Apologies for possibly restarting an old debate but there would be no need for tanks to be refilled with 87 octane as all RAF front line squadrons were fully equipped with 100 Octane. 87 Octane was used in OCU units that were equipped with Spitfires and Hurricanes but not front line units.

I am the poster who disagreed with Kurfurst in the WW2 Aircraft forum and am able to support any statement or figure that was made by myself in that forum on this subject with published information and or original documentation. If you have incorporated any of Kurfursts theories into your work then I am afraid that you have been seriously misled.

You will find that Kurfurst will not be able to support his statements. If you have any questions or doubts then please do not hesitate to raise them and I will be able to adress them in open discussion.

Can you present a single document stating so..?

I've asked you several times to do so. You were not able to.

During the previous discussion, you have supplied a paper which directly contradicted your past and present claims, stating that 100 octane was to be supplied to "certain Fighter and Blenheim Squadrons":

http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e1...meetingA-1.jpg

Kurfurst
While I wait for the other questions can you tell me what certain means such as how many and of what type?
You have encouraged some big assumptions in this thread so how many is certain and how did you come to that assumption?

I will support my statement that you know, as I have always done before, but I want to know how you came to these figures.

For the meaning of certain, please refer to: http://www.oxfordadvancedlearnersdic...nary/certain_1

I am pretty sure though its meaning is in stark contrast with all.

Clarify what 'some big assumptions' supposed to mean. You are again only presenting rhetorics.
The document you posted and which directly contradicts your thesis speaks of no uncertain terms of certain Fighter and Blenheim Squadrons.
That's not an assumptopn - it's a fact.

Can you present a single document stating so..?

I've asked you several times to do so. You were not able to.

I've asked again in this thread. You've evaded the question.

So I ask again: Can you present a single document stating so..?

The reason I have to ask you for the second time and about the tenth time since we have this discussion is because you were completely unable to support your statement.

Kurfurst You know why I asked you about the number of squadrons and fighters with 100 Octane, its something we have covered before and I want to know if your position has changed.

All
The link that is most important is the following
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/avi...2-a-20108.html
To save time I will often refer to postings in this thread but I am afraid that Kurfurst has misled you from the start. His posting 24 is little more than a fantasy.

For example
The paper that is supposed to be from the Australian Researcher doesn’t as far I am aware exist. It is supposed to be held at the Australian records, who when I asked for a copy could not find it, they could not find it when the Wikipedia people asked for it and this was most interesting we discovered that Kurfurst hadn’t even tried to look for it. See his posting 92 and my reply 96
Even if it does exist it is riddled with errors to be worthless for instance
1) It talks about a great strain on the 100 octane fuel reserves. Posting 2 shows a stockpile of 400,000 tons in August 1940 which consumption in the period of July to August averaged 10,000 tons a month, making it a three and a half year stockpile. I don’t call that a shortage or a strain.
2) It talks about the Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. These meetings didn’t mention 100 octane at all, there were no decisions made and 87 octane was not deemed to be the primary fuel. See my posting 174
3) It says that large quantities of fuel were not available until August which is clearly wrong. Posting 2

In Kurfursts posting on this thread no 24 he says things that he knows to be untrue such as
1) He clearly accuses me of ‘subtle manipulation of the original papers’. This is a lie.
2) He says that I was in communication with the Australian researcher. That's is unfortunate, because I saw the authors of said article discussing the same subject with an Australian researcher. Again this is a lie indeed I was keen to have such communication. See my posting 96 where I ask Kurfurst to get him to contact us. This never happened.

Another tactic the Kurfurst uses is not divulging all the information that he has if its not convenient and there is a good example re the number of Blenheim units that were equipped with 100 octane. He seems to have led you to believe that only two squadrons were so equipped. Lets look at this
1) Posting 2 is a letter from the ACAS on behalf of the Chief of the Air Staff asking for squadrons equipped with fighters and Blenheim to be equipped with 100 Octane
2) Posting 3 covers the arrangements for the transfer
3) Posting 4 is an update showing that Bomber command is going well but there is a misunderstanding re fighter command
4) Posting 6 is a note of thanks for the job done.
In other words all Blenheim bomber units had the fuel. Kurfurst was well aware of this detail.

I have accused Kurfurst of serious things and I have done this with care but he has a track record. I suggest you review. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Ai...tle_of_Britain
It’s the discussion section on the Aircraft of the Battle of Britain. Here you will see the sort of accusation that Kurfurst has not hesitated to use.

I should add that I am not Gavin Bailey my name is David Slack.

Glider, why aren't you posting proof that all RAF units were supplied with 100 octane?

Dear David/Glider,

I am not going to lower myself to your level of evading questions and instead of putting forward your evidence, repeatedly requested by myself in this and other threads, entering into pitiful personal attacks. Its sufficient to say that despite being asked about 3 times already to put forward the evidence to your claims, you've utterly failed to do so. Instead, you've only managed to claim that the evidence I put forward in my earlier posts are 'fantasy' - very convincing and mature arguement indeed!

Therefore, I find it sufficient to point out the following facts. Regarding the Australian Researcher's findings, you strongly distort what he says, and put up strawman arguements, such as putting into his mouth that 'large quantities of fuel were not available until August' - he never said such a thing. You simply make up a lie and then 'disprove' your own lie. He notes that the decisions were made in may 1940 due to concerns of future fuel supplies, which makes the arguement about what the storage was in August completely irrelevant - in may the fuel supply was still just about 200 000 tons, and at the RAF's consumption rate of 40-50k tons per month it would be sufficient for but a few months, had complete 100 octane conversion would have been decided. Regarding you claims about British War Cabinet meetings, earlier you claimed you went into the NA in Kew and 'found nothing' -I am totally on the opinion that you have simply made this up in desperation.

Regarding your comments regarding my posting on this thread no 24, they only show that you are completely lack reading comprehension skills, which makes you probably the least qualified person in this thread to make summaries of far more complicated papers than a forum post written in simple English. Regarding the Australian researchers findings, I must also note that despite I made it clear where the qoutes come from, you first have repeatedly told others that those are my finding and I should produce the paper; you have had to be told several times over and over again that the research was done by an Austrialian fellow, and you were even given a link to the discussion concerned; then you kept claiming some conspiracy that the link wasn't working for you, and now you admit that you in fact seen the thread, but now claim that for some reason you couldn't contact him; I wonder why, when you have seen the thread, you could send him a PM any time have you really wished; why I would need to ask to contact you is beyond my imagination.

Aware of what..? I am glad to see that you are resorting to your favourite tactic, you were asked to support evidence for your claim that all fighter command fighter were running on 100 octane, and utterly failed at that; so instead now you change the subject and brought up a new claim, that all Blenheims were running on 100 octane as well. What's next, Glider? But very well, support that claim as well, I willing to believe if I see the evidence, because your papers, whatever you want to read into them plainly say that

"certain Fighter and Blenheim Squadrons"

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/att...h-meeting-.jpg

"the Bomber Stations concerned was practically complete (these Stations are Wyton Watton, Wattisham, West Rayham)"

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/att...ng-minute-.jpg

Quite clearly only four Bomber/Blenheim bases were 'concerned' with 100 octane fuel. If those four stations held all Blenheim Squadrons, your claim may be true, but somehow I doubt it.

Wyton had two Blenheim Squadrons at the time: Nos. 15 and 40
"In December 1939, both Wyton squadrons were sent to France and Nos. 15 and 40 Squadrons returned from the Continent to Wyton, the first step in converting Battle squadrons to Blenheims. Both squadrons flew their first bombing raids from Wyton on May 10, 1940 against targets in the Low Countries. The Blenheims of No. 57 Squadron were based briefly at Wyton in June before going south, returning for two weeks the following month before flying north only to appear again at Wyton in late October. "

Wattisham had also two, Nos. 107 and 110 Squadrons http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/s30.html
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/s106.html

Watton also had two Blenheim Squadrons: Nos.21 and 82 Squadrons
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/s31.html

West Rayham had only one Blenheim Squadron, No. 139, and possibly from June 1940 also no. 18 also operating.

That's 7 or more like 8 Blenheim Squadrons on 100 octane. At that time there were 15 Bomber Command Sqns. operating Blenheim IVs. But this pretty much explains where 100 octane fuel went in such quantities - even those 8 Blenheim Squadrons were consuming a lot. Total tankage was 468 imp. gallons compared to 85 gallons on the Spit - a worth of about 45 Fighter Squadrons.. ;)

Its very straightforward there is a limit to what I can and cannot prove and that is something that I have always been open about. I do not make assumptions, neither do I post part of the information available to me. So going back to the thread that I put a link in to earlier.

Posting 2
Shows the instruction from the Chief of the Air Staff for fighters and Blenheim units to be equipped with 100 octane. The ACAS has made the request but its safe to assume he wouldn't do this without the authority from the top. Its a clear request without any limits, it doesn't say certain, or limit the issue by Group or any other qualification.

Posting 3
Contains two papers the one that Kurfurst quotes saying Certain squadrons and the second paper that gives the actual status in both Bomber and Fighter commands.
Its worth noting that I didn't have to post the first paper, I knew at the time that the word 'certain' could be used to discredit the position and had I not posted it no one would have known, but for completeness I did include it.
If you look at my posting 12 it includes the line
I could see one line which I knew Kurfurst would almost certainly leap on and could have left it out, but that would have broken the train so I kept it in.
I can only assume that he didn't dare use that word then but has now decided to do so. Anyway back to your question.

Posting 4
Here you can see that as a cost saving measure the Authorities wanted to keep one tank of 87 octane for visiting aircraft passing through. Bomber Command were against this and permission was given in some cases for all the fuel to be 100 Octane.

Note the terminology - the 87 Octane wasn't for non operational flights, but for aircraft passing through.
Note also the reference to the four bomber bases - these four bases were the only ones allowed to be 100% 100 Octane, the other bases had to keep one tank for the aircraft passing through. It certainly wasn't only these four bases were to have 100 octane.

Posting 5
is an update report

Posting 6
Is the paper confirming the completion of the switch from 87 to 100 octane. I do make the observation that
What is interesting is what isn't in the file and its a big file. At no stage is any concern expressed about any shortage of 100 Octane Fuel the level of stocks or any lack of supply. There was never any mention of capping distribution or shipping stocks from one station to another or sector

Posting 12
This is interesting for a different reason. It refers to the experimental production of 100 Octane fuel at a UK Refinery which produced 35,000 tons over four months, at a time when average useage was 10,000 tons a month. In other words had there been a shortage then the UK could easily have been self sufficient. The experiment did take place but due to cost grounds it was switched back to normal production when complete

I was asked if I had a list of when each station was equipped with 100 octane but there wasn't a schedule in the NA files.

