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It it patently obvious that many squadrons used 100 octane fuel. How many? Were they confined to 11 group or were they throughout fighter command? We haven't been able to determine that exactly, yet. But to deny it was used at all is to deny documented historical fact :rolleyes:
Quote: "The spitfire were not so succesfull against the 109s in other theaters. At mediterranean and Afrika the allied resources are bigger. And the RAF suffered heavy loses in Afrika and Malta. The failure of the Luftwaffe in this scenarios was mainly because they were outnumbered and low of fuel. And they performed very well. And the spitfire was there." As an aside, Spitfires (and Hurricanes) initially used in the middle east suffered a considerable performance penalty due to the enormous "Volkes" filter that was attached to keep sand out of the intakes. The "Aboukir" filter that was developed later caused less of a performance issue. |
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The first two screen captures are from Re-arming filmed around June 1940. 609 Squadron Spitfire I's are shown being re-fueled and re-armed. One of the aircraft still has a black & white underside paint scheme, whereas the others have all duck egg blue undersides. Note the 100 stenciled in black paint on the fuselage at the location of the fuel tanks. This is in contrast to the 100 stenciled in white paint at the fuel tanks location of the Spitfire I shown in the instructional film The Daily Inspection of a Spitfire. The location of the 100 octane fuel stencil also varies slightly from aircraft to aircraft. http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...I-100oct-g.jpg http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...I-100oct-i.jpg From The Daily Inspection of a Spitfire June 1940. http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...I-100oct-h.jpg http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...-100oct-1b.jpg |
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FYI, a very good explanation was offered shortly after my last post. Quote:
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Look up the O2 system on the F22 raptor........ALL of the USAF F22 were grounded. It does happen and there is a reason the process to adopt new technology on aircraft is so laborious. The United States is just lucky it did not occur in the middle of a major conflict between first world nations. What if the RAF adopted 100 grade en-mass and it caused the aircraft to be grounded, unavailable to defend the country in time of war??? |
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I don't remember anyone saying 16 Squadrons were "suddenly converted" to 100 octane fuel in September 1940 - just another example of pure speculation on your part. You still have not provided any documentary, or secondary evidence for the rest of your wishful thinking. The rest is nothing but pure hypothesis; what happens to F-22s in 21st Century peacetime conditions has nothing whatsoever to do with what happened in Britain in 1940. |
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No. 32 Squadron pre BoB H No. 92 (East India) Squadron pre BoB S No. 111 Squadron pre BoB H No. 151 Squadron Feb 1940 H No. 602 (City of Glasgow) Squadron pre BoB S No. 609 (West Riding) Squadron pre BoB S No. 1 (Cawnpore) Squadron May 1940 H No. 3 Squadron May 1940 H No. 17 Squadron May 1940 H No. 19 Squadron May 1940 S No. 54 Squadron May 1940 S No. 74 Squadron May 1940 S No. 56 (Punjab) Squadron May 1940 H No. 73 Squadron May 1940 H No. 79 (Madras Presidency) Squadron May 1940 H No. 85 Squadron May 1940 H No. 87 (United Provinces) Squadron May 1940 H No. 229 Squadron May 1940 H No. 43 (China-British) Squadron June 1940 H No. 41 Squadron June 1940 S No. 610 (County of Chester) Squadron June 1940 S No. 611 (West Lancashire) Squadron June 1940 S One third of FC would not be out of action as 87 fuel could still be used. |
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My previous questions are still waiting a reply. 1) If you believe that the RAF only used 16 squadrons of fighters with 100 Octane until Sept 1940, then you need to explain why we have over 30 squadrons mentioning it in combat reports. 2) If you believe that this was achieved by only 16 squadrons using it at any one time then you need to prove it. 3) If you beleive that a pre war plan stayed in force for 12 months without any change then ask yourself this question. Can you find any pre war plan, on any topic, in relation to any combat arm, of any nation that continued without alteration once the fighting started. Find one, this isn't it because we know that Blenhiem units were equipped with 100 octane in France and that alone was more than 2 squadrons. 4) There was no shortage of fuel at any time in the BOB. If you think there was a shortage, prove it. The only shortage I found was in May 1944 before the invasion. 5) All the facts that I have posted on this have come from the official records in the National Archives. If that isn't good enough for you then tell me what is? |
To check the "only-16-squadrons-at-one-time-by-rotating" theory I did count the squadrons that were at one time in No. 11 Group.
July 10th 1940 Hurricane 13 Spitfire 5 Blenheim 3 Defiant 1 http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/document-22.html August 8th 1940 Hurricane 14.5 (No. 85 Squadron is listed twice as the two Flights were at different stations, No. 1 RCAF is operational on August 17th when No. 41 Squadron was already transferred back to No. 13 Group) Spitfire 5.5 (No. 41 Squadron returned to No. 13 Group on August 9th) Blenheim 2 Defiant 0 http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/document-28.html September 7th 1940 Hurricane 14 Spitfire 7 Blenheim 2 Defiant 0 http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/document-44.html If we assume that 16 squadrons operated on 100 octane at one time, by summing up the Spitfire, Hurricane and Defiant* squadrons in No. 11 Group we get: July 10th: 19 Squadrons (84% on 100 octane) August 8th: 20 Squadrons (80% on 100 octane) September 7th: 21 Squadrons (76% on 100 octane) *Blenheim only used 100 octane fuel for better take-off performance when heavy loaded, which was not required in Fighter Command as they didn't carry bombs. |
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R6692 - the Spitfire in the hanger, and the subject of the maintenance film, first flew June 3 was delivered to 6MU 5 June, then 609 Sqn. 7 June http://www.spitfires.ukf.net/p009.htm : in the film the aircraft code letter had yet to be applied, so the film was shot early-mid June, while it was still working into 609 Sqn. service. The 2nd photo of 609 Sqn Spitfires shows two of them still had black wheels, meaning they originally were painted black under the port wing, yet the undersurfaces of the wing were painted Sky, meaning the unit was in the middle of repainting its operational aircraft - again early - mid June 1940. |
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- that the RAF decided in March 1939 to equip 16 fighter + 2 bomber Squadrons with 100 octane - that in May 1940 they acknowledged that the fuel was delivered to select fighter and bomber squadrons - that in August 1940 they decided that other Commands may use 100 fuel as well (which does not mean they did, they were authorized to do so) - 100 octane vs 87 octane issues figures for 1940 all show that 87 octane was the primary fuel issued during the Battle, and 100 octane issues did not increase or took prominence until the day battle was pretty much over Everything else is merely your speculation and wishful thinking about 'all' and 'every' unit using 100 octane, supported by no evidence as many has already told you. You can only offer mere rhetoric and nothing more. Nobody else need to offer counter-evidence to your speculation, as you were not able to offer evidence to start with. The burden is proof is on you. You can't - I see you'd like to - escape from that fact I am afraid. |
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No Pips memo, which he has never seen in the first place; Morgan and Shacklady busted; (pity I still like the book but some of their research lacks depth) and his mere conjecture and wishful thinking over the words "certain" or "selected", written in memos that are 70 years old. Not forgetting that Kf very recently did provide a document stating that the RAF actually considered it had adequate reserves of 100 octane fuel in November 1939. http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit1-12lbs.jpg All he can do is squeak "the burden of proof is on you" - and nobody but Kf has set that 'rule'. If that was really true everything Kf has posted, all of his bluster, all of his attempts to justify his position, has been, in the words of the bard "a tale. Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing" (MacBeth) |
If you are engaged in a battle for survival, do you not think you would utilize every possible advantage you have whether or not there are "adequate" reserves on hand or not?
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Sorry to intervene in the middle of your sword fighting, but if the 100 Octane fuel use was generalized, why is it even mentioned in the combat reports? I really doubt the use of your regular-every-day-normal fuel warrants mentioning.
