Maybe Kurfurst would like to ask him, as he has never seen the paper and has put so much importance to it?

KF's entire "case" is a busted flush and there's absolutely no point in pursuing it any further. People like Glider, and Lane and others have been chasing their tails for years over this chimera, and his wishful thinking. There is nothing wrong with a free flow of information and discussion, and people are entitled to their opinions, no matter how flawed. But something is wrong when so much time and energy is expended having to counter an extremely weak case, because the person putting that case has a genius for using smoke and mirrors, and constant bluster, to camouflage the fact that he has no real evidence to back up his claims. Over 50 pages on this thread alone? I didn't come here for this - but I guess I let myself in for it. :wink: In future I'm not going to bother with KF; he can think and say what he likes - he isn't worth wasting so much time over.

Found in a book on the Dewoitine D.520 (Docavia)...On the 21st April (1940), D.520 No. 2, using 100 octane rated fuel, and with a CEMA pilot at the controls...p.303.

Table of Characteristics of Hispano-Suiza 12Y series engines
12Y-45
Series production D.520 No.s 1-350
Rated for 92 or 100 Octane fuel

12Y-49
Late series D.520 No.s 351- also rated for 92 or 100 Octane fuel p.245.

Also Mushroom Yellow series No 6113 p.38

There is no weak case.

There is quite a bit of raw speculation that attempts to bedazzle folks into thinking a specific way.

For example, you speculate all over the map about FC, BC, Invasion of France, and everything else under the sun like it is a fact in the post below:

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...&postcount=476


It is not, it is YOUR interpretation.

Morgan and Shacklady say something completely different which also fits the information in the document you posted on weekly issues.

That is the RAF built up a strategic reserve and it was not until September 1940 that 16 squadrons from Fighter Command converted to 100 octane.

Not only do I think Morgan and Shacklady's research was more through and grounded than yours, it is a fact that every military required such a reserve.

Heck, BMW built over two thousand BMW801S series motors before the first one was put on a production aircraft. Why??? They used a three to one strategic reserve for engines. Three engines were in the inventory for every one being used operationally. That way losses could be replaced and the operational aircraft maintained.

With the simple logic in this thread some revisionist would be screaming the Germans were sending thousands of BMW801S engines into battle starting in 1943!!

:rolleyes:

I absolutely agree with you that the case is in no way clear. However IIRC there is proof by combat reports and official squadron diaries (ORBs) that more than 16 squadrons used 100 octane before September 1940. Of course this doesn't mean that all squadrons used it. And this could also be caused by rotating the squadrons between the different groups.

The only one suffering from wishful thinking, raw speculation and presenting no case at all, let alone a weak one, is someone who places so much faith in the "well grounded" research of M & S...someone like Crumpp, who has not provided a single scrap of evidence to prove anything throughout this entire thread, apart from parroting what others have said.

From the NA:
cab68/6/11 "War Cabinet Oil Position: Thirty-third Weekly Report: 23 April 1940" (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/r...-1939-1945.htm Scroll down to 4.Cabinet Papers or Memoranda, click on cab68; enter reference no. "cab68/6/11" in this format in top l/h corner of new page, click on "Go to reference"; click on "View digital image" then "+Add to shopping"; it is free and downloadable)

"The process of bringing Norwegian tankers under Allied control has advanced during the week, and of a total fleet of 212 Norwegian tankers 119 are now under Allied control, while 18 are proceeding to Allied ports; 93 are in neutral ports or reported to be proceeding to neutral ports..."

Meaning in April 1940 Britain had already gained the use of 119 Norwegian tankers, 41 more than were sunk between Sept 1939 and November 1940, and more were expected.

cab68/7/31 "War Cabinet Oil Position Monthly Report: November 1940" (issued 20 December) (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/r...-1939-1945.htm)

Table I: "Imports Into the United Kingdom (Services and Civil)"

Shows the total number of tankers arriving in UK ports in the year between September 1939 and August 1940 = 947: (Total shown in table = 1,079 minus 132, June to August 1939.)