It should also be noted that Kurfursts position was that only 18 fighter squadrons were equipped with 100 Octane which is one reason why I was asking him to state what number of aircraft or squadrons was he talking about in this forum being equipped with the better fuel.
It should be noted that we identified well over 30 squadrons which reported the use of the extra boost and additional stations which had 100 octane over and above the ones listed in the records. 100 octane was used in France and Norway so it was widely used and a standard issue

Posting 63
Kurfurst was getting a little desperate at this stage and I was totally open about my position saying
I think one thing has to be made clear. Can I give a 100% Cast Iron, Gold Plated guarantee that every station in fighter command had 100 Octane fuel. No I cannot, as that would involve checking vast amounts of data and I have a life to lead, so in short there could be one station in the back end of nowhere which didn't get the fuel. As Kurfurst rightly pointed out I used the phrase , "sources links that exist and support the view that Fighter Command was effectively fully converted to 100 Octane by May 1940. Note the word effectively.
That said I do believe and there is no evidence in my mind to contridict the view that all stations did have the 100 Octane Fuel.

This remains my position. There is no evidence anywhere that Fighter Command was anything but 100% fully equipped with 100 Octane. Hundreds of books have been written about the battle, probably more than on any other conflict and scores or personal memories and no one ever has mentioned this theory. No one has mentioned the obvious logistical or practical problems that having mixed fuel would mean.

We have a document trail from the instruction from the Chief of the Air Staff asking for fighters to be equipped with 100 Octane and the other papers that follow the implementation until completion. Why did someone type in certain on one paper I have no idea and am not making any assumptions.

We have other papers that were issued by Dowling about the dangers of using the extra boost and not telling the ground crews, papers that were issued to all of fighter command not just some units or stations.

Against this we have a paper that is supposed to exist in Australia which they have never heard of, which Kurfurst has never seen and had never asked for and finally if it does exist, is riddled with errors.

I am very aware that I have made serious accusations about Kurfurst but I have supported my comments and before anyone deletes these postings I suggest you check them out.

If you incorporate his theories into any code then you do stand a chance of being made to look very foolish..

Here's a source that states, unambiguously, that all of RAFFC converted to 100 octane:
https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/-0...lin_100oct.jpg

A. R. Ogston, excerpt from History of Aircraft Lubricants (Society of Automotive Enginers, Inc. Warrendale, PA USA), p. 12.

Seems pretty straightforward but I wouldn't call this a primary source. Do they list their references?

I'm in the process of reading this thread and I can tell you that almost everyone involved "looks foolish", yourself included.

Stop editorializing what you think Kurfurst is doing (Kurfurst is desperate, etc) it only serves to make you look petty, petulant, and juvenile. Indeed from reading your postings at ww2aircraft.net that is the conclusion to which I have come about your character.

In any case, I'm still reading the two threads and have yet to come across any definitive proof that RAF aircraft were 100% equipped with 100 octane at all times. I'm willing to be persuaded but that has not yet occurred.

Kurfurst,

Could you kindly post a link to this article written by the australian author directly? I have been waiting almost 2 weeks for my account at allaboutwarfare.com to be activated but it hasn't happened yet.

Data of the Fiat G.50 Freccia.

Weight(MTOW): 2402 kg
Empty weight: 1963 kg
Max speed: 472 kph/5000m
Cruise speed: 415 kph
Range: 670km
Ceiling: 10,700m
Climb rate: 6000m in 7'30'' ,5000m in 6'3''
Weapons: 2x Breda SAFAT with 150 rounds p/gun
Gunsight Type S.Giorgio at riflesione
Ammo: Counter included in panel
Fire system: Warning light, extintor at biossido di carbonio.
Radio: ARC 1
Fuel: 260 l(provision for 52 l of aux fuel in a fuselage tank)
Power: Engine Fiat A.74 RC, radial, 14 cylinders
740 HP in take off.
840 HP with 2400rpm at 4000m
879 HP with "+100"(WEP)
Propeller: Hamilton Standard 3D-41-1, constant speed, passo variabile
Misc: In panel/cockpit: Carburator heat switch, gear indicators, fire warning light, compressed air indicators, ammo counter, engine instruments, compass, cowling flaps selector, Flaps lever, parking brake lever.
Other: The G.50 turn well to the right but less satisfactory to the left . Stall with 125 to 130 kph. Exit of stall with turn to the right.

Dates from: "Fiat G.50 Le Macchine e la Storia, Stem Mucchi, Modena-Italia"

That's all I have for now.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o.../1940-0897.jpg
While not definative it provides a date when the British public may have become aware of 100 octane

And here is a site that discusses in length the benefits of the 109/Spit including pilot anidotes and references the introduction of 100 Hi-Octane fuel
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit1vrs109e.html

And for those to lazy to read...

The Merlin III engine data is from Rolls-Royce. 24 The DB 601A engine data is taken from curves found in the DB 601 A u. B Motoren-Handbuch of May 1942. 25 Trials were successfully carried out in October 1939 to increase the power of the Spitfire's Merlin II and III engines by raising the manifold pressure to +12 lbs./sq.in. 26 Air Ministry A.P.1590B/J.2-W. dated 20 March 1940 gives official notice that "The emergency use of higher boost pressures up to +12 lb./sq. in. is now permitted for short periods by operation of the modified boost control cut-out". 27 Also during February and March 1940 Spitfire and Hurricane Squadrons were converting their aircraft over to 100 octane fuel, which made possible an increase in engine power by raising the boost to +12 lb/sq.in.. 28a 28b 28c 28d 28e 28f 28g 28h 28i 28j 28k 28l 28m 28n 28o 28p 28q 28r 28s 28t Combat reports show that +12 lb boost was used by the Spitfire (and Hurricane) squadrons during their first combats with the Me 109 E in May 1940 while covering the Dunkirk evacuation. 29 30 Hurricane Squadrons based in France during May of 1940 were also employing +12 lbs/sq.in. boost in combat. 31 31b

The first Spitfire into service was delivered to No. 19 Squadron at Duxford on 4 August 1938. The use of 100 octane fuel was approved for Spitfire Squadrons by 24 September 1938. 32 Fighter Command noted on 6 December 1938 that Duxford, Debden, Northholt and Digby had received 100 octane fuel. 32b As of December 1938 Nos. 19 and 66 were based at Duxford and were the only RAF units then equipped with Spitfires. The Air Ministry noted in a memo dated 12 December 1939 that "100 octane fuel is approved for use in Hurricane, Spitfire and Defiant aircraft, and state that issue will be made as soon as the fuel is available in bulk at the distribution depots serving the Fighter Stations concerned." 32c Gavin Bailey concluded that "The actual authorisation to change over to 100-octane came at the end of February 1940 and was made on the basis of the existing reserve and the estimated continuing rate of importation in the rest of the year." 33 As of 31 March 1940 220,000 tons of 100 octane fuel was held in stock. 34 The Co-ordination of Oil Policy Committee noted in the conclusions of their 18 May 1940 meeting with regard to the "Supply of 100 Octane fuel to Blenheim and Fighter Squadrons" that Spitfire and Hurricane units "had now been stocked with the necessary 100 octane fuel". 35 The Committee recorded that actual consumption of 100 octane for the 2nd Quarter 1940 was 18,100 tons. 36 Jeffrey Quill recalled:

It was only shortly before the Battle of Britain that we changed over to 100 octane. It had the effect of increasing the combat rating of the Merlin from 3000 rpm at 6 1/2 lb boost (Merlin III) or 9 lb boost (Merlin XII) to 3,000 rpm at 12 lb boost. This, of course, had a significant effect upon the rate of climb, particularly as the constant speed propellers (also introduced just before the battle) ensured that 3,000 rpm was obtainable from the ground upwards whereas previously it was restricted by the two-pitch propellers. It also had an effect upon the maximum speed but this was not so significant as the effect upon rate of climb. 37

Wood and Dempster wrote in their book "The Narrow Margin":

As it turned out, aviation spirit was to prove no worry for the R.A.F. By July 11th, 1940, the day after the Battle of Britain opened, stocks of 100 octane petrol used in the Merlin engine stood at 343,000 tons. On October 10th, twenty-one days before the battle closed, and after 22,000 tons had been issued, stocks had risen to 424,000 tons. With other grades of aviation spirit total stock available on October 10th, 1940, was 666,000 tons. Oil reserves were 34,000 tons. 38

Wood & Dempster’s figures for stocks of 100 octane are in agreement with those of the War Cabinet, however, their figure of 22,000 tons issued falls short of the Air Ministry’s figures as shown below. By 7 August 1940 "authority has been obtained for the use of 100 octane fuel in all operational aircraft and that instructions to that effect are being issued to Commands", i.e. all operational aircraft in Bomber, Coastal, Training and Fighter Commands. 39 On October 29, just before the end of the Battle of Britain, 423,400 tons of 100 octane fuel was in stock in the UK. 40a The War Cabinet recorded that 100 octane stocks stood at 202,000 tons on 31 December 1939 and that 100 octane stocks had risen to 499,000 tons one year later on 31 December 1940. 40b The Air Ministry recorded that 58,000 tons of 100 octane were issued during the Battle of Britain. 40c The War Cabinet recorded that 100 octane consumption within the UK for the whole of 1940 amounted to 130,000 tons, an average of 2,500 tons per week. 40d Consumption of 100 octane during the Battle of Britain averaged 10,000 tons per month for the months of July and August rising to 14,000 tons in September followed by 17,000 tons during October. Total consumption of 100 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain therefore was on the order of 50,000 tons. 40e V. A. Kalichevsky, author of the 1943 book The Amazing Petroleum Industry wrote:

It is an established fact that a difference of only 13 points in octane number made possible the defeat of the Luftwaffe by the R.A.F. in the Fall of 1940. This difference, slight as it seems, is sufficient to give a plane the vital "edge" in altitude, rate of climb and maneuverability that spells the difference between defeat and victory. 40f

The Spitfire I Pilot's Notes lays out the use of +12 boost as follows:41



An August 1, 1940 memo from Air Chief Marshall Dowding to all Fighter Groups shows that the pilots often exceeded these limits.

The use of the automatic boost cut out control enables the pilot to get an emergency boost of + 12 lbs. per sq.in. from the engine for 5 minutes when circumstances demand it. Some pilots "pull the plug" with little excuse on every occasion. 42

At least I am a petty, petulant and juvenile person who post sources, links and original documentation.
Being serious for a moment, if you have any questions or explanations don't hesitate to ask either on the forum or by PM. That offer is obviously open to anyone.