Just asking. Was any air force during the WW2 in the habbit of specifying what fuel they flew with unless it was something, i don't know, unusual? |
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However I don't think they were strictly required to mention the use in "Intelligence Form F" (Combat Report) as the ground crew wouldn't read them. However it was a useful information for the intelligence officer, for example if the pilot was able to catch up with a Bf 109 using +12 boost. |
Ok that i understand, thanks for explaining it to me. It really made no sense before ;).
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You have not produced anything that would suggest this policy was revised. Fuel issue/consumption records show that the 87 octane remained the main type issued and consumed. So instead of dancing on the words and expecting others to disprove the unsupported thesis you are speculating about, how about producing a single paper saying that all Squadrons are/are to be supplied, hmm? So far your record with that is dismay failure. Moreover, as you said you have combat reports from pilots from about 30 Squadrons (rotating between Stations that selected to be supplied with 100 octane as others have also correctly pointed out, so alone it gives very little idea of how many units were using the fuel at one time) so one just wonders on really what basis you are claiming that not 30 but 60+ Squadrons were all using 100 octane fuel, when you have only evidence for half of them. After years of rather barren research. |
I found this document http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...tane-issue.pdf rather interesting.
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"serving the fighter stations concerned" "certain units of Bomber Command" ".. 100 octane fuel will come into use in all the approved stations" "bulk storage could be made available at the relevant stations" Quite clear isn't it. Just don't make the mistake that Glider is not aware of all that, he is, for a long time, he just ignores the evidence. |
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The "approved stations" are given in the referenced letter No. F.C. 15447/76/E.Q.2: http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...0oct-issue.jpg http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...0oct-issue.jpg It was also shown here: http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...&postcount=121 http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...&postcount=125 http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...&postcount=133 http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...&postcount=135 that the "certain units" of Bomber Command had received 100 octane fuel until May 1940. And then the Fighter stations started to receive 100 octane fuel, which pretty much agrees with the reported use of 100 octane fuel in several fighter squadrons starting from May 1940. |
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"These are, or will be operational Stations although they have no Hurricanes or Spitfires at the moment. In the near future these stations will have Merlin engine aircraft that will require 100 octane fuel." 9 December 1939
Not might require, not maybe require but will require 100 octane fuel. Clear recognition that as early as December 1939 Merlin engine aircraft such as the Hurricane and Spitfire required 100 octane fuel, and that bases operating Merlin powered aircraft needed stocks of the fuel. |
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[QUOTE=41Sqn_Banks;399463]I read it a bit different. "Issue of this fuel to certain units in the Bomber Command will, however, take precedence over the units equipped with the above mentioned types of aeroplanes." There is a clear constraint on "certain" units in Bomber Command but no constraint on units with Hurricane, Spitfire and Defiant. ;)
Only if you simply forget about the preceeding sentence - ""serving the fighter stations concerned". Its a quite clear constraint, repeated again in the April - May docs, posted previously. Quote:
It was also shown here: http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...&postcount=121 http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...&postcount=125 http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...&postcount=133 http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...&postcount=135 Quote:
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16 Fighter and 2 Bomber Squadrons by September 1940 "The change-over would start towards the end of the present year and ACAS would select the particular squadrons which would operate on the new fuel." |
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http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...0oct-37-38.jpg We also know that the following units were supplied with 100 octane during 1938. Duxford: No. 19 in Spitfire I, No. 66 in Gloster Gauntlet II Debden: No. 85 & No. 87 in Hawker Hurricane Northholt: No. 111 in Hawker Hurricane Digby: No. 46 in Gaunlet II & No. 73 in Hurricane http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...oct-6dec38.jpg It bears repeating that the use of 100 octane fuel for Hurricanes and Spitfires was approved by 24 September 1938. http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...t-approval.jpg |
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Secondly, about the two letters from December 1939. If we assume that the 24 Stations (if I counted right) listed there are indeed the ones that were said to be selected by ACAS in the March 1939 paper by the end of the year, that leaves a bit of problem, because there were about 60-odd fighter stations operated by Fighter Command in the Battle of Britain... Which leaves if these were the ones effected, or 'concerned' it leaves about half of fighter command operating on 100 octane. A curious coincidence is that there are only combat reports indicating 100 octane supply for about half the Squadrons that participated in the Battle. That leaves with a very well supportable case that half of Fighter Command was operating on 100 octane, and the other half on 87 octane. Its not an easy case and I am thankful that as opposed to Fighter Command's case of 100 octane use, the Jagdwaffe's use of 100 octane fuel (naturally denied by lane, glider and minnie :D ) is so much more clearly documented and we know the very exact units, and the number of planes effected. Makes so much less room for arguements. ;) |
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The points to think about: It was not until sometime in September the RAF had 16 fighter squadrons using 100 Octane. That could be the 1st of September or the 30th of September that 16 squadrons were operational. We don't know the exact date. I point this out because during the 100/150 grade debacle, knowing the exact dates revealed the fuel was used for several weeks before being withdrawn in the 2nd TAF. During that time, many squadrons converted back to 100/130 grade on their own because of the unreliability of the engine when using 100/150 grade. As a pilot myself, I have an aversion to flying with anything that will stop that propeller from turning, too. I like it when it works and don't like dying. Second point is the logistical planning of the RAF in many ways was much better than the Luftwaffe. I would be willing to bet the RAF did not wait and suddenly stand up those 16 squadrons at once. Instead, at the completion of operational trials, the units were stood up on 100 octane as soon as the field built up the required reserve, the aircraft converted, and the logistical support in place to maintain combat operations. This would make for a gradient curve and by sometime in September a full 16 squadrons were using the fuel. A word of caution, this is just my opinion and stated to participate or add fuel to any "make my gameshape better" butchering of history. Unfortunately, we don't have the facts to fill in the gaps in our knowledge on that part so the very presence and actual slope is just more guesswork. Given time, the facts will be revealed. Five years ago, I know very little about the development details or extent of operational use of either GM-1 or Alkohol-Einspritzung on the FW-190. We just knew we wanted our aircraft to be as authentic a restoration as possible. After several years of ploughing archives the gaps in our knowledge have narrowed considerably and the picture is much clearer. The same will happen with the introduction of 100 Octane. I highly doubt it will be solved here and now. The answer is probably collecting dust in the files of an archive somewhere. |
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Here's a 602 Squadron Spitfire at Drem. Note the black & white undersides and the 100 octane label stenciled in white. This photo was taken during a press day, probably late February or March 1940. See also the Flight article from 28 March 1940 which describes 602 Squadron's operations using 100 octane fuel, probably the same event. (Ironically, for those that like to "get in the weeds" with this stuff, the author of the flight article was none other than H. F. King ;) ) 602 Squadron converted to 100 octane at Drem during February 1940. http://www.spitfireperformance.com/6...-100octane.jpg http://www.spitfireperformance.com/6...-100octane.jpg |
As the Stations did have there own ORB, did anyone check them for entries concerning 100 octane fuel?
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I also started to review the squadron records and what was interesting was that any squadron that formed after May 1940 had no mention of 100 octane at all and I checked these through to May 1941 by which time they certainly would have been using 100 octane. The inference I drew was that they didn't mention it as by then it was standard issue and therefore wouldn't be mentioned. This would support the view that the paper in May which referred to the stations concerned was talking about the Operational stations that had not been converted by April 1940. I think its worth mentioning that Drem is in the North of Scotland. Not the first place I would issue 100 Octane too, if supply and distribution was to be limited. |
It's interesting that so far ORB was found that mentions the switch to 100 octane fuel after May 1940. Of course some ORBs don't mention the switch at all. However if at least one squadron could be found it would clearly proof that it was not in use by all squadrons.
