in the German forces expected SeeLowe to go ahead for logistical reasons unless Goring's fliers were able to gain mastery of Britain's airspace. This they were unable to do and it cost them pretty dearly.
From the German side it was a fiasco as far as the overall plan to create the conditions for the seaborne invasion was concerned and, when the weather closed down in the Autumn, there had been no lasting destruction of the main targets, i.e. 11 Group's airbases, the Chain Home radar network, and the military bases.
The Luftwaffe had been badly led by Der Eisener and Hitler had turned his sights on the East, so the air assault and the invasion were just allowed to slide.

In hindsight it can be seen that a) properly led the long air battle could have been won, and b) letting Britain off the hook set the stage for what came next.

It's also worth noting that the air assault didn't end when day-bombing was curtailed. Night-bombing remained as another serious threat and continued, but no serious attack on the fighter bases was delivered. Thus I think the German population was lulled into thinking that nothing decisive had occurred - but, for the reasons mentioned, we knew we had driven off the most serious attacks on our shores. And they never recurred, ever. Definitely a cause for celebration in my book!

B

Disagree 100%

I suspect that you wanted to start a fire rather than put one out.
To answer the question that you posed to us " how can this be so?" I think you have to be a psychiatrist, not an historian.
You might find this link interesting. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial

Germany lost alot of experienced aircrew who were needed in the future. Thus the Battle of Britain was a costly loss for the Luftwaffe.

(quote) the question is why does it mean so much to Brits, and so little to Germans.

Well it should mean alot to the Brits, after all their valient efforts saved their nation from invasion. As for the German people, the ones that this mattered to the most, are long since dead, namely Hitler and his high command. I'm sure that the modern day German peoples would perfer to forget about that time in their history. It is much like the battle of Little Bighorn, much pride for today's American Indians. And a time of shame for todays modern white American's.

Disagree that Germany didn't lose.

If you look at the definition of 'battle' and then apply it to the struggle in 1940 you'll see Germany really did loose the Battle of Britian.

And thats what caused previous wars you mentioned ;). Western Europe has always been a rich place because it exploited the rest of the world and much of that exploited land has caused those wars because of the riches they contained.

Its probably because military defeats are never celebrated. Its mightly Luftwaffe was defeated? Thats not good news so makes for bad propaganda, which was the Nazi's forte. The RAF won, and for Britain it not only needed the victory to prevent any invasion, it needed it for a moral boost for the British population, so its celebrated, allot.

The (quote) is not mine :-P

Apologies.

I guess it's like when you get pushed by a bully.

If you stumble and go down you've lost. If you manage to keep your dignity and can hold your head up high, it doesn't matter what happens next, you've won.

Britain kept her head up high, she managed to go onto a back foot and get enough time to take a breath and plan what her next move would be.

Nobody questions whether the Battle of Britain was a close thing, it was!, If it wasn't for the incompetance of the Germans in command, it could have gone horribly differently, yet the fact remains that due to the bravery of the 'Few', (most of them only kids in their 20's) that had to get into the Hurricanes and Spitfires, serveral times a day in many cases, the world would be an entirely different (and much worse) place today.

Good BOB info.
 

Here is a great reference link about the Battle of Britain enjoy: http://www.raf.mod.uk/Bob1940/bobhome.html

I do understand the sentiment contained in the original thread post. My family was in Germany at the time and pointedly mentioned the propaganda practised as fervently by all nations (it is quite simply, the primary universal means of modern government as opposed to perhaps the fear and domination rule of the mediaeval and ancient world).

The civilian experience of BoB in Germany, taken from this rather subjective source was that it was not a defeat for the military, who undoubtedly inflicted as severe losses to the enemy as were sustained. In this sense it was more a personal blow to the arrogance of the Nazis than anything else.

In strategic terms however this was a campaign and it was lost. England won. This is simply because the intention was to invade England and this was prevented during a series of aerial battles prelimenary to the invasion. So Germany did lose, but it is nothing like a sporting event and should not be thought of with any kind of national pride from either side. It was a terrible event and its consequences either way were terrible.

In reality nobody "won" the Battle of Britain. An invasion was prevented, and lots of honest patriots and career soldiers lost their lives defending their respective populations. You shouldn't even go around pointing the finger of culpability, since the political situation stretches to the Great War and beyond.

The Nazis had rotten, barbaric policies which resulted in horrific domestic acts. But it's pretty callous to use that in support of either British or any other mindless patriotism. Let us simply honour the men of the RAF and Luftwaffe for doing their duty.

My favourite tales of the conflict are where a stricken pilot would occasionally be escorted to home territory by an enemy aircraft, such was the maturity of those whom were involved. So let's practise a bit of that, hey? ;)

Dear All,
Another point that has not been considered is the effect of morale. The fact that the British Isles 'held out' against the German might, considering that Poland Denmark Holland Norway Belgium and France had all succumbed must have given some comfort and hope to the resistance fighters. (There was a similar situation that arose with the Island of Malta) It also bought the world time to prepare and consider what to do next. Once the US got involved, Britain was a base to attack and supply from. Equally for the Germans the possibility that the war would continue on probably for years near the borders as with WWI, must have been little comfort to the German high command.
Best regards,
SLP

Salute

In 1974 the British Army held a detailed War Game at its Sandhurst Military college, simulating a German invasion of Britain in September 1940. Participating were many persons who actually were on the staff of the British and German armies of the time, including persons such as General Adolf Galland. The game was predicated on the actual historical situation on September 16th 1940, ie. the Germans have not yet obtained air superiority. The landing locations, airdrops etc. were based on the original German plans, and the British dispositions based on the real units positions.