Maybe i missed something but why the debate on 100 octane at all, is there a quotable source that says it was not available?
Again all the sources I have found indicate it was, and ironically even during the Battle for France 12 lb boost was used an indication 100 Octane was available then?

There isn't one that I or anyone else has found.

If I can address the question of the number of Blenheim squadrons which were stocked with 100 octane.

Kurfurst had until the last few days said that there were only two squadrons and asked me to supply my evidence.

The following papers which he has seen before and quoted on recently make it clear that the four stations are the only stations to be fully fuelled with 100 octane. The paper makes it clear that these are the exception and that the norm must be to retain one tank of 87 octane for aircraft that are passing through.

Note 1 - all Blenheim units are to be equipped with 100 octane
Note 2 - only the four specified bases are to be only equipped with 100 octane
Note 3 - the 87 octane is for aircraft passing through not non operational flying

If anyone wants any additional information please let me know

Hi. Can you attaching higher resolution picture? I can not read the second page :(

Save n Zoom?

the 300 pixel wide text part will not be more detailed, just bigger :)
The native language of who is English, read it more easily sure...

It is a dreadful copy but the following may help

Thank you, it helps :)

I can re-post for you the original post(s) from July 2004. Needless to say, Neil Stirling got a heart attack when he saw it. ;) Neil, like some other here were pushing for a pet theory about 100% 100 octane use in FC for some years, but have found no evidence during 10 years of research. It must have been very sobering to him.


The most interesting part is that "Pips" found this well before, in 2004 or earlier, and it agrees with every single document Neil managed to dig up afterwards, though Neil and now Glider tries to discredit this research with whatever means, basically calling Pips a liar behind his back at every opportunity, but never to his face.. The problem is, if Pip would have made it up, he was extremely talented, because Pips information from 2004 - for example that the large scale fighter conversion begun in late September 1940 - agrees perfectly with what Neil found in British archives in 2009 about 87 vs 100 octane consumption rates (and then waited two years before publishing it, as it was obviously not very helpful to his own thesis).

Note that as per the consumption figures, 100 octane did not become the main fuel until late September 1940, just like Pips stated, 7 years ago.

http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e1..._duringBoB.png

[QUOTE=Glider;298446]Kurfurst had until the last few days said that there were only two squadrons and asked me to supply my evidence.

Stop making things up and putting into other's mouths. As others have noted, it makes you look petty, petulant, and juvenile. Its the lowest form of arguement, when you have nothing worthwhile to offer.

The paper does not say that. You have made it up.

I would like to see the complete papers, not just snippets you wish to show.

Here's what the best Spitfire book (Morgan/Shacklady: Spitfire, the History), by far, has to say on the question.

Take note that it very well mentions the supply problems with the import of 100 octane from overseas, and also take note Glider is very well aware of this work, having shown this several times. Instead, he sells a story about 'hundreds' of books not mentioning a thing.. ;)

The relative lifespan of the engine (10-20 hours on +12 lbs vs 100 hours on +6 1/4 lbs) is also of interest.

http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e1...00octane_1.jpg
http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e1...00octane_2.jpg

Those two images you attached speak pretty clearly to me, and say that the DTD230 (which I assume is 87 octane?) is not simply "for aircraft passing through" but rather the station must include aircraft passing through when calculating its total consumption requirements for DTD230. In other words, the station must take into account not only its own consumption of 87 octane but also the consumption of any aircraft that might be passing through.

In fact the first scan states quite clearly that the decision to eliminate their holdings of DTD230 should not be taken as a precedent, so to me this is in fact quite compelling evidence that the RAF had not converted all its aircraft to 100 octane (at least in April of 1940 when the document is dated).

http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e1...00octane_2.jpg

There are several errors in the above excerpt. The Merlin X had a two stage SC and was not a Merlin III modified to run on 100 octane.

British Tanker losses in the first year of the war were quite low.

OTOH, it shows clearly that the Merlin III could be run for long periods of time at 12lb/3000rpm. 10 hours in 1938 engines and 20 hours in later engines.

http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e1...00octane_1.jpg

and this is a prewar planning document, and we all know that RAFFC made a wholesale conversion to CS props and 100octane fuel in the spring of 1940 in response to wartime events, especially the improved performance of the Me109. Conversion to 100 octane without changing over to CS props was almost pointless, but a March 1939 planning meeting could not have envisaged the largescale changes that would be required by Spring 1940.

This might clarify the position. The first paper you have seen before and is the Summary of the Conclusion of the 5th Meeting of the Oil Committee. You have seen this before its where the Chief of the Air Staff has requested that fighters and Blenheim units be equipped with 100 Octane.

The second paper is the actions from the 5th meeting of the Oil Committee for the 6th Meeting. Here the statment is quite clear that Blenheim units in No 2 Group were to switch to 100 Octane.

The previous two papers I posted highlighted that four stations were to be totally equipped with 100 Octane and the others were to keep one tank of 87 Octane. I should add that these were from the 6th meeting of the Committee. I should also add another paper from the 7th Meeting of the Oil Committee where they confirm that the fighter units concerned had been stocked with the 100 Octane Fuel and that the Air Minestry had been impressed with the way that the task had been handled.

You can of course read those previous papers how you wish, but to me when it says to keep one sixth of the fuel as 87 Octane and five sixths 100 Octane and we know that some of that 87 Octane is for visiting aircraft then operations are going to be on 100 Octane. Put all the papers together they tell me that all Blenheim units in No 2 Group are going to use 100 Octane on operations. I emphasise all, not two squadrons.

You may well consider me to be childish but I have produced original documentation to support my case.

The meeting notes you posted seem to confirm that Bomber command was using 100 Octane in the Blenheim's.

However it clearly states that Fighter Command was still not clear whether or not 100 Octane could even be used in Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft.

Yeah...that is the times from the endurance trials, Seadog. It was 10 hours total time. That 10 hours at +12lbs was 5 minutes at a time with a 20 minute rest period in-between. It was not 10 hours straight at +12lbs....

:eek:

Re Fighter Command you are correct and from the papers it was clear that this was totally unexpected, after all the engines had been tested and aircraft equipped with them for performance testing. It was the last thing they expected and was dealt with as the following paper trail explains.

In the Summary of Conclusions of the 6th Meeting the following action was given to RDE 1 who was a Mr Tweedie, the action being to clarify the position with Fighter Command. In the 7th Meeting it was noted that the use of this fuel had been made clear to Fighter Command and that the Units had been equipped with the 100 Octane Fuel.

I don't think any aeroplane of the period had enough fuel to run for 10 hours straight at +12, so I don't think you have to worry too much about the engine not getting rest between bouts of torture... :-P

The endurance trials were conducted over the course of many flights. It was not done on a test stand but on a Hurricane IIRC. The airplane flew multiple flights to accumulate time and the test ended when the engine failed ~10 hours of operation at +12lbs.

Yes, it states the units concerned have been stocked.

What are the units concerned?

It doesn't say but its a common phrase to say in this situation. We do know that the Chief of the Air Staff had asked for fighter units to be equipped with 100 Octane. This request wasn't limited to Group or squadron or any other kind of boundary so I believe that the units concerned are the Fighter units.
I admit that its the sort of ambiguity that some people will try to build a lot on, but I cannot help what a senior civil servant wrote down seventy years ago and have to live with the consequences.

No, that's a quite untrue representation of the doucment. The document actually says: "At the last meeting AMSO referred to a proposal that certain Fighter and Bomber Squadrons should begin the use of 100 octane fuel..."

There's no uncertanity in here. You simply misquote the document.

Gilder, do you have the complete file?

Clearly this posting (note not a paper) forms the core of the argument that RAF Fighter command were not fully equipped with 100 Octane so I will look at it in detail.

Fighter Command started converting its aircraft before March. An exact date I do not have but attach two documents showing that two squadrons were equipped by 16th February, the probability is that there were others but I cannot confirm that.

The 25% figure by May 1940 I cannot confirm or deny so will not comment, but the rest of this section I do fundamentally disagree with. In December 1939 stocks of 100 Octane were 202,000 tons and by August 1940 stocks were at 404,000 tons (documents are attached). We know that in June – August the average consumption was 10,000 tons a month (document attached).
The questions I suggest that we need to ask are:-
1) If you have what is in effect a three and a half year stockpile, is this a strain, let alone a great strain on the stockpile. In my opinion it isn’t a strain at all, it’s barely noticeable
2) The implication that the RAF fought the BOB with only 25% of its aircraft converted is unbelievable. Think of the practical implications, squadrons with mixed fuels and mixed performances, what are new build aircraft 100 octane or 87 octane, engines are changed and replaced, again are these 100 octane or 87 octane. Why hasn’t anybody mentioned this in all the hundreds of books written on the BOB?


The British War Cabinet didn’t discuss 100 Octane at all in May and as a result no decisions were made. I spent a day in the NA going through all the papers for the meetings, the meeting notes and the actions resulting, and Fuel of any kind was not discussed. I should add that in May 1940 the War Cabinet met almost daily and it was a huge amount of paper, literally hundreds of sheets. There were some interesting unexpected gems, the one I liked most was a decision to take over a number of Swedish Naval vessels by force and include them in the Navy. The First Sea Lord decided that while additional vessels were always welcome, giving Germany an excuse to invade Sweden to protect them from the British was too high a risk.

I am afraid that this is incorrect. The previous paper giving the stocks in 1940 show a strong steady increase, it certainly wasn’t the case that they had to wait until August for additional stocks. There is no indication anywhere that the RAF stopped converting fighters in May, fought the BOB with 125 aircraft modified for 100 Octane and then re started converting the aircraft in late September.
In fact the stocks had reached such a level in August that the rest of the operational aircraft in the RAF were authorised to start using 100 Octane (paper attached on following posting).

I am afraid that no one has seen this paper so cannot comment on the sources for the above posting.

This posting contains the missing document from before and a couple of others that show the anticipated delivery/consumption and stocks.

It is an ambiguity...period.

What else needs to be said?

The rest of the argument is built on speculation. What is the difference on the sides?

What sides are there anyway outside of gamer context?? There is only the facts and a mystery to be solved.

If you have consumption documents, why try to plot FC operations vs consumption of 100 grade.

If you see a the curves correspond, they it is probable the fuel was used by FC.

The level of hypocrisy being put out by the Luftwaffles on this board is astounding.

On one hand they demand forms in triplicate showing every single British fighter aircraft and every single fighter field was provided with unlimited supplies of 100 octane. On the other hand, they put forward claims for the German use of high octane and DB601N engines with a complete lack of documentation.

