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As for counting "stations" that are supplied with fuel I would remind everyone in this discussion that aircraft can cover considerable distances in short periods of time. If you want to test a fuel, you need the logistical base to conduct the test. That means stations must have the fuel on hand in the areas your test aircraft are to fly. Otherwise, your maintenance personnel will be draining a lot of fuel tanks for every off station landing. Aircraft fuel tanks have what is called "usable fuel". There is always some left in the tanks that the lines cannot reach in level flight. The Spitfire POH refers to this as the "effective capacity". That left over fuel can be a significant amount in a WWII fighter. The amount is specific to the individual aircraft and will be found with that airframes weight and balance sheet. The average is about 5 gallons a tank for a WWII fighter. Next point is "consumed" does not mean it was put in an airplane and used up. Aircraft fuel has a specific shelf life to it. Once mixed it is distributed and considered consumed. For example, 100LL stock is refined only ONCE per year in the United States. The stock is then distributed to the holding yards. When it is dispensed to the airports, the final mix of that stock occurs and it becomes 100LL fuel. Just because the airport buys 15,000 gallons does not mean it will be sold and go into airplanes by the time the shelf life is over. That is why airport managers keep data on fuel sales! That does not mean they mixed up a huge batches of 100 grade to be "disposed of" either. In many cases fuel can be converted back to stock and then again to a lower grade. It is still 100 grade that is consumed whether it comes back to the holding yard or not! This is why the same reasoning that was used to "prove" the 100/150 grade extent of use was so flawed. First the strategic stocks must be maintained and once the fuel is mixed, it is "consumed". Nothing to do with it being blown out the exhaust pipe of an airplane. |
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:rolleyes: For one thing it was standard FC practice to top up the tanks of all of its fighters as soon as possible after every sortie, mainly to avoid condensation traps because of the fuel left in the tanks. Nor did every aircraft land with empty fuel tanks. There was no "shelf life" when it came to running intensive, frontline operations. No - what this entire discussion comes down to is Barbi's belief that Fighter Command, which proved to be technically astute during the Battle of Britain, deliberately deprived up to half of its front -line pilots of a technical and tactical asset. People can speculate all they like about "selected units" "certain units" etc because, in the end: 1) Was 100 octane fuel available to Fighter Command? Yes 2) Was there enough 100 octane fuel available to cover all sorties flown by Fighter Command during the battle? Yes 3) Was enough 100 Octane fuel distributed and used throughout the battle to allow Fighter Command to fly all 57,971 sorties from July to end of October? Yes, with more than enough left over to allow Blenheims of Bomber Command to operate. |
Crump
I must admit I don't understand what your last posting was about. As for counting "stations" that are supplied with fuel I would remind everyone in this discussion that aircraft can cover considerable distances in short periods of time I don't see the connection between the distance a plane can travel and the stations issued with the fuel. I also don't see the emphasis on testing of the fuel. Testing started in 1938 and was completed in 1939 when it was signed off for use as documented in Kurfursts paper. 1940 is about the use of the fuel in combat, not testing it. If you wish I can show you the consumption figures, i.e. the fuel used and I can show you the issued figure, which is as you would expect is a little different. That might help clear the topic, just let me know. Re your comment on the line I posted The problem here is that you do not know the details behind the paper and your reply And nobody else does either.....including you You are absolutely correct, no one does know the details. No one knows which squadrons, which aircraft, which stations, how it was to be distributed and so on were for the pre war paper. The difference is that I do not pretend to know. However I do know that this idea of 16 + 2 bomber units wsan't mentioned at all in the Oil Committee meetings who would have been instrumental in the distribution of the fuel to the 16 fighter squadrons whatever those squadrons might be, wherever they may be based. |
You chaps have done your bit. The fact that a couple of sad knobheads still argue the toss even though there is overwhelming evidence is neither here nor there. I feel sorry for their own investigation and journey into history really, because with a viewpoint so precise it is not possible to speculate or deduce anything at all. Past their own lifetimes I dare say everything is debatable and by their own logic it is a large, mostly blank, canvas. I wonder if these guys believe anything at all about WW1, or the Roman Empire, or what happened at the Battle of Trafalgar, or anything where there is nothing to absolutely state in triplicate with recorded footage about that something happened in the past. Cpt. Mainwaring has the perfect response to them imo.....
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I see Eugene is confused, still.
As for the testing Eugene thinks was being done at those 21 bases, 100 fuel had already been tested. Duxford, Debden, North Weald and Digby had received 8142gal a year earlier for 'testing'. |
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You guys keep chewing on the same information. Problem is none of the information is complete or changes what Morgan and Shacklady put out. In fact, it only supports what they wrote but we don't have all the documents that they obviously referenced. 16 squadrons sometime in September 1940 were converted to the fuel. That would require their operating bases as well as their satellite fields to be supplied. In other words, anyplace they might have to land would need a source of fuel. Did they just suddenly poof into existence 16 squadrons converted? Maybe....maybe not. If they gradually phased in those 16 squadrons as resources became available, then looking at squadron logs is not going to tell you much. FC maintained a high rate of rotation to keep its fighter pilots as rested as possible. So looking at squadron logs is not going to be much help again. |
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I highly recomend you do as so many others have learned to do.. Ignore those three.. They are clearly biased.. Everyone can see that they are biased.. So no need to prove it over and over again. |
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6v4pk...e_gdata_playerHmmm. Missing documents? Can't understand why....had my best man on it....
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16 Fighter Squadrons + 2 Bomber units = THE SELECTED UNITS The Oil Committee used very plain language. |
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S:TH pg 55 "A meeting was held in the AMDP's room on 16 March 1939......... The decision taken was initial delivery to 16 fighter and 2 bomber squadrons by September 1940." AMDP - Air Member for Development & Production But then the war heated up and Barbi and Eugene expect this 16+2 to be kept. :rolleyes: As can be seen, the 16+2 went bye-bye. At the least 22 squadrons converted to 100 fuel by the end of June: By Month 32 Squadron pre BoB H 92 (East India) Squadron pre BoB S 111 Squadron pre BoB H 151 Squadron Feb 1940 H 602 (City of Glasgow) Squadron pre BoB S 609 (West Riding) Squadron pre BoB S 1 (Cawnpore) Squadron May 1940 H 3 Squadron May 1940 H 17 Squadron May 1940 H 19 Squadron May 1940 S 54 Squadron May 1940 S 74 Squadron May 1940 S 56 (Punjab) Squadron May 1940 H 73 Squadron May 1940 H 79 (Madras Presidency) Squadron May 1940 H 85 Squadron May 1940 H 87 (United Provinces) Squadron May 1940 H N229 Squadron May 1940 H N43 (China-British) Squadron June 1940 H N41 Squadron June 1940 S 610 (County of Chester) Squadron June 1940 S 611 (West Lancashire) Squadron June 1940 S |
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Honestly. You actually believe that wartime fuel stocks sat around long enough to live past it's shelf life? During the BoB?