The wargames were extremely detailed, using all the factors which might be considered. Following is a summary of the results:

>>>

Operation Sealion - summary of an exercise held at the
Staff College, Sandhurst in 1974.

The full text is in 'Sealion' by Richard Cox. The scenario
is based on the known plans of each side, plus previously
unpublished Admiralty weather records for September 1940.
Each side (played by British and German officers respectively)
was based in a command room, and the actual moves plotted
on a scale model of SE England constructed at the School
of Infantry. The panel of umpires included Adolf Galland,
Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher
Foxley-Norris, Rear Admiral Edward Gueritz, General Heinz
Trettner and Major General Glyn Gilbert.

The main problem the Germans face is that are a) the
Luftwaffe has not yet won air supremacy; b) the possible
invasion dates are constrained by the weather and tides
(for a high water attack) and c) it has taken until
late September to assemble the necessary shipping.

22nd September - morning
The first wave of a planned 330,000 men hit the beaches
at dawn. Elements of 9 divisions landed between
Folkestone and Rottingdean (near Brighton).
In addition 7th FJ Div landed at Lympne to take the airfield.

The invasion fleet suffered minor losses from MTBs during
the night crossing, but the RN had already lost one
CA and three DDs sunk, with one CA and two DDs damaged,
whilst sinking three German DDs. Within hours of the landings
which overwhelmed the beach defenders, reserve formations
were despatched to Kent. Although there were 25 divisions
in the UK, only 17 were fully equipped, and only three
were based in Kent, however the defence plan relied on
the use of mobile reserves and armoured and mechanised
brigades were committed as soon as the main landings were
identified.

Meanwhile the air battle raged, the Luftwaffe flew 1200
fighter and 800 bomber sorties before 1200 hrs. The RAF
even threw in training planes hastily armed with bombs,
but the Luftwaffe were already having problems with their
short ranged Me 109s despite cramming as many as possible
into the Pas de Calais.

22nd - 23rd September
The Germans had still not captured a major port, although
they started driving for Folkestone. Shipping unloading
on the beaches suffered heavy losses from RAF bombing
raids and then further losses at their ports in France.

The U-Boats, Luftwaffe and few surface ships had lost
contact with the RN, but then a cruiser squadron with
supporting DDs entered the Channel narrows and had to
run the gauntlet of long range coastal guns, E-Boats
and 50 Stukas. Two CAs were sunk and one damaged. However
a diversionary German naval sortie from Norway was
completely destroyed and other sorties by MTBS and DDs
inflicted losses on the shipping milling about in the
Channel. German shipping losses on the first day
amounted to over 25% of their invasion fleet, especially
the barges, which proved desperately unseaworthy.

23rd Sept dawn - 1400 hrs.
The RAF had lost 237 planes out 1048 (167 fighters and
70 bombers), and the navy had suffered enough losses such
that it was keeping its BBs and CVs back, but large
forces of DDs and CAs were massing. Air recon showed a
German buildup in Cherbourg and forces were diverted to
the South West.

The German Navy were despondant about their losses,
especially as the loss of barges was seriously
dislocating domestic industry. The Army and Airforce
commanders were jubilant however, and preperations for
the transfer of the next echelon continued along with
the air transport of 22nd Div, despite Luftwaffe losses
of 165 fighters and 168 bombers. Out of only 732 fighters
and 724 bombers these were heavy losses. Both sides
overestimated losses inflicted by 50%.

The 22nd Div airlanded successfully at Lympne, although
long range artillery fire directed by a stay-behind
commando group interdicted the runways. The first British
counterattacks by 42nd Div supported by an armoured
brigade halted the German 34th Div in its drive on Hastings.
7th Panzer Div was having difficulty with extensive
anti-tank obstacles and assault teams armed with sticky
bombs etc. Meanwhile an Australian Div had retaken
Newhaven (the only German port), however the New Zealand
Div arrived at Folkestone only to be attacked in the
rear by 22nd Airlanding Div. The division fell back on
Dover having lost 35% casualties.

Sep 23rd 1400 - 1900 hrs
Throughout the day the Luftwaffe put up a maximum effort,
with 1500 fighter and 460 bomber sorties, but the RAF
persisted in attacks on shipping and airfields. Much of
this effort was directed for ground support and air
resupply, despite Adm Raeders request for more aircover
over the Channel. The Home Fleet had pulled out of air
range however, leaving the fight in the hands of 57 DDs
and 17 CAs plus MTBs. The Germans could put very little
surface strength against this. Waves of DDs and CAs
entered the Channel, and although two were sunk by U-Boats,
they sank one U-Boat in return and did not stop. The German
flotilla at Le Havre put to sea (3 DD, 14 E-Boats) and at
dusk intercepted the British, but were wiped out, losing
all their DDs and 7 E-Boats.

The Germans now had 10 divisions ashore, but in many
cases these were incomplete and waiting for their
second echelon to arrive that night. The weather
was unsuitable for the barges however, and the decision
to sail was referred up the chain of command.