In the this thread, and the threads from other boards we have had clear and comprehensive documentation for the use of 100 octane presented. This can be summarized as follows: (documentation for all these stages has been provided in this thread or the other threads from other boards which have been linked)

1) As far back as 1937, the RAF and British scientists recognize higher octane fuel provides the opportunity for higher power output and better performance for their fighter and bomber aircraft.

2) The RAF and British government begin planning for the accumulation of stocks of fuel, this begins with the importation of higher octane fuel from the US, but also involves the conversion of British refineries to allow domestic production if the US sources are jeapordized.

3) Testing of 100 octane fuel in the Hurricane, Spitfire and Blenheim aircraft types begins pre-war in March of 1939. Entire Squadrons are converted and standardized to the use of the fuel.

4) As a result of these tests providing successful results in the use of 100 octane, and the accumulation of several 100 thousand gallons of fuel, (more than two years supply) the RAF is given the go ahead to convert the entirety of Fighter Command and selected Blenheim Squadrons to the use of 100 octane. This process is directed to be initiated in March of 1940. The gravity of the strategic situation demands every step be taken. With plentiful supply, there is every reason to move ahead.

5) Reports from both the organizational bodies of the RAF, as well as plentiful Squadron and Pilot reports, during the period May-September 1940, mention the stocking and/or use of +12 boost and 100 octane in Hurricane, Spitfire and Defiant aircraft at all of the sector fields and most of the secondary fields in 10, 11 and 12 Groups, the three RAF Fighter Groups which were most heavily engaged in the Battle. Other Squadron and pilot reports note the use of 100 octane earlier during the Battle of France.

6) Mid battle, a memo is directed to ALL RAF Squadrons from Air Chief Marshal Dowding, the officer in command of Fighter Command, cautioning all pilots not to over use +12 boost, (only used with 100 octane fuel) in situations which are not emergencies.

7) Consumption of 100 octane fuel rises heavily from the period June to September 1940. Despite this, RAF stocks of the fuel remain plentiful thanks to deliveries from the US.

8 ) All newly manufactured RAF aircraft during the period July-September 1940 are standardized with new equipment which allows them to accept and run 100 octane fuel and higher boost.

With all this documentation, the weight of proof clearly indicates 100 octane fuel was in standardized use by Fighter Command in the 10, 11 and 12 Group areas during the Battle. These Group areas encompass the entire section of Britain represented in the COD map.

Only those who have closed minds and a fixed agenda can continue to against the inclusion of 100 octane fueled aircraft.

Meanwhile these self same naysayers make their claims for the use of high octane German fuel, and DB601N engines, with an infinitely smaller scale of proof.

+1

In regards to the Blenheim, the pilot's notes for the Mk.IV specify use of BOTH 87 and 100 octane fuel.

They wanted extra range so they added two extra fuel tanks (the outboard ones) along with a jettison valve for each one.

This made the aircraft heavier when fully fueled and they needed extra boost to maintain a safe takeoff distance. So they modified the engines to run +9 lbs and installed a boost cut-out.

The extra boost caused detonation so they needed 100 octane, but fighter boys needed it too.

The solution? When loaded for long range, Blenheims used 87 octane fuel in the inboard tanks and 100 octane fuel in the outboard tanks.

Take off was done on 100 octane and +9 lbs, climb was done on 87 octane and +5 lbs (ie, they throttled back and switched tanks right after takeoff), cruise was still on 87 octane with a limit of +3.5 lbs for auto-rich mixture and +1.5 lbs for auto-lean.

The standard operating procedure called for depleting the inboard tanks first because they lacked a jettison valve and their fuel contents couldn't be dumped to lighten up the aircraft in an emergency.

Once the inboard tanks were exhausted they were to fly the rest of the mission on 100 octane from the outboard tanks.

For short range missions they would only load the inboard tanks with 87 octane, because +5 lbs boost was deemed sufficient to takeoff with the reduced fuel load.

At least that's what the Mk.IV pilot's operating handbook states.

Simple blatant lie. See:

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...9&postcount=42
http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...9&postcount=43

And another. The memo is a circular that was of course generally to be circulated to all Groups.

Source please.

Actually, evidence for the use of 100 octane fuel is far more decisive and reliable than in the case of the RAF.

For example, we do not know how many RAF Fighter Stations were issued 100 octane fuel, apart from the 'certain' number 'concerned'. We do not know how many Merlins were converted and were in service use for 100 octane. We do not know how many RAF Fighter Stations were issued 100 octane fuel, apart from the 'certain' number 'concerned'. We do not know even how many FC Squads were using the fuel at the same time.

All we have is a handful of RAF fans who keep screaming hysterically, and showing childish innuendo waving around the same 3 worn pages over and over again, and try to read into them something they wish for but the papers do not say.

All the specifics they managed to dig up that the RAF decided in March 1939 to equip 16 Fighter Squadrons for 100 octane by September 1940, and that the 'certain' Squadrons 'concerned' were equipped so by mid-May 1940. Oh wait - we knew that already from books, just see the Spitfire the History scan...

In contrast, we know all this for the German side and have a much clearer picture without any need of dubious 'interpretation' by biased fanatics. The facts are plainly on the table. We know when, where, and how many planes were flying with DB 601N and in what units. Which is why there's so much less hysteria about it - well apart the aforementioned fanatics. ;) Solid research does that.

Bravo! :)

clarifying the ling Kurfurst
The request from the ACAS is included in the first paper. You will see that its item 9 in the papers giving the summary of the conclusions of the 5th Meeting. This note is direct and simply asks for squadrons armed with fighters and Blenheims be equiped with 100 Octane fuel
The paper you are referring to is also attached for completeness. It is the summary of the actions from the 5th meeting for the 6th meeting. You will see that it specificly refers to item 9 in the Summary of Conclusions. So the paper trail is clear and complete. Now why he says certain I do not know and am not going to guess, but the request from the ACAS was clear and I did not misquote it.

[QUOTE=Kurfürst;298531]Please see your posting 52 and 76 on this thread.

Actually the lie is yours, you lie by omission. Your links are an incomplete listing of combat reports, there are more than these available if you bother to look through the previously mentioned threads, needless to say, you have a vested interest in not doing so. AND in addition to the combat reports there are the administrative reports and photographs, listing deliveries or showing 100 octane being present at fields in fuelers.

You keep throwing these 'lie' words about, yet the facts show you are the one who is misleading people... :D

Dowding's memo is a normal chain of command directive to all Group Commanders which was in turn to be communicated to all Squadron commanders and thence pilots. The Memo specifically says the memo is to be copied "...to all Squadrons and fighter stations". The content is worded and directed "Handling of Merlin in Hurricane, Spitfire and Defiant Aircraft", ie. instructions directed to the pilots who flew the aircraft.

Pdf here:

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/dowding.pdf

Why send a memo the contents of which are for the instruction of ALL fighter pilots unless those pilots are all using 100 octane?

Such demands... :D You already have seen the relevant memo many times over and unless your memory is as poor as your reasoning, you should be quite aware of the directive changing specifications for newer aircraft.

Memo dated March 20th 1940, noting the changes required to allow use of +12 boost notes modifications for aircraft already in field service. These are for engines manufactured prior to the approval for use of 100 octane and +12 boost.

As you know, once an engine modification has been officially tested and approved, Rolls Royce gave that mod a number and it was implemented on the factory floor for new engine manufactures.

The modification for the boost cutout valve is listed in the memo as 'Mod Number Merlin/154', ie. it is officially approved and now part of the engine production regime. It is a very simple case of drilling a couple of holes, shown in the official instructional drawing released with the modification. (Drg. No. A.P. 1590B/J.2/40) This drawing and the instruction would have been incorporated into the Merlin III assembly handbook used by factory mechanics, and all new Merlins would have this incorporated.

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/ap1590b.jpg

Again, your memory seems to be failing you. In fact, rather than 3 pages, we have presented dozens, close to hundreds of pages of documentation, they can be found in the threads linked earlier. Holding your breath and pretending not to be aware of them will not make them disappear.

You are very strict about demanding proof from the British side, strange how there doesn't seem to be a quid pro quo as far as the standard of proof on your side. Perhaps you'd like to present your clear documentation comprehensively in a thread? I have yet to see examples of this 'solid research' in a thread entitled 'Use of high octane and the DB601N engine during the BoB'.

So how about it?

All

Can anyone supply any information (apart from a pre war planning paper) that indicates that 100 Octane wasn't available to all of fighter Command.

The only one that I can think of is the posting from Pips which I have commented on in some detail and I cannot believe that anyone will nail their flags to that mast.

In the WW2aircraft forum Kurfurst did just that until awkward questions were asked such as:-
a) How do 30+ different squadrons share 125 aircraft
b) What happens about replacements
c) Why would a nation fighting for its life leave 350-400, 000 tons of high octane fuel sitting around unused when the changes to the aircraft were small and the impact in performance huge.

What evidence do they have remembering that every book both tactical and technical by every historian and every memoir supports the fact that it was supplied.

You can agree or disagree with what I and others have posted, lets see what evidence you can supply for us to agree or disagree.

Yada yada yada....

You claim that all stations received the fuel and there documentation to.
It was shown to you which stations are indicated by this documentation, combat reports etc.
You now claim that certain stations/combat reports are omissioned.

You change the subject whenever it gets hot, and it threatens you with doing some actual research and providing evidence for your claims. Fine.The listing was compliled by the Grinch, and I trust he has done an honest job at it.

If you believe some stations were left out, list them. II expect that you will change the subject again and remain silent about this, probably resorting to another ad hominem attack or making another stupid claim you can't back up.

You keep throwing about ad hominem insults all the time, attack posters but that only shows how childish you are and how utterly incapable of showing anything that would support your point. You are a waste of time for everyone here.

For the same reason they sent out 150 grade instructions in the Spitfire IX to all Groups in ADGB in 1944, even when only two IX Squadrons (Nos 1 and 165) were actually operating on the fuel on an operational trials. http://www.spitfireperformance.com/adgbs29867g.gif

Its simply common good sense and practice to circulate such letters to everyone. It was done everywhere.

Memo dated March 20th 1940, noting the changes required to allow use of +12 boost notes modifications for aircraft already in field service. These are for engines manufactured prior to the approval for use of 100 octane and +12 boost.

As you know, once an engine modification has been officially tested and approved, Rolls Royce gave that mod a number and it was implemented on the factory floor for new engine manufactures.

