Wouldn't it be more relevant to ask in a less biased manner how many conversion were done before August 40 ? :confused::!:

You ask them. I'll ask what I want to know. Thanks.

Hopefully Holmes had more a Cartesian thinking ! ???!!!

I'm no Sherlock, that much is elementary my dear TCVIP.

Anyway, I've only made a brief enquiry at RR, just to see if they hold Service records for Merlins.

I didn't wanna start the whole thing with..'There's this argument on the internet... etc'

Just a brief message to say that I did try the NA this week. I didn't get what I wanted, the airfield records differ considerably, some go into some detail as to what was going on on the base, some stuck rigidly to the base and concerned themselves with transfers, promotions and visitors. Finally some had pages missing, Duxfords for instance had the pages for January to April missing. I was only able to look at six reports and gave up after that.

All I found were some more details re the import of fuel for the period June to August when approx 250 tankers arrived or were expected to arrive in the UK carrying petroleum products. It didn't split these into MT, 87 or 100 Octane totals.

I also found a memo dated dated Nov and its clear that the reserves were more than healthy. The Phrase 'We are very well ahead in our fuel reserve and shall not make an appreciable increase in the pesent stocks' is used. (note their English not mine).

I will have another go next week.

However the War Cabinet records are on line at the NA website if someone wants to support the view held by Pips that they discussed the lack of fuel in May and made the decisions he states, they are free to try. I did look a second time at the originals, but again didn't find anything apart from some weekly reports (from May monthly) but again they support the steady increase in stocks.

So much fuel arrived in June 1940 that storage capacity for MT fuel was brimmed out (their phrase).

Absolutely agree with the above. There's no doubt a significant number - how many, we do not know - Mark Is and IIs, and Hurricanes were running on 100 octane with the associated boost levels. There's a need for a Spitfire MK.I with CSP and CSP+100 as you say. Mission designers and server admins will then decide which will be used based on the evidence found on whether the home station was historically supplied with the fuel or not.
In contrast Glider's position is that the basic Spitfire MK.I with CSP should be not modelled at all, so that nobody would have choice to make up his mind wheater 100 octane was in universal use or not. Glider himself will have the right to make that decision instead of them and the developers.

I doubt it is about balance; after all, we have the Mark II which is already running on 100 octane and with a performance that is virtually identical to Mark Is with 100 octane. The problem is the FM has simulation-wide issues, and presently the 109E are not runing at historical performance levels. I do not think a 109F is needed for "balance", after all the basic 109E with 601A had very similiar performance as the 100 octane RAF birds, and we do not even have 601N powered Emils or similar 110 Ceasars.

Overall, however, I do not think this thread warrants more discussion on the subject, as the current evidence level is simply lacking. We will see if Glider or others can shed light on the issue based on hard evidence in the archives. Otherwise, its just neverending talk, talk, talk..

Can you give a link to these online sources, David?

I'm not David, but I think he means here

Thats correct. I believe the files that you want start CAB 65/7/1 and should be available to download. If you are stuck on anything let me know on the thread or via a PM.
Good Luck

Have you got any luck in the archives, David, you have been a bit silent for a month about the subject.

What have you found?

The only interesting thing that I picked up was that there was a serious shortage of 100 Octane Fuel, serious enough to start impacting operations in the period May to August 1944 (not 1940).
Emergency measures were taken such as switching RAF squadrons which had US radial engines to US 90 octane fuel and a temporary dip below the previously set strategic minimum reserve level. Once the invasion was firm and the pressure eased the situation returned to normal.

There was one file I was after which they couldn't find and another that I had high hopes of, that only had one sheet of paper in it. Its unlikely that I will get to visit again until October.

Kurfurst, How did you get on finding evidence of the May 1940 meetings that support Pips posting?

I did go to the NA today for a while to do some family history but did spent some time looking at a few of the squadron operational records. Once again I found that the details vary by squadron but can add two maybe three additional squadrons to the list of 100 Octane users.

No 111 squadron (based at Drem)
On the 15th February 1940 the squadron was released while the tanks were drained and replaced by 100 Octane.

No 32 Squadron (based Gravesend)
29th February 1940, 20 new type aircraft fitted with Metal Wings, new propellers and fuel were delivered during the month. 13 L type machines were flown away

No 213 Squadron
24th February new aircraft were delivered to the squadron.

As you can see, no 111 and 32 squadrons are pretty clear, but I have little doubt that no 213 squadron will be debated by some. My personal view is that if 32 squadron received new aircraft with all the improvements, its unlikely that 213 wouldn't less than a week earlier.

I did go to look up 232 squadron but they only formed in July 1940 when 100 Octane was the normal issue, so it wouldn't have been worth mentioning, i did look but there was no mention. I found it interesting that all the dates are in February.

Okay, how about some simple calculations?

Now, there is no doubt that 100 Octane fuel was available to Fighter Command before and during the Battle of Britain.

How Much? Woods and Dempster say 22,000 tons - which is too low.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/tec...b-16305-2.html

Mike Williams #26 scroll down to Table II Monthly Consumption of fuel & oil:

June - Aug 1940 = 10,000 tons consumed
Sept - = 14,000 tons consumed
Oct = 17,000 tons consumed

1 imperial gallon of 100 Octane = 7.1 pounds ("Oil" by D.J Peyton-Smith the official British war history on the oil and petroleum industry during WW2 page xvii "Note on Weights and Measures"):

1 ton of 100 octane = 2,240 lbs therefore 2,240 divided by 7.1 = 315.5 imp gal

Fuel Capacities:

Defiant I = 97 imp gal
Hurricane I = 90 imp gal
Spitfire I & II = 84 imp gal
TOTAL = 271 imp gal divide by 3 = average fighter fuel load = 90.3 imp gal (Defiant from memory, so feel free to correct me. Defiant II = 104 imp gal)

1 ton = 315.5 imp gal divided by 90.3 imp gal = 3.5 fuel loads (or sorties) per ton of 100 octane fuel. Assuming all aircraft emptied their tanks for each sortie, and assuming all aircraft shot down = 1 fuel load of 90.3 imp gal

NB: Not all aircraft returned with empty tanks and RAF policy was to refill each aircraft as soon as possible after landing, or each evening or early morning, to avoid vapour traps.

Blenheims were the only other aircraft known to have used 100 Octane fuel, albeit only in their outer wing fuel tanks, making things complicated for the poor pilots. (Warner, The Bristol Blenheim:A Complete History 2nd ed, page 100.)

Merlin III & XIIs could still use 87 octane fuel, hence training flights and other secondary flight duties, such as delivery, ferry flights, etc could use 87 octane fuel instead of 100.

June to August: 10,000 tons x 3.5 = 35,000 fuel loads
September: 14,000 tons x 3.5 = 49,000 fuel loads
October: 17,000 tons x 3.5 = 59,500 fuel loads

June to October = 41,000 tons x 3.5 = 143,500 fuel loads in 22 weeks = 6,523 fuel loads = 931.8 fuel loads per day

If Woods and Dempster 22,000 tons distributed (not consumed) between July and September = 77,000 fuel loads divided by 13 weeks = 5,923 fuel loads per week = 846 fuel loads daily.

The Battle of Britain by T.C.G. James shows 51,364 sorties, day & night from July 10 through Sept 30; some of the most intensive combat took place between these dates. Of course there were quiet periods when far fewer combat sorties were flown by Fighter Command; eg: August 16 & 17, between two days of intensive combat August 15 & 18.

51,364 divided by 13 weeks = 4,280 fuel loads = 611 fuel loads daily
average:

Hooton’s Eagle in Flames, Table 2, FC flew Sep 23-29: 4,825 defensive sorties Sep 30 – Oct 6: 1,782 defensive sorties, and yet consumption of 100 Octane was still increasing.

Been here before, unfortunately http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/avi...a-20108-7.html

really ?

20000 post of the same "piece of evidence" does not makes it a demonstrated fact. We are still waiting for some cross references.

One combat report that shows the use of +12 boost (which requires 100 octane) is enough to proof that 100 octane was available. Of course it doesn't proof that it is available to all units, that's why NZtyphoon did the calculation.

Here's one!

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/lane-26-5-40.jpg

;)

Hi NZtyphoon:

Please note that the 10,000 tons of 100 octane, shown in Table II - Consumption consumed for the period June - Aug 1940, is the monthly average of those 3 months, therefore for the period June - Aug 1940 30,000 tons were actually consumed.

IIRC no one contested this (availabe or not), only the quantity.
Interesting report. When he used the 12 lbs boost on deck, he was able to fly with only 300 mph...

Indeed. I don't think anybody has doubts that 100 octane was used in a number of FC's - and also BC's Squadrons., as a number of Blenheim Squadrons (3 or 4 I believe), were also issued with the fuel. Which is why NYTyphoons 'calculations' are flawed and be considered at best for their entertainment value, as he ignores all bombers with many times the consumption and requirement of a fighter squadron, as well as training, moving flights and engine manufacturer demands, which are are simply ignored.

But the evidence to somewhat sensational claim that 100 octane was the only fuel issued is still sorely lacking and is directly contradicted by a number of primary and secondary sources. As another poster said, its a bit boring to see the same piece of non-evidence posted the 20000th time, it only seems to reinforce the sense that some people are perhaps a bit fanatical about enforcing their views on the others.