23rd Sep 1900 - Sep 24th dawn
The Fuhrer Conference held at 1800 broke out into bitter
inter-service rivalry - the Army wanted their second
echelon sent, and the navy protesting that the
weather was unsuitable, and the latest naval defeat
rendered the Channel indefensible without air support.
Goring countered this by saying it could only be done
by stopped the terror bombing of London, which in turn
Hitler vetoed. The fleet was ordered to stand by.

The RAF meanwhile had lost 97 more fighters leaving only
440. The airfields of 11 Group were cratered ruins, and
once more the threat of collapse, which had receded in
early September, was looming. The Luftwaffe had lost
another 71 fighters and 142 bombers. Again both sides
overestimated losses inflicted, even after allowing for
inflated figures.

On the ground the Germans made good progress towards Dover
and towards Canterbury, however they suffered reverses
around Newhaven when the 45th Div and Australians
attacked. At 2150 Hitler decided to launch the second wave,
but only the short crossing from Calais and Dunkirk. By
the time the order reached the ports, the second wave
could not possibly arrive before dawn. The 6th and 8th
divisions at Newhaven, supplied from Le Havre, would not
be reinforced at all.

Sep 24th dawn - Sep 28th
The German fleet set sail, the weather calmed, and U-Boats,
E-Boats and fighters covered them. However at daylight 5th
destroyer flotilla found the barges still 10 miles off
the coast and tore them to shreds. The Luftwaffe in turn
committed all its remaining bombers, and the RAF responded
with 19 squadrons of fighters. The Germans disabled two
CAs and four DDs, but 65% of the barges were sunk. The
faster steamers broke away and headed for Folkestone,
but the port had been so badly damaged that they could
only unload two at a time.

The failure on the crossing meant that the German
situation became desperate. The divisions had sufficient
ammunition for 2 to 7 days more fighting, but without
extra men and equipment could not extend the bridgehead.
Hitler ordered the deployment on reserve units to Poland
and the Germans began preparations for an evacuation as
further British arracks hemmed them in tighter. Fast
steamers and car ferries were assembled for evacuation
via Rye and Folkestone. Of 90,000 troops who landed
on 22nd september, only 15,400 returned to France, the rest
were killed or captured.

<<<

So if the British hadn’t won the battle of Britain they would have won the war right there and then?
Interesting thought!

In warfare a denial of victory for the opponent is the same as a victory.

And if you can choose when and how to engage the enemy, and also, when and how to disengage you will, eventually, win the war.
.

Viking

A fascinating scenario. The Kreigsmarine is defeated without the Royal Navy having to commit their capital ships. Which points out the single greatest failing of the German High Command, to wit, the complete and utter lack of understanding of the importance, and implementation, of a large blue water navy.

No, approx. 100,000 troops for the Germans killed or captured as indicated by this scenario would not be a huge loss. It would more be a question of the prestige of the army, and the fact it would be a setback in their ability to timetable an attack on the Soviets. (if they even would want to do that after a defeat in England) Remember the Wehrmacht was huge.

The Germans lost 250,000 dead and 500,000 wounded in the first year of the invasion of the Soviet Union, even though that year was pretty much an unbroken string of victories.

It was the first time Hitler had been stopped in his relentless advance, so it certainly WAS a victory for the Allies.

Now began the hard struggle of fighting back.

It took 5 long years but the Battle of Britain WAS the beginning of the end for the Nazi Regime.

Excellent post, Buzzsaw. That made for fascinating reading.

~S~

I would be interested of the outcome if AH hadn´t made the mistake to change the target from raf to terror-bombing.
As it was so close germany might have gotten air-superiority.

Excellent posts Buzzsaw, especially the resume on page 4.

However, I still have doubts that, had the Germans had taken Moscow and Stalingrad, Russia would have collapsed. I believe that Stalin would simply have pulled further and further back, drawing thinner the German supply lines and their ability to cover the territory militarily, until Stalin was able to strike back. I understand that by the time of 'Stalingrad' much of his production had been moved well to the rear and we all know how strongly he eventually came back.

Regarding the "Britain loses the BoB" or "Britain accepts peace terms" angle, I know Russia would probably not have had support from Britain or the US but it seems unlikely that Germany could have overrun the entire country (almost = continent) with Stalin there to drive his people in his inimitable way.

On the original topic itself, I think enough has been said, Germany were defeated in their objective. I would love to have been a fly on the wall at that invasion scenario though :)

In my opinion the hope and intention of the German offensive was to force the British to a peace agreement, you keep your dominions etc and we do as we please in Europe, and then get on with the plans in the east, the Barbarossa offensive. The invasion planes for Britain were just a hoax.

Viking

Edit: I believe bluff is a better word than hoax.

I certainly agree with that summation, Viking. Even Hitler is noted as having said that he thought there would be "some technical difficulties" in achieving the aims of Operation SeeLowe. However, he was content to allow Goering to attempt the aerial supremacy part of the operation - but rapidly lost interest when Britain held out.

In retrospect we (the British) should probably be grateful that Hitler didn't give Sea-lion his full attention, as he did with the Battle of France. Goering and Udet were still caught up with the ideas of the First World War while Hitler was able to think "outside the box", as he demonstrated with the Blitzkrieg on mainland Europe. Perhaps he would have been able to direct the air operations in a more detached manner, and focussed his attentions on the vulnerable points in the British defences.