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The RAF had a very vigorous rotation schedule. The fight was tough and very dangerous so Dowding very intelligently rotated his units out to rest/refit. In some cases, the rotation was in as little as 10 days of fighting. So when you count a 30 day chunk of time, that can be up to three rotations!! |
As I understand it, the rotation was based on combat strength of the unit and not a set schedule or time.
In one month, (08 August 1940 thru 08 September 1940) 16 squadrons from 11 Group were rotated out of the fight and replaced by fresh ones. That would show up over a month period as up to 32 squadrons using 100 Octane fuel. |
So by that rational, basically your saying that 11 group used 100 octane......
Now which group bore the brunt of the fighting by far....... ;) |
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http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/biggin.gif http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/croydon.gif http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/debden.gif more http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/0006.html |
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We also don't know when in September or when other squadrons were approved. It could have been a sloping curve of units being stood up on 100 grade when the strategic reserves were in place and the fuel distributed to the stations concerned. So if we have 16 units on 01 September, we could have the entire RAF FC by 30 September!! Consequently, if we have 16 squadrons on 30 September, then that picture changes. Facts are we don't know. |
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The airfields that are displayed below are all those airfields within Fighter Commands' 11 Group including satelite airfields. The time span of each chart is from July 10, 1940 untill September 31, 1940 and all those squadrons that officially based the airfields shown are shown to the left of each chart. |
Didn't see the airfields. Yes, 501 were @ Kenley for a couple of weeks but spent most of the time @ Gravesend giving Jerry a black eye.
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What about the squadrons at Hornchurch, Northolt and North Weald.....
Also sector airfields in 11 group. i can see quite a few squadrons missing from those charts. |
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By the way Osprey, i love the specs of your computer, if only i had the money:) |
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Question: How much fuel was needed to fly all defensive sorties flown by FC during the battle?
The Battle of Britain T.C.G. James: 51,364 sorties, day & night from July 10 through Sept 30: Hooton’s Eagle in Flames, Table 2, FC flew Sep 23-29: 4,825 defensive sorties Sep 30 – Oct 6: 1,782 defensive sorties. Total = 57,971 sorties 1 imperial gallon of 100 Octane = 7.1 pounds ("Oil" by D.J Peyton-Smith the official British war history on the oil and petroleum industry during WW2 page xvii "Note on Weights and Measures"): 1 ton of 100 octane = 2,240 lbs divided by 7.1 = 315.5 imp gal Fuel Capacities: Defiant I = 97 imp gal Hurricane I = 90 imp gal Spitfire I & II = 84 imp gal Total 271 imp gal divided by 3 = 90.3 imp gal 315.5 divided by 90.3 = 3.5 fuel loads per ton of fuel 57,971 divided by 3.5 Answer: 16,563 tons of fuel Crumpp likes to talk about shelf life and fuel being returned to depots etc: total 100 Octane fuel issued between July 11 and October 31 = 62,000 tons: fuel consumed = 51,000 tons - 16,563 tons = 34,437 tons available for other purposes. Now why, Eugene, would FC bother using 87 Octane fuel for half its frontline fighters? Hmmm? Can you give us some good, tangible reasoning bolstered by a modicum of evidence that this is the way things were done? Pleeease? Quote:
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It actually was one of Dowdings more unpopular decisions to maintain such a vigorous rotation schedule. Many commanders felt it took experienced guys away from the fight and increased the casualty rate by placing inexperienced pilots in their place. |
NZTyphoon, Once again.....
In the pursuit of gamers proving 100/150 grade was the standard fuel of the RAF, documents were produced that showed hundreds of thousand of tons of the fuel being moved around various stations and brought into the RAF logistical system in anticipation of the fuel being adopted. The operational use turned out to be extremely limited and for a very short period of time before it was withdrawn from service. You cannot look at fuel stocks to determine the extent of operational use. Logistics is there to answer the question, "Do we have enough to use?" They do not answer the question, "Can we use this fuel?"....that is the operational side of the house! |
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So, genius, explain exactly what happened to 51,000 tons of 100 octane fuel and provide some evidence for your claims. E-v-i-d-e-n-c-e! Is that so hard? |
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David Ross, Stapme, The Biography of Squadron Leader Basi Gerald Stapleton DFC, (Grub Street, London, 2002), pp. 22-23 http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...pleton-p23.jpg http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...pleton-p22.jpg Tony Bartley DFC, Smoke Trails in the Sky, (Crecy Publishing Limited, Wilmslow, Cheshire, 1997), p. 35. http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ley-100oct.jpg Tim Vigors DFC, Life’s Too Short to Cry, (Grub Street, London, 2006), p. 137. http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...-100octane.jpg |
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a) there was more than enough fuel for every operational sortie "in stock", "issued", "consumed" (or however you want to call it that the fuel is circulating) b) it was in operational use by at least 30 squadrons And your theory is that only 16+2 squadrons only used it at one time because they didn't want to change a pre-war plan ... and the other squadrons didn't use it because of ... uhh? I mean these squadrons had been modified to use it (and even if not modified it wouldn't have harmed the engine) and the fuel was been tested in regular squadrons since 1938. |
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http://www.amazon.co.uk/Spitfire-His.../dp/0946219486 I just know nothing in this thread is convincing otherwise to make their conclusion invalid. If you have a copy, look it up. If you don't and are interested in the Spitfire, get one. |
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What we have is evidence that Fighter Command wanted to change to 100 octane fuel and we have a large amount of squadrons that used 100 octane in May/June 1940 compared to a the few squadrons prior that time which used it on trial. Common sense tells me that it's not very likely that all squadrons changed from 87 octane to 100 octane in 6 weeks. Maybe someone can proof that I'm wrong with that assumption ;) My believe is that the widespread (meaning not limited to certain squadrons) use started in May/June 1940, however I don't believe that all squadrons used it exclusively from that time on but that the amount of squadrons that used it increased steadily and maybe it took the whole summer for some isolated squadrons. |
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This is the 1st edition. |