The trend shown in the consumption of 87 octane and 100 octane fuel is, however intererting. It is clear that about 2/3s of the fuel consumed during the Battle was 87 octane (by all Commands) and 1/3 consumed was 100 octane (by Fighter and Bomber Commands).

Checking the trend lines of operational (combat) Fighter sorties and 87 octane consumption during the Battle is interesting. When Fighter Command flew a lot of sorties, 87 octane issues also increased, when Fighter Command flew less of sorties, 87 octane demands decreased, with some delay of course. I think the conclusion is quite obvious.

Another interesting trend is that 87 octane issues suddenly plummeted during early october, while 100 octane issues increased. This is in line with Pips summary of the Australian paper, which notes that Fighter Command only switched completely over to 100 octane in the late automn 1940.

Its also completely in line with what an unquestionably reputable secondary source, Morgan nad Shacklady's ultimate Spitfire book, 'Spitfire: The History' notes about the initial uncertainity of 100 octane shipments (as all 100 octane had to be imported from overseas).

It also refers to the fact that RAF was intending to initially equip 16 fighter Squadrons and 2 bomber Squadrons with 100 octane, which is again underlined by the memo of the Fuel Commitee's meeting, noting that the selected fighter Squadrons and Blenheim Squadrons have been converted, the memo of which was summarized in a 'doctored' textus on Mike William's site to further the site's agenda.

Also of interest that the RAF wished to build up a reserve of 800 000 tons for precaution, which couldn't be met in 1940.

What exactly would make you happy Kurfurst?

A 100° British lager ?:rolleyes:

How about even a decision or plan after the spring of 1940 (when this paper states that select squadrons are to be issued with 100 octane, so we can know for quite certain that at this point, it was meant for some and not all) that all Fighter Squadrons are to switch over to 100 octane? Even a plan, a draft..? Apparently, people who have been quite desperate to find such evidence for years could find none, even though I am quite sure they looked under every rock and grow rather frustrated in the process.

I am quite certain that if the British took such pain to note and discuss at such high levels that some Squadrons will use 100 octane from - was it March? - there should be ample discussion and record about extending the avgas issues to other Squadrons.

The lack of such evidence makes it quite likely that such sudden, overnight changeover simply didn't happen until after the Battle.

The suggestion is worthwhile for further consideration.. and an experimenting with.

LOL, this mysterious paper that only one person has ever seen. :rolleyes:

So tell me Barbi, which fighter squadrons that were based on airfields on the CloD map were only using 87 octane fuel.

Well I guess http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...8&postcount=43 already covered that question.

"Based on the current evidence (feel free to add new sources showing 100 octane at the said airfield during the Battle and I'll update the list) shows that 100 octane aviation spirit was supplied to

8 out of 19 Sector Airfields
9 out of 32 Fighter Airfields (however 7 of the 32 functioning as satellite airfield for rotation etc., with no Sqn permanently based there)."

Which follows that appearantly 11 Sector Airfields and 23 Fighter airfields show no evidence at all that they have been supplied by anything else but the standard 87 octane. Of course even in the rest of the airfields its rather difficult to find out from what time is there any evidence to 100 octane fuel supply - for some airfields we have for example combat reports from October 1940, and they may or may not have been supplied with 100 octane earlier.

In 11 Group, 87 octane airfields apparently include, at the current level of evidence

RAF Debden.

RAF Debden was home to the Debden Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 85 Squadron from 22 May 1940
No 17 Squadron from 19 June 1940
No 257 Squadron from 15 August 1940
No 601 Squadron from 19 August 1940
No 111 Squadron from 19 August 1940
No 17 Squadron from 2 September 1940
No 25 Squadron from 8 October 1940

RAF Detling.

Detling was one of the 11 Group satellite airfields used by units on a day-to-day basis as required, often flights or squadrons would detach to such an airfield in the morning and return to their main operating and maintenance base in the evening.

RAF Eastchurch.

RAF Eastchurch was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 266 Squadron from 12 August 1940

RAF Ford.

RAF Ford was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 23 Squadron from 12 September 1940

RAF Gosport.

Gosport was, along with Lee-on-Solent, one of the Royal Navy's airfields used in the defence of Southampton and Portsmouth. Royal Navy fighters were permanently based there, and occasionally RAF units were detached, using the airfield in the same way as a satellite or relief landing ground.

RAF Hendon.

RAF Hendon was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 257 Squadron from 17 May 1940
No 504 Squadron from 5 September 1940

RAF Lee on Solent.

Lee on Solent was, along with Gosport, one of the Royal Navy's airfields used in the defence of Southampton and Portsmouth. Royal Navy fighters were permanently based there, and occasionally RAF units were detached, using the airfield in the same way as a satellite or relief landing ground.

RAF Lympne.

Lympne was one of the 11 Group satellite airfields used by units on a day-to-day basis as required, often flights or squadrons would detach to such an airfield in the morning and return to their main operating and maintenance base in the evening. Due to the extreme forward position of this site it was under constant threat of attack and was not permanently manned during the Battle by any one Squadron.

RAF Manston.

RAF Manston was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 604 Squadron from 15 May 1940
No 600 Squadron from 20 June 1940

RAF Martlesham.

RAF Martlesham was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 25 Squadron from 19 June 1940
No 257 Squadron from 5 September 1940
No 17 Squadron from 8 October 1940

RAF Stapleford.

RAF Stapleford was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 151 Squadron from 29 August 1940
No 46 Squadron from 1 September 1940

RAF Thorney Island.

RAF Thorney Island was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 236 Squadron from 4 July 1940


RAF West Malling.

RAF West Malling was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 141 Squadron from 12 July 1940
No 66 Squadron from 30 October 1940


In 10 Group, 87 octane airfields apparently include, at the current level of evidence>

RAF Filton.

RAF Filton was home to the Filton Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 504 Squadron from 26 September 1940


RAF Boscombe Down.

RAF Boscombe Down was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 249 Squadron from 14 August 1940
No 56 Squadron from 1 September 1940

RAF Colerne.

RAF Colerne was used as a satellite and relief airfield for Middle Wallop during the Battle, units rotated in and out of the station on a daily basis.

RAF Exeter.

RAF Exeter was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 213 Squadron from 18 June 1940
No 87 Squadron from 5 July 1940
No 601 Squadron from 7 September 1940

RAF Pembrey.

RAF Pembrey was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 92 Squadron from 18 June 1940
No 79 Squadron from 8 September 1940

RAF Roborough.

RAF Roborough was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 247 Squadron from 1 August 1940

RAF St Eval.

RAF St Eval was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 222 Squadron from 18 June 1940
No 236 Squadron from 8 August 1940
No 238 Squadron from 14 August 1940
No 222 Squadron from 11 September 1940

I see you didn't update.

11 Group

RAF Detling
No. 85 Squadron May 1940

RAF Ford
23 Squadron flew the Bristol Blenheim which you yourself said used 100 octane fuel

RAF Manston
600 (City of London) Squadron - Bristol Blenheim and Bristol Beaufighter
604 (County of Middlesex) Squadron - Bristol Blenheim and Bristol Beaufighter

RAF Martlesham
25 Squadron - Bristol Blenheim and Bristol Beaufighter
17 Squadron May 1940

RAF Stapleford
56 (Punjab) Squadron May 1940

RAF Thorney Island
236 Squadron - Bristol Blenheim

RAF West Malling
66 Squadron 6 Sept 1940

12 and 13 Groups are irrelevant.

10 Group

RAF Boscombe Down
249 (Gold Coast) Squadron 6 Sept 1940
56 (Punjab) Squadron May 1940

RAF Exeter (not on the CloD map)
87 (United Provinces) Squadron May 1940

RAF Pembrey (not on the CloD map)
92 (East India) Squadron pre BoB
79 (Madras Presidency) Squadron May 1940

RAF St Eval (not on the CloD map)
236 Squadron - Bristol Blenheim

No Kurfurst. You are not even an honest man. What would make you happy is if everyone agreed with your rhetoric wholeheartedly, that 100 octane was never used. This way you could be a bigger ace online.
Over time you have been forced into changing that view to admit it was used by at least some, but that is a battle lost as part of a wider war.

Let me put this other prosecutive angle on your theory for you (I made up a new word). You believe in the 109, you see it as superior and dislike the thought that it was matched, or worse, bettered. So you seek to discredit your foe as much as you can and display an enormous bias to the impartial viewer. Let us say that you are wholly correct and the 109 was as superior as you make out - in that case can you explain how the Luftwaffe was so decisively beaten? I can draw a conclusion given the superiority of the 109 in your world that the Luftwaffe pilots must've been rubbish. It can't be tactics, the RAF were hugely outnumbered and only had 300 Spitfires out of the 900 fighters, and the tactics only changed when Goering started to panic.

So what is your agenda? Are you just a bad virtual pilot or something?

RAF Manston certainly had 100 octane fuel on 29th July 1940.

41 Squadron took off from Manston of on this day and one of it's pilots used 12 boost during this sortie.

http://www.oldrafrecords.com/records/424/4240182.gif
http://www.oldrafrecords.com/records/424/4240191.gif
http://www.oldrafrecords.com/records/424/4240192.gif

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/Webster-29july40.jpg

Note what I said:
NB: Not all aircraft returned with empty tanks and RAF policy was to refill each aircraft as soon as possible after landing, or each evening or early morning, to avoid vapour traps.

