Re the Minutes of the War Cabinet Minutes
On Post 305 I advised that these records were available on line,
On post 307 you asked for the link,
On post 308 Winny attached a link
On post 309 I gave you the file no and was willing to help if you had problems.

Re Yes or No
The reply is yes, the War Cabinet Minutes do not record any decision of this kind.

Re the Paper you quoteAs mentioned a number of times The Australian War Memorial Archives have not heard of it. I do not believe it exists. The actions you highlight were not made by the War Cabinet in May as proven by the Minutes which do not mention this decision, in turn puts a huge hole in the existance or if it does exist, the accuracy of the said paper.

100% of Fighter Command using 100 OctaneYes, all the evidence points towards it. I have always said the case for it was a good case but not a perfect case, however there is no evidence to say that any squadron was using 87 octane for combat missions.

Did I go through the whole file for the War Cabinet
Yes I did. The files I concentrated on were, The War Cabinet , The Oil Committee, The Chief of the Air Staff official papers. The private papers of the Chief of the Air Staff which mainly consisted of memos between him and Churchill, plus people who became involved in resolving Churchils questions and the Air Ministry committee papers.

It was very interesting and the detail that people of this level got involved with was unbelievable. I did get my hopes up when there was a file on the availability of tankers. Turned out Churchill had a conversation with a pilot officer on a visit who said that the squadron could turn around quicker if they had an extra tanker to refuel the aircraft. As you might guess the topic was not what I hoped. If anyone is interested the delay wasn't in refueling the aircraft it was in rearming them and the Chief of the Air Staff had to inform Churchill of the steps being taken to speed this up. The steps were to train guards and others on how to rearm the aircraft so if there was an emergency situation they could assist.

You can now see why I get a little frustrated that I have put quite a considerable amount of effort into researching this topic, and you haven't even tried to find the one paper that you base your case on.

Edit
For a detail set of comments on the Pips Paper (with supporting docs) refer to posting 141

Can you tell us where you get 200 plus committees?

Time to answer this directly: I have read the relevant sections in "Australia in the War of 1939-45: Civil: War Economy 1939-42 by S J Butlin. (Petrol and Substitute Fuels 280-292)

http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listi...condition=used

1) There was no "Australian Military Commission" or any such organisation in Britain during WW 2.

2a) The Australian Government dealt directly with the oil companies when requesting stock of fuels of all types, including aviation fuels. "After the outbreak of war stocks continued to come from the oil companies and to be imported and distributed through their organisation...there were special features in the requirements of the forces: fuel oil for the navy; petrol for the army; and the special high grade aviation fuel for the air force. (p. 285): "Liaison with the oil companies had been maintained from before the war..."(p. 286):

b) Lord Beaverbrook and the Ministry of Aircraft Production had nothing whatsoever with deciding what types of fuels were supplied to Australia, nor how much. The Australian War Cabinet made decisions on aviation fuel supply and storage "In August 1940 the War Cabinet was asked for a decision on aviation spirit stocks....The suggestion therefore was that the Department of Supply should purchase 3,000,000 gallons and that three 1,200,000-gallon storage tanks be built. The Cabinet approved the purchase...(p. 287)

3) What did need to be co-ordinated with the British was the shipment, allocation of tankers etc. "Diversion of tankers to meet the special needs of the United Kingdom...(p. 288)

The book should be available through libraries, second hand bookshops etc so anyone can check.

There is a document (97 pages) available in the National Archives of Australia that deal with the supply of 100 octane fuel for the RAAF that covers 1940 and 1941.

Fortunately they are available online:
A705, 164/1/975 (searching for this reference number doesn't return a result, search for "Supply of Octane 100 aviation gasoline" will give you the result)
RAAF - Directorate of Supply - Supply of Octane 100 aviation gasoline
http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/using/search/

You can also simply type "100 octane" in the search field, there are only 4 documents.

Maybe there can be found a evidence that Or there might be evidences that this was not the case, for example if there was enough supply on 100 octane fuel available there was no need to protest.

So far I didn't read through all the pages.


Interesting find page 97:

Exactly where and in what context? A J P Taylor did an excellent biography of Beaverbrook, dealing extensively with his duties as Minister in charge of MAP, and using Beaverbrook's records and direct interviews with Beaverbrook. Nowhere is there any mention of Beaverbrook dealing with the Australians on a question of fuel supply and one would have thought that a biography of this nature would have at least mentioned something that was of such apparent importance that Churchill quoted from parts of it.

An excellent Link many thanks.

Excellent? A small understatement:

Page 13 "Suggest therefore that Shell be asked to import the whole of 500,000 gallons at their own expense"

page 19 (30-1-41) "Only a small portion of this percentage of 100 Octane Spirit is yet to be delivered, but the balance is now on the water according to our latest advices from the SHELL Company."

page 55 (22-2-41) 2 "Meantime I have spoken to Captain Jones of the Shell Company and informed him that we require 100,000 gallons (or some substantial portion thereof) of Octane 100 to be ordered at once for delivery..." (Group Captain Department of Supply)

page 59 (19-2-41) Cable to Shell "It is a provision of the new contracts about to be entered into with your company and the Vacuum Oil Company....The Department of Air now desires...that 1,000,000 gallons of 100 octane base fuel be substituted in lieu thereof...(Deputy Director of Contracts to General Manager Shell)

page 60 (19-2-41) Similar cable to Vacuum Oil.

and lots more besides - bottom line Australian Government ordered supplies of 100 octane directly from oil companies Shell and Vacuum

From what I've read so far in 1941 Australia received their 100 octane fuel directly from Shell and Vacuum Oil Company.

In fact they didn't need 100 octane fuel in 1941 as they didn't have any aircraft that required it. What they actually needed was 90 octane fuel for their Catalina flying boats.

It was possible to blend 90 octane fuel from 73 octane base fuel by slightly violating the specifications in case of emergency. However they decided to mix it locally from 100 octane and 87 octane fuel.

Ironically on 21 February 1941 (page 61) where the Australian Government is supposed to protest against the continuous supply of 87 fuel:
Page 47-53 gives stock in Feb/March 1941 and approx. consumption of 90 and 100 octane for 1941.

Page 44 gives expected amount of 100 octane for June 1941

Which were in fact delieverd, see Page 41:

To come back to the previous theory:
1. Supply of 100 octane fuel to Australia was received directly from Shell and Vacuum Oil Company without the involvement of any other Government.
2. They did in fact receive the amount of 100 octane fuel they have ordered.
3. The RAAF only "wanted" to employ 90 octane fuel where the engine required it.

Oh Yeah it's a great document. And thx for that. But what is buzzing me as hell is why are you so one sided in your citation.

In the doc they said that as of Jan/feb 41, no op plane needs 100Oct fuel.
They are also concerned abt what kind of fuel shld be used in the engines of the US planes they ordered (some seems to be outsourced from some French former order) as the Octane quality seemed higher than what they were presently using.

In all their discussion I hve read so far the 100oct fuel is to be mixed with lower grade (old stocks such as basic 73 octane fuel)and additive (TEL) to obtain grade of 95, 90 and 87 octane according to the types of eng in OP use.

They even estimate the quantity of needed 100 oct to be blended in to 95 octane fuel for their operational fighter(US fighters?). In no way they are mentionning any type requiring 100 oct fuel. (14.2.1941 - entry nbr sixty-eight - see bellow - extracted from http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/)

The price of 1 gallon of 100 oct fuel is fixed at 18 cents from Vacuum (company name). It wld be intersting to know what was the price for other grade (87 mainly)

Regarding the Brit situation it is interesting to note that if in August 40 they envisoned a large use of 100 octane, in the latest document (see attached files) even in feb 1941 they still hve no direct use of that grade in their fighters ;)

Pls that time don't wall text or insult me. Thx in advance.

Keep in mind which aircraft types were operated by the RAAF in Australia in 1941. Was there even any fighter available? I mean they even didn't receive Brewsters or P-40s before 1942.

Nice find 41Sqn_Banks, thanks for sharing! Good job summarizing the material in your post 407.

Ok fair enough for the fighters. But with so many RAAF personnel flying Hurries and SPits in ENgland, any 100 oct probable requirement would hve been listed.

What import most in the doc is that 100 OCT was a safety measure to prevent any lack of required grade fuel during the forseen switch in engine fuel with increased "technologies" (and even more lowered safety level ;) )

I pointed out (or I shld hve - lol ) a paper listing the composition of all grade of blended fuel (11.5% for 87 for exemple).

This shld be put in perspective with the average quantities of 100 oct consumption in england (the Kurves Kurfust traced).


ANd plse for the sake of the reader don't over quote each other with hundreds of lines of citations only to add a single sentence.

Over 400 post in this thread and I am sure that less than 20% are original meanings :rolleyes:

sJust like that :rolleyes:

Firstly, I want to thank Glider, NZTyphoon, Banks and Lane for coming in here to lance this historical boil. I have no problem with Kurfurst having an opinion but what alarms me is when it may affect other's opinions on history due to his agenda driven bias. It's all very well being on this forum but it actually disgusts me that this man sees fit to edit Wikipedia with his theories which are at odds with the painstakingly researched work of proper historians who seek the real answers, agenda free. I found it annoying enough that he wishes to pad his online stats by trying to negatively influence the flight model of his online enemy, that affects the hobby I enjoy enough - but to deliberately doctor popular information websites to suit his agenda is a disgrace.

@Tomcat, regarding your fighter question. The RAAF didn't operate in the Battle of Britain, only some Australian pilots did along with Kiwi pilots such as Al Deere. They made their own way to the UK and joined the RAF flying the same aircraft in British squadrons. The point being made here though is nothing to do with what the RAAF used, but the fact that the Australian government did not deal with the UK government in order to obtain their fuel and that this is contrary to Kurfursts long standing opinion which he will not move from and tells everybody that he can that it's the truth.

