Hi NZtyphoon,

Thanks for the info on the book and the photograph. I’ll get the book. That sure is a nice photo! ;) Unfortunately, I forget where I got it.

Following on the discussion about consumption and the use of 100 octane in the Blenheim, it shouldn’t be overlooked that the Defiant also used 100 octane and +12 boost. See the
Combat Report of T. D. Welsh of 264 Squadron from 29 May 1940 where he recorded "I pulled the boost cut out…" for example.

A.&A.E.E. reported on trials of the Defiant operating +12 boost.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...vel-speeds.jpg

And last but not least see Dowding’s memo from 1st August, 1940, with copies to all Stations and Squadrons, regarding Handling of Merlin in Hurricane, Spitfire and Defiant Aircraft wherein he mentions "The use of the automatic boost cut out control enables the pilot to get an emergency boost of + 12 lbs. per sq.in. from the engine for 5 minutes when circumstances demand it. Some pilots "pull the plug" with little excuse on every occasion."

Small alteration. KF has never found or when I last heard, even looked for this paper. The reason he gave for not looking was that he doesn't live in Australia and he was too busy.

Posting 92 in attached thread
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/avi...a-20108-7.html

PS Its worth noting that the key to this Pips was a decision made by the War Cabinet to stop roll out of 100 octane. Earlier in this thread I did give KF the file nos for the War Cabinet minutes to look at on line, so he could confirm the Pips theory. I would be interested to see if he has done this easy, available and free basic check and let us know what it said.

And another: Glider never looked for the paper, he sent an email to the Archieve's staff without giving any reference. The Archive did not reply that they don't have it, they have replied that without Glider giving them a correct reference, they cannot find it. A world of difference I guess, just to straight out the spin our friend NZTyphoon is putting on it. ;)

I have checked as much as I could, there are however gazillion pages of several cabinets, as what you (and Pips) call "War Cabinet minutes" are actually covering a broad range of aspects, and apparently the work was split between several committees for fuel, ammunition, air, production and similar.

Now, as far as the documentary evidence goes, the only relevant paper you've produced so far is the May 19th meeting's summary, and that says some fighter and some Blenheim Squadrons, which is what it reads. As we all know this is the paper that has been doctored on the Mike Williams site to have the meaning 'all'.

If that decision was not overruled by later ones, then it was some fighter and some Blenheim Squadrons it is. There is no evidence of it (yet?) that it was overruled.

You were certainly unable to show any such decision, though I recall that you have claimed Committee on 29th June or 10th August supposedly overruled this. I have asked many times to supply these papers instead of giving your view of them, but you always evade that for some reason.

And for some reason you are refusing to post files referring to the meeting after May 1940, which is what the Beaverbrook paper covers, namely, that any further expansion was halted and frozen.

Simply to put, you can argue until you are blue in the face about if the Beaverbook paper can be found again or not (I think though I may have a single page from it, as the context seems very similiar, which was posted many many years ago on Ring's site).

But its all irrelevant since the only British decision presented says some fighter and some Blenheim Squadrons, and it takes an amazing level of spin - or as some solved the question, doctoring - making 'some' to mean 'all'.

This seems mighty unlikely during the 1940 timeframe given that it seems the two (or three) Blenheim Stations identified earlier were only supposed to be supplied with 100 octane. If there is no 87 octane in the Station just 100 octane, how they are supposed to tank up from both? This may have been true earlier, but certainly not in these Stations concerned.

As well as operational Squadrons on combat missions of course.

Source?

Grand, then we agree that Fighter Command used both 87 and 100 octane fuel for its operational fighters.

I think you do disservice to your already marginal credibility by pretending things anyone can check by reading the thread.

I am afraid I have posted the 87 and 100 octane fuel consumption during the Battle, which is a primary source, the May 18 decision that explicitly says that 100 octane is not issued to all Fighter Squadrons, as well as the earlier decision in agreement that the plans were for 16 fighter and 2 bomber Squadrons, by September 1940. Of course the sour in your mouth about the other pre-war papers is that they note that British 100 octane fuel programme was fueled by fear that the Germans could much more easily produce great quantities via their synthetic process.

And yes I have also made reference to the paper Pips found, and yes you are lying when you say that "the Australian National Archives themselves cannot find it", and not for the first time.

All KF is saying is that large numbers of aircraft in other commands were using 87 Octane. Big deal.[/QUOTE]

You seem to have reading comprehension problems when you believe that when I write ALL commands I meant OTHER commands. But I agree, its not a big deal, everyone else but you seemed to get it.

'Naturally'. Really? Whenever the RAF was battling the Luftwaffe in a frenzy, it automatically meant that suddenly bomber command flew more sorties, training units flew 10 times as much, and coastal command was flying more sorties too?

Or did Spitfires after landing at a fighter base quickly drain their tanks of 100 octane, refill with 87 octane to fly training flights, move between airfields, and then drained the tanks of 87 octane and refilled again with 100 octane?