Blenheims were the only other aircraft known to have used 100 Octane fuel, albeit only in their outer wing fuel tanks, making things complicated for the poor pilots. (Warner, The Bristol Blenheim:A Complete History 2nd ed, page 100.)

Merlin III & XIIs could still use 87 octane fuel, hence training flights and other secondary flight duties, such as delivery, ferry flights, etc could use 87 octane fuel instead of 100.

Other aircraft known to have been using 100 Octane fuel were a small number of Beaufighters and PR Spitfires.

Westland Whirlwinds still used, and continued to use 87 Octane right through their operational lives.

Nor did I say anywhere only 100 Octane fuel was issued. And where are KF's primary and secondary sources? The main primary sources "presented" by KF are a mysterious Australian/Beaverbrook paper which no-one apart from KF and "Pip" can find (The Australian National Archives themselves cannot find it), and some pre-war planning papers.

All KF is saying is that large numbers of aircraft in other commands were using 87 Octane. Big deal.

Yup, there were things like training flights, delivery flights, ferry flights and other second-line duties which naturally increased at times when the frontline units were operating more intensively.

Meaning FC switched to 100 Octane fuel for secondary as well as frontline duties? Seeing as no-one else apart from KF and "Pip" has seen this paper, and it is missing from the Australian National Archives I guess we have to take his word for it...:-|

Convoys started operating in September 1939; the most important were the HX convoys which sailed from Halifax to (mainly) Liverpool. The first - HX.1 - sailed on 16 September 1939. Referring to http://www.convoyweb.org.uk/hague/index.html
The HX convoys incorporated cargo ships, some of which carried aviation fuel, and tankers: many of the latter had sailed from refineries in the West Indies and America. The BHX series sailed from Bermuda, starting in May 1940 (BHX.41), and joined the main HX convoys in Halifax. Some of the tankers from the HX convoys diverted to French ports, enough to supply the RAF fighters in France.

From the HX series of convoys alone (HX 11, 13, 31, 33-35, 40, 43, 49, 55, 57-59, 64-68, 70, 73, 76) 44 tankers carrying AVGAS arrived in British or French ports; one tanker was destroyed by a mine in the Bristol channel. This contradicts the assertion in Shacklady and Morgan that ...large numbers of tankers were sunk by German submarines...

Another reputable secondary source is "Oil" by Payton-Smith which, as noted, is the official war history. He notes that "...in the summer of 1940 there was a surplus of these ships (tankers) because of the incorporation into the British merchant marine of tanker fleets from countries over-run by Germany." pp. 128–130.

This memo was a planning paper from 16 March 1939 , based on a pre-war assumption that US supplies would be denied to Britain in wartime, limiting the numbers of front-line units able to use the fuel.

In "Oil" (Official Second WW history) Payton-Smith said:

"By 1939...The prospects of securing sufficient supplies of 100-octane fuel in addition to the 87-octane petrol required for non-operational flying looked doubtful...(he goes on to state on page 57)...It was true that by 1939 it seemed increasingly unlikely that American supplies would be withheld. But to have accepted anything less than absolute certainty, to have depended on the goodwill of foreign suppliers to meet the essential needs of the Royal Air Force, would have been a radical break with traditions that had governed British oil policy since long before the First World War."

Meaning that the pre-war planning papers quoted by KF were being conservative in their estimates, as per a long held tradition.
Payton-Smith went on to say:

"...this problem (supply of 100 Octane aviation fuel) disappeared; production of the new fuel in the US, and in other parts of the world, increased more quickly than expected with the adoption of new refining techniques." pp. 259-260

Interesting how KF resorts to pre-war planning documents to say what happened up to 16 months later, during the Battle of Britain, yet cannot provide primary documentation to prove that the situations discussed up to two years earlier actually eventuated in 1940. And his assertions about "doctored" documents when his own documentation is so shoddy and questionable?

Proving nothing really, except that in wartime pre-war plans can change. There was still more than enough 100 Octane fuel consumed by FC, and some Blenheims during the Battle to allow all operational sorties to be flown on this fuel alone.

Interesting to note that Merlin engines using 100 Octane fuel were being built in 1938, as well as C.P propellers

http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchi...0-%203453.html

Hi NZtyphoon:

One small correction if I may regarding the Westland Whirlwind:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...-whirlwind.jpg

:)

Just for fun whilst on the subject - from Flight, March 28, 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o..._1940pg293.jpg

From IWM: 19 Squadron, Fowlmere, Sept. 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...01357-1200.jpg

:)

In Victor Bingham "Whirlwind: The Westland Whirlwind Fighter (Airlife Publishing, 1987) he wrote that in April 1940 the Director of Design/Research and Development in the Air Ministry, W Farren, commented that it was wrong that one of the latest types of fighter aircraft (the Whirlwind and its Peregrines) was only rated to use 87 Octane fuel instead of 100. (p.36)

The photo is of a 137 Sqn "Whirlybomber" from at least mid-to late 1942, so is it possible that the R-R Peregrine was rated to use 100 Octane by then?

From another forum:

Reserves Information
The following information are the reserve stocks of 100 Octane fuel during the BOB period
This information has come from the War Cabinet Oil Position Monthly report (a) that is available from the National Archives, as well as Gavin Baileys paper(b) and Wood and Dempster(c).

Stocks of 100 Octane
30th September 1939 153,000 tons(b)
27th February 1940 220,000 tons(b)
31st May 1940 294,000 tons(a)
11th July 1940 343,000 tons(b)
31st August 1940 404,000 tons(a)
10th October 1940 424,000 tons(c)
30th November 1940 440,000 tons(a)

Oh found this: from http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchi...0-%202155.html "It fell to the
Shell Development Company in California to produce for the first time a commercially manufactured 100-octane gasoline
in 1935. It was 50/50 straight-run material with synthetic blending agents, plus 4.8 c.c. tetra-ethyl-lead per Imperial
gallon."

Thanks for the info from Bingham's book. I don't know much about the Whirlwind, so I'm going to see if I can find a used copy. I appreciate the tip. I too figured the photo of the Whirlwind and bowser to be a 137 Squadron Whirlwind; probably taken around September-October of 1942. Don't know where though, maybe Manston? It's pretty clear they were cleared for 100 octane by the time the photo was taken though ;)

I have Warner's Blenheim book and in reviewing the bit about 100 octane in the outer wing tanks he wrote:

"To take full advantage of 100 octane petrol the supercharger pressure could be increased from the normal 'Plus 5 lb/sq.in. boost' by the operation of an 'Emergency Boost Override' lever on the instrument panel. This overrode the Automatic Boost Control to allow 'Plus 9 lb' pressure, and was used for take-off and in emergencies only, for a maximum of 5 minutes."

Interesting - and not unlike the Hurricane and Spitfire use of the boost cut-out enabling +12 lbs, although rather more complicated in practice apparently.

19 Squadron, Fowlmere, Sept. 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...01357-1200.jpg

Nuff said imho

I did some research on this when i was active on my pet project, "getting off the ground in a Blenheim in CoD" :grin:

After reading through a copy of the pilot's operating handbook i found online, that's what i could gather:

1) Extra tanks were installed in the wings for more range.

2) This made the aircraft too heavy to safely take-off with bombs loaded.

3) Higher boost was needed.

4) Only the outer tanks got 100 octane fuel to assist in take-off, enabling use of +9 psi boost.

This can be easily gleaned from reading the checklists. It was not as much of a WEP setting, as it was simply a "take off when overloaded" power setting.

There were also other kinds of weirdness involved because only one pair of tanks had the ability to jettison fuel, the default inner tanks.

This meant that the potential for WEP was completely wasted: crews were instructed to cruise to the target on the outer 100-octance tanks and drain them completely before switching to the inner ones, since the outer ones couldn't be drained by jettisoning fuel in an emergency.
As such, the 100 octane fuel was effectively used during the probably safest part of the journey at cruise settings (or at least when some element of surprise still existed, during the inbound leg), not during the return from the target for escaping flak and fighters when it would mostly be needed.

Historical loadouts for short range missions were what we use when we fly it in multiplayer on the CoD map: just 55%-60% of fuel (that is the threshold between inner and outer tanks), with the engines limited at +5 psi boost.

details of plane in picture from http://www.spitfires.ukf.net/p004.htm

P7420 IIa CBAF MXII 6MU 16-9-40 19S 26-9-40 flew into tree nr Boxford Sussex Sgt Roden killed 15-11-40 SOC 23-11-40 FH44.40

http://www.amazon.com/Whirlwind-West.../dp/1853100048 ?
The photo is part of a whole sequence of 137 Sqn photos taken at Manston in 1943; the last Whirlwind ops for 137 occurred on 21 June 1943, when 137 stood down to re-equip with Typhoons.The remaining Whirlwinds were transferred to 263 Sqn which had its last op in December before re-equipping with Typhoons.

Hi NZtyphoon,

Thanks for the info on the book and the photograph. I’ll get the book. That sure is a nice photo! ;) Unfortunately, I forget where I got it.

Following on the discussion about consumption and the use of 100 octane in the Blenheim, it shouldn’t be overlooked that the Defiant also used 100 octane and +12 boost. See the
Combat Report of T. D. Welsh of 264 Squadron from 29 May 1940 where he recorded "I pulled the boost cut out…" for example.