What you are seeing from Kurfurst is very bad science who clearly has an agenda which is contrary to finding out the truth. He can draw you as many graphs as he likes but the bottom line is that he's having strong evidence shoved in front of him and is still arguing about it. Did you know that 99% of people in prison are not guilty? It's the same mentality.

+1

Okay, for Tomcat's convenience, let's break it down.

1)Since about 2004, Kurfurst has held up the "Pips" memo as being an exemplar of accurate information regarding the supply of 100 Octane fuel to the RAF.

2) Whenever asked to show the original document, or at least provide solid evidence that it exists, on this and in other forums, KF has fobbed people off, and told them to find the document themselves, or contact Pip and ask him, or travel to Australia, often with insults and sneers.

3) When people like Glider have contacted the Australian War Memorial Archives to find the document, and have been told it cannot be found, KF has almost invariably resorted to calling the inquirer a liar.

Enough of history:

1) The reason for the "Pips" memo supposedly being in the AWM Archives is because it was copied to "the Australian Military Commission". No such Commission existed. On that basis alone, this Pips memo is a fabrication.

2) Beaverbrook apparently used the memo, supposedly from Rolls-Royce, to explain to the "Australian Military Commission" the reasons why Australia was still being supplied with 87 Octane fuel, rather than the 100 Octane it wanted: "The Australian Government was protesting vigoriously..."

3) At no time was the Australian Government accountable to the British regarding supplies of aviation fuel of any grade. The Australian Government got its fuel supplies directly from the oil companies, after negotiating directly with the oil companies. Beaverbrook had absolutely no say in the matter, nor could he influence the process in any way. There is an Official Australian War History and, far more importantly, a whole swag of documents discovered by 41Sqn_Banks, which proves this.


4) It doesn't matter what grades of fuel were being requested by the Australians - fact was they were getting all that was needed, and their requirements changed according to the types of engines being mooted for the Catalinas, Hudsons and other types ordered from the Americans.

Nuff said? It is pathetic that KF who has a deal of intelligence (?), has wasted so much of other people's time and energy on such a sham. If you want to continue to defend KF, be my guest. :cool:

Well said Osprey and NZtyphoon.

Simply put, as I understand it from reading the various threads on this forum plus the threads on ww2aircraft.net linked by Klem on page 9 of the Spit MK I/II thread, RAF fighter command's Spitfires and Hurricanes flew combat sorties using 100 Octane fuel during the Battle of Britain - there is ample and overwhelming evidence for this backed up by references linked; there has been no evidence provided backed up by a reference for the use of 87 Octane fuel by Spitfires or Hurricanes during BoB. So simply put, in a combat flight sim of BoB, Spitfire and Hurricanes should be modeled using 100 Octane fuel.

That is really the best summation of this whole argument.

There is not enough evidence for it to be decided with facts, only on opinion.

Reminds me of the 100/150 grade fiasco.....how many "tons" of that horse pucky was thrown around as proof of widespread adoption in gamer world.

If you have any evidence that 87 octane was used in combat I would be very interested to see it. Kurfurst whole approach is to never supply any evidence to support his view but to nitpick at any evidence that is offerred the other way, magnify it and blow it up out of proportion.

So it would be nice to see someone prove that 87 octane was used in combat. Hundreds of books and pieces have been written on the battle. Many personal accounts have been published. It would be nice to find one, just one that says 87 octane was used, or even frustration at not having 100 octane available.

I have stated many times that the case for the use of 100 octane is a strong one but not a perfect one. However there is no evidence of any kind that says 87 octane was used in combat.

Instead of shouting from the sidelines it would be nice to see someone who supports the belief that 87 was octane was used in combat, to back up those shouts.

For instance, did Kurfurst ever get capt doggles included onto the thread that was supposed to support his case. If not did he even copy the details of the exchange and make them available to him. Penny to a pound says he didn't.

I have put up with a number of insults from Kurfurst and Captdoggles (who has gone very quiet) but just supplied documents to support my case being honest and admitting the case wasn't perfect. Now its time for Kurfurst and others who believe 87 octane was used to support their belief with something substantial

To put it another way, its time they put up or shut up

Enough with the personal attacks. Discuss, disagree etc, but personal attacks are unacceptable.

Let me translate what it actually.

NZTyphoon found the Second World War Official Histories, legally and freely available to anyone at the Australian Goverment's website at http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/second_world_war/

Instead of giving the link where everyone could check what the source said, he magnamiously shared an amazon link, where people can buy, what he could read for free. Of course nobody will buy the books, so he can 'quote' them in any way he see it to his liking. At wikipedia he often resorted to this, 'backing' his own ideas that he wanted to be included to the enrichment of the wider public with references to the works of respected authors, even though those authors never said anything like it.

Let's see now some examples.

Says NZTyphoon - the 'ustralia in the War ' official histories of course make no such statement. But, as we are all aware, NZTyphoon have told us recently with equivalent certainty that British tanker losses were marginal, then it was shown that they've lost 600 000 GRT worth of tankers in the year under question according to the records.

Only the bottomline is missing from the quote - see below. Yes Australia contact various oil companies for supply. For various reasonons detailed below, the companies could not get the oil to Australia.

This is a classic strawmen arguement. Strawmen arguements are about deliberately misrepresenting the other's actual position, and then 'disproving' that distorted position, and therefore 'winning' the argument.

In reality however, nobody said or claimed that it was Lord Beaverbrook and/or the Ministry of Aircraft Production were deciding what types of fuels were supplied to Australia, nor how much.

The context in what Beaverbrook's name came up was that Pips found a paper, that says that British were worried about 100 octane fuel position for the future, and decided to halt further 100 octane conversions until the supplies could be secured.

The paper wan copied by the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, [b]by[b] Roll Royce [b]to[b] Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War.

As you can see, Beaverbrooks name came up in a different context, and nobody said Beaverbook decided in the question.

And this is classic selective quoting. NZTyphoon wishes to create the impression that Australia was fully autonomous in fuel suppy, that they had no contract whatsoever with the British in that regard etc. He wants people to believe that the background of the papers has been fabricated, the Australian goverment was in such an excellent position with regard of fuel, that discussions with the British about fuel supplies is a surreal idea.

This has been not the case, however. The bits on pages 288-289 tell a whole lot more of the story, which is I believe why NZTyphoon was careful not to share his source in the first place. You can't cherry pick qoutes if anyone can find it out in a minute, now can you?

Pages 288-289 in full:

In August 1940 the War Cabinet was asked for a decision on aviation
spirit stocks . Before the war the plan had been for a reserve of 6,400,00 0
gallons (that is, the requirements of nineteen squadrons) and although
this had not been achieved (approximately 5,500,000 was the holding )
it did not matter so much because a force of nineteen squadrons had no t
been achieved either. When the Empire Air Training Scheme requirement s
could be calculated the companies had agreed to increase their holding s
progressively, but now plans were afoot to expand the force to thirty-tw o
squadrons, the present contract was to expire on 31st December, and i t
was "not considered reasonable that the present contractors should b e
requested to further increase their stocks without some assurance of continuance
of business for a reasonable period " . 2 The suggestion therefor e
was that the Department of Supply should purchase 3,000,000 gallon s
and that three 1,200,000-gallon storage tanks should be built .

The Cabinet approved the purchase and sent the storage problem to the Commonwealth
Oil Board. The board recommended six 200,000-gallon tanks—two each
in three centres, to be approved by the Air Staff . But by March 1941
the three centres were revised to twelve and the total capacity was no w
4,030,000 gallons .

There might be grounds for satisfaction with these attempts to provide
extra storage tanks ; there could be none over the provision of the petrol
they were intended to hold . After the reduction of the ration which came
into force on 1st April 1941, the Supply Minister in the middle of that
month placed before the full Cabinet comparative sales figures for six
months. 3 "The effect of rationing and of all other inducements to reduced
consumption," he submitted, "may therefore be estimated at a figur e
of 16 per cent (that is, consumption has been reduced by 16 per cent) . "
Diversion of tankers to meet the special needs of the United Kingdom, side
by side with the persistently high sales, had reduced stocks to 82,000,00 0
gallons, "with no immediate prospects of restoring stocks even to thei r
former level" .

[b]By the beginning of May he reported "the prospective stock position
has deteriorated so much and the prospects of tankers are so uncertain
that I feel bound to report the matter to Cabinet ". He complained about
inability to get information from the United Kingdom authorities despite
attempts by the Prime Minister and another visiting parliamentarian. The
Government had protested about "our insecurity" with reference to tankers
and had been promised a tanker programme which, if maintained, woul d
bring stocks at the end of June to about 65,000,000 gallons . 4

Meantime on 2nd May the minister sought and received permission to
reduce use of private cars and cycles to 2,000 miles a year and to make
varying percentage reductions in other classes to fulfil the one-third cu t
"recommended by the original rationing board about twelve months ago" .


BTW, did anyone notice that despite I and others have asked him many times to post the alleged text in its full context from Payton - Smith, he always evades that request?

Again, the quoting is selective and out of context; reading the full text reveals that aviation fuel reserves could not be met, despite previous contacting with various companies. The reasons were two-fold: the British were buying up much what was available in the (American) market, which had finite amounts of 100 octane to offer. Indeed this is a returning subject in all British papers, can sufficient amount of American supply secured?

Secondly, Australia had no sea-going tanker capacity worth to mention - all oil had to be imported in British-owned tankers.

In short, the context of the Australian Military Commission's mission to Britain about getting 100 octane was that the Australians tried to build up large reserves, constructed tanks to hold it, but they couldn't buy enough on the market, and couldn't transfer it to Australia, because - despite NZTyphoons's claims that the British had no tanker capacity problems whatsoever, everything was green and nice - the Brits who controlled the whole Commonwealth tanker capacity suddenly decided to use the whole to their own purposes.