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For example they say that there were large numbers of tankers carrying 100 octane fuel lost in 1940, but there is no evidence cited in the book to back that up - it is a blanket statement. In fact 78 (KF's figures) tankers were sunk - it is a high number, and terrible for those who died on them, but does not compare with the 1,151 which unloaded in Britain, as shown by a primary source document from the British War Cabinet (Grand Total of Tankers arriving in UK Sept 1939 to November 1940 = 1,151 Grand Total of Oil Products Imported = 12,169,300 tons: 10,573 tons of oil product per tanker - my wording, not the cabinet paper) Morgan and Shacklady are great at describing technical details of the Spitfire, which was their primary focus, but their interpretation of historical events not so much, because that is not their area of expertise. You have critiqued Alfred Price in a similar way in another thread http://forums.ubi.com/showthread.php...Bf-109s-Forums - great author, enjoy reading what he says but he's not always accurate in specific details. You don't know, even with the evidence that's been placed here - that's fine, if you want to place your entire faith in one book, that's up to you - historical research about events that happened in wartime Britain, or any other country cannot come up with 100% answers. That goes for matters concerning the Luftwaffe. The houses of Parliament in London were bombed during the battle and there is the possibility that documents that people like Glider have spent hours patiently searching the archives for were destroyed. Take an unblinkered look at the "evidence" posted by Kurfürst, who admits that he only has a very passing interest in the RAF, yet has for years has obsessively pursued a theory about the RAF not using 100 octane fuel, later modified to the RAF having some 100 octane fuel in the B of B - it is all based on a memo presented by Pips in another thread in 2004 which Kurfürst has never seen. What else has he actually presented that stacks up? Nada - nothing, lots of abuse and scorn and lawyerly twisting of words and context. Other people have recognised that the sheer weight of evidence for the RAF using 100 Octane fuel extensively throughout the B of B is "overwhelming" - if you can't see it, I cannot help you. |
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I remember when people loved to post the Mach .98 dives of the recon Spitfire that lost a propeller available on that website "Spitfire Performance" as representative of the diving ability of the aircraft. Anybody with some knowledge of aerodynamics who reads Morgan and Shacklady can immediately spot the issue with that. Not only does the A&AEE officially retract those measurements but it is very easy to spot the fact the A&AEE had their static ports in the wrong location to get any kind of accurate speed measurement from their rake in the original report. Not their fault, we just did not know as much about transonic flight and the difficulty in obtaining accurate airspeed measurements. I agree the 800,000 ton strategic reserve requirement be built up before any squadrons convert probably comes from a pre-war estimate. If it is correct, then there is absolutely no chance a single operational squadron flew with the fuel during the Battle of Britain. England simply did not have enough 100 Octane fuel on hand to come close to that reserve requirement. Again, that is just speculation on my part. Morgan and Shacklady just listed the two facts we know but they were not writing a book on the history of the Oil Committee and strategic reserves. 1. An 800,000 ton Strategic Reserve was required to be on hand before a single aircraft flew operationally. 2. 16 Squadrons converted in September 1940. They were doing the technical development of the Spitfire. The 16 squadrons is a very important part of that technical development and inline with the subject they were research. One can look at the 87 Octane consumption on the documents in this thread and easily tell that it was not until after September that 100 Octane became the predominate fuel used by the RAF. |
Where has Kurfurst gone anyway
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This is just what I have even before the BoB started: By Month No. 32 Squadron pre BoB H No. 92 (East India) Squadron pre BoB S No. 111 Squadron pre BoB H No. 151 Squadron Feb 1940 H No. 602 (City of Glasgow) Squadron pre BoB S No. 609 (West Riding) Squadron pre BoB S No. 1 (Cawnpore) Squadron May 1940 H No. 3 Squadron May 1940 H No. 17 Squadron May 1940 H No. 19 Squadron May 1940 S No. 54 Squadron May 1940 S No. 74 Squadron May 1940 S No. 56 (Punjab) Squadron May 1940 H No. 73 Squadron May 1940 H No. 79 (Madras Presidency) Squadron May 1940 H No. 85 Squadron May 1940 H No. 87 (United Provinces) Squadron May 1940 H No. 229 Squadron May 1940 H No. 43 (China-British) Squadron June 1940 H No. 41 Squadron June 1940 S No. 610 (County of Chester) Squadron June 1940 S No. 611 (West Lancashire) Squadron June 1940 S Well quite naturally 87 fuel was predominate as the other RAF Commands (Bomber, Coastal, Training etc) used 87 fuel. |
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You're disregarding contemporary combat reports, pilot's memoirs, Morgan and shacklady and more, in favour of a document that was written when nobody in Europe expected the war to start in 1939. Nobody, not even hitler. Britain was in the process of rearmament. Everything changed in September '39. They were expecting to have to fight in '41 or '42. As soon as Poland was invaded all the plans changed. The history of trimpell oil refinery says that according to their records there were over 300 converted spitfires and hurricanes by the end of July. They supplied the fuel, at the time. Surely their account is more reliable. EDIT: Corrected spelling of Trimpell |
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"Bulk supply contracts for higher octane fuel were placed by the Air Ministry and it was put into widespread use in the RAF in March 1940 when Spitfires' Rolls Royce Merlin engines were converted to use the 100 octane fuel. By May 1940, reconnaissance Spitfires had begun flying combat missions using the 100 octane fuel. By 31 July 1940, there were 384 Spitfires serving in 19 squadrons using the 100 octane fuel." Heysham Heritage Association, The Trimpell Oil Refinery http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...mpell-1200.jpg Heysham’s position is not unique, rather it’s very much in keeping with the conventional view: http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o.../1940-0897.jpg http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...anuary6-44.jpg Alec Harvey-Bailey, The Merlin in Perspective, (Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust, Derby, 1983) http://www.spitfireperformance.com/r...yce-100oct.jpg Alfred Price, The Spitfire Story, (Arms and Armour Press Ltd., London, 1986) http://www.spitfireperformance.com/price-pg74.jpg David Ross, The Greatest Squadron of Them All, The Definitive History of 603 Squadron, RAauxAF, (Grub Street, London, 2003) http://www.spitfireperformance.com/603-ross-pg125.jpg W.G. Dudek and D. R. Winans, AIAA Paper No. 69-779, Milestones in Aviation Fuels, (Esso Research and Engineering Company, New York 1969.) http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...-42363-319.jpg A. R. Ogston, History of Aircraft Lubricants, (Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc. Warrendale, PA USA), p. 12. http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...cants-pg12.jpg |
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And I'd forgotten about the fact that they were converting 87 into 100 - which means that the import figures do not take into account existing 87 that was converted in the UK. Nice. |
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This might help. This is the RAF Order of Battle as reported to FC at 09.00 on the 13th July giving squadrons, bases and the operational status, I only hope you can read them. These are the original reports posted to FC as held in the NA
The no of Spitfire Squadrons is an almost exact match for my OOB plus the Hurricane Squadrons not mentioned in the prior posting |