A.&A.E.E. reported on trials of the Defiant operating +12 boost.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...vel-speeds.jpg

And last but not least see Dowding’s memo from 1st August, 1940, with copies to all Stations and Squadrons, regarding Handling of Merlin in Hurricane, Spitfire and Defiant Aircraft wherein he mentions "The use of the automatic boost cut out control enables the pilot to get an emergency boost of + 12 lbs. per sq.in. from the engine for 5 minutes when circumstances demand it. Some pilots "pull the plug" with little excuse on every occasion."

Small alteration. KF has never found or when I last heard, even looked for this paper. The reason he gave for not looking was that he doesn't live in Australia and he was too busy.

Posting 92 in attached thread
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/avi...a-20108-7.html

PS Its worth noting that the key to this Pips was a decision made by the War Cabinet to stop roll out of 100 octane. Earlier in this thread I did give KF the file nos for the War Cabinet minutes to look at on line, so he could confirm the Pips theory. I would be interested to see if he has done this easy, available and free basic check and let us know what it said.

And another: Glider never looked for the paper, he sent an email to the Archieve's staff without giving any reference. The Archive did not reply that they don't have it, they have replied that without Glider giving them a correct reference, they cannot find it. A world of difference I guess, just to straight out the spin our friend NZTyphoon is putting on it. ;)

I have checked as much as I could, there are however gazillion pages of several cabinets, as what you (and Pips) call "War Cabinet minutes" are actually covering a broad range of aspects, and apparently the work was split between several committees for fuel, ammunition, air, production and similar.

Now, as far as the documentary evidence goes, the only relevant paper you've produced so far is the May 19th meeting's summary, and that says some fighter and some Blenheim Squadrons, which is what it reads. As we all know this is the paper that has been doctored on the Mike Williams site to have the meaning 'all'.

If that decision was not overruled by later ones, then it was some fighter and some Blenheim Squadrons it is. There is no evidence of it (yet?) that it was overruled.

You were certainly unable to show any such decision, though I recall that you have claimed Committee on 29th June or 10th August supposedly overruled this. I have asked many times to supply these papers instead of giving your view of them, but you always evade that for some reason.

And for some reason you are refusing to post files referring to the meeting after May 1940, which is what the Beaverbrook paper covers, namely, that any further expansion was halted and frozen.

Simply to put, you can argue until you are blue in the face about if the Beaverbook paper can be found again or not (I think though I may have a single page from it, as the context seems very similiar, which was posted many many years ago on Ring's site).

But its all irrelevant since the only British decision presented says some fighter and some Blenheim Squadrons, and it takes an amazing level of spin - or as some solved the question, doctoring - making 'some' to mean 'all'.

This seems mighty unlikely during the 1940 timeframe given that it seems the two (or three) Blenheim Stations identified earlier were only supposed to be supplied with 100 octane. If there is no 87 octane in the Station just 100 octane, how they are supposed to tank up from both? This may have been true earlier, but certainly not in these Stations concerned.

As well as operational Squadrons on combat missions of course.

Source?

Grand, then we agree that Fighter Command used both 87 and 100 octane fuel for its operational fighters.

I think you do disservice to your already marginal credibility by pretending things anyone can check by reading the thread.

I am afraid I have posted the 87 and 100 octane fuel consumption during the Battle, which is a primary source, the May 18 decision that explicitly says that 100 octane is not issued to all Fighter Squadrons, as well as the earlier decision in agreement that the plans were for 16 fighter and 2 bomber Squadrons, by September 1940. Of course the sour in your mouth about the other pre-war papers is that they note that British 100 octane fuel programme was fueled by fear that the Germans could much more easily produce great quantities via their synthetic process.

And yes I have also made reference to the paper Pips found, and yes you are lying when you say that "the Australian National Archives themselves cannot find it", and not for the first time.

All KF is saying is that large numbers of aircraft in other commands were using 87 Octane. Big deal.[/QUOTE]

You seem to have reading comprehension problems when you believe that when I write ALL commands I meant OTHER commands. But I agree, its not a big deal, everyone else but you seemed to get it.

'Naturally'. Really? Whenever the RAF was battling the Luftwaffe in a frenzy, it automatically meant that suddenly bomber command flew more sorties, training units flew 10 times as much, and coastal command was flying more sorties too?

Or did Spitfires after landing at a fighter base quickly drain their tanks of 100 octane, refill with 87 octane to fly training flights, move between airfields, and then drained the tanks of 87 octane and refilled again with 100 octane?

If this happened, they surely made a big fuss in 1940 just to support some silly-ass speculation of a Spitfire-fan in 2012 didn't they. :D

Or we should take the word of you, who has just lied that its 'missing' from the ANArchives...

[QUOTE][QUOTE]Originally Posted by Kurfürst
Its also completely in line with what an unquestionably reputable secondary source, Morgan nad Shacklady's ultimate Spitfire book, 'Spitfire: The History' notes about the initial uncertainity of 100 octane shipments (as all 100 octane had to be imported from overseas).No, its just your spin on it.

Morgan nad Shacklady writes of concerning tanker losses, while you write of tanker losses in convoys (obviously a lot of them weren't travelling in one), and then further limited your 'research' to the HX convoys (obviously again not all tankers went through HX convoys), and then even further limited to scope to 'tankers carrying AVGAS' (obviously again a tanker capacity lost is a tanker lost - if it also carried some kind of fuel it was even worse, but a tanker sunk with ballast en route to America was just as painful for shipping space as a tanker lost inbound to Britain).

This is how tanker losses suddenly became 'tanker losses carrying avgas while travelling in convoys in the HX series convoys'. Its a classic straw-man argument.

Now, anyone who searches back in this thread will find the actual figures for British / Allied tanker losses in the period, they were quite serious indeed, iirc several hundred thousends of GRT worth. Mines, torpedo planes and bombers, uboots all took their toll. I don't bother to post them again.

I believe Morgan and Shacklady are quite aware of Payton-Smith's book.

What seems to be at odds is Payton-Smith and Morgan-Shacklady, but your humble - and rather untrustworthy - interpretation and quoting of Payton-Smith vs. Payton-Smith's interpretation by rather distinguished British aviation historians.

I agree. So is there ANY documented evidence that it was amended? Anything at all?

Can you explain to me how Payton-Smith speaks one thing on page 59. - about the 1939 situation, when the British evidently seeked 'absolute certainity 'went on to say' on page 259-260

To me it seems you are cherry picking quotes out of the context and putting them together from two hundred page apart.

For example, what is the context "...this problem (supply of 100 Octane aviation fuel) disappeared on pg. 259? Does the second quote it even remotely related to 1939-1940, or you just frankensteined them together?

No, actually evidence was provided that the 1939 papers speak of partially converting Fighter and Bomber Command to 100 octane, and all the 1940 papers supplied so far also speak of partially converting Fighter and Bomber Command to 100 octane.

The March 1939 papers speak of 16 fighter and 2 bomber squadrons, the May 1940 papers speak of the fighter and bomber squadrons 'concerned'.

Not a single paper could be found or supplied that would say that or hint that all of Fighter Command is to be converted to 100 octane fuel.

Its quite clear to any reasonable man.

Of course pre-war plans can change. But did they?

Yes, though I would not necessarily equate 'quoting figures on the Rolls-Royce stand for the Merlin R.M. 2M rated on 100 octane fuel' to 'being built'. While Rolls-Royce was quoting figures, DB 601 powered Heinkels and Bfs using 100 octane were setting records anyway. :p

A couple of points:-
1) In normal debate the person who is relying on a paper is expected to produce thier evidence
2) Clearly Kurfurst hasn't tried looking for the paper
3) Also he hasn't looked up the War Cabinet Minutes which are available and would support his case. I should add that I have looked at these both on line and in the original paper copies and no decision of this was made and it was not even discussed by the War Cabinet. If Pips said that the War Cabinet made the decision then they would have made the decision. You would not exepect the War Cabinet to do the research but they did make decisions or were informed of decisions, and 100 Octane was never mentioned.
4 ) as for his assertion that I didn't ask the following is the reply I received from the Australian War Records, which gives a reference for the question I raised.

Australian War Memorial Research Centre
ReQuest

Response to your question with Question #: RCIS20344


Your question is:
I am trying to find a copy of the following Document which I have been told is held in your archives.

Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And Its Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War

The first question is of course do you have a copy of this document and secondly if you do what is the process to try and obtain a copy.
Our response is:
Dear David,

Thank you for your enquiry to the Research Centre of the Australian War Memorial.

I have searched our books database (which includes journals), RecordSearch (which is the National Archives of Australia's search engine for our Official Records) and our general search field in the hope that your text may be picked up as a reference in an online article without success.

Do you have any more information about the record? Is it a journal article or a monograph? If you can think of any other identifying markers, please email our Publishing and Digitised team at pub&dig@awm.gov.au A curator will search again for you.

I'm sorry I couldn't help you.

Kind regards,
I

Kurfurst is aware of this and I invite him to add anything he knows to help track this paper down.

PS Kurfurst, I believe you owe NZ an apology for saying he was lying about the Australian Archives not having the paper

There is no Beaverbrook paper. After May the subject of roll out of 100 Octane was never mentioned again by the oil committee until May 1944 when the RAF had supply difficulties due to the volume being used in the preparation of the Invasion. I have been through the entire file and its a big one.