This left the Australians in an unenviable position, their reserves were dropping, and had to introduce severe rationing of fuel to the civilian sector to ensure sufficient reserves for the military.

The Page 288:

The army's figures were repeated in a submission by the Minister fo r
Supply to the full Cabinet on 11th June 1941, in which he reported tha t
the new ration scale to bring consumption to a figure of 20,000,000 gallon s
a month was now in force . But news of future tankers was poor. In an
endeavour to bring aviation spirit reserves up, only 7,000,000 gallons o f
motor spirit would come in in June ; quantities for July were uncertain .
The minister recounted at length the sorry story of the delay in rationing
and that "it resulted in only half the saving in consumption that had been
forecast by the motor trade whose advice had been accepted by the
Government in August". He reiterated the statement that no warning was
given by the United Kingdom of any alteration in the tanker position an d
only early in 1941 was it known that diversions, thought to be temporary ,
would become pronounced.

He concluded :
It is open to question whether severe rationing of the order I am now bound t o
suggest should be conducted by the civil authorities on their own account or unde r
the authority of the army . The army in association with my Controller of Liqui d
Fuels has evolved a mobilisation petrol scheme which would be operated by my
department. I gather that the army would prefer the rationing to be conducte d
entirely under the authority of my department .
In view of the opinion expressed by the Oil Board, strongly supported as it is
by the Department of the Army, I have no option but to recommend that I be
authorised to reduce the monthly consumption of motor spirit for civil purposes
to a level of 12,000,000 per month as soon as that may be practicable . If necessary
the use of private cars other than for business purposes could be stopped as from
the beginning of next month and certain other classes could be reduced at the sam e
time . The full scheme could not be introduced, unless the Army Mobilisation System
were brought in, until August . ?

Such proposals were drastic ; but the Cabinet deferred only long enough
to ask the Minister for Supply to present two schedules, one with, an d
one without, private cars (that is, class 2 in the rationing schedule) ,
designed to bring consumption to the required 12,000,000 gallons . 8 The
decision was to keep private cars on the road, but to allow them 1,00 0
miles a year only . The following evening, 17th June, the Prime Ministe r
announced the reductions which would begin with the August issue o f
ration tickets .

The shoe was beginning to pinch . If further restrictions were needed—
and no one could say that they would not be—some thought would have
to be given to other ways of economising : rationalising delivery services ,
zoning, transport pools . In effect, for the future, the petrol problem was
not just one of simple restriction. Like so many other problems it could
no longer be dealt with in isolation, and indicative of the Government ' s
realisation of the need to relate problems one with another, the Prime
Minister included in his reorganised....


Or at the Australian Goverments website, where you have found it yourself while researching the Australian online archives, should you bothered to give a link to it.

http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/second_world_war/

The pages I have provided the full quote can be found here: http://www.awm.gov.au/collection/rec...l-vol3-ch8.pdf

@Glider about post 401.

I am afraid I cannot answer you in detail now due to the lack of time and won't be in the position to do so in the next two weeks.

On the other hand, I do not see any appearance new evidence or even argument in your post, as it only repeats the ones you have been telling us in the last 40 pages of discussion, and probably no undue haste should be spent in addressing these points again.

FYI I have looked over about 1500 pages of 'War Cabinet' and related files at Kew.
I could not find any decision about the alleged full conversion of Fighter Command to 100 octane in the War Cabinet Minutes.

Which tells me that the reason you can't find any reference to 100 octane 'conversion freeze' in the War Cabinet Minutes either is because it was discussed and decided at lower levels, in one of the apprx. 200 War Cabinet commitees - which still are the part of the War Cabinet.

For the number of Committees, please refer to the relevant page of the National Archives website which provides general information about the War Cabinet on the apropos providing 'open access' to the public via digital copies.

Well said Bounder. Is there anyone out there that would disagree with Bounder?

Bounder, I respectfully suggest that you could be accused of applying intelligent, reasonable logic; however, such thinking is not acceptable to a 100 Octane denier.

The burden of proof in a UK criminal court is “beyond all reasonable doubt”. Given the evidence, I believe that RAF Fighter Command would be found guilty of premeditated and wide spread use of 100 Octane fuel by a jury of 12 good citizens of sound mind. LOL. Moreover, in a civil court, with the burden of proof being “on the balance of probability” the RAF would have been locked up long ago!

Happy landings,

Talisman

I can understand a passionate discussion guys, but keep the emotions in check if it starts to get too personal.

I've had reported posts about namecalling and personal attacks in this thread, so i urge everyone to go back 3-4 pages and see if they have any in their posts and then edit them out before the moderating team has to step in and issue infractions.

On the matter at hand, the best way to solve this debate is to model both versions. It's not like they are useless to have: in a dynamic campaign (either offline or online) there will be cases where 100 octane supplies will be low due to enemy action.

For people that want an exact day-to-day recreation of BoB then yes, the most widespread version is the only one they will need.

However, there's a large amount of users who are interested in a dynamic campaign. That definitely needs both versions, because otherwise there's no real incentive to go after the opponent's fuel supply, essentially cutting off a pretty vital part of strategic bombing objectives and throwing it out of the picture.

Better yet, each one can use what they want offline or fly on the servers that use what they prefer when going online, instead of trying to convince each other in the hopes their favorite ride will be better.

I really don't get why we should restrict everyone to a single way of doing things, especially when both fuel types actually existed in the first place.

Like i said, many people want things in the sim to be exactly like they were in the 40s. Many however want the conditions to be the same, but they also want the ability to change the outcomes somewhat. Bomb the enemy's supplies of 100 octane to make their fighters intercept you with more difficulty, so you can then move on to bombing other targets with reduced casualties and so on. It's a whole extra layer of interesting tactical considerations that would be a must for any dynamic mission environment.

Having only 87 oct or 100 oct is not conducive to that. So why should these players be limited in their enjoyment of the product when the first group has nothing to lose by the inclusion of both versions (they can simply choose which version to fly)?

Pretty much agree on all your points.

Anyway I've always said that both 87 and 100 octane versions would be nice to be implented in the sim. As you noted, having two versions is better for all. It allows for dynamic campaigns, it does not restrict the hands of mission designers or server hosts to decide what versions of planes they want to have in. It allows OPTIONs.

The only loosers are the small group who wants to set their version of history to all in stone, and having only the bestest planes to fly for one side. And its a miniscule group compared to the entire group.

Well at least, what we hve shown lately with our research in th Au archives is that :

- there was 100 oct fuel ordered and delivered
- This fuel was used ONLY to be blended with old stock of 74 octane fuel to create adequate 87, 90 or 95 octane fuel
- The stoichiometry of the blend is defined in the archive
- To be blended adequately, some specified additives where requested and delivered by the oil companies
- There was no plane in Australian air force that needed a single drop of pure 100 octane fuel as of feb 1941

What we also learned is that the cost of 100oct fuel was stated after some negotiations at 18 cents a gallon

my 1/9th gallon (of 100octane of course)

@Kurfurst. I believe you could learn from the "Russells Teapot" argument.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell's_teapot

I'm not interested in the flaky Australian argument anymore since it appears far too unconvincing and more importantly, irrelevant. It matters not even if, as you suggest, that the UK wouldn't give the Australians any 100 octane because they were short. That is not evidence that the RAF didn't have enough to use themselves.

We can use simple logic to decide the truth here. I ask you, do you deny any of these 4 points listed?

1. That the RAF used fuel.
2. Every flight recorded a combat report (provided the pilot returned).
3. That the fuel type or boost to indicate the type was frequently mentioned in combat reports throughout the BoB.
4. That 87 is never ever mentioned and 100 was in every case.

Therefore the entire RAF MUST have used 100 in in combat and no other type. It really is that straightforward. What I do not find straightforward are your reasons for objection. Please, what are they?

From KF in another post: http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showthr...rst#post378110
"...I have only seen a summary on a board..." Kf has not actually seen the original, but it is guaranteed to be 100 percent accurate. :rolleyes:

'Nuff said.

Credibility can add tons to the weight of a man's words. ;)

I have no reason not to trust Pips account. He had no take or special interest in the matter, just shared his research's result.

On a different note, may I ask why you keep changing your login handles?

Your first sentence makes no sense to me. But, may I ask why you avoid answering questions which destroy your argument? If you cannot answer without resorting to character assassination then you are defeated.

What the hell do Australian Fuel Supplies in 1940 have to do with the Battle of Britain?

Are we seriously to believe that the British Government's reluctance to assist in the supply of 100 octane fuel to Australia, at a time when there was no war in the Australian region, was an indication that they didn't have enough for the RAF in Europe where there was a war raging? "Here you go Australia, we actually need it more than you do at the moment because we're trying to survive but we're nice guys so we'll take a chance ..."

The British 100 octane fuel position in 1940 is explained in many documents, links etc already posted. And if there was any doubt about sufficient supplies for the entire RAF does anyone seriously imagine that the key front line defence units (fighter squadrons) would have had to make do with anything less than the best that was available?

Oh, wait. We've already had that discussion.

I don't care if 87 octane aircraft are modelled as long as 100 octane types are too. Both fuels were available during the BoB. Beyond that, take it up with the mission builders.

Exactally

In the series of " What archives tells us" here is the FLIGHT archives that I cited two days ago :

- There was no 100 octane fuel usage during BoB in the FC. Here I am putting my money on British pride that would hve pushed forward any of its usage (ok Brits are not French but never the less ;) )

- in 1941 increased power Merlin's had 9lb boost level

- 100 oct fuel was used by some aircraft in the RN (Fulmar) fitted with special engines such as the Merlin VIII (presumably to compensate for the extra weight of the 2nd crew member and low alt missions)

- In 1941 planes were still using 87 octane such as was the Hurricane with Merlin XX

Sources : (http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchi...0-%201286.html)

1. "International power of the Merlin I and II was 950/990 h.p. at
2,600 r.p.m. at 12,250ft, and the maximum take-off output was
890 h.p. at 2,850 r.p.m."