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NZTyphoon has run out of his limited stores of unconvincing ruckus, and he can't seem to be able to decide between copy-pasting his old posts or pathetic personal attacks on other members. You and him should really decide whether I'm 'trolling' the thread or I am absent from it. It is impossible in the same time you know. Or look at 'lane' (Mike William's umpteenth login handle). He posts the very same papers for about the 20th time every two pages or so, in the belief that spamming the thread with irrelevance has convincing power. Without managing to convince anyone, and especially not the developers. I guess another sore outburst in the next path news thread at the development team is in order.. ;) Even better, look at your own performance. You can't admit you can't prove anything apart from what we have already known and you cannot admit that you don't know anything about the number of Squadrons, Stations supplied, when this happened. Others do not find it so difficult and we all understand that the evidence is lacking, but at a later time, it may well clear up. Instead, we see fanciful explanations why your own supplied documents have been mistyped or being irrevelant pre-war planning, or the latest that they were 'destroyed in the bombing of London'. You only manage to come up with these childish call-outs, like 'where is Kurfurst'? You know, he's patiently awaiting for you to find something you could not find in all these years. But let me direct a question to you - did having the last word work out so well in the kindergarten that you grow so fond of such approach? I won't even mention 'Al Schlageter' who is the undisputed champion of having the most handles and at the same time, the most frequently permabanned member of this forum, and the only one who went as far as opening a thread just to call Oleg Maddox an idiot for including the 1,98 ata Bf 109K-4 in Il-2. So tell me, why should anyone be interested in this sad quartet...? The whole thread is loud with your agony and frustration, and pretty much everyone lost interest in watching any more it. Sure, its amusing for a while, then people move on. You came here with an agenda and an axe to grind, but only managed to convince anyone with grey matter between the ears that the honest answer is 'we do not know', and also that it's a waste of time to listen to you, since you are either repeating the same like a broken record, or frothing in the mouth. Well, congratulations - I find that I don't even need to enter a debate with you, as you are perfectly capable of behaving in a manner that nobody in their right mind would take seriously what you say anyway. |
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And you're talking rubbish, why would an RAF fanatic (as you put it) argue that the RAF had 100? If they didn't have 100 octane then what they achieved in 1940 is even greater than I thought it was. Truth is what happened happened, if they did it on 87 octane (they didn't, but I'll humour you) then they are even better than I thought they were. And you nailed it - I'm not making this argument for a video game - It's about what happened, not what you say happened because you can't handle being killed by Spitfires in a computer game. Seeing as 'everyone else has lost interest' why are you even posting? To accuse us of being fanatics when you run and maintain a 109 site is frankly beyond hypocritical. Your opinion is so biased as to be of no value what so ever. |
Good job K.
They've supplied evidence, and you've personally attacked them....... How about something of a rebuttal, based on actual evidence, rather than slander. If you can. |
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It would be interesting to find the pre-war estimates for the reserves of other grades of aviation fuel and see how they match up with war-time reserves - has anyone got the pre-war estimates for other grades? |
Knocks the air out of Eugene's argument of 16 squadrons.
"By July 31 1940, there 384 Spitfires serving in 19 squadrons using 100 octane fuel." Pity the article doesn't mention the number of Hurricanes using 100 octane fuel. |
Obviously a contentious issue. Saying that, if you can't show a little respect to each other the thread might have to be locked, which is a shame.
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Kurfurst
It is a shame that you concentrate on throwing accusations around but don't reply to any questions or supply any evidence. Whatever you may think I have always supplied papers to support my positions, and often one will support another. The papers are often copies of originals from the NA and are complete. I do not rely on unsubstantiated postings as being the definitive line, neither do I ignore the other persons view. If there is a contridiction I try to find the more accurate path. Wherever possible I give access to everyone the links and encourage them to make up their own minds examples include the pilots notes and the War Cabinet Minutes. I do not claim to have a perfect case, but a strong one whereas yours is at best weak supported mainly by bluster. I stand by my case and the evidence put forward to support it. Your case stands on two main items, 1) the pre war objective of 16 fighter squadrons and 2 bomber squadrons 2) Pips posting, All I and others have asked is for you to support any part of Pips posting not even all of it with some documentation, some official record. On the 16 + 2 supply anything that shows that the roll out of 100 Octane was limited to the 16 + 2. Tragically we are still awaiting your evidence to support anything, anything at all and all you can turn to is bluster and accusation. As I said I stand by my case, am happy to let the evidence support it and let people decide on the evidence for and against the use of 100 Octane |
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You dismiss 1 by claiming it was changed, but have presented no evidence of any change intended. You dismiss 2 by the arguement that you have not seen the papers yourself, called a researcher a liar and a fraud, yet I have asked perhaps a hundred times to see the meeting file in its completeness, and not the cropped version you deem fitting to share. You never answered that, and refused to show the whole file to anyone even if its not a problematic at all. You stick to showing only select papers from it. I think it speaks for itself. 3, Morgan and Shacklady. You dismiss them for god-knows-what reason. 4, Your own papers of the May 1940 and previous meetings all which say 100 octane was issued only to select units. You dismiss that as 'a typo in the document'. Sure, right, if the papers don't say what you say, the papers are in error, not you. 5, Actual consumption figures of 87 and 100 octane fuel between May 1940 - November 1940 which all show that 87 octane was dominant fuel used until October 1940, and issues oddly increased when Fighter Command activies. You dismiss that claiming that it refers to fuel consumed by other commands, but supplied again no evidence. 6, Spitfire manuals noting both 87 and 100 octane limits at the time. You dismiss them with the weird argument that despite the manual is clearly marked June 1940, it refers to Spitfire variant which according to you, was already withdrawn from service and sent to training units where it supposedly used 87 octane (no evidence presented) before it even entered service...(!). 7, ... and the very fact that the small circle of die-hard RAF fans who are claiming that 100 octane was the only fuel used operationally were completely unable to show ANY kind of evidence for it in 10 years of desperate and fruitless research. All which are in perfect agreement and logically follow each other and do not need the mountain of 'explaining', twisting and dismissal which you seem to rely on when the documentary evidence do not support your case. Quote:
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In your world, it happened overnight, universally, by the touch of a magic wand, and in complete secrecy which is why there's no written trace of it. So why should I or anyone waste any more time on you, tell me? You're unable to give a convincing case, behave like a fanatic, and do not even present an intellectual challenge or interesting evidence. You merely repeat the same over and over again, try to win the debate by having the last word, and when people got bored with it, you call them out like a child.. So present your evidence or just don't expect me to be bothered by this ruckus. |
Check posting 697
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I checked it, its incoherent nonsense IMO.
