Historical accuracy aside, if you underestimate a 110 ingame, you will be punished severely for it. And if flown by a competent human pilot, you better know how to fight it and exploit it's weaknesses. Or you'll be riding the silk elevator, if you even make it that far.

I think the 110 ingame is one of the more interesting aircraft to fly, since it takes real skill to employ it well. And where a burst of fire from a Hurricane or Spitfire can damage a 110, a burst from the 110 can shred the Hurri or the Spit. I've had people attack me when I'm in a 110 head on, and you don't have to be a rocket scientist to understand the idiocy of such a manouver.

Umm, that's completely untrue; Parks talks about being in an 'uncomfortable situation'. He is very sanguine about the probability of winning, stating that given losses of aircraft and pilots vs output, the RAF will probably win in the end. Given he had more aircraft and pilots on strength in early September that he did at the end of July, and only Manston had been rendered unuseable as a full-time base, he was right.

Despite what was written in the 1960s, Fighter Command at the time were fairly optimistic based on the data they had. 1,030 vs 825 fighter losses on both sides by end of September (not that they had precise Luftwaffe loss rates) shows why they were right. The 'Narrow Margin' is a myth, like the 'useless 110'.

The brits were getting short of pilots, not aircrafts. And is their own people saying that during the last week of August/first week of september they were on the very edge of accepting defeat.

And besides, you know how brits talk, when one of them is saying they're in an "unconformable situation" you can bet your life on the fact hat he's actually neck-deep into the shit.

Most wartime accounts of 110's from RAF pilots gave them little credence and both hurricane and spitfire pilots felt they were more than a match for the 110. GC Johnnie Johnson wrote in his book 'Wing Leader' an account in his early days from some Czech Hurricane pilots: (page 35)

"The 110 didn't give you any trouble. In fact it was slower than the hurricane and was of little account. As soon as they were bounced, the 110 pilots formed a defensive circle. But this was easy to break up, as long as the 109's weren't lurking above. The 109's! Yes, you soon knew when they were about!"

Personally rather than relying on theorists and statisticians, I prefer to trust the word of the guys who flew against them.

No they weren't, this is an oft-repeated myth. There were more aircraft and more pilots on strength in late August / early September than in July. No RDF stations had been out of commission for more than 24 hours, no airfields had been 'knocked out' (though Manston was becoming too difficult to use as a full time base owing to its proximity to the coast). There is simply no evidence that anyone involved thought that they were 'near the end' or close to 'accepting defeat'. The whole this is overly Romanticised via Churchill books and some poorly written histories. The facts are there in terms of numbers of pilot, aircraft, supplies and infrastructure and neither Dowding nor Park thought they were losing though they were worried about the ability to turn out enough pilots with sufficient hours to give them a fighting chance. This lead to the prioritisation approach of A, B and C squadron catagories to determine rotation rates between Groups.

a) Park was New Zealander

b) You can bet all you like but you're still wrong - that was about the most pessimistic remark he made. Much of his negative reporting during this period was about his frustration with Leigh-Malory for not getting 12 Group's arse in gear quicker to play its part in peeling the German onion :)

c) Trying to infer what might have been meant as an opposite of what was said is very dodgy historiography :)



That's laudable, but as many fighter pilots were hit by an unseen opponent their own accounts may not give a true picture; they are vulnerbale to 'group think' just like any other organisation. 110s may have accounted for more of Fighter Command than they are credited with; pilots accounts may not give an accurate picture of this.

y'all buncha dad gum know-it-alls!! :D

Can you change the armament in COD ?? I would like to see the rear gunner with a 20mm cannon, then lets see how vulnerable it is! :grin:

Actually Arm all the He111 with 20mm dorsal guns then 109s can do what they like! LOL!


He111.

If we consider the CoD as a fair representation of BoB combat machines, I guess we'll see soon enough how the 110 would fare if handled well tactically.

Apart from electing/alowing a genocidal maniac to run the country and diverting useful resources to these 'mad' schemes, the Germans didn't make many mistakes, so i would suggest they handled themselves very well tactically.

Was that not facing forward for engaing ground targets? Trying to aim a manually handled 20 mm sounds like a receipe for not hitting much...


It should do quite well as it will be flown by people who want to win and survive, rather than according to an operational requirement which usually requires a degree of sacrifice on the part of the individual. Look at its record in other theatres and you can see the capabilities of the design.