2. Merlin III : "The power output of the standard engine,"
writes Harold Nockolds, "was 1,030 b.h.p. at 3,000 r.p.m. at
10,250ft with plus 6i lb boost. "

3. "the petrol normally used at that time was 87
octane"

4. "The Merlin II and I I I were installed in the Spitfire I, Defiant I,
Hurricane I, Sea Hurricane I, and Battle I, and were—as will
always be remembered—vital factors in the winning of the Battle
of Britain. The Merlin IV had pressure-water cooling in place
of the glycol cooling of the earlier models, and was developed
for installation in the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley IV bomber.
The Mk VIII, installed in the Fairey Fulmar I, was a medium supercharged
unit rated at 1,010 h.p. at 2,850 r.p.m. at 6,750ft,
and, using 100-octane fuel, delivered 1,080 h.p. at 3,000 r.p.m. for
take-off."

5. "The Merlin X—installed in the Halifax I, Wellington II and
Whitley V and VII—represented a very important advance in
that it had a two-speed supercharger to improve take-off, lowaltitude
performance during climb or level flight, and fuel
economy under cruising conditions. The speed change was
effected through an oil-pressure system, the actual changeover
under full power taking about a second. In low gear the Merlin X
gave 1,145 h.p. at 5,250ft, and in high gear 1,010 h.p. at 17,750ft."

6. "The Merlin XII, driving a Rotol three-blade constant-speed
airscrew, was installed in some Spitfire lls ; its maximum output
was 1,150 h.p. at 3,000 r.p.m. at 14,000ft and it had a 0.477:1
reduction gear."

7. "The next production-type engine was the Merlin XX, which,
compared with the X, delivered a greatly increased power at
height." [...] "Thus, using 100-octane fuel,
the international rating in low gear was 1,240 h.p. at 2,850
r.p.m. at 10,000ft and plus 9 lb/sq in boost; in high gear the
figure was 1,175 h.p. at 2,850 r.p.m. at 17,500ft, again at plus
9 lb boost."

8. "The Merlin XX powered the Beaufighter II, Defiant II, Halifax II and V, Hurricane II and IV, and Lancaster I and III."

9. "An increase in take-off output from 1,300 h.p. to 1,600 h.p. characterized
the Merlin 32, which powered the Barracuda II and
Seafire II."

10. "A variant which saw very extensive service was the Merlin 45,
fitted in the Spitfire V, P.R.IV and VII, and Seafire I I ; at 16,000ft
and 2,850 r.p.m. its output was 1,200 h.p. The Merlin 45M was
rated for duty at lower levels and delivered 1,585 h.p. at 2,750ft;
it was fitted in the Spitfire L.F.V"

11. "The Merlin 46 and 47 were
both high-altitude engines (1,115 h.p. at 19,000ft); the 46 powered
the Spitfire V, P.R.IV and VII, and Seafire I, and the 47 (which
had a cabin supercharger) found its application in the Spitfire VI."

12. "The key feature of the Merlin 61 was its two-speed, two-stage
supercharger, with two rotors on a common shaft. The mixture
was compressed by the first stage and was delivered to the inlet of
the second stage, where it was further compressed before being
delivered to the induction pipe. In order to reduce the mixture
temperature to a normal figure, a box-like intercooler was interposed
between the outlet of the second-stage supercharger and
the rear of the cylinder blocks. In a typical Spitfire installation
the intercooler radiator was mounted under the port wing in a duct, which also housed one of the main engine-cooling radiators."

13. "The real significance of the Merlin 61 was that at 40,000ft it
developed double the power given at a much lower altitude by the
Merlin II of 1939/40. Even at 23,500ft its maximum power was
1,390 h.p. The weight had risen to 1,640 lb."

14. The 67 had a reduction gear of 0.42:1 instead of 0.477:1,
as had the 63, 64 and 66, and the 68 was a Packard-built model,
designated V-1650-3 and installed in the Mustang I I I . Its takeoff
output was 1,400 h.p.

15. "The 67 had a reduction gear of 0.42:1 instead of 0.477:1,
as had the 63, 64 and 66, installed in the Mustang I I I . Its takeoff
output was 1,400 h.p. In the Merlin 69—another Packardbuilt
variant, known in America as the V-1650-7—1,490 h.p. was
available for take-off; this engine powered Mustang I l l s and IVs."

16. "The Merlin 130 and 131 were the first of their family to incorporate
downdraught carburettors; and, to eliminate the air scoop
as used on the Mosquito, ducted air intakes were faired into the
leading edges of the wing. The war-time Bendix/Stromberg
carburettor was replaced by a low-pressure fuel-injection system,
which delivered through a spray nozzle into the supercharger eye*.

17. The sum total of improvements incorporated
in these remarkable engines raised the output to 2,030 h.p. at
1,250ft with a boost of plus 25 lb/sq in.

18. Feel free to add your own episode !

*Ivan are your sure of your doc ?

I don't understand your point Tomcat. Are you seriously arguing the 87 octane case here? I expect it from Kurfurst because he appears to have painted himself into a corner with too much personal pride invested in the argument. But you claim to be a man of education by profession?

@klem, I am a mission builder for our server and it does and will run historical missions only. We have a Luftwaffe faction too, they won't have a problem with it.

Of course there is no connection. However Kurfürst claims that the reason why the infamous Australian document exists is because the Australia Government "rigorously protested" to receive 100 octane fuel from Great Britain in February 1941. It was shown that this was not the case because
a) they didn't intent to switch to 100 octane fuel at that time,
b) they received the requested amount of 100 octane fuel to mix the 90 octane fuel required for the Catalinas and
c) they received the 100 octane fuel directly from Shell and Vacuum Oil Company without negotiation of Great Britain.

@Osprey :

I don't push frwrd the 87 case.

I firmly believe that there was some MkII fitted with improved Merlins. That the improvement was only linked in operational level to fuel is something that I do not believe if we are talking abt 100 octane. But it's only my own opinion.

I also will gladly eat my hat if I am wrong.

Regarding Kurfurst, I hve to say that I dislike the way some are referring to him here. That he deserve it for some past actions... well perhaps you know something that I don't but I do not really like to read some of the comments.

I am not in anyway perfect myself.

~S!

Are you saying that Flight stated the above?

You would be correct that RAF FC did use 100 octane fuel.

Below is a list of squadrons that I have found references for that used 100 octane fuel.

No. 92 (East India) Squadron pre BoB S
No. 111 Squadron pre BoB H
No. 151 Squadron Feb 1940 H
No. 602 (City of Glasgow) Squadron pre BoB S
No. 609 (West Riding) Squadron pre BoB S

No. 1 (Cawnpore) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 3 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 17 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 19 Squadron May 1940 S
No. 54 Squadron May 1940 S
No. 74 Squadron May 1940 S
No. 56 (Punjab) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 73 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 79 (Madras Presidency) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 85 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 87 (United Provinces) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 229 Squadron May 1940 H

No. 43 (China-British) Squadron June 1940 H
No. 41 Squadron June 1940 S
No. 610 (County of Chester) Squadron June 1940 S
No. 611 (West Lancashire) Squadron June 1940 S

No. 145 Squadron July 1940 H

No. 64 Squadron 5 Aug 1940
No. 65 (East India) Squadron 12 Aug 1940 S
No. 303 Polish Fighter Squadron 9 Sept 1940 H
No. 234 (Madras Presidency) Squadron 18 Aug 1940 S
No. 603 (City of Edinburgh) Squadron 31 Aug 1940 S
No. 616 (South Yorkshire) Squadron 15 Aug 1940 S

No. 66 Squadron 6 Sept 1940 S
No. 152 (Hyderabad) Squadron 4 Sept 1940 S
No. 249 (Gold Coast) Squadron 6 Sept 1940 H

So much for the accuracy of the Flight article. LOL and some say that Lovesey is a Rolls-Rroyce PR lackey. :rolleyes:

Like i said, i want both versions in the sim but ok, i'll bite and play devil's advocate here just for the sake of showing you guys what i get from the whole discussing here. Lets go ahead and take each numbered point one by one, shall we?

1. Correct
2. Correct
3. Correct, the operative word being "frequently". Which could mean it was a differing practice (to be mentioned in the first place) but widespread enough (to be mentioned frequently).
4. Correct. Which could mean 87 wasn't mentioned because it was the default, while 100 was mentioned because for one it was the exception to the rule and secondly, extra boost warranted extra inspections by the mechanics.

I'm not arguing either case, this is just an example to show everyone here how flaky the whole thing appears to an outside observer, no matter which side of the argument one tends to support.

I just think no side has provided any undisputed facts: i see a lot of credible sources in this thread but far too often a lot of them are conflicting, with no real means to discern which i should "believe more". I'm not convinced either way and that's why (as well as the dynamic campaign considerations) i advocate the presence of both types for all aircraft that use higher grade fuel during the BoB.

I remember seeing similar evidence about half the 110 units being also equipped with better fuel and higher rated engines. I want to have both versions, no matter if its a Spit or Hurri or 110. Forgive me when i say that i doubt some of the most invested posters in this thread would do the same, as i have a suspicion that many who support 100 octane Spits would denounce DB601N-equipped 110s and vice versa.

Let's have options is all i'm saying ;)

You have hit on a key item, I never claimed that the War Cabinet approved or decided on the roll out of 100 Octane fuel. It wasn't their decision.
The point is that this Pips clearly stated that the War Cabinet halted the roll out, that they restarted it later, they didn't it would be in the minutes. This paper if it exists is wrong. If you believe that someone else made the decision find it,, and explain why Pips made such an obvious mistake.