Now answer the question why every paper speaks of select squadrons, and none of all squadrons, thank you. |
Kurfurst
My case is outlined in the posts 681/682 that cover my belief in the definition of the words select. It shows the development path of the process. I recognise that you will never agree with me or I with you but that isn't important. What is important is that third parties see the arguments and evidence for both and are able to make up their own mind. All I am asking you again is to support or even define your case. You believe that select is a limited number that is clear, but what you believe that number to be we don't know. Is it the 16 + 2, is it the 30+ squadrons we have combat records for, is it something between the two, is it simply less than 100% of fighter the squadrons? Tell us what is your belief So lets start with something simple:- a) How many RAF fighter squadrons do you belive used 100 Octane in the BOB? b) How do you support that view? |
I am watching the posts. My personal conclusion is:
For sure the 100 octane was present. But to me there is no evidence that the all fighters used 100 octane. How many is difficult to say. If i was the developer i ll model the 100 octane, 87 octane, and C-3 for the Germans and let the mapmakers decide. Obviously 100 octane was not a panacea and not one of the main reasons for the Luftwaffe failure. The battle was fierce and the acs were very well matched. RAF loses were great even with the 109s and Luftwaffe operating in the limits of its logistics and radius. In other scenarios the Spits were not so succesfull. |
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Evidence re use in Other Commands, permisson given 7th August.
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Will we are waiting for Eugene to post his RAF OoB, here is the OoB for 53 Spitfire and Hurrican squadrons, from the official RAF site.
1 Squadron Stations: Tangmere 23 June 1940, Northolt 1 August 1940, Wittering 9 September 1940 3 Squadron Stations: Wick 23 May 1940, Castletown 2 September 1940, Turnhouse 14 September 1940, Dyce 9 October 1940, Castletown 12 October 1940 17 Squadron Stations: Debden 19 June 1940, Tangmere 19 August 1940, Debden 2 September 1940, Martlesham Heath 8 October 1940 19 Squadron Stations: Fowlmere 25 January 1940, Duxford 3 July 1940, Fowlmere 24 July 1940, Duxford 30 October 1940 32 Squadron Stations: Biggin Hill 4 June 1940, Acklington 28 August 1940 41 Squadron Stations: Catterick 8 June 1940, Hornchurch 26 July 1940, Catterick 8 August 1940, Hornchurch 3 September 1940 43 Squadron Stations: Tangmere 31 May 1940, Northolt (D) 23 July 1940 to 1 August 1940, Usworth 8 September 1940 46 Squadron Stations: Digby 13 June 1940, Duxford 18 August 1940, Digby 19 August 1940, Stapleford Tawney 1 September 1940 54 Squadron Stations: Rochford 25 June 1940, Hornchurch 24 July 1940, Catterick 28 July 1940, Hornchurch 8 August 1940, Catterick 3 September 1940 56 Squadron Stations: North Weald 4 June 1940, Boscombe Down 1 September 1940 64 Squadron Stations: Kenley 16 May 1940, Leconfield 19 August 1940, Boscombe Down 1 September 1940, Biggin Hill 13 October 1940, Coltishall 15 October 1940 65 Squadron Stations: Hornchurch 5 June 1940, Turnhouse 28 August 1940 66 Squadron Stations: Coltishall 29 May 1940, Kenley 3 September 1940, Gravesend 11 September 1940, West Malling 30 October 1940 72 Squadron Stations: Acklington 6 June 1940, Biggin Hill 31 August 1940, Croydon 1 September 1940, Biggin Hill 14 September 1940, Coltishall 13 October 1940, Matlask 30 October 1940 73 Squadron Stations: Church Fenton 18 June 1940, Castle Camps 5 September 1940 74 Squadron Stations: Hornchurch 25 June 1940, Wittering 14 August 1940, Kirton-in-Lindsey 21 August 1940, Coltishall 9 September 1940, Biggin Hill 15 October 1940 79 Squadron stations: Biggin Hill 5 June 1940, Hawkinge 2 July 1940, Sealand 11 July 1940, Acklington 13 July 1940, Biggin Hill 27 August 1940, Pembrey 8 September 1940 85 Squadron Stations: Debden 22 May 1940, Croydon 19 August 1940, Castle Camps 3 September 1940, Church Fenton 5 September 1940, Kirton-in-Lindsey 23 October 1940 87 Squadron Stations: Church Fenton 26 May 1940, Exeter 5 July 1940 92 Squadron Stations: Pembrey 18 June 1940, Biggin Hill 8 September 1940 111 Squadron Stations: Croydon 4 June 1940, Debden 19 August 1940, Croydon 3 September 1940, Drem 8 September 1940 145 Squadron Stations: Tangmere 10 May 1940, Westhampnett 31 July 1940, Drem 14 August 1940, Dyce 31 August 1940, Tangmere 9 October 1940 151 Squadron Stations: North Weald 20 May 1940, Stapleford Tawney 29 August 1940, Digby 1 September 1940 152 Squadron Stations: Arklington 1 October 1939, Warmwell 12 July 1940 213 Squadron Stations: Arklington 1 October 1939, Warmwell 12 July 1940 222 Squadron Stations: Kirton in Lindsay 4 June 1939, Hornchurch 29 August 1940 229 Squadron Stations: Wittering 26 June 1940, Northolt 9 September 1940 232 Squadron Stations: Sumburgh 17 July 1940, Castletown 18 September 1940, Skitten 13 October 1940, Drem 24 October 1940 234 Squadron Stations: Arklington 1 October 1939, Warmwell 12 July 1940 238 Squadron Stations: Middle Wallop 20 June 1940, St Eval 14 August 1940, Middle Wallop 10 September 1940, Chilbolton 30 September 1940 242 Squadron Stations: Aldergrove 20 July 1940 249 Squadron Stations: Leconfield 18 May 1940, Church Fenton 8 July 1940, Boscombe Down 14 August 1940, North Weald 1 September 1940 253 Squadron Stations: Kirton-in-Lindsey 24 May 1940, Turnhouse 21 July 1940, Prestwick 23 August 1940, Kenley (A) 29 August 1940, Kenley (G) 16 September 1940 257 Squadron Stations: Arklington 1 October 1939, Warmwell 12 July 1940 263 Squadron Stations: Grangemouth 28 June 1940, Drem 2 September 1940 266 Squadron Stations: Wittering (D) 7 April 1940, Wittering (C) 14 May 1940, Tangmere 9 August 1940, Eastchurch 12 August 1940, Hornchurch 14 August 