If this happened, they surely made a big fuss in 1940 just to support some silly-ass speculation of a Spitfire-fan in 2012 didn't they. :D

Or we should take the word of you, who has just lied that its 'missing' from the ANArchives...

[QUOTE][QUOTE]Originally Posted by Kurfürst
Its also completely in line with what an unquestionably reputable secondary source, Morgan nad Shacklady's ultimate Spitfire book, 'Spitfire: The History' notes about the initial uncertainity of 100 octane shipments (as all 100 octane had to be imported from overseas).No, its just your spin on it.

Morgan nad Shacklady writes of concerning tanker losses, while you write of tanker losses in convoys (obviously a lot of them weren't travelling in one), and then further limited your 'research' to the HX convoys (obviously again not all tankers went through HX convoys), and then even further limited to scope to 'tankers carrying AVGAS' (obviously again a tanker capacity lost is a tanker lost - if it also carried some kind of fuel it was even worse, but a tanker sunk with ballast en route to America was just as painful for shipping space as a tanker lost inbound to Britain).

This is how tanker losses suddenly became 'tanker losses carrying avgas while travelling in convoys in the HX series convoys'. Its a classic straw-man argument.

Now, anyone who searches back in this thread will find the actual figures for British / Allied tanker losses in the period, they were quite serious indeed, iirc several hundred thousends of GRT worth. Mines, torpedo planes and bombers, uboots all took their toll. I don't bother to post them again.

I believe Morgan and Shacklady are quite aware of Payton-Smith's book.

What seems to be at odds is Payton-Smith and Morgan-Shacklady, but your humble - and rather untrustworthy - interpretation and quoting of Payton-Smith vs. Payton-Smith's interpretation by rather distinguished British aviation historians.

I agree. So is there ANY documented evidence that it was amended? Anything at all?

Can you explain to me how Payton-Smith speaks one thing on page 59. - about the 1939 situation, when the British evidently seeked 'absolute certainity 'went on to say' on page 259-260

To me it seems you are cherry picking quotes out of the context and putting them together from two hundred page apart.

For example, what is the context "...this problem (supply of 100 Octane aviation fuel) disappeared on pg. 259? Does the second quote it even remotely related to 1939-1940, or you just frankensteined them together?

No, actually evidence was provided that the 1939 papers speak of partially converting Fighter and Bomber Command to 100 octane, and all the 1940 papers supplied so far also speak of partially converting Fighter and Bomber Command to 100 octane.

The March 1939 papers speak of 16 fighter and 2 bomber squadrons, the May 1940 papers speak of the fighter and bomber squadrons 'concerned'.

Not a single paper could be found or supplied that would say that or hint that all of Fighter Command is to be converted to 100 octane fuel.

Its quite clear to any reasonable man.

Of course pre-war plans can change. But did they?

Yes, though I would not necessarily equate 'quoting figures on the Rolls-Royce stand for the Merlin R.M. 2M rated on 100 octane fuel' to 'being built'. While Rolls-Royce was quoting figures, DB 601 powered Heinkels and Bfs using 100 octane were setting records anyway. :p

A couple of points:-
1) In normal debate the person who is relying on a paper is expected to produce thier evidence
2) Clearly Kurfurst hasn't tried looking for the paper
3) Also he hasn't looked up the War Cabinet Minutes which are available and would support his case. I should add that I have looked at these both on line and in the original paper copies and no decision of this was made and it was not even discussed by the War Cabinet. If Pips said that the War Cabinet made the decision then they would have made the decision. You would not exepect the War Cabinet to do the research but they did make decisions or were informed of decisions, and 100 Octane was never mentioned.
4 ) as for his assertion that I didn't ask the following is the reply I received from the Australian War Records, which gives a reference for the question I raised.

Australian War Memorial Research Centre
ReQuest

Response to your question with Question #: RCIS20344


Your question is:
I am trying to find a copy of the following Document which I have been told is held in your archives.

Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And Its Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War

The first question is of course do you have a copy of this document and secondly if you do what is the process to try and obtain a copy.
Our response is:
Dear David,

Thank you for your enquiry to the Research Centre of the Australian War Memorial.

I have searched our books database (which includes journals), RecordSearch (which is the National Archives of Australia's search engine for our Official Records) and our general search field in the hope that your text may be picked up as a reference in an online article without success.

Do you have any more information about the record? Is it a journal article or a monograph? If you can think of any other identifying markers, please email our Publishing and Digitised team at pub&dig@awm.gov.au A curator will search again for you.

I'm sorry I couldn't help you.

Kind regards,
I

Kurfurst is aware of this and I invite him to add anything he knows to help track this paper down.

PS Kurfurst, I believe you owe NZ an apology for saying he was lying about the Australian Archives not having the paper

There is no Beaverbrook paper. After May the subject of roll out of 100 Octane was never mentioned again by the oil committee until May 1944 when the RAF had supply difficulties due to the volume being used in the preparation of the Invasion. I have been through the entire file and its a big one.