The modification for the boost cutout valve is listed in the memo as 'Mod Number Merlin/154', ie. it is officially approved and now part of the engine production regime. It is a very simple case of drilling a couple of holes, shown in the official instructional drawing released with the modification. (Drg. No. A.P. 1590B/J.2/40) This drawing and the instruction would have been incorporated into the Merlin III assembly handbook used by factory mechanics, and all new Merlins would have this incorporated.

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/ap1590b.jpg[/QUOTE]

Well there you go! You were right on this one doubt. Now how about supporting your other claims the same way?


"Close to hundreds" - :D

Actually what Glider does is posting the same three pages hundreds of times for the lack of evidence, perhaps that the thing that confused you. They say that certain fighter stations/squadrons concerned will receive 100 octane fuel.

Regardless that its pretty obvious that this means selected units, as was pointed out to him here by at least 3 other posters and numerous others at ww2aircraft.net, disproving his thesis, he continously misrepresents that and mirepresents what the papers say. Its funny, because I remember he used to say the same about them, but then argued that these papers were 'revised' later. When asked to tell when this supposedly happened, he kept shooting random dates, but every time asked to present the papers, he went silent.

And now he claims that 'certain' Fighter Stations 'concerned' actually reads 'all'.

Note - I have been asking Glider if he has the complete file, and every time he remains silent. Truth is that he has never been in the National Archives at all and never seen the files.

I don't want them to be disappear at all. The documents posted say that as of May 1940, only selected Fighter command stations were supplied with 100 octane fuel.
That's my point all the way through and pretty much everybody elses in both this thread and ww2aircraft.net boards.

I already did that on this board, ww2aircraft.net boards and on my website as well.

That you or Glider wish to make up your own fantasies about that Germans didn't operationally employ 100 octane fuel is entirely your problem. Fact is that British pre-war desires to get 100 octane in their fighters was fueled by fears that the Germans were developing their engines for 100 octane fuel, and they were in a much better position to obtain 100 octane fuel, as they produced it themselves, and were not dependend on foreign availabilty or could be denied from it by blocking sea imports.

I notice a lack of evidence on your part here Kurfurst. I gave you two linking documents and admit I don't know why the person who received the paper said certain when the request was clear, but I didn't make any assumption. You have now made an assumption that it was limiting in some way, but in what way you don't know and don't supply anything to suggest what 'certain' meant interms of squadrons, bases, groups anything in fact.

If I recall the debate went my way Kurfurst and no one disproved anything that I said.

Priceless

And where did I say that?

I don'y have the complete file its huge, but I certainly went as a number of the documents were not in the public domain before I posted them



Whch of us was banned from the WW2aircraft thread? and the Wikipedia editing thread? Me or you




This is as you know total rubbish as documented in some detail by Gavin Bailey (a published historian from Dundee University) in his papers on fuel. You will remember him, the person you accused of coming from Pennsylvania, using another identity, purporting to be Gavin Bailey and grossly misrepresented his findings to the degree that he made formal complaints to the Wiki editing team.
Here is the link if you have difficulty remembering http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Ai...tle_of_Britain

What is missing from your tirade is any evidence to support your theory that the RAF wasn't effectively fully equipped with 100 Octane. All you have tried to do is distort other peolpes document supporting that theory.

PS do you still stick by Pips postins as the basis of your argument. If you don't then what is the basis of your argument?

Could you two fight this out via PM????
That would be a relief for this topic as your post are OT!
Talk about performance and not the reasons why or why not it was reached.

I note you have again evaded my question.

Do you have the complete file of these meetings, Glider?

Answer the question if you want your questions to be answered.

So its up to others to disprove the claim you've made but could not prove? Sorry it doesn't work that way. The burden of proof is upon you, otherwise we would be in a nonsensical case of Russel's teapot:

"Many orthodox people speak as though it were the business of sceptics to disprove received dogmas rather than of dogmatists to prove them. This is, of course, a mistake. If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such a teapot were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into the minds of children at school, hesitation to believe in its existence would become a mark of eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the attentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the Inquisitor in an earlier time."

But since you need evidence, I direct you to the papers you posted, which say that only certain Fighter Stations concerned will receive the fuel. Since all Fighter Stations previously held 87 octane, it follows that certain other Fighter Stations that were not 'concerned' kept operating at 87 octane, and not 100 octane.

It's clear-cut, we have document that says only select Fighter Sqns were supplied with 100 octane, we have fuel deliveries showing that 2/3s to 4/5 of the concumption was 87 octane, we have Spitfire II pilots notes which show rating for both 87 and 100 octane, and we have the papers which show that conversion of stations to 100 octane did not re-commence until late September. By coincidence, fuel issues papers also show that 100 octane did not begin to replace 87 octane as the main fuel consumed until late September..


In contrast I cannot remember any paper that would say all fighter stations are supplied with 100 octane fuel. You have actually admitted yourself earlier this thread, that you have not seen one either.

The only awkward thing was your stubborn defiance to accept the facts. Several other posters in WW2aircraft forum told you that your 'evidence' is simply not sufficient to make the claims you were making. If you wish to believe your own fairy tale, that's your problem.

Now to answer your questions.

a, This was answered WW2aircraft forums and here earlier in this thread. Your dishonesty represents itself in that
aa, You make a nonsensical strawmen arguement. Pips noted that apprx. 25% of FC converted to 100 octane in May, which, in May, represneted about 125 aircraft. And here you say turn this inside out by comparing that May 1940 apprxtion of 125 to combat reports by ca. 30 Squadrons between May 1940 and November 1940 in a seven month period. Who do you think you're fooling - yourself?

b, They are cut in small pieces, gently fried, salted and peppered according to taste, and served after chilled. I hope you do not find this answer any more awkwardd than your question was.

c, Because they simply did not have 400 tons of fuel. They had but half of that when the decision was made.
ca, The Germans were sinking British tankers at an increasing rate, and all 100 octane fuel was coming in those tankers
cb, Because they consider pre-war (see March 1939 paper, 16+2 Sqns w. 100 octane by September 1940) that reserves of 800 000 tons were needed to be built up. By the end of 1939 they had accumalated only 200 000 tons. Five months later, their reserves of 100 octane were still just 220 000 tons. They expected another 436 000 tons to arrive, but this was increasingly uncertain as Uboot took their toll on the tankers, and, during May and June, until the French capitulation, with 25% of their fighters and some of their bombers running on 100 octane the British consumed 12 000 tons of 100 octane and 42 000 tons of other (87) grades, or 54 000 ton of avgas at total - and there was no tanker running in with 100 octane until August 1940. Thus, as the situation looked in May-June and July, replacing other grades with 100 octane was thus simply out of the question, as they could run out of 100 octane in that case in roughly 5 months time.

Your claim that "every historian and every memoir supports" your claim that 100 octane was supplied to all Fighter Command stations is simply hogwash. You managed to present one such book, that concentrates on engines and not on operations (and thus likely in error as it was not the authors field) that says that. In contast a far more respected source, Spitfire the History who's authors went into extreme depths in research such as listing the detailed fate of every single Spitfire ever built clearly state that the original plan was 16 Fighter Squadrons to be supplied, but there were problems with supply due to the Uboot threat, though this was eased later. This is exactly what Pip's papers say, and in fact, the same thing your papers say, too.

Glider,

Your paper of the 7th meeting in May 1940 says that only select Fighter Stations are supplied with 100 octane fuel.

Deal with that.

Frankly I don't understand what are those ppl hijacking a game forum - that shld be dedicated mostly to young players - to rage a war that seems to count countless uneventful battles.

Now as I am not that much hypocrite I will tell you what I am thinking abt this debate that as lasted too long :

Firstly : Historically in none of the book that I hve read so far (and I hve read nearly a thousand on aviation field) have mentioned the fact that BoB RAF's Spitfire fleet did use 100oct
Secondly : none of you 10Other care much abt the Hurri despite that we know pretty well what Dowding fear most and the fact that Hurri were at that time accounting for two third of the RAF order of battle
Thirdly : your arguments (boost for HP and speed) regarding the use of 100oct does not fit any mechanical logic regarding the subsequent dev of the Merlin
Fourthly ; your over aggressive comments in such a sensitive time of history does not honor the fighting spirit of those "few" hundreds of men that didn't hesitate to make the ultimate sacrifice without loudly putting their case to the public(at least when all the pint of beer and bottle of whiskey stand at bay)
Fifth : The arguments you provided against does not convince us as much as those advocating the other thesis. If you can't prove that something does exist you can't say that it's a truth. Only believer can agree in certain case but I am sry to say that your lack of poetry and chivalry deserve your meaning.

Let's resume :
1st. We can say that some Spit and Hurri did rely to 100oct latte in BoB in frontline units.
2nd We can assume that 100oct was used on low alt raider bombers - perhaps "the some of the spits" were low alt escorting fighters. This makes more sense that 100oct being used at alt high fight (were BoB did occur : Bob was an anti-bomber campaign for the RaF !)
3rd The value for the HP provided are grossly overestimated and only focused on the Spit witch does not makes any sense as Spit and 109 were much close match and it seems to be well known for years
4th the Spit FM in CoD is so ridiculously CFS friendly that your lack of any ref to this fact makes your thesis very suspicious. If realism, impartiality and accuracy were your credo you sincerely miss there a strong opportunity to lift your case.
5th Average reader here (and I am one of us) does not know what are your anger against Kurf (with who I hve not particular preference but who did provide us better analysis in term of logics IMHO) but let me say that many of us does not approve any public hanging. In Eu these are( or must stay) facts of the past as are Nationalism, racism and revisionism...Thx so much to the very "Few" (and sadly millions of others)

I hope this sterile debate wld be close on this forum for now.


If you hve read all this text so far, thx for the time spent. Pls be assured that I don't want to hurt anyone based on quickly typed arguments on a public game forum. We are not historians.

~S!

I will drop the agression and let the documents speak for themselves. The reason I went into this debate was to try and ensure that when you model the aircraft for the sim you need to ensure that the RAF fighters are equiped with 100 Octan performance.

If you don't then you stand a very high chance of being ridiculed by some very knowledgable people who will want to know what the evidence is.

Whatever the comments some vital documents have not been questioned so I will only touch on those here.

The stocks of 100 Octane were very significant and grew during the battle to approx 400,000 tons by the end of the battle at a time when consumption was only 10,000 tons a month on average between June and August so there was no shortage of the fuel.

We know that the changes to the engines to use the fuel were small and the performance gains substantial and we know that 30+ squadrons used the fuel including units in France and Norway. It was 30+ not because we only found 30+ squadrons but because we only looked at 30+ squadrons. I am very confident that if we looked at the rest we would find the same but cannot guarantee it

Although said with vigour, my postings have been honest and as complete as I can make them. Look at the explanations I have given in a cool light and you will see that where I don't know I have said I don't know for instance where the original papers said certain. Where I have made an interpratation I have tried to support it and explain why I made it. An example being the request from the ACAS which was clear but the Oil Committee members said proposal and certain. In these cases you need to look at both papers not just the one.