1940, Wittering 21 August 1940 302 Squadron Stations: Leconfield 13 July 1940, Northolt 11 October 1940 303 Squadron Stations: Northolt 22 July 1940, Leconfield 11 October 1940 310 Squadron Stations: Duxford 10 July 1940 312 Squadron Stations: Duxford 29 August 1940, Speke 26 September 1940 401 Squadron Stations: Middle Wallop 21 June 1940, Croydon July 1940, Northolt Mid-August 1940, Prestwick 11 October 1940 501 Squadron Stations: Croydon 21 June 1940, Middle Wallop 4 July 1940, Gravesend 25 July 1940, Kenley 10 September 1940 504 Squadron Stations: Castletown 21 June 1940, Catterick 1 September 1940, Hendon 5 September 1940, Filton 26 September 1940 601 Squadron Stations: Tangmere 17 June 1940, Debden 19 August 1940, Tangmere 2 September 1940, Exeter 7 September 1940 602 Squadron Stations: Drem 28 May 1940, Westhampnett 13 August 1940 603 Squadron Stations: Turnhouse 5 May 1940, Hornchurch 27 August 1940 605 Squadron Stations: Drem 28 May 1940, Croydon 7 September 1940 607 Squadron Stations: Usworth 5 June 1940, Tangmere 1 September 1940, Turnhouse 10 October 1940 609 Squadron Stations: Northolt 19 May 1940, Middle Wallop 5 July 1940 610 Squadron Stations: Gravesend 26 May 1940, Biggin Hill 2 July 1940, Acklington 31 August 1940 611 Squadron Stations: Digby 10 October 1939 615 Squadron Stations: Kenley 20 May 1940, Prestwick 29 August 1940, Northolt 10 October 1940 616 Squadron Stations: Leconfield 6 June 1940, Kenley 19 August 1940, Coltishall 3 September 1940, Kirton-in-Lindsey 9 September 1940 |
check my posting 746 it might of of use
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The informational/educational value of this thread gets watered by you guys throwing insults and sticking to whatever agenda you might have. I found the discussion very interesting but too much "barbi/eugene/whatever" crap cluttering the info presented. Everyone wants the last word..But luckily can filter the crap and digest on the actual data hidden between the ePeen contests and insults :D |
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This is the most important post in the entire thread. I have read it all and I still don't know what Kur's actual view on this is. So come on K... What is your main point? Other than you're right and everyone else is wrong? |
Looks like Kurfurst got permanently banned from Wikipedia. If you read into this he upset a lot of respected editors by constantly editing articles. They frequently mention an agenda that he has, it would be quite an amusing read if these weren't real people he was wasting the time of.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikiped...d_for_Kurfurst |
That does not suprise me at all.. Other than it took this long for wiki to ban him
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Some people like our good Hungarian friend Kurfurst-Barbarossa-Isegrim's reputations precede them in flight sim and other flight discussion forums....Best to say no more and leave it at that. :)
I'll refrain from saying anything disparaging as this plays into their hands and is not necessary anyway....Glider in particular has conducted himself remarkably well and very gracefully in this very one sided 'discussion' (AKA absolute Naysayer hammering) in which for no good or justifiable reason whatsoever he has already been quite outrageously dubbed a 'Liar' by a certain party, 99.9% of people can see this is most certainly not so, carry on mate. Don't play the 'tit for tat' game with some people, even when provoked. Whatever the temptation. You are better than me because I would have lost my rag a LONG time ago lol....I can have a very short fuse at times, its a flaw, and that is why I am not participating this time around. :grin: That's what some want, a shutdown suits these people to a T, because they have nothing else. Nobody needs any help here anyway...doing a grand job. :) Some people, naming no names, just want to watch the world burn. They have no interest in the actual truth of a matter, still less in objectivity; the concept of intellectual honesty and rigour is an alien one, and the whole MO can be summed up as follows. And thus in his considered view, what does not suit....Cannot be true. Fortunately, for our purpose it really does not matter one jot what some one like this 'thinks' (again naming no names, and not necessarily here ;)).....when they are so patently wrong and consistently and embarrassingly made to look very foolish and debunked.* Keep up the good work chaps, and keep up the demolition job with the trusty sword and shield of corroborated Primary and secondary source evidence and Truth, the avalanche of which is very apparent and compelling to any reasonable person reading this thread. Bravo. I learned long ago that trying to have a 'reasonable debate' with some people (naming no names) is effectively impossible when they are absolutely devoid of reason themselves. Some people still think the Earth is flat (no, I'm not one of them. :)) and that Mankind co-existed with Dinosaurs etc. What can you do? Don't worry about it. Be happy. :grin: |
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_UTyyps_cCk |
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What may seem strange is obviously perfectly normal for him, he cannot see just how ridiculous he looks to other people, otherwise he would learn and adjust his behaviour. This is perfectly apparent from years of agenda driven vandalism of historical information sites where the same mantra and irritation is driven against some of the most studious people to write on the internet. I conclude that asking him why he is like this and why we would be interested must seem strange to him, rather like other people being very interested in what I had for breakfast this morning - it wouldn't make sense would it? |
Just a quick post about the Trimpell oil refinery figure of 384 spits in 19 squadrons.