BTW: Anyone know what Merlin Modification 102 and 123 was? It was applied to the Spitfire of 41 Squadron in November 1939: http://www.oldrafrecords.com/records/424/4240052.gif Also I remembered that there are two different Pilot's Notes for the Spitfire II are circulating, one that mentions the use of 100 octane only and another that mentions 100 octane (operational) and 87 octane (non-operational). Wouldn't it be logical that the first issue only contains 100 octane use as the new Spitfire II was only used operational at first, and only later when non-operational units used it the handling of 87 octane is mentioned. |
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One of the things that greatly hampered the Luftwaffe was the inability to conduct operational testing outside of combat operations. There was no place like Drem outside of the maelstrom of combat to collect operational data. |
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Merlin/102: To make provision for increased ratio starter gearing the slipping torque of the starter clutch has been increased by extra spring pressure. Merlin/123: Introduction of epicyclic type of starter motor gears having a 94.6 to 1 turning ratio. A bit off topic but flip back one page in your 41 Sqdn ORB and check out Spitfire Alteration 1/36 - Armour Plating ;) http://www.spitfireperformance.com/4...v39-armour.jpg |
The Spit II was introduced in august in OTU.
Regarding the armoured windshield I hd the same remark as KF looking at the picture... weird. Spit II was introduced a bit latter during BoB. Link Alrdy posted on ATAG http://plane-crazy.purplecloud.net/A...e%20mk%202.htm |
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Those 7th December 1939 and 9th December 1939 directives list the stations requiring 100 octane fuel since they had or were expected to have in the near future Merlin engined aircraft. Non operational stations in Fighter command were also required to hold certain quantities of 100 octane. The squadrons equipped with Hurricanes during December 1939 are as follows: 3, 17, 32, 43, 46, 56, 79, 111, 151, 213, 501, 504, 605. During December 1939 these Hurricane Squadrons were stationed as follows. 3 – Croydon, 17 – Debden 32 – Biggin Hill 43 – Acklington 46 – Digby 56 – Martlesham Heath 79 – Manston 111 – Drem 151 – North Weald 213 – Wittering 501 – Tangmere 504 – Debden 605 – Tangmere All these operational stations were listed on the 7th December 1939 or 9th December 1939 as requiring 100 octane fuel, therefore it was Fighter Command's clear intention that these Hurricane squadrons would convert to 100 octane fuel. The Squadrons equipped with Spitfires in December 1939 are as follows: 19, 41, 54, 65, 66, 72, 74, 152, 602, 603, 609, 610, 611, 616. During December 1939 these Spitfire Squadrons were stationed as follows: 19 - Duxford 41 - Catterick 54 - Hornchurch 65 - Northholt 66 - Duxford 72 - Drem 74 - Rochford 152 - Acklington 602 - Grangemouth 603 - Turnhouse 609 - Drem 610 - Wittering 611 - Digby 616 – Leconfield Rochford is the only base not listed on the 7th December 1939 or 9th December 1939 directives, however, 74 Operations Record Book indicates that they had 100 octane while at Rochford in March 1940. Other units participating in the Battle of Britain that converted to Hurricane, Spitfire or Defiant after December 1939 and the station where they converted are as follows: 64 – Church Fenton 92 – Croyden 145 – Croyden 222 – Duxford 229 – Digby 232 – Sumburgh 234 – Leconfield 242 – Church Fenton 245 – Leconfield 253 – Manston 257 – Hendon 263 – Drem 266 – Sutton Bridge 302 – Leconfield 310 – Duxford 312 – Duxford 601 – Tangmere Sumburgh is the only base not listed in the 7th December 1939 and 9th December 1939 100 octane Fuel - Issue of directives to receive 100 octane fuel. 232 formed there in July 1940. Therefore it can be readily seen that the operational stations at which the 100 octane fuel was required were all those stations that held operational Hurricane, Spitfire and Defiant squadrons. Those units based in France during December 1939 were 1, 73, 85, 87 & 607 in Hurricane and 615 in Gladiator. We know from Post 372 that all these France based Hurricane squadrons were using 100 octane by May 1940. This listing accounts for the 50 merlin engined Spitfire, Hurricane & Defiant squadrons that fought in the Battle of Britain. |
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Sector Stations: 10 Group: Filton* (listed as operational 9th December 1939), Middle Wallop# 11 Group: Tangmere*, Biggin Hill*, Hornchurch*, North Weald*, Debden*, Northolt*, Kenley* listed as non-operational, requiring 100 Octane 7th December 1939# 12 Group: Duxford/ Fowlmere*, Wittering*, Digby*, Kirton-In-Lindsey, Church Fenton* 13 Group: Usworth, Acklington*, Turnhouse*, Wick and Dyce Satellite aerodromes 10 Group: Boscombe Down, Colerne, Pembry, Warmwell#,Exeter# 11 Group: Westhampnett*, Croydon*, Gravesend, Rochford*, Manston*, Hawkinge, Martlesham Heath*, Hendon*, West Malling#, Stapleford Tawney#. 12 Group: Coltishall, Turnhill, Leconfield* 13 Group: Catterick*, Drem*, Grangemouth*, Kirkwall, Sumburgh* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAF_Fig...of_Battle_1940 attachment: Combat Report Boyd 602 Sqn showing Westhampnett as using 100 octane. August 1940 From the Battle of Britain Then and Now Vol V: Westhampnett was "...an emergency landing ground for the fighter squadrons based at Tangmere...during the month of July 1940 it gradually assumed the status of a satellite landing ground..." (p. 42.). Kenley was under a programme of reconstruction and expansion from May - December 1939. (p. 46.) The following bases had not been established in December 1939: *West Malling was a private aerodrome and did not become an official RAF station until June 1940. (p.70.) *Stapleford Tawney did not receive its first operational fighter squadrons until March 1940, when 56 and 151 Sqns used it as a stopover. (p. 184.) *Duxford and Fowlmere have to be considered together "as the latter had no separate identity..."(p.198.) *"RAF Station Exeter was officially inaugurated in the presence of Nos. 213 and 87 Squadrons on July 6 1940."(p. 213.) *Middle Wallop was a training aerodrome until becoming an operational fighter base on 12 July 1940. (p.218.) *Warmwell was also a training aerodrome and did not become an operational fighter base until July 4 1940. (p. 231.) 609 Sqn was based firstly at Northolt then moved to Middle Wallop on July 4 and used Warmwell as a daytime base.(p.231.) The Spitfire maintenance film was made at Northolt in mid June 1940. *Filton was later a 10 Group Sector station but only ever hosted one or two squadrons at a time, only one of which - 501 Sqn. - required 100 Octane fuel. "Squadrons stationed at RAF Filton from the beginning of WW2 included 501 (County of Gloucester) Sqdn (Auxiliary Air Force), now flying Hawker Hurricane I fighters, until 10 May 1940 when that Squadron moved to France; and 263 Squadron (reformed on 20 October 1939 at Filton) taking over some of the Gloster Gladiator I biplane fighters previously with 605 Squadron and still wearing that squadron's code letter (HE). The Squadron went on to Norway in April 1940 operating from a frozen lake. Between May and July 1940, No. 236 Squadron were based at Filton with Bristol Blenheim twin-engined fighters, flying defensive sweeps over the Channel." (source http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAF_Filton) In December 1939 there were 36 operational bases, because Fowlmere was an integral part of Duxford. All of the 6 operational and 1 non-operational 11 Group sector stations were to be provided with 100 octane fuel; 12 Group: 4 out of 5 13 Group: 2 out of 5 10 Group: 1 out of 2 6 out of 8 "satellite' airfields in 11 Group were to be provided with 100 octane fuel; 12 Group: 1 out of 3 13 Group: 4 out of 5 10 Group: 0 out of three 25 out of 36 operational bases were to be provided with 100 Octane fuel starting in December 1939, a ratio of better than 2 to 1. Far more realistic than 24 out of "60 odd" stations. |
The evidence keeps mounting up that 100 octane was used throughout fighter command by May 1940.