I should add that I have never said that 29th June or the 10th August made any decisons overuling anything. Tell me where I did and I will apologise and go into the records and copy the papers.

http://www.wlb-stuttgart.de/seekrieg/konvois/hx-39.htm

Ships lost in 1939 and 1940 for SC and HX convoys > 85

HX convoys originated from Halifax (9-knot convoys for ships of sustained speeds less than 15 knots)
SC convoys originated from Sydney NS (7-knot convoys of eastbound ships too slow for the 9-knot HX convoys)

HX
Year: Convoys / Ships / Lost
1939: 22 / 431 / 1 (0.232%)
1940: 91 / 3424 / 54 (1.577%)

SC
Year: Convoys / Ships / Lost
1939: * / * / *
1940: 16 / 508 / 30 (5.905%)

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)

Date: patrols/lost/aborts

Aug39 19/2
Sep39 3/0
Oct39 13/3
Nov39 10/1/1
Dec39 5/1/1

Total 1939: 50/7/2 (an average of 10 patrols per month and 14% lost)

Date: patrols/lost/aborts

Jan40 8/2
Feb40 10/3
Mar40 10/2
Apr40 19/3
May40 8/0/2
Jun40 18/3/1
Jul40 4/0
Aug40 16/2/1
Sep40 12/0
Oct40 13/2
Nov40 14/1
Dec40 6/0

Total 1940: 138/18/3 (an average of 11.5 patrols per month and 13% lost)

The only one putting a spin on anything NZTyphoon is Barbi.:)

Because clearly Blenheim stations were supplied with both grades. Source Warner The Bristol Blenheim: A Complete History (2nd ed) - as definitive a book on the Blenheim as Morgan and Shacklady is on the Spitfire.

P.100 "But the introduction of 100 octane fuel caused further problems for Blenheim pilots...Blenheims were adapted to carry it only in the outer tanks, with 87 octane in the inner tanks.

P.136 (September 1939) "Further difficulties and complications arose as working parties in the hangers of several squadrons were still involved in a hectic programme of bringing up to specification those aircraft that had not been modified to full Mk IV standard, by installing the new outer fuel tanks for 100 octane petrol, plumbing the jettison systems, changing the engines to Mercury XVs....the modifications were all completed by 7 October."

Nope, I have checked through all of this thread and nowhere has Barbi, or anyone else, posted figures on tanker losses until AL Schlagater's posting at 8:41 am today. Barbi makes mention of the mysterious "Pip's" paper with some vague stuff about increasing tanker losses, but no other evidence to support his claims...

No "actual figures" and no evidence that there was "no tanker running in with 100 octane until August"

If they are, it isn't listed in their bibliography, nor do M & S refer to it in the text, so how can Barbi make such a leap?


The book is not entirely about aviation fuel - it deals with all aspects of oil supplies to wartime Britain. The first chapter on Aviation fuel dealt with the pre-war situation when Britain had to plan for the possibility that America would bar fuel supplies to combatant nations.

""By 1939...The prospects of securing sufficient supplies of 100-octane fuel in addition to the 87-octane petrol required for non-operational flying looked doubtful...(he goes on to state on page 57)...It was true that by 1939 it seemed increasingly unlikely that American supplies would be withheld. But to have accepted anything less than absolute certainty, to have depended on the goodwill of foreign suppliers to meet the essential needs of the Royal Air Force, would have been a radical break with traditions that had governed British oil policy since long before the First World War."

Meaning that the pre-war planning papers quoted by KF were being conservative in their estimates, as per a long held tradition."

After this chapter came several others on other issues - civilian oil supplies, shipping etc. Then came another chapter on Aviation fuel which deals with the situation from the declaration of war through to 1942, in which P-S notes that late in 1939...

"...this problem (supply of 100 Octane aviation fuel) disappeared; production of the new fuel in the US, and in other parts of the world, increased more quickly than expected with the adoption of new refining techniques." pp. 259-260

Re the statement
The Germans were sinking British tankers at an increasing rate, and all 100 octane fuel was coming in those tankers....but this was increasingly uncertain as Uboot took their toll on the tankers, and, during May and June, until the French capitulation, with 25% of their fighters and some of their bombers running on 100 octane the British consumed 12 000 tons of 100 octane and 42 000 tons of other (87) grades, or 54 000 ton of avgas at total - and there was no tanker running in with 100 octane until August 1940.

If there weren't any tankers coming in can someone explain how the reserves went up, in particular the 49,000 tons in the six weeks between 31st May and 11th July .
I think we can rule out air freight or submarine cargo

Stocks of 100 Octane
30th September 1939 153,000 tons(b)
27th February 1940 220,000 tons(b)
31st May 1940 294,000 tons(a)
11th July 1940 343,000 tons(b)
31st August 1940 404,000 tons(a)
10th October 1940 424,000 tons(c)
30th November 1940 440,000 tons(a)

PS remember these are reserves total inports would have to cover usage as well

Because they not used it with the Spits! :grin:
(sorry, i can't resist ;) )

Like it, it was an open goal

Damn Brits, all that 100 octane coming in, so they just hoard it like squirrels...:rolleyes:

Tankers
 

Well let's see now the reality.

Tanker losses to all causes, I have gathered a total of 78(!!) tankers were sunk by mine, U-boot (typically), aircraft and raiders, between September 1939 and November 1940. About 90% of them were British, though there are a couple of Swedish, Dutch, French etc. tankers

I have them by name, date, cause of loss, route, cargo, tonnage and so on. For example indeed one tanker that went through Halifax, Inverdagle (9456 tons) was sunk by mines laid by the submarine U 34, with 12 500 tons of avgas - about a month worth consumption of 100 octane, though I am not sure what grade it actually carried - on the 16 January 1940.

The first one was Regent Tiger, with about 15 000 tons of oil products, five days after Britain declared war on Germany. The worst blow was possibly the sinking of 13 000 ton San Fernando by the fabled U-47 on the 21 June 1940 (U-43 got another one on the same day). This one alone carried 18 000 tons of oil product that never reached Liverpool.

Alltogether 558,260 GRT of tankers went to Davy Jones locker, by the end of November 1940, along with 385,957 tons of oil product. Half of that, ca. 243 000 GRT worth of tankers were sunk by the end May 1940.

Fuel oil was the greatest loss, 116 000 tons of it went down with tankers (luckily, no green peace back then). Avgas seems quite untypical as a load, but in the end it didn't really matter, because if a tanker sunk with diesel oil, or even empty, the next one had to haul about its cargo again.

Tanker losses were serious, unfortunately.

Oh, and as for that Australian paper used so extensively by Barbi, here is its title, as used by Barbi as a reference in a Wikipedia article:

"Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War, February 1941, Australian War Memorial Archives."

This came from:
Revision as of 08:39, 16 July 2008 (edit)
Kurfürst (talk | contribs)
(Revised section on 100 octane fuel with more reliable and referenced information; noted fact that the German Air Force also used 100 octane fuel in the Battle. Better sectioning. Added armament info.)

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?...ldid=225978800


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Ai...00_octane_fuel

Barbi's explanation of the origins and importance of this paper:

"The document which relealed the details of 100 octane use in the BoB by the RAF was a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance. Its a British-made document, prepeared for the highest circles. McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report." Kurfürst (talk) 10:53, 19 July 2008 (UTC)

Now, in 2008 I inquired of the AWM whether they had such a paper, giving this specific title, referencing Beaverbrook, Rolls-Royce, the Australian Military Commission etc etc...The AWM's response was that they had no such paper.

Just googled, yahooed, binged "Australian Military Commission England WW2" nada - no such organisation appeared to even exist, but I'll cross reference with Australia's Official War Histories to see if there is mention of it there.

I've also just submitted a search inquiry to the AWM:

"I am making an inquiry as to whether the AWM Archives have a paper entitled:

"Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War, February 1941'

This was a paper written by Rolls-Royce and used by Lord Beaverbrook to address the supply of aviation fuel to Australia via the Australian Military Commission in Britain in February 1941.

I am sorry that there appears to be no AWM reference number, so, hopefully, the title and key references will help."

(Question # RCIS34105
Request type Reference Other
Question )

I am sanguine that they will indeed find this paper and clear this matter up.

wouldn't be the first time

Okay, so let's see the list and the sources.

Vessel Pdt. Tons Built Cargo Notes

SC 21
AMSCO (Br) 72 4,627 1920 Crude Oil

SC3
NOREG (Nor) 43 7,605 1931 Fuel Oil

SC4
SUDERHOLM (Nor) 73 4,908 1917 Fuel Oil
WOENSDRECHT (Du) 52 4,668 1926 Avgas RETURNED

SC5
WOENSDRECHT (Du) 81 4,668 1926 Avgas

SC6
STANMOUNT (Br) 43 4,468 1914 Crude Oil

SC9
GLOXINIA (Br) 61 3,336 1920 Lub Oil

SC14
SOLSTEN (Nor) 42 5,379 1929 Petrol

SC15
TAHCHEE (Br) 52 6,508 1914 Fuel Oil

The above are ships in SC convoys carrying petro gargoes for 1939 and 1940

The below are ships in HX convoys carrying petro cargoes just in 1939.