I don't know which books you have read but if you go to any bookshop or look online you will find a number of books that cover this topic and all of them agree with the proposal that the RAF did equip fighter command with 100 Octane. If you want to send me a PM I will supply some suggestions but don't want to lead you. If you want a balanced view ask Kurfurst and he mght be able to suggest some. I would be interested to know what he suggests.

I do believe that those who don't believe that FC wasn't fully equipped have not put forward any evidence relying on a misinterptritation of the papers put forward by myself and others.

You may want to check out those links I gave to Wikki and the WW2aircraft site to get a feel for things and additional information.

Once again I suggest you think long and hard before distributing a product that doesn't have the RAF with 100 octane as standard for its fighters.

I notice the lack of meaning in your posts, Glider. You are become increasingly rhetorical. You want people to disprove you, after you have failed to prove your point.

Even when you kept posting the same papers - five times on every page - that say only a portion of Fighter is using 100 octane was better.

Assumption? How more ridiculus can you get? The paper you posted says certain squadrons, in fact, a whole series of papers from March 1939 to May 1940 keep saying again and again that the conversion is limited to certain squadrons, and you keep arguing that certain does not mean a limitation, but it means all Squadrons.

Yes, but this recall is from a person who thinks that certain Squadrons means the opposite, it means all Squadrons. :D As for the debate, the only people agreeing you were some of the most biased and self-dillusional persons on the whole board, of whom everyone knows in advance what they will say, kinda like clones of that poor member Buzzsaw over here, or yourself. You have never managed to convince anyone because never managed to prove anything, therefore there was nothing to disprove. All you did was the same as here, spamming the thread with the same paper over and over again, and becoming increasingly rhetorical, and finally hysterical like a 7 year old, see: http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/tec...tml#post449799

Ie. Vincenzo wrote:

"I read the docs in none it's write that 100 octane was in use in all the stations/squadrons (for hurri and spits), the docs clear that all spist and hurri can use the 100 octane fuel also with the engienes were not modified (but with no benefit). if i miss some show me."

Mkrabat42 also disagreed with you, and simply said that you only listed circumstantial evidence, but no solid proof to your case, and solid historical methods require things that you simply do not have.

Well can we see the complete file, Glider? Or just the parts you wish us to see, cropped etc..?

Neither of us, actually. If I was banned from those threads, how on earth are my posts are there..? Hmm, Sherlock, how?

No unfortunately its totally true, and I have posted the papers of the evidence. You are again pretending to have not seen them, which is dishonest. As for Gavin Bailey's papers, they do not say such a thing. (not the person impersonating him on ww2aircraft.net, who btw was so primitive in his behaviour that got in confrontation with mods and they had to clear up his hysterical rantings and close the first thread because of him, and who also made some nonsense claim about the only 100 octane fuel in German aircraft being 'captured British stock' - unfortunately I had to paper he was 'quoting' too and handed his ass to him real nice.)

Nobody misrepresented the real Gavin Bailey's paper, you can read it here below. It again says that select Fighter Command stations were fueled with 100 octane.

I see the a wiki talk page in which Minorhistorian/NZTyphoon was desperately trying to force in his own POV, even through falsifying sources, and at the same time, remove all references to German 100 octane fuel use in BoB) into article for months, ' all the sudden' appearance anonymous, non-registered IP appears :D and claims to be a historian... uhum. And I am Tina Turner.

Now, this is what describes your posts. That is why you've got these replies from just about everyone in this thread that you are behaving childish, that your papers don't say what you claim them to say and so on. You are an increasingly desperate, self-dillusional person who started from an extremely biased, nationalism-fueled POV and managed to convince only himself but nobody else, and now got increasingly frustrated, and increasingly aggressive - and increasingly impotent in his arguements.

Which is why everyone is telling YOU and not ME that the documents you posted don't support what you say... right?

Well that the May 1940 papers clearly say that 100 octane is only supplied to select fighter command stations, of course. Nobody is sticking to Pips; there is no need, everything points to the same direction and fits together nicely, without any need to rape the primary papers like you do. But you can live in your partisan world, and believe what you want, nobody actually cares.

Salute

What is clear is we have an individual, Kurfurst, (who hides his real name) and who has been banned from two respected sources for information on the subject, Wikipedia and WWII Aircraft Forum, during similar debates, and for behaviour inappropriate and claims which cannot be substantiated.

Now he is repeating the same claims and commentary here, again without substantiation or documentation.

If anyone chooses to believe there is veracity in his posts, then I guess that is their right.

Gavin Bailey wrote the following on the subject - I am not going to post here the whole article, as this would reasonably hurt the actual writer's interest, but the relevant part, permissable under free use; if anyone doubts anything significant was left out, contact me in PM.

"Similar figures at the intersection of the military and industrial spheres were to perform an identical role in advocating the adoption of 100-octane fuel in Britain as they did in the United States. As the USAAC moved towards the adoption of 100-octane, Klein's article was circulated in the Air Ministry and Rod Banks outlined the possible operational importance of the fuel in a paper delivered to the Royal Aeronautical Society and Institute of Petroleum in January 1937.27 Apparently as a direct consequence, the Air Ministry specified that future engine development should incorporate the capacity to use 100-octane fuel. Contracts were placed for the delivery of substantial quantities of 100-octane fuel, amounting to 74,000 tons of iso-octane per year from three supply sources, including one in Trinidad outside United States control.28 By the end of 1937, the Air Ministry had accepted 100-octane as the future standard for the RAF, and by early 1938 it was decided that the authorised war reserve stock of fuel was to be composed of as much 100-octane as possible.29

Significantly, at the same time as the British were preparing to take these preliminary steps required to utilise 100-octane fuel, a committee was formed consisting of representatives from the leading oil companies, Imperial Chemical Industries and Air Ministry officers. Chaired by Sir Harold Hartley, the chairman of the Fuel Research Board, the objective of the committee was to recommend measures to ensure that adequate supplies of 100-octane fuel could be supplied in wartime.30 The immediate impetus behind this development was the possibility that the main existing source of supply"”hydrogenation plants run by Standard Oil and Shell within the United States"”might become inaccessible owing to the embargo requirements of the US Neutrality Acts on the outbreak of war. A further consideration was the fact that 100-octane supplies were purchased in dollars in the case of Shell and Standard Oil production in the United States and in Dutch guilders for Shell production from Curacao in the Netherlands West Indies and later on from the Netherlands East Indies. This presented a potential problem for British balance of payments and foreign currency exchange which was only resolved in the short- and medium-term future by the adoption of supply under the terms of lend–lease in 1941.31

The Hartley Committee eventually determined in December 1938 that three new hydrogenation plants should be funded partially at government expense in Trinidad and in Britain to expand British-controlled annual 100-octane fuel production capacity to 720,000 tons above the level already in prospect from existing supplies. At this point Shell and ICI had co-operated to build the first hydrogenation plant in Britain at Billingham on Teeside and further plants were being planned at Stanlow in Cheshire by Shell and Heysham and Thornton in Lancashire by the Air Ministry.32 In January 1939, when the Hartley Committee report was adopted by the Committee of Imperial Defence, the Treasury was able to cancel one of the planned plants in Trinidad on the grounds of cost, in return for an expansion of the authorised war reserve from 410,000 tons to 800,000 tons, 700,000 tons of which were to consist of 100-octane. This represented an entire years worth of estimated consumption on the basis of the major expansion and production schemes then in force and required an enormous investment in building the required protected underground storage infrastructure.33

RAF tests with 100-octane had begun in 1937, but clearance for operational use was withheld as stocks were built up. In March 1939, the Air Ministry decided to introduce 100-octane fuel into use with sixteen fighter and two twin-engined bomber squadrons by September 1940, when it was believed that the requirement to complete the war reserve stock would have been met, with the conversion of squadrons beginning at the end of 1939.34

By the time war broke out, the available stocks of aviation fuel had risen to 153,000 tons of 100-octane and 323,000 tons of other grades (mostly 87-octane).35 The actual authorisation to change over to 100-octane came at the end of February 1940 and was made on the basis of the existing reserve and the estimated continuing rate of importation in the rest of the year.36 The available stock of 100-octane fuel at this point was about 220,000 tons. Actual use of the fuel began after 18 May 1940, when the fighter stations selected for the changeover had completed their deliveries of 100-octane and had consumed their existing stocks of 87-octane. While this was immediately before the intensive air combat associated with the Dunkirk evacuation, where Fighter Command units first directly engaged the Luftwaffe, this can only be regarded as a fortunate coincidence which was contingent upon much earlier decisions to establish, store and distribute sufficient supplies of 100-octane fuel.37

While much of this total stock had originated from production in the United States, the actual anticipated sources of supply assessed one month later and given in Table 3 indicate the actual diversity of supply which allowed operational use to go ahead.


View this table:
[in this window]
[in a new window]

Table 3: Revised forecast of 100-octane fuel stock position: supplies due between 1 April 1940 and 31 December 1940 (figures in tons per annum)


It can be seen that, despite the preponderance of American supply, the extent of the existing accumulated reserve and the anticipated production from non-American sources of 100-octane do not conform to the blanket statements of dependency upon the United States alone which is asserted in many sources.

The extent and relative importance of this diversity can be seen in the Anglo-Iranian (British Petroleum (BP)) 100-octane plant in Abadan. The Abadan plant had been built as a private venture by BP and was producing 100-octane spirit which met the Air Ministry specification in June 1940 after production facilities had been expanded at Air Ministry request.38 The first delivery of fuel from Abadan to Britain took place in July 1940, and by the end of the year 23,000 tons had been delivered. The importance of this can be seen from the fact that the total supplied from this single non-American source equates to the issue of 22,000 tons of 100-octane fuel between 11 July and 10 October 1940 by Fighter Command, almost exactly corresponding to the accepted span of the Battle of Britain.39

Shipments from Abadan were later reduced in light of the availability of oil of all kinds from the United States, as the shorter voyage across the Atlantic from America economised on the tanker tonnage required for importation. But it remained a viable alternative to American supply sources. In February 1941 continuing uncertainties over dollar purchasing before the passage of the Lend-Lease Act led to the temporary abandonment of the ˜short-haul' shipping policy to the benefit of supplies from Abadan.