You have stated a number of times that you believe in his paper, that is your choice. I suggest you prove that any statment, he made on any topic on the paper is correct and I do mean any statement, your choice. Something, anything to confirm that any point is correct.

The choice is huge. Take the 25% being converted when the roll out stopped, with 75% of FC using 87 octane you should be able to find something. The Oil Committee who were responsible for the purchase storage and distribution must, if its true, mention it somewhere.

Where is your evidence that this material actually exists? You have not viewed the material itself - Your words, not mine.

You are quoting material from another forum the thread of which which - conveniently - is no longer accessible: http://www.allaboutwarfare.com/forum...0&st=0&start=0

(http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showthr...=20110&page=28)

So, you do have a contact for Mr Pip but cannot provide the material you so strenuously defend?

Have you actually searched for the papers yourself? You keep telling others to do so, but have not bothered to do some basic research of your own?

If you are so right about them, I would have thought you would have long ago jumped at the chance to present them and prove everyone else wrong - you know, embarrass the naysayers. Why haven't you?

It's easy enough to start a search, just go onto http://www.awm.gov.au/database/ go down to "Official Records" which puts you onto http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/using/search/ - The AWM and NAA use the same search engine. Type in the title, or keywords if you don't have the official archive numbers...

Alternatively you can go onto this page http://www.awm.gov.au/contact/ and directly ask a question http://awm.altarama.com/reft100.aspx?key=research

Its easy - no long trips to Australia needed, and anyone here can do it.

The Pip statement:

As can bee seen the above is total nonsense.

"By 11th July 1940 the RAF had 343,000 tons of 100 octane in store, and the rate of importation was such that stocks rose to 424,000 tons by 10th October, 1940 after 22,000 tons had been issued during the Battle. Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, The Narrow Margin. The Battle of Britain and the Rise of Air Power 1930-1940 (Hutchinson, London 1967. First published 1961), p.101-102. Importation from BP at Abadan alone was sufficient to meet this consumption. Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company, p.244"

Less than 6% of the July stock was used during the BoB, so hardly well below the level considered necessary for widespread use.

NZ, this is from the link you posted.

So absolutely wrong.

Glider,

Pips didn't say it was mentioned in War Cabinet Minutes papers - that's something that you seem to be reading into it, and you have entered a circular logic, that you think it should be in the papers titled 'War Cabinet minutes'' in CAB 65 (iirc) reference, and since it isn't, Pip's research is wrong. The logical error is clear to see, and I think mistake (in logic) is your's not Pip's.

The 'War Cabinet' is a rather general term and could refer to the War Cabinet with W.C. and the other people at the top, or any of the many Committees under the W.C.

Now I believe it was you who posted the attached paper. It seems to mention some kind of problems with tanker allocation. This sounds familiar from Morgan and Shacklady isn't it?

It also says: 'certain Fighter and Bomber squadrons should begin the use of 100 octane fuel'

and

'removal DDT 230 (ie. 87 octane - my note) fuel from Bomber and Fighter Command stations where 100 octane fuel is being bought into use'.

This hardly sounds as univeral use, David. In fact, it quite clearly says that there were to be selected Fighter and Bomber bases where 100 octane fuel was to be used. On another page they specifically say 'no' to Bomber Command's demands to have only 100 octane fuel on Bomber Stations on economical grounds (100 octane was more expensive, and Britain was running out of cash), save the 4 BC Stations mentioned.

Of course I haven't seen all the series of these papers. It would be nice to see them for all I guess. But since these and all subsequent papers I have mention 'stations concerned', the 'fighter units concenred' I have no reason to believe other that the high octane fuel was always meant to be supplied to select stations, while the others kept operated on the standard fuel of the RAF - 87 octane.

Glider already tried this line. The Forum and the thread is easily accessible, for registered AND approved members.

You can contact him on the forum in PM if he still reads it. Not much is happening there anymore.

Yes I asked Pips about them and tried the Australian archieve digital site. Few things are digitalised there unfortunately - one of them is named 'Proposal of securing 100 octane...'.

You have seen that one, I gave you the link, and IIRC you also got a heart attack when a British doc mentioned that one of their driving force for getting 100 octane is that German synth plants are so suitable for producing virtually any amount. :D So I am puzzled about why you ask if I had searched the site.

Because I have a life and only a very passing interest the RAF... and to be honest I've probably had plowed too many young bucks like you into the ground already to find particular excitement in it anymore. :D

Now, you see, I have done that before you even got to the University - no offense, but you should get a fair idea that I am actually into this stuff for, let's see 13 years now? - I have the above mentioned proposal of 100 octane fuel since March 2007. I know the AWM site, I have searched it. There's a lot of interesting stuff up there, but very little on 100 octane, at least, in an available form.

There are two practical problems:
- only a couple of random docs are digitized. I am quite sure there's a lot more WW2 100 octane in the AWM than the four or so papers it lists... some of the paper, like 'Proposals for...' is clearly copies of British papers.

- not all papers are entered into the registry. The paper recently shown and posted in this thread about the Australian attempt to buy/mix/steal/whatever 100/95/90 octane is only open since 2009 or so, at least as I recall from its sheet.

Archives often have only minimal staff and tons of papers, which is colossal work to register. When last time I was in the HTK archives, the registry was some DOS 6.0 based database program on something that resembled a 486 or an early 586. Do you even know what these things were? :D It illustrates the situation nicely - the online records are far from perfect, or accessible.

So if you think that it's just a case of browsing through the online archives, you will be disappointed. Some times questions like this just solve themselves in time.

Hi Kurfürst, I have some questions about the "Australian document".

Is the reason why it is included specifically stated in the document or is this a interpretation?
How do you know that the listed persons quoted from the report, where can these quotes be found?

Is the following quoted text a summary/interpretation by Pips or is this a actual quote of the document?

I never heard of a initial limitation of +9 boost and you just mentioned that this was already discussed. Can you give me a link to this discussion or source?

Your playing your game again Kurfurst only quoting one paper from a complete stream. However you believe that certain means 25%, so prove it. All you need to do is look at the strength of FC compare it to the combat reports/squadron records and you will have your 25%.

Pips clearly states
Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place
We know the War Cabinet didn't make those decisions so find out who did, simple request.

The other core to the Pips position is that there was a shortage of 100 Octane which caused the decision he believes the War Cabinet made. I ask you to find any reference to any paper from any official source that states that there was a shortage of 100 Octane for FC in 1940.

I realise this thread is a bit acrimonious but overall the content has been very interesting. The technical points have already been made but I am interested in the logic of is being argued.

Kurfurst, your argument appears to be that it cannot be proved definitively that all fighter stations during the BOB used 100 octane. On that narrow definition you are quite right, especially if you hold your own personal threshold of 'absolute proof' very high.

But based on the material presented in this thread, I still consider it likely that the BOB was fought largely if not completely with 100 octane. Almost all others in this thread, and also the previous very large thread on the same topic at another forum, seem to be of the same opinion. Perhaps someone in these threads at some point has stated that ALL RAF fighters were using 100 octane by the BOB without exception, but if you are arguing against that statement, you are presenting a variation of the straw man argument...refuting the most extreme position of your opponents instead of the typical position (and declaring victory!).

Neither using or not using 100 octane in the BOB is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence, or extra onus of proof on either side. Personally I could easily believe either of them, and have no initial bias that I am aware of. An extraordinary claim would be that the RAF had a jet squadron during the BOB, for example.

Typically when deciding between such competing ordinary claims, people examine what evidence exists and make a qualified judgement on the topic to move forward with. Seeing there is an large amount of anecdotal evidence for widespread use of 100 octane as reported in this thread, also a compelling historical reason to use 100 octane, and finally documented historic availability of 100 octane, it doesn't seem surprising to me your argument is not being taken up or accepted by others.

Going against the crowd is of course not a logical problem. If you argued against the existence of witches in the 1600s, you would be widely refuted but still correct (I hope!). But for every case like witch existance/nonexistance, there are many many more cases where the person arguing against informed peer belief is just mistaken. Of course your continuing arguing from your corner has lead to a lot of interesting technical information posted, and for that I thank you.

camber

And still, amongst all of his blather, KF has not presented any evidence whatsoever that the Pips memo actually exists, nor has he seen it himself except as a summary on a thread. Yet everyone who argues against KF has to provide solid, documentary evidence to back up their claim, otherwise it is dismissed out of hand.

even in the current german http://www.flugzeugclassic.de/zeitsc...ft=704&nav=621 issue, the talk about 100 octan for the RAF fighters in the BoB campaign. It seems everyone is rong lol....

;)

There is plenty of documentation of 100 octane fuel use before and during the Battle of Britain. For starters:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o.../1940-0897.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...anuary6-44.jpg

602 Sqdn. Operations Record Book
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/6...-100octane.jpg

611 Sqdn. Operations Record Book
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no611-100oct.jpg

151 Sqdn. Operations Record Book
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...rb-16feb40.jpg

74 Sqdn. Operations Record Book
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/no74-100oct.jpg

111 Sqdn. Operations Record Book
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...100-octane.jpg

David Ross, The Greatest Squadron of Them All, The Definitive History of 603 Squadron, RAauxAF, (Grub Street, London, 2003)
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/603-ross-pg125.jpg

Alec Harvey-Bailey, The Merlin in Perspective, (Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust, Derby, 1983)
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/r...yce-100oct.jpg

Alfred Price, The Spitfire Story, (Arms and Armour Press Ltd., London, 1986)
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/price-pg74.jpg

Leo McKinstry, Hurricane, Victor of the Battle of Britain, (John Murrey Publishers, London, 2010)
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...nstry-pg87.jpg

Leo McKinstry, Hurricane, Victor of the Battle of Britain, (John Murrey Publishers, London, 2010)
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...stry-pg191.jpg

W.G. Dudek and D. R. Winans, excerpt from AIAA Paper No. 69-779, Milestones in Aviation Fuels, (Esso Research and Engineering Company, New York 1969.)
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...-42363-319.jpg

A. R. Ogston, excerpt from History of Aircraft Lubricants (Society of Automotive Enginees, Inc. Warrendale, PA USA), p. 12.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...cants-pg12.jpg

RAF History
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ory-100oct.jpg

602 Sqdn. Spitfire I
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/6...-100octane.jpg

609 Sqdn. Spitfire I
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/6...e-I-100oct.jpg

610 Sqdn. - Hawkinge, July 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...nge-july40.jpg

I know that and I thank you for your posting, but it cannot be questioned that central to the Pips position is that there was a shortage. All I am asking is for Kurfurst to provide any evidence, that any part of the UK government, any department, considered there to be a shortage of 100 octane for FC, at any time during the BOB.