B

Wrong. The Germans had expected Britain to surrender after France fell, and in the eventuality that happened, Britain might have been treated more leniently. (surrender the fleet, pay reparations) But after Churchill's firery speeches to Parliament, ('We shall fight on the beaches....We shall never surrender') they realized that negotiations were not possible.

The Germans were deadly serious about the invasion of Britain, they drew up detailed plans for the occupation of England, as well, as I have mentioned earlier, plans to have all 'subversive' elements, ie. Churchill and his supporters, labour union leaders, Jews, Communists, and anyone else who they deemed to be unsatisfactory to be liquidated. S.S. supervised Concentration camps were planned to be set up. Hitler appointed a bureaucracy and military governor to rule the country in summer 1940. The plans also included the removal of King George and his replacement with the Nazi sympathizing Edward VIII.

Things were to be much the same as in France and the situation there with the Vichy state, with the occupation of most of industrial Britain, with a British 'puppet' government being installed at the Nazis pleasure in a smaller northern city, I think York was mentioned.

You are correct in assuming that the Nazis did not want the destruction of the British Empire, but that didn't mean they wanted things to remain as they were. The British were to be treated in the same way as the French, all their overseas possessions were to be run by the puppet government, under Nazi supervision, and in instances where the Eastern overseas possessions could not be controlled by the puppet government, then they would be handed over to Japanese supervision. (in the same way that Indochina was handed over to the Japanese when the Vichy government couldn't guarantee that it would stay in the Nazi orbit)

Canada, Australia and New Zealand would not have surrendered, the British Government would have gone into exile in Canada, and would have continued the war, while appealing for American protection. (which would likely have been offered, the U.S. under the Monroe doctrine, would not tolerate European control of areas of North America, or Australia) What was left of the British Fleet would have rebased, likely to Halifax, Canada, which is the largest deep water port in Canada. Australia would likely have tried to conclude an alliance with the U.S. in protection against Japanese attack.

The United States would probably have built up its bases in Iceland, as a screen and warning for any potential threats from Europe.

India would also likely initially have stayed in the war, but there would have been a lot of agitation by Indians for independence, and a self controlled parliament, which might have wanted a peace.

The Japanese would have automatically occupied Hong Kong, Singapore, and the British Pacific islands.

Let's not forget who was running Germany. Hitler was a genocidal sociopath, not some altruistic statesman, and his Nazi party cohorts were just as bad. That was one of the major reasons that Britain would not surrender after the fall of France. Churchill and the British knew that Hitler could not be trusted, and that any peace treaty would not allow the British people to remain masters of their own destiny. Hitler would not have accepted a peace which did not involve the surrender of the British fleet, and with their fleet gone, Britain could be occupied at anytime by the Nazis.

I’m not young enough to know everything; I just stated my opinion.

Viking

The Battle of Britain was a draw. Neither side won outright.
The loss of pilots was similar on both sides.
As far as Britain was concerned a draw was enough to stay in the fight.
Germany gave up the attempt and concentrated its efforts elsewhere.
So a tactical draw but strategic defeat for Germany.

The LW were tasked with obtaining air superiorty. The RAF prevented the LW from gaining air superiority. I don't see how that makes it a draw.

Exactly. Germany set an objective and were prevented from finishing that. Hence they lost.

Using the 'draw' or no winner thing...you could apply the same thought to the Ardennes offensive or about half the battle of WW2.

Rather than make aspersions, I would suggest you actually do some research.

Start with 'Sealion' by Richard Cox, and look for other sources which detail the German plans.

Let me start with "I don't believe that Germany won the Battle of Britain", for those requiring a simple answer. I wonder how many of the "revisionist screamers" actually read Lt Col Lund's article which was referenced in the linked article. For those who missed the link, or did not read it, here it is:

http://funsite.unc.edu/hyperwar/ETO/BOB/BoB-German/

Remember that this is a USAF Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course, written by a United States Air Force Officer. It disturbs me to see my own countrymen accuse their own Military analysts and Officers of being "revisionist". That's usually internet speak for "Traitor". I think that's what is meant, but I could be wrong.

For Britain it turned out to be a Strategic victory. For Germany, on the other hand, it was an Operational defeat. Both of these conditions, however clear in the 20/20 of hindsight, could very well have turned differently, based upon Hitler's decision making AFTER the fall of 1940. The German decisions which followed are best viewed as Strategic mistakes, lead by an emboldened Hitler, most namely the invasions of Yugoslavia and Greece, the expedition into North Africa and the maddeningly idiotic invasion of Russia. Had Hitler simply left Mussolini to bear the burden of his mistakes early-on, the war would certainly have gone differently. But of course, this was one of the most fatal flaws in the "Little Corporals" strategic decision making. He was simply unable to focus on a few critical objectives for too long. He was constantly changing his mind and adding objectives.

I think that the point of the original poster was to present the differing perspectives from which the same outcome can be viewed. Hitler, Goering, Von Rundstedt, Raeder, Student - for example - had differing purposes, priorities and expectations concerning both the realistic goals of Operation Sea Lion and it's viability.