The case has been proven beyond any reasonable doubt: any jury would have come to that conclusion over 60 pages ago in this thread and any number of other threads in this forum and others. I joined this debate many months ago with an open mind and have been convinced by the evidence presented and have not seen anything that makes me doubt that conclusion. Until such time as fresh evidence is put forward that any fighter command aircraft were using 87 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain I suggest this thread is closed lest newcomers to the debate stumble upon it and heed the opinion of the tiny minority and believe the matter is being seriously questioned. When future questions are raised regarding this matter referral can be made back to this thread where all the evidence resides- especially for the developers who seem to have acceded to the minority view that 100 octane was not used routinely in fighter command until late in the BoB. The only reason this poor excuse for a debate continues is due to a small number of posters who are determined to have the last word and their intransigence in the face of all the evidence. As the old saying goes 'There are none so blind as those that refuse to see'. |
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But of course, you can dream up almost anything and nobody will care. ;) Quote:
How much lower can one get I wonder...? |
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Out of curiousity, what is your source for armored windshields? |
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Performance of a Supercharged Aero Engine Hooker, Stanley 1872922112 Rolls Royce Heritage Trust http://www.amazon.com/Performance-Su...6&sr=8-2-fkmr0 (seems the price has increased - the bill I dug out of my archives says 6.53€ !) Regarding the Spit II, I didn't heard any of your commentaries regarding the roll out date (august) and service intro (sept late) ;) |
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P7281 IIa Morris MXII 6MU 17-6-40 612S 27-8-40 611S 27-8-40 41S 24-10-40 54S 22-2-41 616S 10-7-41 417S 26-1-42 15OTU 15-2-42 57OTU 30-7-42 CB 22-4-43 SOC 23-1-44 P7282 IIa Morris MXII 6MU 26-6-40 611S 22-8-40 41S 24-10-40 shot down by Bf109 P/O Draper injured C3 30-10-40 SOC 14-11-40 P7283 IIa Morris MXII 8MU 1-7-40 611S 26-8-40 41S 24-10-40 C2 ops 17-11-40 54S 12-2-41 234S 3-7-41 152S 28-10-41 8FTS 13-6-43 10AGS 17-4-45 FTR ops 17-5-45 SOC 18-6-45 P7284 IIa Morris MXII 8MU 7-7-40 611S 26-8-40 41S 24-10-40 C2 ops 26-10-40 54S 22-2-41 308S 14-7-41 610S 11-9-41 3ADF Spun into ground in circuit Valley CE 2-11-41 SOC 5-12-41 P7285 IIa Morris MXII 8MU 1-7-40 266S 5-9-40 603S 7-10-40 Shot down by Bf109s 16m E of Dover 8-10-40 F/O Kirkwood missing P7286 IIa Morris MXII 9MU 13-7-40 152S 17-7-40 603S 17-10-40 shot down by Bf109 P/O Maxwell 27-10-40 AST AAEE 16-1-41 trials with Rotol constant-speed prop Morris rad and inertia weight 234S 12-5-41 VA 3-7-41 66S 31-7-41 152S 3-9-41 Overshot landing into fence Swanton Morley CAC 16-9-41 ASTE SOC 10-11-41 more @ http://www.spitfires.ukf.net/p003.htm |
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The Zeno pilots notes you quote are here http://www.zenoswarbirdvideos.com/Im...pit2Manual.pdf Please note item 35 gun controls where it has a) and b) and B has 2 x 20mm and 4 x LMG. Section 2 has the bit you keep quoting 100 Octane and 87 Octane. The posting where you identified these as being the ones you quote is here http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/avi...a-20108-8.html The Pilots Note I refer to are here http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/oth...uals-9050.html Please note item 44 Gun Controls where only the 8 mgs are mentioned, and item 55 where it clearly states only 100 Octane The question I ask is this:- When you know with an absolute certainty, that the quote you are making is wrong and misleading, why do you keep mentioning it as part of your evidence? Unless of course you believe it to be true and that the RAF had Mk II spits in July 1940 with 2 x 20mm and 4 x LMG which is what your pilots notes say People are free to look at these links, and if you do not reply with an explanation may well make their own mind up as to why. |
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This Spit is on display in UK. You might hve the oportunity to check it by your own eyes :evil: |
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*every aircraft of was first assigned to a Maintenance Unit and than transferred to a Squadron. I don't understand how you conclude from this link that the Spitfire II was first introduced in August 1940 in OTUs and wasn't used operational before September 1940. |
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Did I ? just mixed MU and OTU. :rolleyes: September ! september ! september ! |
Ok, mixing abbreviations can happen.
Not September, but August. http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no611-orb.jpg Quote:
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Banks, "my" Spit II is the 14th ever produced (Castel Brwnich) and made it in OP the 6th september.
It's hard to imagine any significant use of the II during august ;) A short abstract of the MkII history : http://www.historyofwar.org/articles...fire_mkII.html |
Even your own link says says that the first squadron (No. 611) received them in August 1940. Then there are excerpts from the Operational Record Book of No. 611 Squadron which confirm the first operational use in August 1940. http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no611-orb.jpg
But obviously your claim switched from "service introduction" to "significant use". There was significant use in one squadron. Significant use in whole Fighter Command is of course a different story. |
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I also know for certainty that you have an idiotic thesis why to dismiss yet another source which is clearly dated June 1940 and notes what limits apply 'when 100 octane fuel is used' and not 87. Guess what, I just do not give credit to neither this idiotic thesis of yours, neither the other which says that when British papers say select fighter squadrons, it's 'a typo', nor the one which says its not a typo but it was reveresed later, nor the one which says the only 100 octane fuel the Germans had was from captured British stock, nor the one which says that no Spitfire or Hurricane had two pitch propeller in the Battle of Britain and so on. Guess what, you simply have no credibility left in my eye. Quote:
"P9504... still had four of the original Browning MG mountings in the wings. It was used to test a trial installation of two Hispano cannon and four Browning guns... within days a second Spitfire, X4257 had a wing built from scratch, with the new armament and service trials begun on 20 August. Five days later R6761, 6770,6889,6904 and 6919 were withdrawn from No.19 and modified to the same standards. etc.." P9504 was a Mark I, the first produced a/c with 4 x 7.7 + 2 x 20mm, first flight 30 April 1940. Quote:
How about just taking Crumpp's advice which seem to be the majority view here anyway - admitting that we (you) simply do not know the exact details (yet) and have really no solid idea how many Squadrons were employing 100 octane fuel? |
The only unit using the Mk II in combat from August - September was 611 Sqn based at Digby; the first significant action I can find in The Battle of Britain Then and Now Vol V was on 21st August when P7290, P7304, P7303, P7292 (P7305 damaged hitting a chock while landing) were damaged during combat against Do 17s of KG2: one Do 17 was shot down while two collided and crashed (pp.373, 591).
The next entry is for September 9 when P7320 force landed, out of fuel, then September 11 when P7298 was set light during combat and crashed, while P3721 was heavily damaged by an He 111 and crashed on landing category C2 (pp 441, 446). Other units to start equipping in September included 74, 266 and 603 Sqns, although there seemed to be some swapping around, and 421 Flight (later 91 Sqn). |
http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/attachm...3&d=1332019557
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And the testing for this was done in 1939; "...it being observed that the Merlin XII has been type tested and approved for 12½ lbs. boost take off conditions." (para 5) |
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X4257 Ib 1037 EA MIII FF 16-8-40 6MU 20-8-40 first Spit with 'B' wing Type 340 AMDP EA 30-8-40 RAE 3-9-40 AAEE 20-10-40 1CRU new eng 8MU 15-11-40 AFDU Duxford 11-1-41 R-RH 10-2-41 M45 fitt redesignate FVB 92S 16-2-41 service trials engine failed crashed Maidstone 19-3-41 AST 411S 8-11-41 AAEE 1-42 R/T function trials at high alt with R7120 (FVI) 242S 25-9-42 VASM 5-4-43 fuel syst mods wing stiff 118S 2-7-43 64S 25-9-43 power loss force-landed hit obst nr Lodiswell S Devon CE SOC 3-7-44 F/O W Smart killed |
He obviously will not mind the RAF using the IIB in July 1940. Can I have one please.