There are a raft of papers to the contrary and I could add a load more to your posting but I am not asking Kurfurst for that, I am just asking him to provide one paper, just one, that says there was a shortage.

It shouldn't be that difficult, hundreds of papers, books, articles, personal memories, histories have been written about the battle. There must be one that agrees with him.

Hi TomcatVIP, interesting claim given the overwhelming evidence for widespread use of 100 Octane fuel during the Battle of Britain. Perhaps there is new counter evidence in this document? EDIT: I found you post on page 39 (post 383 of this thread) that has a working link. I don’t see anywhere in that document the statement that 100 Octane fuel was not used in the Battle of Britain, or on the contrary, that 87 Octane was used by Spitfires or Hurricanes during the Battle of Britain. Nor I could not find any mention that “In 1941 planes were still using 87 octane such as was the Hurricane with Merlin XX”.

In response to your claim in point 3 of your post (434) on page 44, and I quote you said "the petrol normally used at that time was 87 Octane" I find this slightly misleading as the time in question is 1937, which you did not state nor was there an attempt to put the quote in context. Whilst it does say on Page 557 of the original text (link) that “the petrol normally used at that time was 87 Octane” it is referring a to pre-war flight endurance test in 1937 where the Spitfire in question used “fuel of a higher Octane” (than 87 Octane). Note, this is stating that in 1937 the petrol normally used was 87 Octane – it does not mention the normal Octane used during the Battle of Britain 3 years later in 1940. I fail to see the significance of this quote regarding Octane usage during the Battle of Britain when we examine the whole quote.

If I have missed any quotes in the document regarding 87 or 100 Octane fuel usage during the Battle of Britain, and I may well have done considering it's a huge document, could you please quote them directly and list the page in the document that they appear so we may examine them in full. For example as I have done above by stating the quote and it’s appearance on page 557 with a working link to the page. Thanks.




MoGas, could you post a summary or even better images of the article you are referring to in english since it seems the magazine you are referring to requires a subscription.

Thanks, Bounder

This is what Pips said about what he found when asked: "were the British deceiving to the Australians?"

So even Pips has his doubts about the factual truth of what he found.

(It seems that the one accusing others of being selective is himself being selective.) tut tut

There is certainly evidence that this was a deception for British stocks of 100 octane fuel was:

30th September 1939 - 153,000 tons
27th February 1940 - 220,000 tons
31st May 1940 - 294,000 tons
11th July 1940 - 343,000 tons
31st August 1940 - 404,000 tons
10th October 1940 - 424,000 tons
30th November 1940 - 440,000 tons

It is written in german, but anyway, it is a story about the Supermarine Spitfire part 1 (part 2, follows next months) where they talk about early issues with the Spitfire and her problems.

"In the article it is written, that, since early 1940, WHEN possible, EVERY fighter Sqn, got 100 octan fuel!" ,"Since the end of 1939, the focused already on 100 octan fuel, to rise the performance on the engines" ,"The RAF used 100 octan since 1937 already, but it was limited very much, because, he was coming from the USA, and it was expensive"

I will scan the text, or page, but I dont like to fall in a copyright issue, if you know what I mean..

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/attachm...5&d=1330023206

This graph is garbage as it includes 87 fuel issued to all RAF Commands. It is also unreferenced as to the source of the data plotted.

Hi Bounder!,

The number of pages concerning the article (exception made of the 2 pages of adds) is only 3 pages p576 to 579. It seems for me that quoting the page was of no importance as I alrdy took great care of extracting for the reader AND in the same order what was the essential for the discussion.

That article was written at the occasion of the commemoration of 40 year of aero engine dev by RR and 50 years of History. The article is filled with 1 page add of RR. Obviously, we can understand that as it is today the article might hve been reviewed by RR !

The journalist of FLIGHT (H. F. K I N G , M . B . E) use a chronological order in his article and describe any major evolution of that engine IN THAT ORDER.

For example if he specified that 87 octane was the fuel grade in use at the time, when 100 oct fuel is introduced in an engine he noted the modification.

For example he clearly explains that if Hurri and Spits did rely on the Mk II and III, the Fulmar equipped with MkVIII could be fueled with 100 octane (with a max output power of 1080shp at T.O contrary to 1010 without - without meaning obviously with 87 ocatane ;) ).

On point 1: yes we are talking abt 1937. It's the beginning of the article that deal chronologically with the Merlin story.

To say that the 87 oct fuel was the normal fuel used at that date I am using the quote on point 7 saying that using 100 oct fuel the Merlin XX had a 9lb boost
The date I mentioned (remark that I didn't re-use the 1942 date as in the FLIGHT article) is in perspective with the service introduction of that engine as in my own memory.

Note also that there is no mention of any use of the XX engine in the Spitfire but one on how the process of introducing that level of improvement was difficult ("These figures represent an
increase of nearly 250 h.p. over the Merlin II of identical cylinder
dimensions, and illustrate in a convincing manner the technical
progress achieved by years of 'toil, tears and sweat,' to borrow a
classical phrase from our worthy Prime Minister.")

All that makes sense to me on the base of technical grounds.

The quote made out of the rest of article are there to put the subsequent development in perpective regarding SHP and boost with the ultimate being 25lb for the post war 131/132 on the Hornet.

Hence we have two door in the Merlin history acording to the article : one in 1937 for introduction of 87 octane (confirmed in 1940 with the mention made of the Fulmar using a special engine) and the other in 1941 (42 in Fligt article) for possibility of 100 octane usage in the mkXX.

After that date it's upon the reader to decide witch fuel was in use since the article does not mention any switch (witch I found interesting despite all the other details of the engine modifications) but it's another story ;)

Note also that in 1954, the merlin with 150000 units produced (all manufacturer included) represented more than 80% of all engines build by RR at the time (185000)

Source : http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchi...0-%201286.html

You made broad statements claiming principally that 100 Octane fuel was not used by RAF fighter command during the Battle of Britain and to do this you used the article in Flight and listed quotes to support your argument. No where in that document is this stated at all i.e that 100 Octane fuel was not used during BoB.

The article covers the start of Rolls Royce and goes on to discuss the development of the Merlin engine. What I gather from your posts is that you are basing your argument that, when the Merlin II and III engines where first tested they used 87 Octane fuel, I have no problem with that. You are then saying that when the Merlin XX engine was introduced later in 1941 it ran on 100 Octane fuel, again I have no problem with that.

The problem I have with your argument is that it assumes Merin II or III engines could not or were not be modified to run on 100 Octane fuel – this is not stated in the article and is contrary to all the evidence posted in this thread and historical accounts showing that Spitfires and Hurricanes were converted to 100 Octane fuel before the Battle of Britain.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

PS: Thanks MoGas, I wouldn't post any scans if it could cause copyright issues.

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Just for the record, my concern regarding the whole 87 vs 100 Octane fuel stemmed from previous information that seemed to indicate at the time that CoD would not offer official models of the same aircraft with different octane fuel (link to post http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showthr...439#post389439). My worry is that if only one octane model per aircraft will officially be supported that we will get official models using 87 Octane fuel without corresponding models using 100 Octane. Given the overwhelming evidence of 100 Octane fuel used by Spitfires and Hurricanes during BoB against the complete lack of evidence for those aircraft flying combat sorties using 87 Octane fuel, having official models only using 87 octane would, in my opinion, be historically inaccurate.

I understand that once the SDK pack is released players could model their own variants and I feel that if people want to model 87 octane Spitfires and Hurricanes that would be great and allow for more choice, particularly in dynamic campaigns where the LW successfully target enough RAF fuel supplies, bases etc forcing RAF fighters into 87 Octane fighters. Also, I don’t have a problem with variants of the Spitfires and Hurricane we have in game modelled officially with both 87 and 100 Octane, then it’s up to the user / mission designer to pick. But if we can only have one variant per model, then it should in my opinion be the 100 Octane variant since all the evidence supports 100 Octane fuel use in BoB.

Hi, was this a recent post was made by Pips, i.e. are you in contact with Pips? Could you provide the complete post or a link to the post (I assume it was made in the not public allaboutwarfare forum).

Thanks in advance :)

Yes Banks that was in the thread Barbi so loves to quote from. Pips, afaik, has not been from in years.

Sign up on the board. Lots of interesting info has been posted, though the board is rather dead now.

If it was not used no one will tell that it has not seen any use... C'mon ! DO you see flying car in the street ? What would you think if someone will tell you 70 years latter that car were flying as there is no proof of the contrary and that no one at the time as wrote that cars were not flying (for the future generations : I AM WRITING THIS IN THE EARLY 2012 AND CAN TESTIFY THAT NO CARS ARE FLYING AT THIS STAGE !) ?

humm remind me a movie with some monkeys, Bruce Willis and Brad Pitt ;)


I didn't say that - I said that the article write that once used with 100oct MkXX had a boost level of 9lb (what is confirmed by some source alrdy posted). Pls re-read the article

If it was the case, RR would have asked this to be included in that article and FLIGHT would have been proud to put that fact in their story.

That's an adventurous conclusion !