The assumption presented by some seems to be that since there was a plan for Seelowe, the Germany was 100% committed to it. This is only true with respect to the Luftwaffe. Hitler had other things on his mind, Student knew he could not drop troops after June, Raeder knew that he did not have anywhere near the forces to even partially complete his tasking. Von Runstedt knew that the opportunity of taking England by the Heer, was probably lost at Dunkirk and certainly lost within a three week period after it. Only the idiot Goering, believed that he could accomplish his mission, which he executed poorly - making three disastrous assumptions (that his fighter pilots had no bravery, that he had enough strike capability, and that those tall metal towers on the coast were communications antennae) and at least one completely bone-headed co-decision (with Hitler, to switch from military to civilian targets).

I would suggest Sir B.H. Liddell-Hart's interviews with captured German decision makers, leaders and other witnesses, documented in "The Other Side of the Hill" (UK Edition) and "German Generals Talk (condensed US Edition)" - first published in 1948 as a reference. Particularly pages 144 to 153 in the U.S. Edition.

"Hitler's Generals" - edited by Correlli Barnett is also an excellent book which documents much of what is known and understood about Hitler's reluctance to fully "kick off" Operation Sea Lion. Based upon the statements of Von Rundstedt, members of his staff including Blumentritt, the actual history goes like this - After allowing the BEF to escape at Dunkirk, Hitler fully expected to work out a "deal" with Britain. No matter what we may think about the prospects of Hitler's expectation - that was his objective in stopping 5 German Divisions from closing the encircled BEF BEFORE the BEF hardened defensive positions at Dunkirk and ultimately evacuated the brunt of their forces, back to Britain.

Some of the arguments and conclusions drawn in this thread are over-simplified, one dimensional and limited in scope. Without studying the German side in detail - you simply cannot grasp the complexity and ever changing nature of strategic decision-making as effected by Hitler.

For example, the argument that the British success in the Air Defense of the home Island started a chain reaction that forced Hitler to invade Yugoslavia is absurd. The poster of that silly conclusion needs to examine the Balkans campaign in it's entirety. I know it's complicated but, alas those details, which have no relationship to the Battle of Britain, are essential in forming an opinion.

In summary, the overarching point to this entire subject can best be summarized as follows:

The Battle of Britain was a fight for the British Home Islands, which if lost, would have had horrific consequences, and resulted in a strategic loss of the greatest magnitude. The British public, leadership and military was completely aware of what these air battles meant - the awareness driven home by falling bombs and visible death and destruction of civilian areas.

For Germany, it was a failed excursion - almost unknown to the public - and militarily a limited defeat. The failure of Seelowe barely made a dent in the next two years of Hitler's horrific expansion. The actual forces committed to the defense of France, after the fall of 1940 were minimal. Two Jagdgeswader were able to hold off and maul the next two years of RAF efforts into France, while minimal ground forces were actually required in defense. Only when the USAAF came to full operational capability, adding it's forces to the RAF - did the tides start to turn.

S~

Gunny

No aspersion expressed or intended; I just don’t like the beginning word of your answer.

You and I we don’t know what Hitler or the OKW where thinking or planning at the time right? So the word “Wrong” is misplaced, references to your sources would have been welcomed in the first post; but one should be cautious as most writers have an agenda or is trying to prove a thesis. Research is a serious matter and involves cross checking many independent sources and a lot of thinking “outside the box”, reading a book or two simply doesn’t qualify.

I still believe that the prime motive for the whole kanalkamp etc. was to force the British to the negotiating table and finish the war in west, perhaps only for the time, while Hitler conquered Russia and, most essentially, reached the oilfields in Caucasus. There was simply nothing of value in England for the continuation of the conquering of the world. It was also urgent to finish the war in west, or to make the British look weak enough, to stop the Americans from getting involved.
In order to make this “bluff” credible enough it had to be backed by visible planning and some hardware to back it up but in my mind there never was intent from the leaders to follow through. It would have been too plain stupid with the hardware available and the knowledge at hand.

Churchill on the other hand made a media show of the threat in order to show America the will and determination of the British people to resist and succeeded in getting America involved. Perhaps this was the biggest gain or “victory” in the Battle of Britain.

But we don’t know now, do we? We can just speculate.

Viking

Most posters are (respectfully) missing the point about the role of the BoB in WWII. Yes, it increased UK morale, and maybe it did not actually damage German morale (though I would contend the Luftwaffe pilots would have felt it was a setback).

The BoB served a much greater purpose, which was to ensure that the USA entered the war.

To American airmen, the conflict was an exciting opportunity to fly and fight in aircraft that were the apogee of engineering at the time. The Spitfire was as iconic in the USA as it was in the UK and many pilots would give an arm and a leg (and some, their lives) for the chance to fly it. US pilots who could not qualify for the USAF training program because of its then limited intake, were welcomed with open cockpits in the RAF.

Most crucial though was the role that victory in the Battle of Britain played in encouraging a reluctant America to join the war against Germany. Until the BoB, the German war machine had proven itself invincible. This perception was a powerful ally to American isolationists who argued that at most, the US should be providing materiel to Britain and its dominions, though never should it enter a conflict in Europe. They could use the spectre of an invincible Nazi war machine to scare the public and politicians and persuade them that this fight was not Americas fight.