I have a copy of the order of battle for fighter command on 1st August 1940. Guess how many operational spitfire squadrons are listed, in total, all sectors and groups..? Yep, 19. So that says to me that, as I suspected.. All of fighter commands spitfire squadrons had been converted by the end of July. All of them. Now somebody please debunk me. Edit: if you want me to list them, and where they were stationed I will. |
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I'm going to take a wild stab at this and suggest that you fly Luftwaffe. I'm guessing this based on your request for C3 (which frankly I have very limited knowledge of, other than, I gather, a tiny minority of aircraft were trying it out). Therefore I conclude that you would consider it to your advantage to have underperforming RAF to fight online. Fine, enjoy it. But if you could take off the flying hat and put on the historian hat, for a moment, and evaluate the documents posted (AND I MEAN THE OFFICIAL RECORDS) then you should be able to deduce that the RAF had it and used it on the front line for all fighting squadrons. Fortunately I make maps for our server so I'll make sure that 100 is available if 1C can get around to finishing what they started. |
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Sometimes you do not need to prove what was done, but what wasn't done! We have Kurfurst numbness to thank for a lot of this. Had it not been for his myopic granite stance you fine chaps wouldn't have pulled all of this info together in one place and thrashed out the situation via logic and elimination. And you can bet your bottom dollar that if the Spitfires had it then so did every Hurricane squadron too. What would be wonderful is if you guys could get all of this together and publish it online as evidence because as long as 'he' has air in his lungs he will pollute history. |
lol, you only need read the first part, Kurfurst is quoting Dr Gavin Bailey as his source
http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...&postcount=161 But here's what Dr Bailey had to say about Kurfurst in September 2009. "Kurfurst, this seems to be the third occasion when you have attempted to use my work to support a conclusion on the use of 100-octane fuel in the Battle of Britain which I have explicitly rejected. You have been asked, repeatedly, to desist. You cannot claim to be unaware of my views on the matter, having been confronted by them on a previous occasion when I challenged you on the misuse of my work on the forums of www.ww2aircraft.net. Note my comments there on 31 January 2009. http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/tec...bob-16305.html ...nothing in my work either can or should be used by people attempting to argue that 100-octane fuel was not in widespread use in Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain. That position is contradicted by a mass of original evidence cited in my work (and elsewhere). The next time anyody attempts to produce carefully-selected references from my work to contradict the historical use of 100-octane fuel by the RAF in the Battle of Britain, please refer them back to my original article which if nothing else should provide them with sufficient primary source evidence to disabuse them of that notion. I also refer you to my post of 7 February 2009, which concludes; http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/tec...b-16305-4.html My thesis, if this requires further clarification after my original posting on this forum, is that 100-octane fuel was supplied from a diversity of sources within and outside the US (in contrast to the received wisdom), but also was in widespread use during the Battle of Britain, as a mass of incontravertable primary source evidence demonstrates (in conformity with the received wisdom). Yes, you have quoted one decision mentioned in my article about the planned use of 100-octane fuel in selected squadrons in 1939. However you then ignore the text and references which then indicate that this decision was overtaken by others. Highlighting that first decision without exploring the subsequent changes to it is either mistaken or dishonest. If you cite my work again, I would ask you to make it clear that I have explictly and publically disagreed with your revisionist appreciaton of the use of 100-octane in Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain. Your apparent need to misrepresent and distort the works of others discredits your thesis out of hand. Your apparent willingness to repeat this misrepresentation and distortion after being challenged by the author of that work themselves does you even less credit. Gavin Bailey" |
I don't think further discrediting is needed, this will only get the thread locked and it doesn't provide any new information/proof/evidence on the subject.
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Yes i fly the Luftwaffe. And even with this 100 octane is possible to perform very good against any Spitfire since i would fly within the performance envelope of the 109. Above the 5000m the 100 octane advantage was lost. I simply have to fly in my terms and fly higher were the 109 was better. And engage and disengage at high speeds. One of the articles posted above to prove the 100 octane use also says that since the most of the air fighting in BoB was above the 4000m the 100 octane were not a panacea, and any advantage were minimized or lost. Put what UFO do you want in you server they ll go earth in flames. :cool: My pleasure will be higher in disapointing the overconfident spitfire pilots. The 109s difficulties acctualy is because the pilots are trying to counter the spits lower than 4000m or even in deck. |
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There won't be no dissapointment if I get shot down as a Spitfire Mk.Ia pilot as I know I am pulling the shorter straw with my a/c performance and I must compensate with skill and often with luck in order to succeed. I assure you that with your tactics as you describe it, any skilled RAF pilot would not let himself shot down so easily unless outnumbered by several 109s and I certainly would like to see myself going 'down in flames' when I meet you up in 20k where I usually loiter. You'd be lucky to make it back to France in one piece (probably saving yourself in a dive with quite a few .303 vent holes). Same situation in 5000k, I'd be lucky to make it home. I understand though what you're point is - it's the tactics in the first place and with that I agree. |
The interesting thing is that when flying in the BOB, I prefer the 109.