Being serious for a moment, do you know when the first IIB was built, the ones quoted are Spit IB's Another small point is that anyone who has seen the RAF Pilots Notes will see that the format of the one that Kurfurst quotes, isn't an original document. The format didn't change until well after the war. My notes for the Hunter are still in the WW2 standard layout. |
Don't know when they were built, but i believe 92 squadron were the first to use them operationally in jan 41.
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P8134 IIb CBAF MXII DGRD AAEE 12-3-41 9MU 14-5-41 58OTU 14-8-42 53OTU 21-6-43 1CRU ros 24-3-44 SOC 14-12-45 seems to be the most likely candidate to be the first IIB (March 1941). Tested by A&AEE and didn't reach an operational unit so P8135 on 66 Sqn was the first one in squadron service. |
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Now in desperation he has switched to a new excuse, making up that 'it isn't an original document' because it 'looks like post-war'. :D As I said, he makes it all up on the go. ;) |
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Re the layout of the pilots notes, people are free to look at a selection and make their own mind as to which has the correct format. They may also wonder how you have pilots notes for the Spit IIb with 20mm (including photos of the cockpit) in July 1940, for an aircraft that wasn't built until 1941 and believe that to be solid proof. |
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"A.M.D.P asked that D.D.C(3) should keep him informed of the rate of output of 100 octane fuel in order that the rate of change-over of squadrons to this fuel could be kept under review in the light of any diminution or acceleration in supplies." (attachment 1) The 16 fighter and 2 bomber squadrons by September 1940 was hypothetical, based on March 1939 conditions of fuel supply, and was flexible, not fixed in stone. Supplies of 100 octane fuel continued to increase from 202,000 tons in December 1939, which was the time specified for the change over. In November 1940 it was considered that there were "adequate reserves" of 100 octane fuel to go ahead with the modification of all Hurricane and Spitfire Merlin engines to use 12 lb boost. http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit1-12lbs.jpg Problem: squadrons did not, and could not hold their own fuel supplies, to require them to do so would be an operational and logistical nightmare: it was airbases that were supplied with fuel, not individual squadrons. In the 6 May 1940 paper (Item 9 7th Meeting Summary...) "Units concerned" cannot be talking about individual squadrons, it is referring to bases which, depending on their importance, (eg; Sector Station) hosted up to three squadrons. 18 squadrons = 8-10 airbases. The December 7 1939 letter, which sets out a process for supplying 100 Octane fuel starts: "I have the honour to refer to my letter...dated 27 October 1939, regarding the issue of 100 Octane Fuel for use in Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft in this Command." (attachment 2) 25 Fighter Stations were listed as requiring 100 octane fuel "in the first instance", including non-operational Kenley, Usworth and Hendon, with a further 17 non-operational bases which required supplies for visiting aircraft, but "which have no Hurricane or Spitfire aircraft at the moment." Squadrons that were to use 100 octane fuel were not selected by Squadron number but by the type of aircraft used. Bases that hosted these aircraft types were accordingly supplied with 100 octane fuel. Same for the Bomber squadrons, namely Blenheims. The only Blenheim capable of using 100 octane fuel was the Mk IV the first of which emerged in March 1939. The Defiant was not listed in December because it was not yet operational. All of the 11 Group Sector stations were listed, plus Filton which, in June 1940, became part of the new 10 Group; 4 out of 5 12 Group sector stations, 2 out of 5 13 Group sector stations, and 11 other airfields, including 6 of 11 Group were listed. In May 1940 stocks of 100 Octane fuel were 294,000 tons, while stocks of "other grades" were 298,000 tons (attachment 3). Far from there being a crisis in the supply, of 100 Octane preventing a continued change over of units (according to the famous Pips document) for the next two months, 100 Octane fuel was becoming the dominant fuel type being stocked; by August 404,000 tons was being held, cf 230,000 tons of other grades. |
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Section 2 starts with Para 1 "Handling and Flying Notes for Pilots" on page "F.S/3". This is the one posted by Kurfürst, that contains engine limits for 100 and 87 octane fuel. This page is amended by Amendment List 31, I don't have a date for this list but A.L. 30 was issued December, 1943. At the end in Para 55 of Section 2 there is the unamended page "F.S./16" that contains only limits for 100 octane fuel. The "List of Contents" (dated June, 1940) confirms that Para 55 contains the "Notes concerning the Merlin XII engine", however Para 1 should actually contain an "Introduction" and not "Handling and Flying Notes for Pilots", which obviously was added later. The unamended Para 1 can be seen in this copy here: http://www.scribd.com/doc/4598146/Pi...lin-XII-Engine |
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Section 4 "Instructions and Notes for Ground Personnel" mentions in Para 4
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It's obvious that the guidelines for the use of 87 Octane fuel were not contained in the initial issue of June 1940 and were added later. |
Interestingly, at the time of the March 1939 planning memo calling for 100 octane to be brought into use by 16 squadrons, 15 squadrons were operational with Spitfires or Hurricanes, with 3 others in the process of forming or converting. The units are as follows:
Mar-39 Sqdn Base Aircraft 1 Tangmere Hurricane 19 Duxford Spitfire 32 Biggin Hill Hurricane 41 Catterick Spitfire 43 Tangmere Hurricane 46 Digby Hurricane Converting from Gauntlets March 39 54 Hornchurch Spitfire Converting from Gladiator March 39 56 North Weald Hurricane 66 Duxford Spitfire 73 Digby Hurricane 74 Hornchurch Spitfire 79 Biggin Hill Hurricane 85 Debden Hurricane 87 Debden Hurricane 111 Northolt Hurricane 151 North Weald Hurricane 213 Wittering Hurricane 501 Filton Hurricane Forming with Hurricanes in March 39 The status of other squadrons that had not converted to Hurricane or Spitfire by March 1939 but had converted by December 1939, when the stations at which they were based in December 1939 were required to be supplied with 100 octane, were as follows: 3 Kenley Gladiator 17 Kenley Gauntlet 65 Church Fenton Blenheim 72 Church Fenton Gladiator 152 not formed none 504 Hucknall Gauntlet 602 Abbotsinch Gauntlet 603 Turnhouse Gladiator 607 Usworth Gladiator 609 Yeadon Gladiator 610 Wittering Hind 611 Speke Hind 615 Kenley Gauntlet 616 Kenley Gauntlet The 100 octane approval memo from 24 September 1938 suggests that the impetus for converting to 100 octane pre-war was for improved take-off performance, given the propellers that the aircraft were equipped with at that time. |
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If that's correct, our Spitfire II is running well above (having +12 performance) the established limits applicable (+9 lbs boost) and having a performance not representative for the Battle of Britain period. With it's historical +9 lbs limitation the Spitfire II was capable of about 290 mph at SL. Ours do well over 300 mph. If Bank's findings are correct, this should be corrected to historical levels. One does wonder though about what was the point about the Spitfire II, given that at it's historical limit of +9 lbs and 100 octane it was only equal in speed to the Spitfire Mk I on 87 octane fuel and inferior to the Bf 109E on 87 octane fuel (not to mention 96 octane C-3 fuelled variants). Quote:
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I believe that a lot of frustration is being expressed and think it would be a good time to stand back, look at the overall picture and let people decide the strength of the two sides of the argument. This is best done by showing all the relevant papers in the time line so everyone can see how they fit together. Before I start I will confirm my view that all of Fighter Command was effectively supplied with 100 Octane Fuel for the BOB, that the case is a strong one, but not, a perfect one. However all the following are supported by original documentation from the NA or from published works 16th March 1939 Meeting Held to consider the question when 100 Octane Fuel should be brought into use in the RAF and the number and type of squadrons involved. There are three main parts to this. i) It is true that at this meeting authorisation was given for 16 fighter squadrons and two twin engined bomber squadrons be converted to be use 100 Octane fuel by September 1940. The change over to start at the end of 1939 and the ACAS would select the squadrons. ii) It was anticipated that these units would use 10,000 tons of fuel over a twelve month period and this would slow down the aim of achieving an 800,000 ton reserve. iii) The AMPD asked that he should be kept informed as to the progress of the production of the 100 Octane fuel in order that the change over of squadrons could be kept under review in the light of any acceleration or diminution in Supplies. General Points - Clearly this is a peace time plan, the war hadn’t started, 18 squadrons would use a lot more than 10,000 tons over twelve months when at war. It is certain that when war started there would be changes. - It covers both fighters and bombers - They were not defined as being Blenheim just twin engined bombers of which the RAF had a number of types. - The 18 squadrons wasn’t a fixed number, it was open to change. 14th November 1939 letter Supplied by Kurfurst The tests of 100 Octane in the Hurricane and Merlin In this letter it mentions:- i) That the tests were successful ii) It is understood that sufficient stocks of 100 Octane are available iii) That approval for use in Hurricanes and Spitfires should be given forthwith 7th December 1939 Letter from FC Admin to HQ This letter starts going into the nuts and bolts of how the change from 87 to 100 Octane would need to be handled. It’s the sort of information any change of this magnitude will need. The most interesting part is that it lists the 21 operational stations at which the fuel will be required in the first instance. At the time these were all the stations that were equipped or planned to be equipped, with Hurricanes and Spitfires. Also that training units would not be supplied with 100 Octane. 12th December 1939 Letter from Director Of Equipment re Issue of 100 Octane Fuel Letter confirms that 100 Octane Fuel is approved for use in Spitfire, Hurricane and Defiant aircraft. Issue to be made as soon as the fuel is available at the distribution depots servicing the fighter stations concerned. Some bomber units may be given priority. The date of use is dependent on when the fuel can be put down in bulk at the distribution sites and the relevant stations. Re the latter as a station empties a tank of 87 Octane it will be replaced with 100 Octane. Observations Clearly 7th and 12th papers are a change to the March 1939 notes. Certain aircraft are included and other aircraft in Fighter Command are excluded, no Blenheim fighter units are included or are any Gladiator units. There is no limit set to the number of squadrons or area such as 11 Group, or any reference to specific squadrons. The RAF decided to use the 100 Octane and instead of limiting it to a number of squadrons, have decided to limit it by type of aircraft. All current and planned Spitfire and Hurricane bases are identified as being in the first instance. Its worth commenting that Fuel was held at different levels, Strategic Reserves where they were imported, Regional level which is self explanatory, District Level which for FC was depots close to the Sector Stations and those at the individual satellite stations that were supplied from the Sector Stations. The method of distributing 100 Octane was to burn off the supplies of 87 Octane and as the tanks emptied to replace them with 100 Octane fuel. It takes time to use the 87 Octane Fuel in place, to make way for the 100 Octane so there isn’t a schedule roll out, the time will vary from station to station. February 1940 The first combat reports are being recorded using 100 Octane and stations are also reporting the replacement of 87 Octane with 100 Octane fuel. Clearly the roll out is starting to reach the squadrons and one of the stations we have records for is Drem in Scotland and North Weald in the South of England. Drem is the last place I would change over to 100 octane, if there was a shortage of the fuel 24th February 5th Meeting of the Oil Committee Request from ACAS that squadrons with Spits, Hurricanes and Blenheim should begin to use 100 Octane., no limitations. Interesting choice of words as it is clear that some squadrons and bases have already converted and are using 100 Octane. However, there is a change in the replacement process they are discussing how to actively remove 3,600 – 4,000 tons of 87 octane fuel from station storage and replace it with 100 Octane, they are no longer waiting for the 87 Octane to be used up. The pace of change has increased. 6th April 6th Meeting of the Oil Committee Progress Report on the change. 2 Group Bomber Command making good progress and want to have only 100 Octane on their bases. Agreement reached that four stations would only have 100 Octane and the others five sixths of fuel to be 100 Octane and one sixth 87 Octane. Confusion in Fighter Command over the changes needed to operate 100 Octane. A Mr Tweedle is tasked with clarifying the situation with Fighter Command There is also confirmation that the approved storage capacity of 800,000 tons is sufficient and that this tankage will hold between 640-700, 000 tons of fuel allowing for Ullage. Definition of Ullage - the quantity of wine, liquor, or the like, remaining in a container that has lost part of its contents by evaporation, leakage, or use 18th May 1940 7th Meeting of the Oil Co ordination Committee Summary of Conclusions The key points here are:- i) The Committee took note that the position of the use of this fuel in Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft had been made clear to Fighter Command. ii) Satisfaction was expressed that the units concerned had been stocked with the 100 Octane Fuel iii) The Minutes were to reflect the appreciation of the work of the Petroleum Board and that the Air Ministry had been impressed with the manner in which the work had been executed. May 1940 France There are a number of papers detailing the roll out of 100 Octane to the RAF units in France. These were not in the original list of stations to be equipped and we have similar records for the RAF units sent to Norway. Squadron Records Post May 1940 A number of RAF squadrons that took part in the BOB formed after May 1940, namely the commonwealth squadrons. None of the records that I have seen for these units mention any change over to 100 Octane and I checked these records until May 1941 by which time they would certainly be using 100 Octane. It’s my belief that this was because the use of 100 Octane after May 1940 was the norm. 1st August 1940 Memo from Downing re the Handling of the Merlin Engine This note is advising the pilots that there is an increase in engine failures in the overuse of the emergency 12lb boost. The interesting thing is that this memo was sent to ALL fighter groups. Had we been talking about the 16 squadrons or less this would not have been the case. It would have been sent to the squadrons involved. 7th August 1940 Note confirming that the Use of 100 Octane had been authorised for all Commands.This speaks for itself. Reserves Information The following information are the reserve stocks of 100 Octane fuel during the BOB period This information has come from the War Cabinet Oil Position Monthly report (a) that is available from the National Archives, as well as Gavin Baileys paper(b) and Wood and Dempster(c). Stocks of 100 Octane 30th September 1939 153,000 tons(b) 27th February 1940 220,000 tons(b) 31st May 1940 294,000 tons(a) 11th July 1940 343,000 tons(b) 31st August 1940 404,000 tons(a) 10th October 1940 424,000 tons(c) 30th November 1940 440,000 tons(a) Point of interest. From the start of the war until the end of the BOB the reserves never dropped and continued to increase. There was never any danger of the supply of the oil running out, there is no record of any concern over the lack of 100 Octane fuel supplies, in the Air Ministry or the Oil Co ordination Committee, until May 1944. From September 1939 small quantities of 100 Octane of under 1000 tons were held at Malta and Gibraltar Consumption Information The following information are the consumption details of fuel during the BOB period. This information has come from the War Cabinet Oil Position Monthly report that is available from the National Archives. Consumption of Aviation Spirit The following figures are for the Air Minstry and are the Average Monthly Consumption September – November 1939 16,000 tons Dec 1939 – February 1940 14,000 tons March 1940 – May 1940 23,000 tons June 1940 – August 1940 10,000 tons (100 Oct) 26,000 tons (87 Oct) Sept 1940 – November 1940 15,000 tons (100 Oct) 18,000 tons (87 Oct) Consumption was running at approx 21% of the Imports Combat Reports We have combat reports from over 30 squadrons showing the use of 100 Octane. Its worth mentioning here that the NA have changed access to the combat records. They used to be on microfilm so it was fairly easy to get the combat reports for a squadron and find an example. They are now available on line, but you have to pay to view each record and you cannot view them until you have paid so it becomes a very expensive business with many hundreds of records to look at. A price I cannot afford, but have little doubt that if we were to look at the other squadrons we would find similar records. Important Note All the above is supported by original documentation with the exception of my observation on the Squadron Records of Post May, I did look at a number but not all of those squadrons that is a fact but the interpretation is mine alone |
Those who doubt the Previous Posting