We need to consider the role of the aviator, Charles Lindbergh. Lindbergh was famous, wealthy, had frequent access to politicians including Roosevelt, and was an avowed pacifist. Working against him was an almost reclusive personality and strong dislike of the media. But his anti-interventionist message was strong, he expressed public respect, if not admiration, for German military achievements, and it can be argued he more than anyone else, he paid the biggest public role in trying to keep America out of the war. Much has been made of Lindbergh’s reputed pro-Nazi leanings, and his admiration of the achievements of the Luftwaffe and German aircraft engineers, but in the end his message was simple. Germany has achieved what it wants to achieve in Europe, the war is all but over, we should stay out of it.

But the Battle of Britain outcome was effective in turning public opinion in the US, and allowing time for a change in public policy. For the first time, the German advance was stopped in its tracks. It showed that Hitler was not invincible, and gave strength to the arguments of the interventionists who had been saying he should be taken on – now it was shown that he could be taken on.

The BoB created a pause in the conflict in Europe, which Roosevelt could use from Sept 1940 onwards, to overcome the isolationist voices in the US, and more importantly, to rearm, and re-equip: both British forces, but also his own underdone airforce and navy.

The US sent its officers and politicians to Britain to study the conflict in real time. The visited aircraft engineering works, viewed prototype aircraft like the Typhoon (influencing their decision to prioritise the P-47 for production) and came back deeply impressed by the role of air power in the new conflict.

One such delegation reported to Roosevelt:

"Insofar as the defense of England is concerned, it has been for some months, is now, and probably will be for some time to come, an air war. . . . The lesson from this war, as far as we are concerned, is that we must build up the striking component of our Air Force as quickly as possible.

We both have the very definite feeling that sooner or later the United States will be drawn into this war. . . ."

The US also sent a corps of observers to work with all levels of the British air defence system, taking home the lessons learned the hard way in the Battle of Britain, including the importance of integrated intelligence, the value of radar, the limitations of night fighters, the inaccuracy of bomb aiming, and interestingly, the crucial role of women in armaments production, home defense, and ferrying of aircraft.

Meanwhile the tide of public opinion was turning – the images of German bombers over London forced the US public and politicians to confront a future without a powerful ally like Britain in Europe, or act to change that future. And the victory gave backbone to the argument that the US not only should, but would, prevail in a conflict against Germany.

It is irrelevent whether Germans believed the Battle was won or lost, the fact that the UK and USA believed it was, is all that mattered.

I really doubt that. According to Wikipedia ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-Bri...s_contribution ) only 7 US pilots servered in the RAF during the BoB, and they were "incognito" because US citizens were prohibited due to US Neutrality Acts.

The BoB was really irrelevant to the US in general. The US society considered the war a "European Problem" and only after Pearl Harbor and Hitler's declaration of war it became "their" problem, too.

I've read the 'Sealion' invasion report.
Generally a fine wargame, but I do disagree on one critical point.
The Royal Navy would have sent in the big guns along with the cruisers and destroyers, and most liley enmasse.

Firstly there is the issue of Service pride - that Trafalgar thing that makes the Royal Navy Britains main line of defense. Ok, reality had shifted it to airpower, but the RN would have gone in to prove that they were still the decisive factor. Frankly I can not imagine the RN not throwing the big guns in to such a decisive battle.
The Armada > Trafalgar > Jutland > The Channel 1940.
Anything else would have been unthinkable.

What could be gained from not using them compared to what could be lost?
What is better - loosing a BB or several or loosing the war?
An established bridgehead would have meant defeat for Britain, and the loss of her BB's as well most likely as they would be handed over like the German High seas fleet was in 1918. BB's can be rebuilt should you win.

Bullet mangnets? Yes they would have drawn the Germans like moths to a flame, but every attack on them is an attck not happening to other naval assets. Add in their greater ability to weather such damage and you have a lot of tough nuts to crack. And if they were taken out then by being bullet magnets a larger number of their escort would have got through for the engagement, ships that would have otherwise been the targets and sunk.

Political compulsion.
I can't see Churchill keeping them out - his biggest asset in a sea fight when all over air and land forces are being thrown in to the climatic battle for Britains survival. It's just not him.

So I personally would believe a large Naval force of BB's plus numerous assests would have forced the channel and wrecked havoc. Even with significant loss to the naval forces they would have devestated the invasion fleet.

The invasion would have been a blood bath. Think dunkirk, but with hostile naval forces involved as well!

Exactly my point, sorry if it was badly made. During the actual Battle, there were very few US pilots involved, but because of the success of the Battle from a US PR point of view, you will find that before Pearl Harbour more than 6,000 US pilots had applied to join the RAF/RCAF to fight in Europe, indicating the the US citizen did indeed see it as 'their problem' long before the US was attacked by Japan.

The first 'Eagle Squadron' was formed in Sept 1940. US neutrality did not pertain, because they joined as private citizens.

Three 'Eagle Squadrons' were formed and became the famed 4th Fighter Group of the USAF 8th airforce. Without the perception of victory in the Battle of Britain, there might still only have been seven US pilots in Britain at that point!

Among the US bean counters, it was very much an American "economic" problem. All trade to Europe was effectively strangled by the war. Once the US had finished milking the British cow - as Roosevelt put it, they needed to get involved to regain their foreign market. There were plenty of Senate debates on this before Pearl Harbour. The surprise attack only accelerated the process.