March to May 1940 = 109 tankers; 1,112,300 tons imported;
June to August = 100 tankers; 1,058,900 tons

total tonnage of oil products imported = 9,986,900. (11,126,900 minus 1,140,000 tons, imported June to August 1939.): an average of 10,546 tons per tanker.

September and October 1940: 124 tankers (62 per month) arrived and in November 80: September = 640,500 tons of imports; October = 651,600; November = 890,300 tons

Grand Total of Tankers arriving in UK Sept 1939 to November 1940 = 1,151
Grand Total of Oil Products Imported = 12,169,300 tons: 10,573 tons of oil product per tanker

Total number sunk Sept 1939 - Nov 1940 = 78(!!); 385,957 tons of oil product = roughly 6.8% tankers; roughly 3.2% of tons imported to Britain. The amount of oil product per tanker destroyed was 4,948 tons, meaning on average the tankers sunk were carrying less than half the weight of cargo each tanker that arrived in port was discharging; the tankers being sunk were either smaller than average, or, more likely, at least half of them were sunk in ballast.

Explains why fuel stocks continued to rise right throughout the B of B, and shows that Morgan and Shacklady were right in that tankers were sunk; problem is that the numbers were paltry compared with the numbers arriving in Britain and unloading their cargo. Nor is there any cross referencing used by M & S providing sources for their claim that large numbers of tankers carrying 100 octane were sunk.

http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e1...00octane_2.jpg

Cabinet papers, which can be downloaded and examined for free as opposed to unreferenced speculation by Morgan et al.

No Crumpp, you provide some documentary evidence that frontline fighter units of FC were using 87 octane fuel during combat operations during the B of B

Crumpp; You provide some documentary evidence that the RAF stuck to its pre-war plans to have 800,000 tons of 100 octane fuel before releasing it to FC.

Crumpp; You provide documentary evidence that the RAF considered that stocks of 100 octane fuel were too low to supply more than the 16 front line fighter squadrons of FC and two Blenheim units that you and others allege.

Crumpp; You provide documentary evidence that so many tankers carrying 100 octane fuel were sunk that somehow there was never enough to go round.

Oh, do you mean the attached document dated 7 August stating that All operational aircraft have been authorised to use 100 Octane, and that instructions have been issued to Commands?

And yet here you are, re-entering with nothing fresh or useful to say. :rolleyes:

Banks and NZt, I see selective reading by the nay sayers. They stop reading when they come across something that supports their nay saying.

That was not the case with the DB601N.

"6.10.1940: Until the end of October, 1100 - 1200 DB601N engines were delivered. They are installed in the four existing Me 110 groups and the single existing Me 109 group, some reconnaissance aircraft of the Aufklärungsgruppe Ob. d. L., plus 130 reserve engine pool. The rest of the engines went into Me 109F and Me 110 production. The production of DB601N-engined Me 110s is to be channelled into night fighters, for which a constant strength of 120 is demanded."

Perfect and logically well founded summary, dear Banks. As far as it stands, the trail of evidence seems to last until May 1940, when these memos and summaries we have seen state that select fighter and bomber stations were supplied with 100 octane. At its core, this is clearly the continuation of same policy as laid down in March 1939 (16 + 2 Sqns, ie. basically select Sqns but not all being effected).

How many Squadrons were effected is somewhat uncertain, but as you have noted the combat reports, orbs. etc. do give some insight. We do have accounts for some 30 Sqns (out of ca. 60..) or so using 100 octane at one time or another, though as you noted Sqn rotation between stations makes it quite difficult to find out how many Sqns (stations) were using it simultaneously. There's of course this paper of 7 August that supposed to 'authorize' all Commands for using 100 octane, but the 100 octane consumption figures quite clearly refute that this happened or even started in August. There's clearly no increase in consumption of 100 octane or fall in consumption of 87 octane until the end of September 1940.

As Crumpp said, the above are the ascertainable facts from which a learned man would draw factual and logical conclusions.

