Flew that one for the fun of it. First try I stuck with my wing leader, he was extending, climbing and coming back high, at which point he dived and killed an A6M, a few moments later he had one on his 6, at which point I dived and killed that one. I then had lost him and went for targets of opportunity, found another distracted A6M and shot it down. Had to dive to the deck and run at some point, but wingmen cleared my 6.
Next try I just went up to mix it, turning around and climb immediately after take off, engaged the leading A6M flight, shot one down. Then I had 6 A6M's on me, so I dived to the deck and kept running. At one point four of them turned away, and I turned around to re-engage the remaining two. I had enough separation for a head on, where I damaged one, and having gone below them, they apparently lost track of me for a moment, which allowed me to easily position for another attack, killing the other one. Then going after the damaged one in a bit of a dogfight, got that one too. Headed back to the carriers, found a bit of a fight still going on, got three more kills, all A6M distracted with engaging other planes in my flight.
In the second run, only 2 A6M and 3 B5N survived the attack, and we lost 3. Pretty good result, I'd say. We lost the carrier, though.
Anyway, my defensive tactics were extremely simple, I usually just dove to the deck and ran away. In the initial part where separation was still small, I banked the plane a little alternating left and right as to not make a too easy target, but I didn't really manoeuvre. It's simple, but it works. Had to defensively stall fight once, when I got bounced and figured a dive wouldn't give me enough separation. I ended that stall fight when he had scissored on a course opposite to mine, at which point I dove away to the deck, as usual.
Note, you're in an F4F-3, which only has 4x0.50 cal. The P-40 (E&M) has 50% more firepower, so you'll have to get used to needing a bit more time on target. But ammo is plenty, so you can fire away more freely than in a P-40.

This is the key to escaping the Zero... Chinnault's Tigers were doing this before Pearl Harbour in P40's... just that back home they didn't know how to read combat reports.

The Zero had limited top speed (around 390 kph) for maneuverability in the rolling axis, where it's ailerons locked due to compressibility. The wing profile that gave it's high maneuverability at low speeds, suddenly had big limitations at high speed.

The Allies learned about this very quickly and used the high speed roll to escape or out-maneuver the Zero.
:)

The AVG had its first combat on 20 December 1941, when aircraft of the 1st and 2nd squadrons intercepted 10 unescorted Kawasaki Ki-48 "Lily" bombers of the 21st Hikotai raiding Kunming.

This is 2 weeks after Pearl Harbour.

Freddy, Freddy, Freddy. You are being unfair to people who didn't even have digital watches, much less cell phones and internet porn.

How do you think that combat reports made their way back to the US from Rangoon, and from the US to carriers at sea? (and this is just based on the assumption that detailed reports were made at the time and sent to--most likely--USAAF Headquarters). Back in 1942, there was nothing even remotely like the instant communications we enjoy today; Burma was literally the backside of nowhere, and telegraph was the fastest form of communication available assuming that British commanders on the scene were willing to pass on tactical observations to a foreign power from what they considered a bunch of Yank mercenaries. Chances are that any reports were relayed through the US embassy in Chunking, and hand carried up the chain, again, assuming that the ambassador had the space in his couriers' bags at any given time.

At best, the reports from the pilots and their commander made it back to Washington in a month or two, and then you have to keep in mind that the USAAF was run by the bomber boys who had very little use for Chennault and his fighter doctrines (which was why he had to retire early in the first place). Were it not for the sensationalist press reports, his combat evaluations might never have been read at all.

NONE of the Allies seem to have been reading even their own combat reports in 1941-42; even though some RAF squadrons in England were reportedly flying finger four combat formations in early 1941 across the Channel, other squadrons in the Med and Far East continued to fly vics and strings well into 1943 (and paying the price in blood).

It seems like everyone was forced to figure things out for themselves; the USN's Thach had experimented with formations of two pairs in late fall of 1941 in San Diego based on what almost everyone at the time considered ridiculous reports about Japanese fighters whose performance equaled the best the Western Powers had, and possessed of unGodly maneuverability besides. Apparently, he had the time to kill since he was ashore prepping a new fighter squadron with the F4F-3, which was coming in in dribs and drabs, and had less than ideal performance compared to contemporary land based fighters.

Chennault, whose reports may have been what prompted Thach's experiments, adapted tactics best suited to the Hawk 81s he was expecting from Lend Lease to China. Those tactics wouldn't have worked as well for Wildcats, whose speed and acceleration were less exhilarating than the Hawks', but did possess better forward vision and sufficient maneuverability to take advantage of the deflection shooting that USN aviators trained for.

Meanwhile, in Java and then Northern Australia, the survivors flying P-40Es had learned their lessons the hard way and compared notes. None of these people had an opportunity to learn from each others' experiences until much later in the war if not after. When Chennault's 23rd FG finally got razorback Merlin Mustangs in mid-'44, his guys never got the memo about the guns jamming due to wing flexing, and they never figured out a fix beyond getting the D-models to replace the A/B/C models that never quite replaced the P-40Ms and Ns in China.