I should add that I have never said that 29th June or the 10th August made any decisons overuling anything. Tell me where I did and I will apologise and go into the records and copy the papers.

http://www.wlb-stuttgart.de/seekrieg/konvois/hx-39.htm

Ships lost in 1939 and 1940 for SC and HX convoys > 85

HX convoys originated from Halifax (9-knot convoys for ships of sustained speeds less than 15 knots)
SC convoys originated from Sydney NS (7-knot convoys of eastbound ships too slow for the 9-knot HX convoys)

HX
Year: Convoys / Ships / Lost
1939: 22 / 431 / 1 (0.232%)
1940: 91 / 3424 / 54 (1.577%)

SC
Year: Convoys / Ships / Lost
1939: * / * / *
1940: 16 / 508 / 30 (5.905%)

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)

Date: patrols/lost/aborts

Aug39 19/2
Sep39 3/0
Oct39 13/3
Nov39 10/1/1
Dec39 5/1/1

Total 1939: 50/7/2 (an average of 10 patrols per month and 14% lost)

Date: patrols/lost/aborts

Jan40 8/2
Feb40 10/3
Mar40 10/2
Apr40 19/3
May40 8/0/2
Jun40 18/3/1
Jul40 4/0
Aug40 16/2/1
Sep40 12/0
Oct40 13/2
Nov40 14/1
Dec40 6/0

Total 1940: 138/18/3 (an average of 11.5 patrols per month and 13% lost)

The only one putting a spin on anything NZTyphoon is Barbi.:)

Because clearly Blenheim stations were supplied with both grades. Source Warner The Bristol Blenheim: A Complete History (2nd ed) - as definitive a book on the Blenheim as Morgan and Shacklady is on the Spitfire.

P.100 "But the introduction of 100 octane fuel caused further problems for Blenheim pilots...Blenheims were adapted to carry it only in the outer tanks, with 87 octane in the inner tanks.

P.136 (September 1939) "Further difficulties and complications arose as working parties in the hangers of several squadrons were still involved in a hectic programme of bringing up to specification those aircraft that had not been modified to full Mk IV standard, by installing the new outer fuel tanks for 100 octane petrol, plumbing the jettison systems, changing the engines to Mercury XVs....the modifications were all completed by 7 October."

Nope, I have checked through all of this thread and nowhere has Barbi, or anyone else, posted figures on tanker losses until AL Schlagater's posting at 8:41 am today. Barbi makes mention of the mysterious "Pip's" paper with some vague stuff about increasing tanker losses, but no other evidence to support his claims...

No "actual figures" and no evidence that there was "no tanker running in with 100 octane until August"

If they are, it isn't listed in their bibliography, nor do M & S refer to it in the text, so how can Barbi make such a leap?


The book is not entirely about aviation fuel - it deals with all aspects of oil supplies to wartime Britain. The first chapter on Aviation fuel dealt with the pre-war situation when Britain had to plan for the possibility that America would bar fuel supplies to combatant nations.

""By 1939...The prospects of securing sufficient supplies of 100-octane fuel in addition to the 87-octane petrol required for non-operational flying looked doubtful...(he goes on to state on page 57)...It was true that by 1939 it seemed increasingly unlikely that American supplies would be withheld. But to have accepted anything less than absolute certainty, to have depended on the goodwill of foreign suppliers to meet the essential needs of the Royal Air Force, would have been a radical break with traditions that had governed British oil policy since long before the First World War."

Meaning that the pre-war planning papers quoted by KF were being conservative in their estimates, as per a long held tradition."

After this chapter came several others on other issues - civilian oil supplies, shipping etc. Then came another chapter on Aviation fuel which deals with the situation from the declaration of war through to 1942, in which P-S notes that late in 1939...

"...this problem (supply of 100 Octane aviation fuel) disappeared; production of the new fuel in the US, and in other parts of the world, increased more quickly than expected with the adoption of new refining techniques." pp. 259-260

Re the statement
The Germans were sinking British tankers at an increasing rate, and all 100 octane fuel was coming in those tankers....but this was increasingly uncertain as Uboot took their toll on the tankers, and, during May and June, until the French capitulation, with 25% of their fighters and some of their bombers running on 100 octane the British consumed 12 000 tons of 100 octane and 42 000 tons of other (87) grades, or 54 000 ton of avgas at total - and there was no tanker running in with 100 octane until August 1940.

If there weren't any tankers coming in can someone explain how the reserves went up, in particular the 49,000 tons in the six weeks between 31st May and 11th July .
I think we can rule out air freight or submarine cargo

Stocks of 100 Octane
30th September 1939 153,000 tons(b)
27th February 1940 220,000 tons(b)
31st May 1940 294,000 tons(a)
11th July 1940 343,000 tons(b)
31st August 1940 404,000 tons(a)
10th October 1940 424,000 tons(c)
30th November 1940 440,000 tons(a)

PS remember these are reserves total inports would have to cover usage as well