Hitler had no intention to invade Germany. There were never enough sea transport resources assembled to transport the first wave of troops, the amphibious tanks were designed for river crossings in the east, not sea landings, adolf galland said the plan was never serious, cooperation between luftwaffe, army and navy was never properly established, and as soon as sealion was abandoned Hitler sent Hess to Britain to sue for peace.

His real goal with the Eagle campaign was to bomb Britain to the negotiating table and neutralise the UK to free himself for the Eastern Front.

That said, it would be great to see a Sealion campaign or even just a few missions in SoW if the LW player can achieve air superiority!!

PLEASE!

Invade Germany?

You should read the thread at the Zoo where one called Odin says an invasion would have been successful.

Not correct. The President of the United States Franklin Delanor Roosevelt considered the survival of Britain to be crucial to the interests of the United States. He was supported by large segment of the population, including most of the well educated. Unfortunately, there was another segment, equally as large, who were against the war for reasons that had either to do with anti-european feelings, (isolationism) or pro-German feelings. These included people like the Ford (car manufacturing) family, Dubya's Grandfather, Joe Kennedy, (father of John) etc.

Roosevelt could not ignore the 50% of the population who were against involvement, but he did everything he could to assist Britain, short of declaring war. That included the "Lendlease" act, which allowed Britain to take ownership of war armaments without paying for them, the gift of 50 Destroyers, (crucial to the defence of the convoy routes) in exchange for bases in the Caribbean, etc. Without U.S. help, Britain would not have survived.

Sorry Biggles, you got it backwards. The tanks were converted for amphibious use for Sealion, then, when Sealion was cancelled, later used in the Barbarossa campaign for wading rivers.

Not correct. The Germans lost far more pilots and aircrew. Many RAF pilots were able to bail out of damaged planes and fight again. Not so for Luftwaffe pilots who bailed out over England.

I read the article.

That linked article has a clear conclusion:

Germany lost the Battle of Britain.

How the site which has the link on it could come to the conclusion that Germany didn't lose the BoB based on the linked article is a real question...

Then why did Hitler move 330,000 troops to the French coast, move barges which were crucial to German industry away from the Rhine and other rivers to the French coast, convert 130 + tanks to amphibious use, move large parts of his fleet, etc. etc. Seelowe was much more than a 'plan'. It was an operational order.


Amazing... another myth rears its whimpering pathetic head... :D

Hitler did not 'allow' anyone escape at Dunkirk, he did his best to capture all the forces which were trapped there. Following normal operational procedure for the German Army, once the pocket had been formed, the Panzers were moved onwards to position themselves for the next breakthrough (which ended up being on either side of Paris) Panzers did not reduce pockets, they left the mopping up to Infantry. The entirety of the Army Gruppe B which had come through the Netherlands, plus most of the Infantry from Army Gruppe A did what was expected, and started to reduce the pocket. The Germans never expected the British could evacuate the BEF, let alone 100,000 Frenchmen. They thought they had them in the bag. Operationally, the Germans were more concerned about a counterattack from the south to relieve the pocket, than they were about an evacuation. That is another reason for the repositioning of the Panzers southwards. The Luftwaffe, which up to this point had been completely successful in all its tasks, assured Hitler that the Royal Navy would be bombed out of existence if they showed themselves on the French side of the channel. Too bad that Dowding committed enough Spitfires and Hurricanes to make it impossible for the Luftwaffe to stop the RN. And that the British and French within the pocket, fought very hard and skillfully, because now, the Germans were not behind them, or outflanking them, but were forced to go headon against desperate men.


I have examined the Balkan campaign in great detail. I think perhaps you should do the same.

Like for example, doing some reading on the Yugoslavian coup, which was sponsored by the British, and which led to the Nazi sympathetic government being overthrown, and then to Hitler invading. The regent Prince Paul, who was a client of the Nazis, signed the Tripartite pact on March 25th. Two days later he was overthrown in a coup led by the 18 year old British sponsored King Peter and Yugoslavia's agreement was voided. Hitler responded by postponing Operation Barbarossa and started the bombing of Belgrade on April 6th, with the invasion following shortly thereafter. Please explain how such a coup could have happened in the Spring of 1941, if the British had lost the BoB and were no longer in at war with Germany????

Quote:
Originally Posted by biggles109
Hitler had no intention to invade Germany. the amphibious tanks were designed for river crossings in the east, not sea landings

"The Battle of Britain" was easy to win by Germany. Sometimes over confident makes massiveness, isn't it. There is nothing good about war ever in the history as my point of view.

The article only raises a moot point.

How the Germans viewed the battle is irrelevant in terms of who won. What is relevant, given that the intended outcome was for Germany to invade Britain, is that Britain was not invaded.

I'll concede that Hitler was only half-hearted about Operation Sealion but that doesn't alter the negative outcome for his forces in the field who were resoundingly defeated by the RAF in almost every major engagement of the battle.

The German strategic objective of the Battle of Britain was to force Britain out of the war, either by forcing her to sue for peace, or if this did not happen to create conditions in which an invasion could succeed. In this they failed.

A secondary effect of the battle was to significantly degrade the Luftwaffe capability which had a knock on effect in subsequent theatres.