HX
LANGUEDOC (Fr) * 9,512 1937 crude oil Le Havre

HX3
ONTARIOLITE (Br) 63 8,889 1925 crude oil Le Havre

HX4
ELONA (Br) 61 6,192 1936 lub oil

HX5
SAN ERNESTO (Br) 51 8,078 1939 petrol
VACLITE (Br) 32 5,026 1928 lub oil

HX6
CADILLAC (Br) 72 12,062 1917 PETROL
D L HARPER (Br) 54 12,223 1933 CRUDE OIL
DARONIA (Br) 47 8,139 1939 PETROL
ECLIPSE (Br) 62 9,767 1931 CRUDE OIL HAVRE
F J WOLFE (Pan) 53 12,190 1932 CRUDE OIL
FRANCHE-COMTE (Br) 75 9,314 1936 PETROL BORDEAUX
LUSTROUS (Br) 95 6,156 1927 CRUDE OIL PAUILLAC
NARRAGANSETT (Br) 45 10,389 1936 PETROL
PEDER BOGEN (Br) 91 9,741 1925 DIESO
PENELOPE (Pan) 66 6,559 1925 CRUDE OIL RETURNED
ROBERT F HAND (Br) 94 12,197 1933 PARAFFIN
SAN CALISTO (Br) 81 8,010 1937 PARAFFIN
SCOTTISH HEATHER (Br) 63 7,087 1928 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
VOCO (Br) 23 5,090 1925 LUB OIL

HX7
EL MIRLO (Br) 42 8,092 1930 CRUDE OIL
HORN SHELL (Br) 81 8,272 1931 FUEL OIL
REGINOLITE (Br) 73 9,069 1926 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
SARANAC (Br) 23 12,049 1918 PETROL
ROCAS (Br) 63 7,406 1927 FUEL OIL

HX8
ADELLEN (Br) 83 7,984 1930 FUEL OIL
COWRIE (Br) 52 8,197 1931 DIESO, FUEL OIL
HEINRICH VON REIDEMANN (Pan) 83 11,020 1930 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
LUXOR (Br) 74 6,554 1930 AVGAS LE HAVRE
MIRALDA (Br) 51 8,013 1936 DIESO, CRUDE OIL
PELLICULA (Br) 54 6,254 1936 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
PERSEPHONE (Pan) 64 8,426 1925 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
PRESIDENT SERGENT (Fr) 72 5,344 1923 CRUDE OIL DUNKIRK
SAN CONRADO (Br) 34 7,982 1936 PARAFFIN
SAN FLORENTINO (Br) 24 12,842 1919 FUEL OIL
VICTOLITE (Br) 53 11,410 1928 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE

HX9
ARLETTA (Br) 22 4,870 1925 PETROL
CERINTHUS (Br) 42 3,878 1930 LUB OIL
CHARLES PRATT (Pan) 94 8,982 1916 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
CONCH (Br) 63 8,376 1931 PETROL
DILOMA (Br) 34 8,146 1939 PETROL, PARAFFIN
HARRY G SEIDEL (Pan) 83 10,354 1930 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
REGENT PANTHER (Br) 61 9,556 1937 PETROL
SAN ADOLFO (Br) 64 7,365 1935 FUEL OIL
SAN CIRILO (Br) 62 8,012 1937 PETROL
SAN FABIAN (Br) 71 13,031 1922 FUEL OIL
SAN TIBURCIO (Br) 33 5,995 1921 GAS OIL
SAN UBALDO (Br) 23 5,999 1921 FUEL OIL
VENETIA (Br) 73 5,728 1927 PETROL

HX10
BRITISH WORKMAN (Br) 82 6,994 1922 PARAFFIN
C O STILLMAN (Pan) 72 13,006 1928 CRUDE OIL
CARONI RIVER (Br) 64 7,807 1928 DIESO
CLIONA (Br) 93 8,375 1931 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
GOLD SHELL (Br) 74 8,208 1931 CRUDE OIL
LUNULA (Br) 12 6,363 1927 AVGAS
AN GASPAR (Br) 21 12,910 1921 FUEL OIL
SCOTTISH CHIEF (Br) 94 7,006 1928 CRUDE OIL PAUILLAC
VANCOLITE (Br) 83 11,404 1928 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
VICTOR ROSS (Br) 63 12,247 1933 FUEL OIL LE HAVRE

HX11
ALDERSDALE (Br) 83 8,402 1937 FUEL OIL
ATHELVISCOUNT (Br) 65 8,882 1929 FUEL OIL
BRITISH UNION (Br) 92 6,987 1927 FUEL OIL
CASPIA (Br) 52 6,018 1928 PETROL
COMANCHEE (Br) 71 6,837 1936 LUB OIL
EL GRILLO (Br) 93 7,264 1922 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
COTTISH MAIDEN (Br) 95 6,993 1921 CRUDE OIL DONGES
ARAND (Br) 53 6,023 1927 AVGAS

HX12
ARNDALE (Br) 34 8,296 1937 FUEL OIL
ATHELCHIEF (Br) 94 10,000 1939 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
ATHELPRINCESS (Br) 81 8,882 1929 CRUDE OIL DUNKIRK
FREDERICK S FALES (Br) 64 10,525 1939 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
GEORGE H JONES (Pan) 53 6,914 1919 CRUDE OIL
JAMES McGEE (Pan) 84 9,859 1917 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
MACTRA (Br) 74 6,193 1936 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
MONTROLITE (Br) 63 11,309 1926 CRUDE OIL
SAN FELIX (Br) 73 13,037 1921 FUEL OIL

HX13
BEACONHILL (Pan) 42 6,941 1919 AVGAS
CHAMA (Br) 73 8,077 1938 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
ERODONA (Br) 74 6,207 1937 LUB OIL
AN ELISEO (Br) 43 8,042 1939 GAS OIL
SAN FERNANDO (Br) 64 13,056 1919 CRUDE OIL LE HAVRE
SAN GERARDO (Br) 32 12,915 1929 FUEL OIL
SCHUYLKILL (Br) 52 8,965 1928 PETROL
SOCONY (Br) 63 4,404 1936 AVGAS
SOLARIUM (Br) 44 6,239 1936 PETROL
W C TEAGLE (Br) 62 9,552 1917 CRUDE OIL SOUTHAMPTON

from http://www.convoyweb.org.uk/hague/index.html

1939:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)

Sep39 48/178,621
Oct39 33/156,156
Nov39 27/72,721
Dec39 39/101,823

Tot39 147 (36.75/month)/509,321 (127,330.25/month)

British merchant ship construction capacity from 1939-1941 did not exceed 1.2 million GRT per year.
US merchant ship construction in 1939 was 0.242 million GRT.

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)

Aug39 19/2
Sep39 3/0
Oct39 13/3
Nov39 10/1/1
Dec39 5/1/1

Tot39 50/7/2 (an average of 10 patrols per month and 14% lost)

Thus for 1939, an average of 2.94 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 21 ships sunk (note that throughout these averages will be slightly inflated since they do not include the minor contribution of the Italian submarine fleet.)

1940:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)

Jan40 53/163,029
Feb40 50/182,369
Mar40 26/69,826
Apr40 6/30,927
May40 14/61,635
Jun40 66/375,069
Jul40 41/301,975
Aug40 56/288,180
Sep40 60/288,180
Oct40 66/363,267
Nov40 36/181,695
Dec40 46/256,310

Tot40 520 (43.33/month)/2,462,867 (205,238.91/month)
US merchant ship construction for 1940 was about 0.5 million GRT.

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)

Jan40 8/2
Feb40 10/3
Mar40 10/2
Apr40 19/3
May40 8/0/2
Jun40 18/3/1
Jul40 4/0
Aug40 16/2/1
Sep40 12/0
Oct40 13/2
Nov40 14/1
Dec40 6/0

Tot40 138/18/3 (an average of 11.5 patrols per month and 13% lost)

Thanks Al: I'll go through the http://www.convoyweb.org.uk/ database as well and find out how many tankers and other ships carrying avgas were destroyed in 1940 - last time I looked a couple of years ago I could only find one Inverdagle (9456 tons) which, as Barbi mentions, was sunk by a mine in (I think) the Bristol Channel? I know that some tankers diverted to France up to May or June 1940, accounting for some of the 100 Octane fuel used there.

Regarding the Blenheim and 100 octane in the wing tanks - 14 April 1940:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...-14april40.jpg

Yup, that's what the pilot's handbook says for the Mk.IV.

100 octane only when the long range outer tanks are needed for take off and cruise to target, 87 octane in the inner tanks for all other cases (return from target on long range missions, or the entire mission in case of short range hops).

Still waiting for
a) Your explanation of how the reserves went up during the BOB if the tankers didn't bring it in.
b) An explanation as to how you came to believe that I hadn't looked for the document
c) An explanation as to why NZ was lying about the Australian records not having it
d) As you agree that the War Cabinet clearly didn't approve any stopping of the roll out of 100 Octane to FC in May a position supported by the Oil Committee who didn't discuss it from May 1940 to May 1944. Can I ask who you believe would have the authority to overule the Prime Minister, who was the leader of the War Cabinet, The Chief of the Air Staff who asked for the fighter squadrons to be equipped with 100 Octane, and the Oil Committee who had responsibility for the purchase, storage and distribution of the fuel.
e) Where is this Beaverbrook Paper

I could go on with the list of questions you have yet to respond to but I think the point has been made.