This reactive and dynamic process can also be seen in the case of the Shell/ICI hydrogenation plant at Billingham, which produced 30,000 tons of fuel in 1939.40 This plant, and the delivery of further supplies of 100-octane from BP refineries in Iran, provided immediately available substitutes which individually had the contemporary capacity to supply Fighter Command with the quantity of 100-octane fuel expended in the Battle of Britain. Beyond this, the German conquest of the Netherlands in May 1940 had prompted the British to immediately occupy the Netherlands West Indies, where the main Shell and Standard Oil 100-octane refineries were located.

The RAF remained alive to the issue of continuing supply into the summer of 1940. When towards the end of August it was suspected that an oil embargo on belligerents might be implemented in US administration policy in response to Japanese expansion in south-east Asia, a further review of existing stocks and future production indicated that stocks of 100-octane had risen to 389,000 tons while more than 75,000 tons could be expected from non-US sources before the end of the year.41

These facts significantly challenge the identification of the United States as the specific national origin of supply of 100-octane in isolation. While the development of 100-octane fuel and the early supplies of it to Britain in 1937–9 were heavily dependent on US production, this cannot be extended to become a critical dependency on American production alone once the extensive steps taken to ensure a diverse and reliable supply which were taken by the British during the period of rearmament are taken into account. The supply of 100-octane fuel to the RAF was the result of technological development initiated in the United States, but it was established and developed in Britain by a partnership of commercial oil companies and government agency within the cohesive framework of pre-war rearmament policy.

The United States was the single most important country of origin for RAF supplies of 100-octane fuel in the period 1939–40. Yet British importation plans in 1938 reveal that the United States was expected to contribute nothing to the initial accumulation of the war reserve up to March 1939, with the available storage capacity of about 103,00 tons in that month being partially filled with 12,000 tons from Aruba, 12,500 tons from Trinidad and 55,000 tons from the Shell hydrogenation plant at Pernis in the Netherlands.42

This geographical diversity in the relevant sources of supply can be seen as late as August 1940, when the fact that 6.3 million out of a total of 27.8 million tons of oil imports scheduled between May 1940 and April 1941 would originate in the United States could prompt the following observation."

RAFFC had about 45 Merlin engined fighter squadrons and 5 Blenheim Squadrons operational under RAFFC command on July 08. About 10 - 12 Hurricane, non operational squadrons were forming up.

so lets say that RAFFC had 57 operational squadrons during the 1st week of Sept. 57 squadrons into 5700 sorties = 100 sorties week/squadron. Lets assume 15 Blenheim squadrons (5 x RAFFC and 10 X RAFBC) = 1500 sorties at 230 gallons/sortie = 1108 tons of 100 octane. So our 5 Blenheim squadrons flew 500 of RAFFC's sorties leaving 5200 to be flown by Merlin engined fighters @ 75 gallons/sortie = 1254 tons, so total RAFFC and RAFBC 100 octane use = 2362 tons. This is only about 1/2 the total consumption of 100 octane and it accounts for 5200 SE fighter and 1500 hundred twin engined Blenheim sorties. There simply isn't enough 100 octane fuel users left over to consume the ~4400 tons if RAFFC isn't using 100% 100 octane.

According to the graph you supplied, the RAF used about 15000 tons of 100octane and ~ 24000 tons of other grade during Sept 1940. How much 100 octane did the Luftwaffe use?


Can you present evidence stating that even one operational RAFFC Merlin engined squadron was using 87 Octane from July to Oct 1940? If I was an RAFFC pilot and my Hurricane/Spitfire was using 87 octane, when the squadron down the road was using 100 octane, you can be sure that I would have mentioned it my memoirs or complained about it while writing up a combat report: "The Ju-88 got away because I couldn't use overboost..." Yet there isn't a single statement anywhere about RAFFC pilots complaining about the lack of 100 octane engines or fuel, during the Battle.

Can you present evidence that there's no giant pink elephant with white stripes and a huge "Nokia" advertisment tattood on its forehead hiding behind the other side of the moon?

There isn't a single statement about RAFFC pilots complaining about the lack of giant pink elephants with white stripes and a huge "Nokia" advertisment tattood on there forehead flying Spitfires during the Battle either.

Its shows very well that giant pink elephants with.... were well supplied to every FC Squadron during the Battle. I guess.

I agree with the above and share your conclusions. This debate has grown barren, and nothing new or useful seem to come out of it, so its seems better to end it, as the facts are on the table and there is no point in repeating the same arguements. Glider came here with an agenda, an axe to grind and a character assassination campaign in mind. It has backfired, and deserves no more attention IMO.

So the answer is no. You cannot present evidence showing that even a single operational squadron of merlin engined fighters was using 87 octane fuel during the battle.

1) No, we can say that there is no evidence of 87 octane fuel use in any operational Merlin engined fighter squadron during the BofB.

2) All Merlin engined fighters saw a tremendous increase in climb rate due to the use of 100 octane fuel, when using the combat rating of the engine:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...limb-HRuch.png

for example, the Hurricane I's climb rate increased to ~3450fpm up to 10000ft and the time to 20,000ft declined to about 6.5min at 12lb/3000rpm from 9.75min at 6.25lb/2850 rpm at 6750lbs. The increased climb rate paid dividends even though the performance above ~16,000 ft was unchanged with 100octane fuel.

On the later Spit V at 6965 lbs, the combat rating climb performance was:

.(a) Climb performance.
Combat rating 16lb boost@3000rpm / Normal rating 9lb boost@2850 rpm.
Maximum rate of climb (ft/min) 3710 at 8,800 ft/2650 at 14,900 ft.
Time to 10,000 ft. (minutes) 2.7 / 3.8
Time to 20,000 ft. (minutes) 6.15 / 7.9 min
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/aa878.html

3) There was a considerable increase in performance for both the Hurricane and Spitfire.

Can you clear up the ambiguity, please?

No idea why i just skimmed by 11 pages about 87-100 octane But from what i read (The Role Of Synthetic Fuel In World War II Germany by Dr. Peter W. Becker.) and heard from other pilots That The RAF were in shortage of high octane fuel and lots of it was shipped in from the USA and Canada as part of the lead/lease agreement. After the war Many test were done to see which was the better aircraft the Carb, Spitfire or F.I., 109 Which in many cases was tested using the same grade fuel and facts posted as such. Which were false.
Germany had a high import of oil pre war but a low storage of high octane
even with their infamous peace treaty with Russia in 1939 yielded them 4 million barrels of fuel per year (starting in 1940) and the Russians were diligent in delivering the fuel.

I'm no fuel expert or historian on ww2 fuel supplies but i don't think it would make 1c change to HP on the spit or 109 by 10mph

https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/-0...lin_100oct.jpg

No ambiguity, the RAFFC used 100% 100 octane during the BofB.

There is no evidence that the above source is wrong. None.

No one has presented a shred of evidence that even one RAFFC operational Merlin engined fighter squadron used anything but 100% 100 octane.

You sound like a religious fanatic, Seadog.. do you think that repeating the same and always having the last word is convincing? Let me tell you, it isn't.

Crumpp
I believe I have done in my posting 150. Two papers are posted, the first item 9 in the summary of conclusions of the 5th meeting of the Oil Committee. This paper clearly and without any limitation says that the ACAS has requested that squadrons armed with fighters and Blenheims should begin to use 100 Octane

The second paper May 1940 which is for the Summary of actions for the 6th Meeting of the Oil Committee is the one that contains the magic Certain word. This paper specifically refers to item 9 of the Summary of the Conclusions of the 5th Meeting so it is clear that it is refering to the previous paper.

As I have said before I don't know why he said certain, but I do know that the first paper was clear and that the request was without limitation.
I am pretty sure that the Oil Committee largely staffed by Air Force Officers wouldn't overide the Chief of the Air Staff without some explanation.
I once worked for the Company Secretary of an Insurance Company and normal practice if the action had changed would be to document the change in the papers for the next meeting. Otherwise people would not know what actions to take or what the Oil Committee are expected to do or be responsible for.
Can I guarantee that they didn't follow standard practice, no I cannot, but Civil Service bodies all over the world love paperwork and the chances are very slim.

If people believe that Certain means a limit of some kind then I believe that they need to try and identify what that limit is and not make assumptions. I looked into it and the only link I found was to the first paper which is unambigious.

I repost the papers for you

Hope this helps

Sure we do Seadog. You posted a secondary source. That is somebodies research paper.

We have a primary source that is clear in its declaration of "certain units".

Did the author of your article have the primary source in his possession? Probably not if he made that declaration in his article.

http://www.princeton.edu/~refdesk/primary2.html

Facts are nobody on these boards can say for sure at this time. We have a primary source that presents an ambiguity. You cannot alter the facts of the primary sources to suit your gaming needs. Primary sources present the facts that are the foundation upon which ALL secondary sources are developed.

Your secondary source contradicts a primary source and is therefore not the full story. In that sense, it is wrong.

Without a doubt the RAF wanted 100 grade fuel without limitation.

The intention is certainly there to switch to 100 grade.

That does not mean it was possible in the time frame given. I read the first meeting declares the intention.

The first paper also states that FC is still not sure of technical requirements to make the switch and therefore has not even begun to operate any aircraft with the fuel.

I don't think they are not just going to switch the entire force in the midst of a fight for survival over without first making an operational test to ensure the fuel is suitable.

The second meeting authorizes the change for certain units. That is a fact. I don't believe that it was misspoken by the author.

If we are talking of primary source and secondary sources of information. Is there any source to support the theory that the RAF in the BOB were not fully equipped with 100 Octane.

Pips posting presumably doesn't count as a source

As a matter of fact, despite Glider's claims the word certain is not limited to a single paper, it is kept repeated in all papers available. It hardly a case of mistyping as Glider would like you to believe.

12 December 1939 - 100 Octane, issue of. Again it talks of "Fighter Stations concerned" "certain Unitsin the Bomber Command" approved stations", "relevant stations".

That is pretty straightforward I think:

http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e1...t-approval.jpg
http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e1...Mar1939web.jpg
http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e1...aneissueof.png
http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e1...ng_actions.png
http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e1...ng_summary.png

Kurfurst
Thanks for that (and I do mean it) the problem is that the last paper is dated December 1939 and the others are pre war.

We are of course talking about decisions taken in 1940 so whilst they are interesting in a historical way, they are out of date. No long term plan of any kind in any nation goes unchanged once the bullets start flying, as priorities change. I take it you agree that Pips posting doesn't count as a source.

Kurfurst
You are linking two totally different paper trails as if they were one.

The fourth paper that you have added is covered in my positing 150 and 172.

The fifth paper covers the equipment of Bomber Command with 100 Octane. The four stations mentioned are those that have to have the 87 octane fuel removed and they are the stations that were authorised to be 100% equipped with 100 Octane. The fighter command section is the removal of 87 octane from each fighter station concerned.