If they didn't make any mention of such "conversions" it's not because they wanted to hide it to the future WWII simmer of the early 21st century but perhaps because there was no such usage.

In the Au archive we have alrdy seen that 100 octane fuel was used to be blended with old stock of 74 octane fuel to produce 87, 90 or even 95 octane fuel.

Last but not least, when used in the MkVIII engine, the 100 octane fuel was not producing tremendous amount of extra power (1010 vs 1080).

Most certainly not. If it was there then I want it. I think I speak for all RAF types when I say that they want accuracy and let the chips fall where they may. I fly Hurricanes, I am already expecting the 109 to have a big advantage on me, but I shall fight on because I want it how it was.

Alec Harvey-Bailey, The Merlin in Perspective, (Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust, Derby, 1983)
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...in3-rating.jpg

"Alec Harvey-Bailey was in charge of Merlin engine defect investigation during WWII. In addition to examination of damaged engines, his role also involved development of engineering improvements and repairs. Harvey-Bailey made numerous visits to active squadrons and even flew aircraft when it was necessary to become familiar with particular problems."



Pilot's Notes, Merlin II, III and IV, 4th Edition, April 1940, page 6.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...erlin3-pg6.jpg

Tomcat please note the engines

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/ap1590b.jpg

http://img.ibtimes.com/www/data/imag...et-by-2012.jpg

;)

Through all his palaver KF is admitting he has not seen the Pips document himself, nor has anyone who has access to the all about warfare forum, so the preamble should read:

"This is from a researcher, researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives, from a purported document, allegedly copied to the so-called "Australian Military Commission" in England in February 1941, allegedly by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook, allegedly outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance. It was purported to be a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report allegedly titled "Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War;" although this has not yet been found in any of the Australian archives contacted.

The reason why it is allegedly included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was supposedly protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF; although no corroberating evidence to support this has been found. McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all allegedly quoted parts from the report."

All the rest is smoke and mirrors by KF; plain fact is he pins 100% faith on a set of documents he has not seen or read, based on a short summary found on a forum, and Pips, who posted the material, has doubts about its veracity. Interesting

;)

1. The emergency use of the higher boost pressures up to 12 lbs./sq.in is now permitted for short periods by operation of the modified control cut-out.

12. The use, in an emergency, of this boost pressure is a definitive overload condition ...

Will the sim implement the bonus and the onus of such feature obligating pilots to use it wisely?

I am sure that the Spitfire was little better than 109 in some aspects. But they were very well matched. The luftwaffe failure was not by the spitfire superiority as a fighter or tactics. But for many reasons.

Of the total of the 109s lost how many were lost simply because they did not come home due lack of fuel and not by being shot down? I will not be surprise if something more than 20% or 30% were lost this way.

And note the dates: March 1940 and April 1940, respectively for the A.P.1590B
notes on the Merlin II & III and the Pilot's Notes.

And will sim pilots have to note the use of overboost in the engine's log book?

Air Commodore F. R. Banks, I Kept No Diary , Airlife Publications, Shrewsburg, 1978, Appendix II Fuel, pp 234-236

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ane/banks1.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ane/banks2.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ane/banks3.jpg

"With the coming of war, Banks entered the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve as a junior officer, being sent to work at the Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment (A&AEE) at Boscombe Down, and with his previous work attracting the attention of Lord Beaverbrook, Banks was accredited as a 'troubleshooter' and given special powers. After a while, Banks was promoted to Air Commodore and was made successively, 'Director General of Engine Production', and 'Director of Engine Research and Development'.

Nothing to do with this. My question is: Acctualy the pilots in the sim just fly with maximun power settings all the time and are not worried with engine safe. Even now with CEM the pilots could fly this way, the just have to maintain radiator and oil fully open.

I mean the developers could program some weathering variable as function of how the pilot use their aircraft. The value of this variable could affect the aircraft in the next sorties and the risk of a malfunction will be higher. This has minor use in normal servers but in online wars with limited aircraft like adw or il2.org.ru this would make sense. The server program can as example numerate the disposable aircraft between 1 to n and at each sortie the weathering ll actualize for each one. The next pilot who picks that ac have higher chance to have problems etc. The commander of each squad can select some of this acs to go maintenance (then they become indisponible fot use for some time etc) reducing the weather variable. Do You understand what i am saying?

Actually in adw if you broke your ac you ll not have another until the high command send more to you. And this could last much time. My suggestion is that the developers include some feature where in an online war each pilot ll fly the same plane for many sorties and how they use the ac in the actual sortie ll influence the ac behaviour in the next. Just this... Obviously some have easier maintenance and are more rough for bad field conditions. One advantages of the 109 was the less maintenance time and cheaper to fix.

Totally tongue in cheek, but I know what you mean...the limit for +12 Boost was set at 5 minutes: on a Spitfire the throttle lever was gated with a thin wire which the pilot pushed forward through to gain maximum boost; the boost cut-out control was mounted on the side of the throttle assembly. (see attachment 1: attachment 2; power curve for Merlin III courtesy http://www.spitfireperformance.com) As the Pilot's notes show the pilot had to report the use of +12 and a note was added to the engine's log book.

I think its worth remembering that consumption in May-July averaged 10,000 tons a month. So imports between 1 June and 31 August must have been approx 140,000 tons (stocks plus consumption) and consumption was about 21.5% of imports.

By the same token on the 11th July pretty much the peak of the fightng the UK had a stockpile of just under 3 years.

Pips and Kurfurst may believe this is a shortage, if it is, I wish my bank balance had this kind of shortage.

Looking at the weekly issues of 100 Octane. There seemed to be a lull in FC operations in the week prior to the invasion of France, and then the fuel issued jumps to 3,600 tons, starting May 23, as BEF and home-based fighter units, and Blenheim units were intensifying operations. Because these amounts of 100 Octane fuel was being issued it can be safely assumed that there was no drastic need to go back to 87 Octane fuel, as the Pips memo alleges. Naturally 87 Octane issues increased as all of the RAF Commands intensified their operations.

ie: Bomber Command
Coastal Command
Army Co-Operation Command

That's very interesting. Thank you Glider for taking the time to sort through the numbers and put them in perspective.

We still disputing the words for "selected units" to convert by counting fuel stockpiles??

:grin:

Hi Glider:

I greatly appreciate the efforts you've made and the documents you have shared regarding the Battle of Britain and 100 octane fuel. As for the other business, it may be advisable to keep in mind the insight and wisdom found in camber's post 448. I believe you've adequately addressed the alleged shortage in your post 475 above.

:rolleyes: No Eugene. I know you have difficulties at times but the counting of stockpiles is to show that there was no shortage of 100 fuel despite what Australia, Pips and Barbi say.

Chart below from: A.C. Lovely, Development of the Rolls-Royce Merlin from 1939 to 1945, Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace Technology, Volume 18 Issue 7, July, 1946 (pp. 218 - 226)
Or alternately here.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...esey-fig24.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ne/Lovesey.jpg

Exactally

So we have a 100 Octane denier here and there. To deny something against all the evidence is a human thing. It happens and we have to accept that. Someone who has committed a crime will often deny it, even though they know they are guilty. People even deny huge world events, despite the evidence, like the holocaust in WWII. I suppose that, sometimes, the denier might like the attention they can draw to themselves or they just have fun making mischief, or have a particular agenda. Anyway, I would like to leave the 100 Octane denier’s to one side for a moment, as they will not change their view even if taken back in a time machine. The point I would like to raise is why have the developers of CloD not included the Battle of Britain historically correct Spitfire and Hurricane to the 100 Octane modified specification? Was it a calculated decision and if so, why? Was it a genuine mistake? Was it just too hard to do? Do they intend not to provide a 100 Octane Hurricane in the BoM sequel so thought they would not bother with it in BoB? Does anyone have any thoughts on this? Perhaps if any developers are reading this they might care to respond? Is 100 Octane to be ignored? What a shame if it is ignored. I would not like to see aviation history and any other aircraft, red or blue, treated this way in a flight sim.

Tali,

with all my respect you might hve been too far inadvertantly.

Pls edit your post.

Absolutely beautifully written and brilliant post Talisman! Salute!

Yeah the same folks with the same "evidence" and agenda also used the same method of looking at stockpiles to "prove" 100/150 grade fuel was the "standard" fuel of the RAF.

All so that people's favorite WWII computer game-shape could be altered to give them an advantage. Nothing at all to do with serious historical research, just gamers wishing.

The truth and the history of 100/150 grade use turned out to be vastly different from what was presented despite the fact England did have significant stockpiles of the fuel in anticipation of widespread use that never occurred.

Nobody has denied that 100 grade was used during the BoB. The extent is what is in question. The only direct evidence from the RAF of the extent of usage we have states quite clearly "selected" units and "those units involved".

That is the simple facts. Everything else is speculation.

I don't know and unlike some do not pretend to know the answer. I just know what the RAF documentation says on its use.

I also know I use 100 grade fuel every time I fly and that is all that matters to me!! I certainly wish it was cheaper though.

Maybe you can find some stockpiles, somewhere? ;)

I cannot comment on the 100/150 debate, just what's happened in this thread:

Historical research rarely comes up with 100% proof that such and such an event happened, why such and such an event happened, or how events unfolded. It is generally accepted, for example, that the Roman legions of Varus were destroyed by Arminius' German forces in 9 AD, in the so-called Teutoburg Forest, because of far more fragmentary evidence than that provided here. The big mystery for nearly 2,000 years was where was the battle site? It wasn't until 1987 that archaeologists brought up evidence that the battle site was nowhere near the forest.

The weight of evidence provided in this thread is more than enough to show that 100 octane fuel was in use by more than Barbi's ""selected" units:

Those who believe that only a select group of units used 100 octane fuel have not come up with any evidence that 87 octane fuel was still being used in combat by front-line Fighter Command units during the B of B (Blenheim nightfighter units, which were still using Mk Is, were still using 87 Octane).