Some good research would clear up the situation, but none is forthcoming, and the thread can be pretty much summarized as the speculation and wishful thinking of three fanatics against the weight of documentary evidence; the arguments are hollow or even absurd (lately it appears that its becoming focused on Russel's teapot analouge, i.e. since they could offer no evidence to their thesis, its up to everyone else to disprove a yet unproven thesis), ad hominem and straw man arguments, or limited to spamming the thread over and over with unrelated papers of no value evidence. These three people do not even play the simulation and are alien to this community and its spirit, having been 'imported' from other discussion boards, with their credibility well worn and resulting in the use of multiple accounts, and apparently interested in nothing else but to push an old agenda and/or vent off their frustration at the developer (see lane's posts in the update threads) or posters.

As noted, the whole story ever increasingly reminds old participants of the 150 grade-fiasco of lane and co. The agenda of 'all the RAF fighter Command was using 150 grade' was pressed with the same fortitude, documents were manipulated and doctored for support the same, until documentary evidence become clear and it turned out that 'all +25 lbs Mark IXs using 150 grade' were in fact but two Sqns on operational trials, the '+25 lbs Mk XIVs' lane was pushing for never existed due to technical troubles, those '+25 RAF Mustang IIIs of the RAF in 1944' were again just two Sqns who have seen the enemy about twice, once over France and once over the North Sea, were and proposed use of 150 grade in the 2nd TAF's IX units was recalled after a month of operation in 1945 - a fact that lane still omits from his website articles. ;)

The 100 octane story/agenda is the same, with the same old origins, methods and smokescreen - though I am sure its can be presented as better case than what turned out to be the truth about 150 grade (giggles). Its curious though that the reaction was the same when it become clear that the 150 grade agenda was lost - back then lane and co. was casting doubts about the use of MW 50 by the German side. Now they cast 'doubts' about the use of German 100 octane 'C-3' in 1940, even going as far as claiming that all the 100 octane fuel the Germans were using was in fact from captured British stocks! :D

Its lovely to see how NZTyphoon constantly conflicts himself, posting the following, which noted that the Merlin failed its type test even a year later, on 4 April 1938.

http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e1...00octane_2.jpg

In fact Merlins still failed type tests at much lower ratings in around November 1939:

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit1-12lbs.jpg

and continued to have an increased failure rate even in August 1940:

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/dowding.pdf

Bottomline, NZTyphoon seems to like to boast about the development of Merlin outputs on single engines and on limited runs on tests stands, ie. 'more or less standard' :D Merlins.

In connection to the 1536 HP achieved on the Merlin in August 1937 with a curious mix of gasoline, benzol and methanol, perhaps equivalent DB developments should be noted to cool of any undue excitement.

[b]11 November 1937. Messerschmitt Bf 109 V13 sets world record with DB 601 Re/III - 1660 PS
8. Juni 1938
8 Juni 1938. Junkers Ju 89 V 2 sets altitude record with 4 × DB 601 Re/IV - 2060 PS each
30 March 1939. Heinkel He 100 V8 sets world speed record with DB 601 Re/V - 2770 PS.

The above also explains why the 'Speed Spitfire' was never attempted. There was no 2700-HP Merlin...

The much modified SpeedFire did run operational reconnaissance missions on a couple of occasion. She was used for high speed low deck run on the French coast fitted with cameras (620/50 kph if I do remind well)

The consumption of her engine prevent her to be flown much deeper.

The pilot (a test pilot if I do remind correctly) had to care about the level of water left in the specific rads (vapor blown away) with great attention (well planned missions). Despite some concerns at the beginning he did not have any serious problem during his attempts.

Le Fana de l'aviation published the story in France some years ago. It might hve been a translated article extracted from US/UK sources.

Regarding the HP of the Merlin as of NZT sources it : He is confusing SHP and BHP. It was a standard use in RR to give the power of an engine without the charger fitted as the methods used to calculate the true corresponding power at alt from a bench test ran on the ground were not reliable (source RR - already mentioned by myself somewhere in the thread).