Their arguments seem to be based on the following The Phrase the Units concerned and Certain Units It’s my belief that these words were used to refer to bases/units which had not yet been converted to 100 Octane. We know that the roll out had already started, as proved by the Station / Combat reports we have from February 1940. This view is supported I believe by:- • the number of combat records we have from over 30 squadrons • the report in the May meeting where the appreciation of the work of the Petroleum Board was expressed and that the Air Ministry had been impressed with the manner in which the work had been executed • The total lack of any conversion records of any FC station or squadron after May 1940 which were checked until May/June 1941 The belief is expressed by some that the use of Certain or concerned proves that the roll out was limited and some have said that this is clearly a continuation of the pre war Feb 1939 plan. We have the 21 stations identified as being in the first instance, clearly there was going to be a second instance, clearly this is more than 16 Squadrons. We know that units in France were equipped with 100 octane and those in Norway, so the 21 stations was built on, this could easily be defined as a second instance. There is absolutely no evidence that says that the roll out was limited. As a minimum the Oil Co ordination committee would have been involved as they were responsible for the purchase, storage and distribution of all fuel. Those who believe this to be the case are invited to provide some evidence. I have stated what I believe to be the definition of Certain and Concerned with what evidence I can find. Its not perfect but I have tried and have shown what I found. I invite the doubters to do the same The view that it didn’t mean 16 squadrons it meant no more than 16 Squadrons using 100 Octane at the same time This is totally new and no one has even tried to support it. Those who propose it are encouraged to support this view with some evidence. Pips Views This paper has never been seen but more importantly there is no evidence to support any of the statements made in it. The War Cabinet didn’t make the decisions he said it did. There was no shortage of 100 Octane, nothing. Again those who believe this view are encouraged to find some evidence to support any part of it. Pips Didn’t Mean the War Cabinet This view that the War Cabinet was actually a much bigger thing with hundreds of component parts is fanciful. The War Cabinet was the War Cabinet, it had a structure, it had members, it had minutes and it was chaired by the Prime Minister. A lot of parties reported to it, including the Air Ministry and the Oil Committee, but the War Cabinet was the War Cabinet and the minutes are available on line. People who believe this are invited to find out who made these decisions, it wasn’t the Air Ministry and it wasn’t the War Cabinet. Pilots Notes I and IIB This has been done in some detail recently. The only thing I can add is that I would expect to find Spit I Pilots notes to have 100 octane and 87 Octane because:- a) it was in service before 100 Octane was available b) Spit I’s were in the training Units and they didn’t have 100 Octane Important Note I invite anyone to look at the evidence put forward to support each side of the case and make their own minds up |
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In addition, within these over 30 Squadrons there are duplications, when several Squadrons rotate between the same stations. We can identify about 20-25 Stations supplied with 100 octane fuel at one time or another out of 50+. |
List of officially accredited Battle of Britain squadrons
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of...tain_squadrons Hurricane (36) and Spitfire (19) squadrons numbered 55 Sector Group Sector Station Satellite Airfield or airfields A 11 Tangmere RAF Westhampnett B 11 Kenley RAF Croydon C 11 Biggin Hill RAF West Malling, RAF Gravesend[7] D 11 RAF Hornchurch RAF Gravesend, RAF Rochford, RAF Manston, RAF Hawkinge E 11 RAF North Weald RAF Stapleford Tawney, RAF Martlesham Heath F 11 RAF Debden RAF Martlesham Heath[8] G 12 RAF Duxford RAF Fowlmere K 12 RAF Wittering RAF Coltishall L 12 RAF Digby RAF Ternhill M 12 RAF Kirton-in-Lindsey N 12 RAF Church Fenton RAF Leconfield O 13 RAF Usworth RAF Catterick P 13 RAF Acklington Q 13 RAF Turnhouse RAF Drem, RAF Grangemouth R 13 Dyce RAF Grangemouth S 13 RAF Wick RAF Kirkwall, RAF Sumburgh W 10 RAF Filton RAF Boscombe Down, RAF Colerne, RAF Pembrey Y 10 RAF Middle Wallop RAF Boscombe Down, RAF Warmwell, RAF Exeter, some control over RNAS Roborough, RAF St Eval Z 11 RAF Northolt RAF Hendon |
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You have supplied no evidence that these 21 stations were approved for 100 octane issues nor that 100 octane was actually issued to them. Quote:
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pronoun (certain of) some but not all: certain of his works have been edited http://oxforddictionaries.com/defini...tain?q=certain Quote:
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Committees are smaller cells of the Cabinet, and Glider hadn't checked these, but claims he has done so. Further information at http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/r...fice.htm#17741 Quote:
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And that is just that, about 1/3 to 1/2 the units, so quite simply there's no factual basis, or evidence to, that all the others were using 100 octane. It's merely a wishful assumption. |
So Barbi what RAF FC squadrons used only 87 octane fuel?
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He doesn't know. But remember, the fact that there is no evidence is countered by the fact that the RAF were the enemy of his favourite aeroplane. When the second fact occurs then no other facts matter.
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cab68/6/11 "War Cabinet Oil Position: Thirty-third Weekly Report: 23 April 1940" (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ Click "Search" then "Browse our guidance A-Z" Click "C" then "Cabinet Government" which will highlight "The Cabinet and its committees" scroll down to 3. "Cabinet Papers online" click on cab68; enter reference no. "cab68/6/11" in this format in top l/h corner of new page, click on "Go to reference"; click on "View digital image" then "+Add to shopping"; it is free and downloadable) "The process of bringing Norwegian tankers under Allied control has advanced during the week, and of a total fleet of 212 Norwegian tankers 119 are now under Allied control, while 18 are proceeding to Allied ports; 93 are in neutral ports or reported to be proceeding to neutral ports..." Meaning in April 1940 Britain had already gained the use of 119 Norwegian tankers, 41 more than were sunk between Sept 1939 and November 1940, and more were expected. cab68/7/31 "War Cabinet Oil Position Monthly Report: November 1940" (issued 20 December) (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/r...-1939-1945.htm) Table I: "Imports Into the United Kingdom (Services and Civil)" Shows the total number of tankers arriving in UK ports in the year between September 1939 and August 1940 = 947: (Total shown in table = 1,079 minus 132, June to August 1939.) March to May 1940 = 109 tankers; 1,112,300 tons imported; June to August = 100 tankers; 1,058,900 tons total tonnage of oil products imported = 9,986,900. (11,126,900 minus 1,140,000 tons, imported June to August 1939.): an average of 10,546 tons per tanker. September and October 1940: 124 tankers (62 per month) arrived and in November 80: September = 640,500 tons of imports; October = 651,600; November = 890,300 tons Grand Total of Tankers arriving in UK Sept 1939 to November 1940 = 1,151 Grand Total of Oil Products Imported = 12,169,300 tons: 10,573 tons of oil product per tanker Total number sunk Sept 1939 - Nov 1940 = 78(!!); 385,957 tons of oil product = roughly 6.8% tankers; roughly 3.2% of tons imported to Britain. The amount of oil product per tanker destroyed was 4,948 tons, meaning on average the tankers sunk were carrying less than half the weight of cargo each tanker that arrived in port was discharging; the tankers being sunk were either smaller than average, or, more likely, at least half of them were sunk in ballast. Quantity of fuel available ( production estimates) from non US sources as of November 1940 Heysham 150,000 tons Trinidad 80,000 tons Billingham 15,000 tons Stanlow 55,000 tons Abadan 50,000 tons Aruba 50,000 tons Palembang 50,000 tons Pladjoe 50,000 tons |
The current level of evidence for 100 octane use with all units of Fighter Command summarized:
http://f00.inventorspot.com/images/1...30036-spam.jpg + http://bluejacket.com/usn/images/sp/...oke-screen.jpg |
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I did check "Vol. I" for references to IIB and found that the "Introduction" page was changed in June, 1941 to contain the difference between IIA and IIB. The changed part in the text is marked by vertical line. And A.L. No. 19 from December, 1941 (see header of Section 1 Introduction) contains description of the different handling of IIA and IIB (Para 34a and b). So I think it was June, 1941 when the difference between IIA and IIB was added to the manual. |
It can be put to rest that the stations listed in the Dec 7 1939 document did indeed get 100 octane fuel, except possibly one.
10 Group Filton No. 151 Squadron Feb 1940 St Athan - training base 11 Group Biggin Hill No. 32 Squadron pre BoB H, No. 610 (County of Chester) Squadron June 1940 Manston 600 squadron Blenheims Marlesham Heath No. 85 Squadron May 1940 H Hornchurch No. 41 Squadron June 1940, No. 65 (East India) Squadron 12 Aug 1940, No. 74 Squadron May 1940 S Northholt No. 43 (China-British) Squadron June 1940 Croydon No. 111 Squadron pre BoB Tangmere No. 1 (Cawnpore) Squadron May 1940 H Debden No. 17 Squadron May 1940 Nowrth Weald No. 56 (Punjab) Squadron May 1940, No. 151 Squadron Feb 1940 12 Group Duxford No. 19 Squadron May 1940 Digby No. 611 (West Lancashire) Squadron June 1940 Leconfield No. 616 (South Yorkshire) Squadron 15 Aug 1940, No. 249 (Gold Coast) Squadron 6 Sept 1940 Church Fenton No. 73 Squadron May 1940, No. 87 (United Provinces) Squadron May 1940 H, No. 616 (South Yorkshire) Squadron 15 Aug 1940 Wittering No. 229 Squadron May 1940 H 13 group Drem No. 602 (City of Glasgow) Squadron pre BoB Turnhouse No. 603 (City of Edinburgh) Squadron 31 Aug 1940 Grangemounth No. 263 (Fellowship of the Bellows) Squadron Acklington No. 152 (Hyderabad) Squadron 4 Sept 1940, No. 79 (Madras Presidency) Squadron May 1940 H, Catterick No. 41 Squadron June 1940 |
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His 2cd image is of American 4 stack destroyers laying a smokescreen, which he is doing.:) |
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http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...xx-15nov40.jpg And 3,000 rpm for climb above 20,000ft in December, 1940, see: http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...xx-11dec40.jpg Also note that even the amended AP 1565 A Pilot's Notes for Spitfire I that comes with the Collector's Edition gives the "All out" limit with 3,000 R.p.m and +6 1/4 lb/sqn.in., and this is dated January 1942. The +12 boost is given under a own paragraph called "combat concessions" on the following page. Also note that AP 1565 A Vol. I gives the +6 1/4 for "All out", however the description of the "boost cut-out" gives +12 boost. Note that A.L. No.6 is dated July, 1940. Quote:
It seems like there was a difference between "all out" and "emergency/combat" power (5min limit in the amended Spitfire II Pilot's Notes is called "combat" instead of "all out"). However, it would be interesting to find a reference when +12 boost and 3000 rpm for climb was actually cleared for the Merlin XII for combat/emergency. Possibly at the same time as higher limits were introduced for Merlin XX (November 1940 and December 1940). |
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We do know that this aim was changed if only by the number of bomber units equipped with 100 Octane. Quote:
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To now say I lied about going through the papers is a new low even for you. Quote:
a) If there wasn't a shortage and we had a three year stockpile, why would the roll out be limited. b) If there were uncertanties about supply, why did we halt production at the Billingham refinery because it wasn't needed c) Please list the dozen Historians you refer to, or the official studies Quote:
You did look at those files I gave you, didn't you? If anyone would like me to reissue the details so they can check for the decisions Pips says were made by the War Cabinet and make their own mind up, please let me know. Quote:
I admit to not knowing where you are coming from here. Are you saying tht the RAF would give 100 Octane to training units, but not to front line units? Quote:
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100 Octane Fuel Consumed
July - Aug 1940 = 20,000 tons consumed Sept - = 14,000 tons consumed Oct = 17,000 tons consumed Total = 51,000 tons of 100 octane fuel consumed 1 imperial gallon of 100 Octane = 7.1 pounds ("Oil" by D.J Peyton-Smith the official British war history on the oil and petroleum industry during WW2 page xvii "Note on Weights and Measures"): 1 ton of 100 octane = 2,240 lbs therefore 2,240 divided by 7.1 = 315.5 imp gal Fuel Capacities: Defiant I = 97 imp gal Hurricane I = 90 imp gal Spitfire I & II = 84 imp gal Blenheim IV = 199 imp gal outer fuel tanks TOTAL = 470 imp gal divide by 4 = average fighter/bomber fuel load = 117.5 imp gal (Defiant from memory, so feel free to correct me. Defiant II = 104 imp gal) 1 ton = 315.5 imp gal divided by 117.5 imp gal = 2.6 fuel loads (or sorties) per ton of 100 octane fuel. *This is assuming all aircraft emptied their tanks for each sortie, and assuming all aircraft shot down = 1 fuel load of 90.3 imp gal NB: Not all aircraft returned with empty tanks and RAF policy was to refill each aircraft as soon as possible after landing, or each evening or early morning, to avoid vapour traps. Merlin III & XIIs could still use 87 octane fuel, hence training flights and other secondary flight duties, such as delivery, ferry flights, etc could still use 87 octane fuel July to August: 20,000 tons x 2.6 = 52,000 sorties September: 14,000 tons x 2.6 = 36,400 sorties October: 17,000 tons x 3.5 = 44,200 sorties Total July-October 132,600 fuel loads consumed or 132,600 sorties in which all aircraft landed with empty tanks. The Battle of Britain by T.C.G. James shows 51,364 sorties, day & night from July 10 through Sept 30; some of the most intensive combat took place between these dates. Of course there were quiet periods when far fewer combat sorties were flown by Fighter Command; eg: August 16 & 17, between two days of intensive combat August 15 & 18. Hooton’s Eagle in Flames, Table 2, FC flew Sep 23-29: 4,825 defensive sorties Sep 30 – Oct 6: 1,782 defensive sorties. Total = 57,971 sorties yet In spite of Blenheims being mixed in there are still 74,629 fuel loads available. OR Quote:
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The only engines cleared to use 100 Octane were the Merlin II III and XII and the Bristol Mercury XV, so it wasn't Bomber Command or Coastal Command who used it all, nor was it Army Co-Operation Command. |
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Now, just for interest, this is assuming all Blenheims used 100 octane only (six Blenheim units may have used 100 octane in all tanks)
Blenheim = 479 imp gals Defiant= 97 Hurricane = 90 Spitfire = 85 Total= 751 imp gals divided by 4 = 187.75 1 ton 100 octane = 315.5 divided by 187.75 = 1.7 fuel loads 20,000 x 1.7 = 34,000 fuel loads 14,000 x 1.7 = 23,800 fuel loads 17,000x1.7 = 28900 fuel loads Total = 86,700 fuel loads - 57,971 = 28929 fuel loads left over Even with all Blenheims theoretically using nothing but 100 octane fuel, there was still more than enough 100 octane fuel consumed - not issued - from July through end of October to supply 100% of FC, and some BC, operations. Once again this is also assuming all aircraft landed with empty tanks and had to be completely refueled, rather than being topped up. But Wait there's More!! According to Kf (attachment) the only British aircraft to fly during the Battle of Britain were those of Fighter Command and they managed to consume all of the "other grades" of fuel issued, and all of the 100 Octane!? :cool: :mrgreen: (Kf also says that consumption of "other grades of fuel went down starting mid to late September. Coincidentally that was the time that Operation Sealion was called off, and the collections of invasion barges that Bomber Command was running intensive operations against dispersed. http://www.military-history.org/arti...n-timeline.htm Except, according to the graph, Bomber Command wasn't operating.) |
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About +12 combat boost for Merlin XII I found a chart posted by Kurfürst which lists that boost. Unfortunately no date is given. National Archives Reference AIR 16/315.
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