I suggest everyone read the book The Most Dangerous Enemy by Stephen Bungay.

The best post war appraisal of the Battle of Britain, by far.

An interesting fact is that the Luftwaffe was sustaining irreplaceable/unacceptable losses during the period before August 1940, but failed to understand so because of the rampant over claiming by the Luftwaffe fighter squadrons at that time. Simply put, the German aircraft industry was not keeping up, while the British aircraft industry ramped up production the entire time.

It was never the "close run" thing that has become the myth of it over time. The Luftwaffe never had a chance in hell of winning.

England has always had power over the sea.
The England and 'enriched with its colonies and possessions.
England had power over the sea and the power to decide the commercial maritime routes.
Mussolini said that he wanted freedom 'on the seas and that Britain is not allowed to move freely on the seas.
Italy and Germany did not have the freedom 'to colonialism on the seas'cause attached note from the U.S. and England.
This power over the seas today in our time England still owns it.
A mysterious hidden power of colonial possession.
But the English colonies have never rebelled against colonialism.

Germany had quite a lot of colonies:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of...erman_colonies

...despite the fact that its navy was always inferior to the one of GB.
Furthermore, also France owns a lot of colonies today, despite the fact, that its navy was obsolete to the one of even Germany already before WW1.
And GB's navy was already inferior to the one of the USA (which still owns colonies too, big example of the praised 'Monroe doctrin' BTW) by start of WW2.

LOL! Best statement so far from you!

I guess, this one guy might have had a different oppinion. :grin:

http://www.google.de/url?source=imgr...PiaMgP_eO6jC7Q

A bit of a misnomer... Dowding's main concern was pilots.. not planes.

Galland explained it clearly in some interviews..
- No focus
- no real co-ordinated plan
- bad fighter tactics
- 'home game' for the Brits
- etc..

He said that the LW was never correctly equiped to fight the UK (overseas).. so they lost from the start... Mein Kampf 'clearly' explains this.

He did more than just lend moral and material support. American lives were lost defending his policies.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Reu...s_%28DD-245%29

His feelings towards Britain was not popular in the United States and for good reason. Many US citizens looked to the past wars the United States fought with Great Britain over the treatment of our ships and sailors.

Britain's own actions made life difficult for Roosevelt to lend support. It was not until the Japanese attack that the US public really even cared to join England in a fight against Germany.

British policy was to detain US ships and crew as well violate our neutrality. It is interesting to note how arrogant and dismissal the British Admiralty is of United States protest until they really start losing the war.

http://asisbiz.com/il2/US-Navy-History-WWII-1940.html

Their are some people who feel that all of WW2 (not just the BoB) is largely overlooked by the German people (lol)...

p.s. I joke, I kid...because I love. ;)

The goal was to win air supremacy over the invation area. This goal was not achieved.
Mission acomplished for the RAF.

Brought to you by the people determined to believe that Germany did not lose WWI. That's right, it was a trick.

Exactly Max.

Sorry to revisit this off-topic from a ways back, but...

..think it had more to to with the two SS Panzer divisions that also happened to be in the area unbeknownst to the Allied planners ;)

Leaving the British Isles uncontrolled was the first big loss Germany took in WWII, after their senses of course. Britain staying free was the first big Allied gain. The course of the war bears those out and the major fighting was air battle so how can the result not be a loss for Germany? Besides the pilots lost being a significant strategic factor for no gain there is a front to guard, the resources of the Commonwealth and another bigger potential enemy behind.

Go by period German newsreels/newspapers and you get propaganda, not-facts.

Arnhem is interesting. The airborne forces actually achieved their objectives, captured the Arnhem bridge and held the bridgehead for the time specified.

The failure was in the speed of follow up by the armoured forces.

That sums it up for me!

Putting it another way:

"Great Britain's "victory" in the Battle of Briatin, was achieved by denying victory to the Germans!"

A victory by any means is still a victory, no matter how the Luftwaffe apologists paint it.

A fairly compelling argument I think.

Unfortunately many gamers want to place the significance for England's victory on the simplistic concept of their favorite game shapes performance. That is simply not true as design contemporaries did not have the performance gaps required to play any significant in combat.

It is the same silly a notion as Americans claiming the P-51 or any other USAAF designs performance won the air war in Western Europe.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m...4/ai_74582443/

In terms of aerial combat losses, Fighter Command took a mauling. In the air, the RAF pilots just did not have the training, tactics, or experience to deal with the Germans. Dowding recognized from the beginning though that all FC had to do was survive.

It did not have to maul the Germans in the air. The Germans lacked a logistical system that could replace their losses at the same pace as the RAF. Thus overtime, despite their training, tactical, and experience advantage as an organization the Luftwaffe fewer losses had a larger impact.

http://img39.imageshack.us/img39/838...rationallo.jpg

Not only was FC superior in numbers of single seat fighters and pilots, they flew many more sorties. On average, they had more fighter airplanes in the air and outnumbered their German opponents at the tip of the spear.

http://img232.imageshack.us/img232/5...ieratesbob.jpg

None of the facts change the emotional and cultural views taught in English school history. "The Few" grossly outnumbered in their elegant Spitfires and flying circles around the invading evil Nazi's is an image that will forever inspire us.

http://img196.imageshack.us/img196/7...battleofbr.jpg