The last paper confirms that the fuel transfer has been completed concerned.

Concerned I take to mean that some will not need all the fuel removed. I would expect the large sector stations to keep some 87 Octane in a similar manner to Bomber Command and the Blenheims of No 2 group. The smaller stations would need to have the fuel removed as done for four stations in No 2 Group. Its worth remembering that some units started using 100 Octane in Feb 1940, before these decisions for a complete roll out were made so to some degree it was already out there and in use.

Clearly you believe that this is a limitation to the roll out, I have given my explanation and can prove it to a degree by supporting the use of 100 Octane in Feb, plus it follows the same principle as used in No 2 Group. Far from perfect I agree but better than nothing.

Can you support your contention that its a limitation to the scale of the roll out?

So back to the first question I ever asked you, what is certain? Which units, which bases

I also take this opportunity to post a War Cabinet Paper that I copied. Its not of interest but it might help you calm your concerns that I never went to the NA or saw the papers.

You are welcome. Now, normal conversation is much more enjoyable, isn't it.. I hope we can keep it that way. I did add a couple of others in the meantime.

As far as I go, I see no problem. In March 1939 they decided that 100 octane will be issued to 16+2 Sqns, ie. a portion of FC and BC. They said the process shall start in the end of 1939, and indeed it did.

In short I do not see a single point that would show that they were doing anything else then (rather slowly) executing the plan according to the March 1939 plan.

That would be a perfectly logical conclusion, a clausula rebus sic stantibus. However you can't simply assume this must have, and did happened. If they revised the pre-war plans, there should be documentation of it. Find it, present it, and I will believe your thesis immidiately.

No, I don't agree. It isn't a source in a way that we do not have scans of the original papers, on the other hand I have absolutely no reason to believe Pips would misreport his findings, and also his comments agree completely with what we found so far. I see no reason to doubt it.

If the pre-war plans were revised, I tend to believe this happened after May 1940. The 7th meeting etc. is clear that they supplied 100 octane to a number of FC/BC Stations/Squadrons, but not all.

That's why it would be interesting to look at the complete file, esp. the post May 1940 happenings to see when the original limited introduction of 100 octane was revised. The consumption figures between May - November 1940 do not lie: the 100 octane issues were practically the same in mid-May and mid-August, the height of activity, as long until the end of September indiciating that there was no expansion in the scale of use until late September, also shown by the sudden drop of 87 octane issues.

http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e1...vember1940.png

I direct you to post no. 42 by The Grunch:

Do you guys ever fly? :confused:

I need to do some work that will take me until Wed Morning, don't take this a a sign of going away I will respond in detail to any questions when I am back.

However, to make no misunderstanding you believe that Pips posting with no documents is a valid source and you believe that they are accurate.

20 years on and off in Gliders, 8 years RN as an Airframes and Engines engineer and P2 time in a small number of powered aircraft from Chipmunks to Hunters.

But I suspect that isn't what you meant.:grin:

:-P

"No one has presented a shred of evidence that even one RAFFC operational Merlin engined fighter squadron used anything but 100% 100 octane during the Battle of Britain."

You keep producing documents from well before the BofB, yet you can't produce a single document showing that even one operational Merlin engined fighter squadron was using 87 octane during the battle. There are literally hundreds of books that cover this subject, thousands of magazine, newspaper and journal articles, and yet not one states that a BofB Merlin engined fighter squadron used 87 octane operationally, yet despite this lack of evidence you persist with missionary zeal to try to win converts...and your behaviour is the mark of the true fanatic.

The Summary of the Seventh meeting is dated 18 May 1940.

I have to agree that your eyesight is spot on.:grin:

Kurfursts posting 176 was timed at 1.26pm, my reply posting 177 was timed at 1.41pm, Kurfursts posting 176 was amended at 1.44pm. I noticed the change and made another posting 178 to cater for the additional documents at 1.55pm
The postings crossed something Kurfurst noted in his posting 179 when commented ‘I did add a couple of others in the meantime.’

I hope that clarifies the position, just a co incidence.

I did send you a PM earlier about the references to sides in a posting that I didn’t understand. Can I ask you to clarify that for me please, in case I have misunderstood something.

Thanking you in advance

As a by-stander in this with no real gameplay gains from the final verdict (i will fly pretty much everything, both sides of the sim), the way the whole thing reads to me is:


1) Fuel was the "property" of stations/airfields, not specific units.

2) Critical airfields received supplies of 100 octane fuel.

3) Units rotated between different airfields as operational needs dictated.

4) When a certain unit happened to operate from a field with 100 octane supplies they would use it, when operating from another field they would not.

5) This also explains why there are a lot of combat reports from different units mentioning the use of +12lbs boost.

I certainly can't believe they would be moving all their fuel supply with them whenever they changed stations :-P

Why are there no reports, memoirs, articles about RAFFC pilots complaining about the lack of 100 octane fuel for their squadron, station, etc? If some stations have 100 octane and others not, it would have created real problems for pilots landing at alternate bases to refuel, since they would be forced to put 87 octane in aircraft modded for 12lb boost, yet no mention of such problems has ever been recorded.

The idea that RAFFC fought the battle with mixed 87/100 octane Merlin engined squadrons is wrong, and is not supported by the historical record. The battle was fought with 100octane only.

Absence of evidence does not equal evidence of absence.

Because it wouldn't pose any technical problem, the plane would operate on +6.25 boost, and the boost cutout would not be used. In fact the Spitfire II manual from June 1940 notes exactly that, +6.25 boost limit on 87 octane, and +12 "When using 100 octane" or something along these lines.

Otherwise, you are like a broken record.

So they land at another base and fuel up on 87 octane and then they return to their home base with a tankful of 87 octane...forcing the ground crews to drain it before commencing combat operations with other aircraft of the same squadron flying 100 octane? This would have been a logistical nightmare that would have drawn lots of comments, mostly to the effect that it would be much simpler for everyone to simply use 100 octane fuel. Which is fact was done.

Check out Post 88 from The use of 100 Octane Fuel in the RAF pt 2. Sometime prior to 7 December, 1939 100 octane fuel was authorized for Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft in Fighter Command. It is quite clear that it was HQ, Fighter Command’s intention to supply all those stations in the UK that held operational Hurricanes & Spitfires with 100 octane fuel.

The operational stations at which the fuel will be required in the first instance are: Acklington, Biggin Hill, Catterick, Debden, Digby, Drem, Duxford, Hornchuch, Leconfield, Manston, Martlesham Heath, Northhold, North Weald, Tangmere, Turnhouse, Croydon, St. Athan and Wittering. Church Fenton, Grangemouth and Filton also “will have Merlin engine aircraft that will require 100 octane fuel.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...0oct-issue.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...0oct-issue.jpg

Taken from: Post 88

The Squadrons equipped with Hurricanes during December 1939 are as follows: 3, 17, 32, 43, 46, 56, 79, 111, 151, 213, 501, 504, 605.

During December 1939 these Hurricane Squadrons were stationed as follows.
3 – Croydon,
17 – Debden
32 – Biggin Hill
43 – Acklington
46 – Digby
56 – Martlesham Heath
79 – Manston
111 – Drem
151 – North Weald
213 – Wittering
501 – Tangmere
504 – Debden
605 – Tangmere

All these Stations were listed as requiring 100 octane fuel.

The Squadrons equipped with Spitfires in December 1939 are as follows: 19, 41, 54, 65, 66, 72, 74, 152, 602, 603, 609, 610, 611, 616.

During December 1939 these Spitfire Squadrons were stationed as follows:
19 - Duxford
41 - Catterick
54 - Hornchurch
65 - Northholt
66 - Duxford
72 - Drem
74 - Rochford
152 - Acklington
602 - Grangemouth
603 - Turnhouse
609 - Drem
610 - Wittering
611 - Digby
616 – Leconfield

Rochford is the only base not listed, however, 74 Operations Record Book indicates that they had 100 octane while at Rochford in March 1940.

Units converting to Hurricane or Spitfire after December 1939 and the station where they converted are as follows:

64 – Church Fenton
92 – Croyden
145 – Croyden
222 – Duxford
229 – Digby
232 – Sumburgh
234 – Leconfield
242 – Church Fenton
245 – Leconfield
253 – Manston
257 – Hendon
263 – Drem
266 – Sutton Bridge
302 – Leconfield
310 – Duxford
312 – Duxford
601 – Tangmere

Sumburgh is the only base not listed to receive 100 octane fuel. 232 formed there in July 1940.

With the one exception of Sumburgh, there is a perfect match between those stations that Fighter Command deemed required 100 octane fuel and those stations where all UK Spitfire & Hurricane operational squadrons were based. I looked through Rawling’s Fighter Squadrons of the RAF and the baseing info checks out.

Because it's possible to change octane ratings as long as you keep to the relevant limits?

Again, cue the Blenheim Mk.IV pilot's notes where it's clearly stated that it was standard operating procedure to switch between 87 and 100 octane mid-flight: the only limitation was keeping boost within the appropriate limits for each fuel type, the engine won't suddenly explode if you just throttle back and switch to the 87 octane tanks, even though the engines were modified for 100 octane use. ;)

So these are the Stations Fighter Command would seen advantagous of having 100 octane fuel?

These are about 1/3 of the stations used by fighters in the Battle of Britain - ca 20 Stations out of ca 60.

Kinda hard to keep formation if some aircraft are using 87 octane and some 100 octane...

In a Blenheim flying a long range recon or ferry mission (which is the only time they could use the auxiliary tanks) it is quite reasonable that there will be long periods where the expectation of enemy encounters are low, and thus mixing octane types is a reasonable risk. The problem is that it will take many seconds before the change back to 100octane can be made, and during that time overboost will not be available and damage to the engine may result if overboost is applied too soon.

I guess not so hard as if half of them are Hurricanes and the other half are Spitfires, even if they would use the same fuel type as long as they would be both stationed at the same fighter station...

Which is why squadrons are generally equipped with one aircraft type.

No, at any manifold pressure and rpm setting below the knock limited performance of the fuel, the power will be the same.

Basically at any manifold pressure below +9lbs (limit for 87 Octane) in the Merlin, the power is the same for 87 Octane or 100 Octane fuels.

The problem is that people think the higher octane fuels magically give more horsepower when in reality they merely allow the engine to develop higher power at higher manifold pressures without engine knock.

This is totally true. :grin: To see every day on the street when the people buy it their car the expensive 100 octane "V-Power" fuel, though into the car 95 octane would be needed :rolleyes: