Post the RAF OoB from July 1 to Oct 31.

<Sarcasm>The pilots fueled their cars with 100 octane petrol and drove into London to hit the pubs. Those that didn't have a car would drive the 100 octane petrol bowsers into town for a drink or to visit their girl friends! I'll leave it to others to do the math as to how many car trips to London the pilots would have to make to "consume" 51,000 tons of 100 octane fuel. </Sarcasm>

David Ross, Stapme, The Biography of Squadron Leader Basi Gerald Stapleton DFC, (Grub Street, London, 2002), pp. 22-23
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...pleton-p23.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...pleton-p22.jpg

Tony Bartley DFC, Smoke Trails in the Sky, (Crecy Publishing Limited, Wilmslow, Cheshire, 1997), p. 35.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ley-100oct.jpg

Tim Vigors DFC, Life’s Too Short to Cry, (Grub Street, London, 2006), p. 137.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...-100octane.jpg

I agree with you that "fuel stocks quantity" and "extend of operational use" can be two different things. However, there is evidence that
a) there was more than enough fuel for every operational sortie "in stock", "issued", "consumed" (or however you want to call it that the fuel is circulating)
b) it was in operational use by at least 30 squadrons

And your theory is that only 16+2 squadrons only used it at one time because they didn't want to change a pre-war plan ... and the other squadrons didn't use it because of ... uhh?

I mean these squadrons had been modified to use it (and even if not modified it wouldn't have harmed the engine) and the fuel was been tested in regular squadrons since 1938.

It is not my theory. I don't know. It comes from what is considered the bible on the Spitfire's development, Morgan and Shacklady.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Spitfire-His.../dp/0946219486

I just know nothing in this thread is convincing otherwise to make their conclusion invalid.

If you have a copy, look it up. If you don't and are interested in the Spitfire, get one.

I have a copy of course. I read the section a week ago and my understanding is that the authors didn't make any conclusion, they only cite the pre-war plan. Some doubt that this plan was changed, some believe it has changed ... but really we don't even have evidence that the plan was accomplished, just as we don't have evidence that all units had converted.

What we have is evidence that Fighter Command wanted to change to 100 octane fuel and we have a large amount of squadrons that used 100 octane in May/June 1940 compared to a the few squadrons prior that time which used it on trial. Common sense tells me that it's not very likely that all squadrons changed from 87 octane to 100 octane in 6 weeks. Maybe someone can proof that I'm wrong with that assumption ;)

My believe is that the widespread (meaning not limited to certain squadrons) use started in May/June 1940, however I don't believe that all squadrons used it exclusively from that time on but that the amount of squadrons that used it increased steadily and maybe it took the whole summer for some isolated squadrons.

Would be interesting to see those OOBs. There are some circulating in the internet, would be nice to compare them with other sources.

Can I ask where in the book it says this as I cannot find it.

Pg 55 under the heading 100 OCTANE FUEL

This is the 1st edition.

I have a copy of the book and, in many respects it is an excellent piece of work; the problem is that there are holes in their interpretation - which is relatively brief - of events in 1940.

For example they say that there were large numbers of tankers carrying 100 octane fuel lost in 1940, but there is no evidence cited in the book to back that up - it is a blanket statement.

In fact 78 (KF's figures) tankers were sunk - it is a high number, and terrible for those who died on them, but does not compare with the 1,151 which unloaded in Britain, as shown by a primary source document from the British War Cabinet
(Grand Total of Tankers arriving in UK Sept 1939 to November 1940 = 1,151
Grand Total of Oil Products Imported = 12,169,300 tons: 10,573 tons of oil product per tanker - my wording, not the cabinet paper)

Morgan and Shacklady are great at describing technical details of the Spitfire, which was their primary focus, but their interpretation of historical events not so much, because that is not their area of expertise.

You have critiqued Alfred Price in a similar way in another thread http://forums.ubi.com/showthread.php...Bf-109s-Forums - great author, enjoy reading what he says but he's not always accurate in specific details.

You don't know, even with the evidence that's been placed here - that's fine, if you want to place your entire faith in one book, that's up to you - historical research about events that happened in wartime Britain, or any other country cannot come up with 100% answers. That goes for matters concerning the Luftwaffe. The houses of Parliament in London were bombed during the battle and there is the possibility that documents that people like Glider have spent hours patiently searching the archives for were destroyed.

Take an unblinkered look at the "evidence" posted by Kurfürst, who admits that he only has a very passing interest in the RAF, yet has for years has obsessively pursued a theory about the RAF not using 100 octane fuel, later modified to the RAF having some 100 octane fuel in the B of B - it is all based on a memo presented by Pips in another thread in 2004 which Kurfürst has never seen. What else has he actually presented that stacks up? Nada - nothing, lots of abuse and scorn and lawyerly twisting of words and context. Other people have recognised that the sheer weight of evidence for the RAF using 100 Octane fuel extensively throughout the B of B is "overwhelming" - if you can't see it, I cannot help you.

The source is the RAF's official History of the Battle of Britain by TCG James. I will scan them and post them when I get the chance.

No they just state the facts as they know them. That is one of things that makes their book so good and so far, everything in it has been correct. Their research into the technical development of the Spitfire is profound.

I remember when people loved to post the Mach .98 dives of the recon Spitfire that lost a propeller available on that website "Spitfire Performance" as representative of the diving ability of the aircraft. Anybody with some knowledge of aerodynamics who reads Morgan and Shacklady can immediately spot the issue with that. Not only does the A&AEE officially retract those measurements but it is very easy to spot the fact the A&AEE had their static ports in the wrong location to get any kind of accurate speed measurement from their rake in the original report.

Not their fault, we just did not know as much about transonic flight and the difficulty in obtaining accurate airspeed measurements.

I agree the 800,000 ton strategic reserve requirement be built up before any squadrons convert probably comes from a pre-war estimate.

If it is correct, then there is absolutely no chance a single operational squadron flew with the fuel during the Battle of Britain. England simply did not have enough 100 Octane fuel on hand to come close to that reserve requirement.

Again, that is just speculation on my part. Morgan and Shacklady just listed the two facts we know but they were not writing a book on the history of the Oil Committee and strategic reserves.

1. An 800,000 ton Strategic Reserve was required to be on hand before a single aircraft flew operationally.

2. 16 Squadrons converted in September 1940.

They were doing the technical development of the Spitfire. The 16 squadrons is a very important part of that technical development and inline with the subject they were research. One can look at the 87 Octane consumption on the documents in this thread and easily tell that it was not until after September that 100 Octane became the predominate fuel used by the RAF.