The main document which lies behind most of this, the "Pips memo" has not even been seen by the main protagonist, just a summary by Pips on another forum, yet Barbi pins 100% faith on this unseen document, the discussion of which is on a locked, membership only thread on another forum. Another member of this forum who now has access, says that Pip himself had doubts about its veracity. Such "evidence" is of questionable value.

Selective reading, faulty memory and faulty reading comprehension, as usual, on your part Eugene. It was not just the RAF that used the 150 fuel but the USAAF's 8th AF FC.

So tell me Eugene what happened to the 77,100 tons of 100 octane fuel that was issued in 1940 til the end of Oct? The ~50,000 tons consumed must have been burned in the pilots cars and motorcycles. :)

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...-100octane.jpg

Sure Eugene. Pilot's combat reports and unit diaries don't count. :rolleyes:

:rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes:

***********************

These names below were mentioned earlier in this thread.

In the AAW thread Pips also said:

Please take note of the " I believe".

I think I can add a little to the debate re the use of the words selected.

Kurfurst is correct in sayinig that I first posted this paper. What he hasn't done is show you all the papers in the stream which will at least give everyone the whole picture.

First some backgrouind. The conversion of FC to 100 Octane had started at the end of 1939 and was dependent on the supply of 100 octane being available at the fighter stations. However the process was that the current fuel 87 octane would be used up and replaced with 100 octane. As a result the stations and squadrons actual conversion would differ.

By February from combat records, station records we know that about 18 squadrons had converted.
At the 5th Meeting of the Oil Committee held on 24th February in item 9 of the summary of conclusions, the ACAS (Assistant to the Chief of the Air Staff) requested that Fighters and Blenheims should use 100 Octane fuel. Paper attached. Note there is no limitation or selection involved. It also recognised that this would involve the active transfer of fuel

At the 6th Meeting held on the 6th April 1940 the magic word Certain is used. (Do I wish they had used something else, you bet.). This comes up in the actions from the 5th Meeting prepared for the 6th meeting. Paper attached.
However in the Summary for the minutes of the 6th meeting it clearly states 'That the policy will be that in the very near future all aircraft in operational units will be running on 100 Octane Fuel but that there is no intention to turn this fuel over to training units.. Paper attached.

In the 7th Meeting of the Oil Committee held on 18th May in the Summary of Conclusions is states Satisfaction was expressed that the fact that the units concerned had now been stocked with the necessary 100 Octane Fuel paper attached.

It is my belief that when they say concerned they are referring to the operational units that had not in February already been converted to 100 octane and excluded the training units.

I should add that I have looked at most of the squadron record of units that formed after May 1940 and that I checked their records up to May 1941. In none of those records was there any mention of converting to 100 octane or CS props.

This has two impacts
1) As the papers state for the 7th meeting confirm that the units concerned had been stocked with 100 octane then it was the norm, that the units formed after May started with 100 Octane so why should they mention it.
2) If the role out had been halted as per pips and Kurfursts belief and restarted in September, then this would have shown in the squadron records.

I can only say that the case for the 100% use of 100 octane in the BOB is a strong one, not a perfect one. However there is no evidence to say that any unit went into combat in the BOB using 87 octane.

There will always be those that doubt but they cannot support their position apart from making the most of the chink of doubt left in peoples mind.

Its also worth repeating that I have been all through the Air Minestry files, the Oil Co ordination Committee file, the Chief of the Air Staffs papers both committee and private files and of course the War Cabinet file. None of these have any mention of a halting of the role out, of any shortage or any restart. If anyone believes that RAF squadrons went into combat using 87 octane then prove it.

Nothing in this thread has convinced me anything other than we do not have enough information.

As an example, Read what Shacklady and Morgan have to say about the 100 Octane fuel.

1. Strategic Fuel Reserve was to be 800,000 tons on hand before ANY aircraft flew using the fuel.

2. Sixteen fighter squadrons and two bomber squadrons were to begin using the fuel in September 1940.

If you look at the consumption figures, you will see it is not until September 1940 that 100 octane consumption begins to equal half of the total fuel consumption.

16 squadrons is just over 1/3 of Fighter Command and our multi engine bombers of course consume more fuel proportional to the number of engines.

You can really see the drop in consumption of 87 Octane after September, 1940. Which also begs to ask, who is using all the 87 octane during July and August of the BoB???

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showthr...=20110&page=23

Point is you can speculate until the cows come home. Without a document saying listing it as the specified fuel, this is all assumption.

I am out of this debate at this point. There is nothing intelligent to discuss about it until a fuel specification order or something saying all units are to use it is found. All that can be said as a fact is the RAF transitioned from 87 Octane to 100 Octane by early 1941. Have fun guys and enjoy what you do.

That's pretty much my take on things too.

I mean, it's pretty obvious 100 octane was used during the BoB, i just can't be sure, in the academically justified sense of the word, about the exact extent and timeframe of its use with the information we have in hand.

That's one of the reasons i would like to see both versions (87 and 100 octane) modeled in the sim.

Once again you are quoting from a March 1939 document which bears no relationship to what actually happened in 1940;

Multi engine bombers, apart from some Blenheims - which were using 87 octane as well as 100 octane fuel - were still using 87 octane, including Wellingtons, Whitleys and Hampdens. Did you notice that these bombers were engaged in intensive operations against targets in Germany, and against French shipping ports holding concentrations of landing barges etc? Then there is Coastal Command to consider.

What on earth do you mean by "If you look at the consumption figures, you will see it is not until September 1940 that 100 octane consumption begins to equal half of the total fuel consumption." Heavy bombers using 87 octane fuel? Do the maths.

Well, some of the pilots noted using 100 octane in thier cars, but 50,000 tons worth? I doubt it!

Tony Bartley DFC, Smoke Trails in the Sky, (Crecy Publishing Limited, Wilmslow, Cheshire, 1997), p. 35.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ley-100oct.jpg

Tim Vigors DFC, Life’s Too Short to Cry, (Grub Street, London, 2006), p. 137.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...-100octane.jpg

Using that approach the UK used 87 octane to the end of the war. Pity about the combat reports we have from 34 squadrons That is because permission for all combat comands to use 100 octane wasn't given until August 1940. So of course consumption would increase. The Bombers of Bomber Command and aircraft of Coastal command who were not allowed to use 100 Octane until August.
Paper attached re the authority for all combat commands to use 100 Octane in August attached.

You are the first person I have come across who calls official original documents held in the National Archives speculation.

Can we lock this thread ?

Nothing as come new and every pages is wallowed by huge images of the same "pieces of evidence".

I won't matter of this if only the insults were not part of the debate. Sadly it's not.

I guess that some hve blended an inch of 100 octane in their milk :evil:

By Month (Total 23 Hurricane and Spitfire squadrons for which I have found using 100 fuel before Aug 1940)

No. 32 Squadron pre BoB H
No. 92 (East India) Squadron pre BoB S
No. 111 Squadron pre BoB H
No. 151 Squadron Feb 1940 H
No. 602 (City of Glasgow) Squadron pre BoB S
No. 609 (West Riding) Squadron pre BoB S

No. 1 (Cawnpore) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 3 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 17 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 19 Squadron May 1940 S
No. 54 Squadron May 1940 S
No. 74 Squadron May 1940 S
No. 56 (Punjab) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 73 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 79 (Madras Presidency) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 85 Squadron May 1940 H
No. 87 (United Provinces) Squadron May 1940 H
No. 229 Squadron May 1940 H

No. 43 (China-British) Squadron June 1940 H
No. 41 Squadron June 1940 S
No. 610 (County of Chester) Squadron June 1940 S
No. 611 (West Lancashire) Squadron June 1940 S

No. 145 Squadron July 1940 H

Now what were you saying Eugene. :rolleyes:

Film of "The Daily Inspection of the Spitfire". Copies may be obtained from the Imperial War Museum (35 mm).

The aircraft being serviced is a 609 Squadron Spitfire I R6692 - first flight 3 June 40, 609 Sqdn 7 June 1940, Struck off charge Cat E 2 Sept 1940.
The aircraft is shown in a pre Battle of Britain white and black underside paint scheme. Note the 100 painted on the fuselage at the fuel tank location.
(Some Operations Record Books such as 602 Squadron's ORB noted a switch to all duck egg blue underside paint scheme in mid June.) 609 Squadron was stationed at Northholt during June of 1940 when the instructional film was shot.

Still taken from the film:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...-100oct-1b.jpg

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tyJiAdMD8AM

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nv2x6RQxFDo

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZUnun6QmVXk

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5__b34cEORE

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ObQ4aoRT50

Interesting how few papers, or little other evidence, has been presented by those who subscribe to the notion that the RAF purportedly refused to issue 100 octane fuel to about 2/3rds of its fighter units, while complaining that there is little evidence to the contrary presented by people who have actually spent hours physically searching the archives, and have posted the results ad nauseum.

Nor have these people explained how the RAF prevented none but "concerned" or "selected units", 16 squadrons, from using the fuel?

To KF, VIP et al:

Could you please explain in concise detail how the RAF selected the 16 squadrons, and how the RAF made sure that only 16 squadrons at a time used 100 Octane fuel, and could you provide documented evidence of the processes and logistics used by the RAF to ensure that only 16 squadrons at a time were allowed to use the fuel during the B of B?

Could you please provide some documented evidence that there was a shortage of 100 octane fuel during July, August, such that FC had to stop using the fuel?

Could you please provide documentary evidence of FC pilots (apart from Gladiators, NF Blenheims and Whirlwinds) using 87 octane fuel in combat between July and September 1940?

Pleeease???

There is a DVD including "The Daily Inspection of the Spitfire", and 3 other IWM Spitfire films: http://www.iwmshop.org.uk/product/15...ntline_Fighter