However as we all know, the unique situation in this period, is that seldom in air combat have the two planes been so well matched. Each has its advantages and its disadvantages but victory normally goes to the pilot who grabs the opportunity and / or has the tactical advantage. |
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2) Kurfürst has not seen the Pips papers, which were presented eight years ago as a summary in a members only forum, so the thread and the discussion surrounding Pips' "evidence" is not readily available. As Captain Doggles noted Pips himself admitted that they might have been misleading. For Kurfürst to pin 100% faith on papers he has not seen then demand 100% proof from others is a bit rich to say the least. 3) Morgan and Shacklady's claims about heavy tanker losses do not stack up. Cabinet papers show 1,157 tankers arriving in Britain September 1939 - November 1940. 78 tankers were sunk in the same time period. 5) And what exactly did other Commands use for fuel? An absurd claim to make in light of the fact that Bomber Command, for example, was engaged in intensive operations against invasion preparations - coincidentally, when Sealion was called off on September 17 and the invasion fleet began to disperse fuel consumption of Other Grades (not 87 Octane) tapered off as well. The fuel capacity of a Wellington, for example was 750 imp gallons; for Coastal Command a Sunderland needed 2,552 imp gal. Does this help explain why other grades of fuel were dominant? Kurfürst has presented no evidence but continues to demand others present theirs then, when more than enough evidence is presented, continues to whine about small details or simply restates his original position as gospel. |
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Question: How much fuel was needed to fly all defensive sorties flown by FC during the battle? (revised - previous posting included Hooton Sep 23-29: 4,825 defensive sorties, which are already included in James' figures)
The Battle of Britain T.C.G. James: 51,364 sorties, day & night July 10 - Sept 30: Hooton’s Eagle in Flames Sep 30 – Oct 6: 1,782 defensive sorties. Total = 53,146 sorties to October 6 1 imperial gallon of 100 Octane = 7.1 pounds ("Oil" by D.J Peyton-Smith the official British war history on the oil and petroleum industry during WW2 page xvii "Note on Weights and Measures"): 1 ton of 100 octane = 2,240 lbs divided by 7.1 = 315.5 imp gal Fuel Capacities: Defiant I = 97 imp gal Hurricane I = 90 imp gal Spitfire I & II = 84 imp gal Total 271 imp gal divided by 3 = 90.3 imp gal 315.5 divided by 90.3 = 3.5 fuel loads per ton of fuel 53,146 divided by 3.5 Answer: 15,184 tons of fuel total 100 Octane fuel issued between July 11 and October 31 = 62,000 tons: fuel consumed = 51,000 tons - 16,563 tons = 35,816 tons available for other purposes. The only engines cleared to use 100 Octane fuel were Merlin II, II, X(? Flight 1938 article), XII and Bristol Mercury XV. 1) Was 100 octane fuel available to Fighter Command? Yes 2) Was there enough 100 octane fuel available to cover all sorties flown by Fighter Command during the battle? Yes 3) Was enough 100 Octane fuel distributed and used throughout the battle to allow Fighter Command to fly all 53,146 sorties from July to 6 October? Yes, with more than enough left over to allow Blenheim IVs of Bomber Command and Coastal Command to operate, and more than enough to allow for secondary duties. Can anyone explain what happened to all that fuel if only half of FCs frontline fighters were allowed to use it? |
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Or maybe they were drinking it? ;) |
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Anyway, thanks very much for the information, your research is appreciated, I bet I am not alone here reading these documents with interest. Cheers for that NZ (and others, too!) |
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(It is called strategic reserves...) We all know what happened when the same group of people started using the logic on that one. Quote:
You take a very very simplistic view. You do realize that in December 1944, the USAAF in Europe, had 4 billion barrels of aviation gasoline issued out and some 12 billion in reserve. The next thing you seem to refuse to deal with is 87 grade remains the predominate fuel in the RAF until September 1940. Only then do we see 100 grade beginning to equal 87 grade. That corresponding rise in consumption very much agrees with Morgan and Shacklady. Until then, it appears the RAF is simply building up the logistical base required to support the eventual change to 100 grade. I will scan those Order of Battle charts from the RAF today. |
Can we see the rest of that document Glider?
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You can have anything that I have but which document in particular are you looking for, I posted a number of different ones. If its the Order of Battle I have posted this on posting 746
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2) If you're too obtuse to understand that "Other Grades" (not just 87 Octane) were used by Bomber Command, Coastal Command, etc which used big aircraft with large fuel tanks - eg Wellington 750 gallons - that's your pigeon. It is a lame argument, but then all of your arguments are lame. |
The heat is rising again and I believe that people need to calm down and the best way is for some simple questions to be asked and to get some replies.
The latest focus of conversation is the fuel that was used. We know that Bomber Command did approx 10,600 combat sorties during the BOB (data from Bomber Command Diary page 91, period 26 June to 13 October) plus a lot of training flights number unknown. I don't pretend to know the size of the tanks on Bomber Command aircraft but can safely assume that they are a lot bigger than a SE fighter. Crump The question I have is simple, do you agree that they would have used 87 octane until late August / September when they were allowed to use 100 Octane as per the paper I posted? Edit For the period 10 May to 25th June BC undertook approx 5,100 sorties |
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Anyway the only info I can find on the fuel capacity of British bombers/Coastal Command aircraft is: Vickers-Armstrong Wellington = 750 imp gallons Whitley, probably similar; Hampden about the same as Blenheim? Short Sunderland = 2,550 imp gal And I still want the the url for the thread on 100/150 grade fuel, and not just Crumpp/Barbi's interpretation. |
http://forums.ubi.com/showthread.php...=1#post3217673
http://forums.ubi.com/showthread.php...=1#post3358320 Quote:
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Sorry, if Crumpp thinks the thread he has presented as "evidence" proves his case, that the RAF built up reserves of 100 octane without using it, he is dreaming. All it proves is that that Barbi and co have lost the debate and have nothing practical to say. |
CRUMPP/NZ
I admit to not giving a damn about 150 octane, this thread is about 100 Octane in the BOB. Crumpp, can I ask you to confirm that your belief is that Bomber Command used 87 Octane during the BOB period until 100 octane was released for general use in all front line commands in August. |
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How much 100 octane fuel was needed to fly all 53,146 defensive sorties flown by FC to October 6? Total = 15,184 tons of fuel total 100 Octane fuel issued between July 11 and October 31 = 62,000 tons: fuel consumed July 1 - Oct 31 = 51,000 tons - 16,563 tons = 35,816 tons available for other purposes. |
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http://pioneerminister.files.wordpre.../diversion.jpg |
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