Hmm, I wonder if its the case that both versions are correct - all Blenheims seem to have had 100 octane as a general rule apart from 87 octane in the inbord engines, but some Blenheim Squadron Stations of No. 2 Group were a bit more 'more equal' and were supplied with 100 octane only, while 87 octane was removed from thesestations - and consequently, could only fill 100 octane in both inner and outer tanks of their Blenheims.

See attached papers David has posted a while ago and compared them to the April note by Mike above. It would also mean that Blenheims consumed far more than originally thought.

Guys the 100 oct justified itself whenn it comes to hve low alt extra power (short time) or increased fuel efficiency at low revs. That's why you see that kind of usage on the Blenheim.

It's not compatible with any highly charged eng usage untill the eng was specifically designed for (impeller etc...)

We hve alrdy say tht and this show that 100 oct usage by high flyng Spit makes no sense*.

Temp issue with the usage of that fuel were to be found even in 1945 with some latte war engines.

Moreover 100 oct costed twice as much as 87 oct fuel. This in pre-war doc. I think at today high soaring fuel cost you will easily imagine that this can draw attention of any war planners.

The only raison tht I see any large FC usage of 100oct is for a low alt air campaign such as to fight back to the sea any German ground force steping on English soil.

*Now the first Spits IIa reached Op unit in mid september if I do recall well. Those type being the only succeptible to hve an eng upgraded if ever they had.

Fighters that need to intercept a high flying enemy first need to climb to that high altitude. It makes a lot of sense to reduce the climb time through the first 10,000 feet to a minimum by the use of highest engine power available (which required 100 octane fuel), especially if you can't detect the enemy on a long distance.

Then explain why many FC pilots described using the extra boost in their combat reports, right through the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain, either to evade attack, or to catch an enemy a/c, and why did Dowding issue a notice warning FC pilots against overusing the extra boost? Why were instructions issued to cover the conversions of Merlin IIIs to use 100 octane, and why did Spitfires and petrol bowsers have 100 octane stencilling?

Fair enough: Assuming all Blenheims used 100 octane (six Blenheim units may have used 100 octane in all tanks)

Wyton:
XV
40

Watton:
82

Wattisham:
107

West Raynham:
101

Blenheim = 479 imp gals
Defiant= 97
Hurricane = 90
Spitfire = 85
Total= 751 divided by 4 = 187.75

1 ton 100 octane = 315.5 divided by 187.75 = 1.7 fuel loads

"Please note that the 10,000 tons of 100 octane, shown in Table II - Consumption consumed for the period June - Aug 1940, is the monthly average of those 3 months, therefore for the period June - Aug 1940 30,000 tons were actually consumed." (Lane#318)

June to August 30,000 tons 100 octane consumed x 1.7 = 51,000 fuel loads divide by 92 days = 554.3 fuel loads per day

Sept 14,000 tons 100 octane x 1.7 = 23,800 divided by 30 days = 793.3 fuel loads per day

Oct 17,000 x 1.7 = 28,900 divided by 31 = 932.2 fuel loads per day

June to Oct = 61,000 tons consumed x 1.7 = 103,700 divide by 153 = 677.7 fuel loads per day consumed on average.

51,364 sorties, day & night from July 10 through Sept 30; some of the most intensive combat took place between these dates. Of course there were quiet periods when far fewer combat sorties were flown by Fighter Command; eg: August 16 & 17, between two days of intensive combat August 15 & 18.

51,364 divided by 13 weeks = 4,280 fuel loads = 611 fuel loads daily
average:

Even with all Blenheims theoretically using 100 octane fuel, there was still more than enough being 100 octane fuel being consumed - not issued - from June through end of October to supply 100% of FC, and some BC, operations. Once again this is also assuming all aircraft landed with empty tanks and had to be completely refueled, rather than being topped up.

I am not quite sure if I got your calculations right - are you saying that the consumed amount was sufficient for a very rough average of 793.3 fuel loads per day for September 1940 for example?

Now the calculation doesn't account for non-operational flights - this was looked into earlier, at around post no 87. It was found that three s-e Sqns that were looked at flew about 230 hours of training/non-operational flights in a single first week of August 1940:

54 sqn for example:
http://www.oldrafrecords.com/records/511/5110313.jpg

32 Squadron flew 60 and-a-half non-operational hours in the first week of August 1940, all of which were transfers to and from their forward base.
43 Squadron flew approximately 10 non-operational hours in the first week of August 1940, namely one transfer of six aircraft and their return and another transfer of seven aircraft, and three night practise flights.
54 Squadron flew approximately 159 non-operational hours

This works out as a rough avarage of 76 non-operational flight per Sqn per week, or about 300 hours a month per Squadron.

These records are interesting. I note that on 8th August 54 squadron had 22 pilots and an ample supply of machines. I wonder if any Luftwaffe units were so well equiped in early August 1940.
Do you have any records Kurfurst?

PS I am waiting for your comments on the questions I raised earlier with interest.

Yes, that and take-off too.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...t-approval.jpg

These documents relating to fuel requirments of the the Advanced Air Stiking Force and the Air Component, both in France during May 1940, give some idea of consumption, stocks, and how fuel requirements were calculated. As can be seen the Hurricanes used 100 octane, the Blenheim used a mix, while the Battle and Lysander used 87 octane, as did any transport, liason, visiting types etc.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...cks-7may40.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...stocks-pg1.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...stocks-pg2.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...stocks-pg3.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...stocks-pg4.jpg



http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...nt-15may40.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ay40-app-a.jpg

To underscore the above documentation of Hurricanes using 100 octane fuel in France please note the following:

P/O John Bushell, 151 Squadron, 18 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...dn-18may40.jpg

F/O Paul Richey, 1 Squadron, 11 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ichey-pg76.jpg

F/O E. J. Kain, 73 Squadron, 14 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...monks-pg98.jpg

P/O D. W. A. Stones, 79 Squadron, 14 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...tones-pg32.jpg

P/O R. P. Beamont, 87 Squadron, 15 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...nt-15may40.jpg

P/O F. B. Sutton, 56 Squadron, 18 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...utton-pg80.jpg

F/Lt. I. R. Gleed, 87 Squadron, 18 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ed-18may40.jpg

F/Lt. I. R. Gleed, 87 Squadron, 19 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ed-19may40.jpg

Sgt. L. H. B. Pearce, 79 Squadron, 20 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ce-20may40.jpg

100 Octane Fuel. Completion of the Thornton Plant. Memorandum by Minister of Aircraft Production.

1940 Oct 30

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/c...AB+67%2F8%2F81

They even thought about cancelling the construction of a new plant in October 1940. Looks like there was plenty of 100 octane fuel available.

There is a point where interesting theories meet reality.
The secondary historians say 100 octane fuel was an important factor, the primary sources say 100 octane was used.
I suggest the people still peddling this theory use their skills for something more productive for us COD flyers.

56RAF_phoenix

I really hope that when the SDK gets released we'll get both 87 and 100 octane versions of the flyables and then it will be the server admin's job to choose what they will use in each mission, rendering this whole debate moot.

Because let's face it, apart from the historical accuracy of things, a lot of the gnashing of teeth on both sides of the argument simply boils down to "i want my plane to be better than yours at the sim's primary design level so i'll always have an advantage". :-P

Nice, thanks for sharing 41Sqn_Banks,

Apparently they decided to keep the Thornton plant -- partially for post war employment reasons. They sound almost apologetic for being awash in 100 octane fuel. "It might be that after the war not only aeroplanes but motor cars will run on 100 octane fuel. :)

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ane-7nov40.jpg

And as you have also noted, there was a rise in consumption of 87 octane fuel as frontline operations intensified. The Merlins and Mercurys could still use 87 octane fuel and for secondary duties would not need to use 100 octane fuel.

Remember also that the figures are for fuel consumed, not fuel issued , and my rough calculations assume that all aircraft used a full fuel load for every sortie, which, of course, didn't always happen. For example, if a Hurricane lands after a half hour flight with 45 gallons of fuel left, the fuel tank would then be topped up with 45 gallons - next sortie it lands with an empty fuel tank. To undertake two sorties that Hurricane consumed 135 gallons of fuel, not 180 gallons. Entire squadrons often landed after a sortie with half full fuel tanks.

BTW: Other grades of fuel means that 87 Octane wasn't the only grade used - from memory there was also 73 and 80 octane used? I think the Gypsy and Gypsy Major engines used in the likes of Tiger Moths could use these lower grades? (Getting way OT here)

I can think of one for which that is true for but for myself and some other it is about historical accuracy.

Same here Al. I get my ego boosted by rocking on stage with my band. Stat whoring in a CFS doesn't do it for me.

In 1954, flight made a retrospective of RR engines history.

Obviously, as an aero specialised magazine, they took much care in detailling every versions of the merlin with dates, fuel, boost level, SHP, planes in wich they were fitted and service users.

A fairly good read :rolleyes: : http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchi...0-%201286.html

For those who wants to understand the differences btw the direct injected engines and its carburated conterpart, here is another detailled account :
http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchi...0-%200562.html

You don't hve to be an engineer to read this or hve any PhD. Just relax, take a tasty (soft) drink and let your mind be enlighten by history written by those that really went trought.

~S!

PS: shld I made a special thread of this?