The Zero's ailerons got a lot heavier very quickly over 200 kts indicated, but it wasn't compressibility (and the shock waves it produced), it was just the tradeoff for having those big ailerons that worked so well at what the IJN considered combat speeds, below 200kts. At the higher speeds air resistance on those large control surfaces was more pronounced and the leverage you could generate on the stick was not so great, particularly for the much shorter average Japanese of the day. Allied fighters were almost all better in this regard, and since few of them could accelerate like the lighter Japanese models, they were already entering expected combat zones at higher than cruise speeds anyway. The relative advantages of staying fast were soon noted, as you pointed out.

cheers

horseback

Chennault was regarded as a loose cannon rather than the hero that he was. Policy and doctrine were not going to be changed on his account.

I've seen a few BoB pilots say on video that learning to switch from close vics to loose fours was one of the most costly lessons yet when their group was rotated out and new guys brought in. It was everyone else's job to clue the new guys in meaning no one was given the job so no one did it. The new guys had to learn the hard way. And the new ones after them. That's how it went. They didn't need radio or telephones, just stop and talk about hard lessons before going off to much-needed R&R and still it didn't happen.

When the works drops in the pot, the training takes over. However hard you trained, that's how hard it is to change.

Ja, you're right, sorry forgot to check my history times.
Remembered that the combat reports were available before the carriers got into action (mistook this for Pearl Harbour)

From what I hear , the Zero wing thickness was much larger than normal allowing better lift and maneuverability at low speed.. but the thick wing caused airflow disruption over the wing and control surfaces at high speeds.. causing the controls to lock.

The pilot stick forces required would be, from the pilots POV, dependent on stick length and force applied, and strength of pilot.. not size.

It would be harder to move the stick all the way at higher speeds, but to execute, say a roll at X-Degrees per second, you require less control surface deflection to execute the same maneuver, than at lower speeds.
:)

200 kts is about 227mph, or less than 370kph--not exactly a blistering pace by WWII standards, and kind of low for the onset of compressibility at medium altitudes and below for an aircraft capable of around an estimated 350 mph (as I understand it, the Zero's actual top speed is a subject of debate).

US pilots testing various models of the Zero both during and after the war have commented on the heaviness of the controls, particularly the ailerons above that relatively low speed, and how light they are at the preferred dogfighting speeds of the Japanese fighter pilot. A standard joystick's 'throw' or arc is limited by the pilot's thighs in most cases, so you have to think that the roll axis of the Zero's stick is limited to a relatively small arc; precise control at high force is very difficult to achieve, and the designer of a fighter has to figure out a way to balance stick forces at a range of speeds desired by his specifications. Jiro Horikoshi, the designer of the A6M, tried to keep his customer satisfied.

The average Japanese male in 1941 was sixty two inches tall and weighed about 125 lbs. The average American male in the same era was sixty nine inches tall and weighed 165 lbs. Even though greater than normal physical strength and coordination are qualities that are common among WWII era fighter pilots, one must at least suspect that being 11% taller and almost 30% heavier, all other things being equal, will usually make you MUCH stronger. As NFL football coach Bill Parcells once observed, in a contest that puts a premium on strength and speed, a good big man will usually dominate a great small man.

cheers

horseback

Hmm... size of the pilot... a small but strong man, could move in spaces where the big man can not. It's leverage will be hampered by the reduced space.
Of all those physic assumptions, most ended as simple nonsense.
I also remember the asumptions on japanese pilots diet, and their probably bad sighting capacity... after all, all japanese wear glasses, isnt 'it? :/

Size does matter; the Zero's cockpit is reportedly roomier than the Bf 109's, so an average modern Westerner fits comfortably. We're not talking about a tiny tunnel, so the sort of stick movements we are discussing give a leverage advantage to the man with the longer arms and broader shoulders. Shorter levers require more force to accomplish the same work, simple as that.

I made no assumptions about Japanese pilots' diet, beyond what their own memoirs tell me, and what they tell me is that in the latter stages of the Solomons campaign (early to mid 1943 and after), the Japanese supply chain was in serious trouble, while the Allied supply chain was becoming much better and more reliable by the day, just as it was in the ETO and Med. German and Axis soldiers undoubtedly became less effective when they were forced to get by on reduced rations short on important nutrients, else we were just shooting and bombing their supply lines for the fun of it.

The Japanese memoirs also report that it definitely had an effect, just as it had an effect on US pilots who also suffered through the malaria and short rations in the early New Guinea and Guadalcanal campaigns. As for the crack about glasses, you're projecting racism where there is none.

If you don't like my opinions, produce facts to counter them.

cheers

horseback