Yep, the 1954 article is a good overview of the development of R-R engines. A more specific article on the development of the Merlin can be found here:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...in-lovesey.pdf

and more general pages on 100 octane

http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchi...0octane%20fuel

and the Blenheim

http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchi...0octane%20fuel

A document outsourced from nowhere with a very specific account of history and so contradictory with - for example - the doc I linked from Flight Journal an internationaly respected publication : humm

A document writed in a civil publication right when war was ranging .... Humm Humm

this one is not too bad but still a civil publication explaining in 1939 why the enemy shld take seriously hence fear the mighty Blenheim ;)


Well you guessed that I am even more ... less convinced. Even more as in their respective history, Flight didn't quote those pages from their own magazine when they did on the other points.

30lb yeah really with 300 hour of endurance ?!

and what next, the Brit first detonated a nuke INSIDE a Merlin engine when the US were still craking nuts in the French Ardennes ? :-|

During June 1937 a Merlin II, mounted in a Horsley, began a 400-hr flight endurance test at Farnborough, and a specially rated "racing" engine was developed from it with a view to installation in the special Speed Spitfire, with which an attack on the world's speed record was contemplated. The engine used was a Merlin III, which differed from the Merlin II in having a standardized de Havilland/Rotol airscrew shaft and dual accessory-drive. It was taken from stock and was fitted with strengthened pistons, gudgeon-pins and connecting rods to withstand the extra load. "The power output of the standard engine," writes Harold Nockolds, "was 1,030 b.h.p. at 3,000 r.p.m. at 10,250ft with plus 6i lb boost. "Solely by opening the throttle, raising the supercharger pressure, and using fuel of a higher octane," he goes on [the petrol normally used at that time was 87 octane], "the engine was made to develop no less than 2,160 b.h.p. at 3,200 r.p.m. with the supercharger giving 27 Ib/sq in boost. This was a phenomenal performance, for it meant that a power to- weight ratio of 0.621 lb per horsepower had been achieved — a considerable improvement on the 0.71 lb per horsepower of the 1931 R engine.
"This tremendous output, which was admittedly only attained for a short period, nevertheless gave ample proof of the inherent possibilities of the Merlin. But Elliott and Hives were perhaps even more satisfied with a 15-hr endurance run at 1,800 b.h.p., 3,200 r.p.m. and 22 lb boost accomplished during the development period. After this they felt perfectly satisfied that the Merlin would be capable of meeting all the demands that might be made of it. How right they were!"

15 hours at 22lb boost in 1937!!!

Alfred Cyril Lovesey CBE, AFRAeS, was an English engineer who was a key figure in the development of the Rolls-Royce Merlin aero engine.

Now what were you saying Tomcat.

But you say Flight Journal is a respected international publication.

Where all this cleverness and fine written irony are gone Schlag?

At war, truth can follow strange path, especially for such a strategical items like the Merlin.

Note pls that I hve no problem regarding the competentcies of Mr Lovesey who ever he was but hve some issues with a scanned doc only available on the website where it was extracted.

Every others sources claim very differents data regarding boost, date and HP.

I think that the Flight article is a good abstract and a far more reliable source per se.

A.C. Lovesey, Development of the Rolls-Royce Merlin from 1939 to 1945, Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace Technology, Volume 18 Issue 7, July 1946 (pp. 218 - 226)

It can be purchased for $25 at the above link or alternately read for free here.

A. C. Lovesey was Research and Development Engineer for Rolls Royce and was responsible for Merlin engine development throughout WWII.

The Flight article is a more reliable source than what comes straight from the mouth of Lovesley? :rolleyes: Give your head a shake.

I will repeat what lane posted.

A. C. Lovely was Research and Development Engineer for Rolls Royce and was responsible for Merlin engine development throughout WWII.

The source where this Lovesley article was posted should have NO bearing what so ever.

Unbelievable !

My thanks to the esteemed self styled tomcatvip.

Clearly Mr Lovesey was simply an ignorant self opinionated anonymous trol too fond of his own voice, trying to impress others with his own brand of "knowledge" merely to stoke his own ego.

I shall place him on my ignore list immediatly, clearly he hasnt got a clue what hes talking about.

What a jerk.

In keeping with the thread's title topic, the following documents are essential reading for the sim developers or anyone wishing to understand the performance of the Hurricane I during the Battle of Britain.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...oct-2oct39.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...bs-14nov39.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...-l1717-cal.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...rb-16feb40.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/ap1590b.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...st-cut-out.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...st-cut-out.jpg

Pilot's Notes, Merlin II, III and IV, 4th Edition, April 1940, page 6.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...erlin3-pg6.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...dn-18may40.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...1aug40-pg1.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...1aug40-pg2.jpg

Wew... are you turning rogue ?

I would say that noting that Lovesey was on Rolls-Royce's payroll sums it up very nicely. I am sure he was a skilled engineer and all, but obviously R-R was interested in publishing PR articles. The article about carburetors is a fine example, apparantly R-R was trying convince everyone that icing, negative-G cut-outs, worse fuel economy, backfires and so on were actually good to have in an engine.

Whats surprise me though that unlike today, the editors of Flight at the time clearly had the courage to put some distance between them and PR articles, regardless of their paper's interests in advertisement fees. I am not sure they would have the same backbone today.

BTW - The source for Lovesy "Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace Technology, Volume 18, Issue 7. London, MCB UP Ltd., July 1946."

So I guess that means that while Tomcat thinks Flight is a load of P R crap, apart from the articles he favours, Barbi knows that they are better than that and more reliable than Cyril Lovesy, who was just putting out propaganda for R-R.

This is the same person who believes in a so far non-existent February 1941 memo, issued, supposedly, by Lord Beaverbrook of the Ministry of Aircraft Production, which says to the non-existent Australian Military Commission in London that stocks of 100 Octane were so perilous that Fighter Command had to revert back to 87; which just happens to be contradicted by this paper, issued by Lord Beaverbrook, head of MAP in October 1940

Hmmm, which one can be believed? ;)

Well I tend to think you compensate for you lack of reading comprehension skills with a considerable amount of wishful thinking, but that's just my opinion. ;)

At the same time, its such a pity that your theory about universal use of 100 octane by RAF FC lacks any documentary evidence that you manage to work up yourself when other people are not entirely convinced by R-R's ' load of P R crap' as you put it. Its a curious thing though that knowledge man on R-R's payroll were spending time on these PR articles about the disadvantages of direct fuel injection, and how less displacement is better, everyone went to direct fuel injection eventually, and R-R was working hard to finish the Griffon with a displacement similar to the DB and Hispano-Suiza engines. :D

Do you know how to spot the person who is wrong, but for some reason is unable to admit it?

It's easy, look for the person that has to resort to name calling (perfect example quoted above)

Why you ask?

Simple they do this to take the focus of the fact that they are wrong by trying to get the person or persons they are replying to to respond in kind (call them names) and turn the thread into a mud slinging match and hopefully get it locked.

Speaking of documentary evidence, have you got any at all, on anything? For instance that page of the Beaverbrook paper that you thought you might have.

Or any comments on the War Cabinet who clearly didn't decide to stop the roll out of 100 Octane as per the paper that the Australian Records cannot find?

[QUOTE=Glider;394576]Source please.

[QUOTE=Kurfürst;394577]I admit, I laughed out loud when I saw this.
The minutes of the War Cabinet, the minutes that are on line (all of them), the ones I gave you the file number to look up.

The same War Cabinet that Pips insisted stopped the roll out in May, that decided to make 87 octane the primary fuel.

Tragically for your case, the minutes don't mention these decisions at all.

As sources go, I would suggest that the official minutes of the War Cabinet are a pretty good source to prove or disprove that statement of Pips

PS I am still waiting for your comments about how the fuel reserves went up from May to August without any tankers getting through.

PPS I can confirm that the original paper papers from the War Cabinet are the same as the on line ones. I went through the originals before they were made avaialble on line

[QUOTE=Glider;394588]I don't recall you giving me file numbers. I have asked you again, and you haven't provided file numbers now either.

So I ask you for the third time: can you give us a source where you claim that "the War Cabinet who clearly didn't decide to stop the roll out of 100 Octane".

YES / NO.

So far your standpoint can be summerized as denial of, from a position of complete ignorance, the existence of a paper in the Australian War Memorial archives that was found and summarized by a researcher there, based on papers you have never seen in your life and completely unaware of their contents, but assume they say want you want them to say.

There are literally hundreds of those 'War Cabinet' papers, as anyone can confirm who took a peep in the search engine and you haven't seen their contents.

Tragically for your case, its entirely transparent that you haven't actually looked into those papers, and simply making your story up.

That I agree. So disprove the statement of Pips. Since you misrepresent his position, I put it forward to you in its originality:

This is from a researcher, researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives, from a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance. It was a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War.

The reason why it is included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF. McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report.

The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.

The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.

Well anyone who reads Pip's words (and not your strawmen of them) can read: "The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August,".

I am sure tankers got through. And a large number of them were sunk, as noted by secondary sources. This seems to have been worrying the British somewhat, since by that time the Germans has sunk about 10% of the British tanker fleet, and twice as many tankers that was under construction (19) in Britain.

And I am still waiting for your comments as to wheter you found a decision that would say the whole of Fighter Command is to convert to 100 octane fuel.

A simple YES / NO will do, because you seem to be very keen on asking questions, excellent at making up stories, but absolutely terrible in answering the questions asked.

No, you haven't went through. Unless you want to tell us you have went through 10 000s of pages created by the War Cabinet's 200+ Committees.