It's Wrong-O-Clock for Crumpp today

http://photos.igougo.com/images/p608...kes_midday.jpg

Wrong, Wrong, Wrong, Wrong.
Wrong, Wrong, Wrong, Wrong.

WRONG.....
WRONG.....
WRONG.....
WRONG.....
WRONG.....
WRONG.....
WRONG.....
WRONG.....
WRONG.....
WRONG.....
WRONG.....
WRONG.....

I don't care if its "standard", I only care how widely it was used.
My point is that "standard" or "specification" are not perfect measures of use.

Understand?

And where is your evidience that this was policy? Or the paperwork saying that it had happened, that makes you so sure?

And what is 100 octane doing in the pilot's notes if it wasn't 'specified'?

I think Crumpp is just finding it difficult to believe the world used to run without extreme beaurocracy.

100 Octane fuel continued to be called 100 octane fuel right throughout the war and never had a D.T.D (Department of Technical Development) number such as D.T.D 230 for 87 octane.

Pilot's Notes Spitfire V Seafire III page 18 100 Octane fuel only

Spitfire Pilot's Notes 1946 3rd ed (supercedes all others) September 1946 page 30-31 100 Octane fuel only - no D.T.D number.

The official designation for 100 Octane fuel was BAM100 (British Air Ministry) because it was developed outside of the Air Ministry's purview, by the private petroleum countries.

http://newsgroups.derkeiler.com/Arch.../msg01078.html

Crumpp you are the one who has consistently ignored information you don't like, so how about you show a little maturity and stop the "I'm superior to you ignoramus because I work in aviation" BS. You clearly have no understanding of how the British did things during the 1930s and 40s, you certainly don't know how things worked during WW 2.

Ok, so you're saying that for even one aircraft to have 100 octane, then all airfields must have 100 octane...

YOU HAVE JUST PROVEN OUR CASE!!!

WE KNOW THAT RAF FC HAD FAR MORE THAN ONE HURRICANE/SPITFIRE USING 100 OCTANE AT THE START OF THE BoFB.

THEREFORE ALL AIRCRAFT MUST HAVE BEEN CONVERTED!

*yawn* you are still debating the 100 octane issue? Wow!

Or is it like in the movie "Groundhog Day" where I have to re-read the whole debate over and over again until I do something special like to propose to implement 94.5 octaine as a compromise to get out of this iternal loop?

I guess the devs either have already made up their mind about the implementation or non implementation of the 100 octane fuel or just want to leave it as it is.

Do try to clue in. The discussion has nothing to do with the game.

Well then I'd say: wrong thread! This is about comparing ingame plane data to RL data. :)

Not quite, this has a great deal to do with the game because +12lbs boost has not been modelled for Spitfire Is and IIs of the B of B.

Why Crumpp has such a beef about this subject is anyone's guess because he doesn't play. Basically he has a bee in his bonnet that he, with his VAST experience in American modern civil aviation, knows far more about "how things are done in aviation" than all those amateurish, but enthusiastic, non-aviator aviation historians (such as Dr Alfred Price) who have, inconveniently, found so much evidence that 100 Octane fuel was in use in all frontline fighter squadrons during the battle.

He has plagued this thread with unproven theories as to why the RAF only allowed 16 squadrons to play with the fuel in "intensive operational trials", there was also his idea that somehow 52,000 tons of 100 octane fuel wasn't actually consumed July-October it just disappeared back into reserves as some type of administrative glitch that only he could understand, then there was a huge amount of quibbling over Pilot's Notes and what he thought they meant etc etc...ultimately wasting everybody's time, but especially his own.

I've also seen this in later manuals, just found it again in a late 1942 Pegasus engine manual. It still carries the same provisional specification, which illustrates how meaningless this is.

I've also attached two examples of how pilot notes were kept up to date in practice. Hand written, if necessary.

I replied to schlageter who said that the 100 octane discussion had nothing to do with the game :)

Crumpp/Kurfurst:

All you have to do is show us proof that RAF FC during the BofB flew at least one, operational squadron, Hurricane/Spitfire 87 octane combat sortie. Just one...

You have presented your thesis and now we want proof.

Yes, it's my time and I decide how I use it.

I just wished this 100 octane thing would have been discussed in a separate thread because all the other data is now drowned in this discussion turning in circles like if the 100 octane issue was the only issue on plane performance in CloD. This thread is about BoB fighters and not only RAF fighters. Perhaps a mod can rename this thread so that it allows other readers to avoid to open this thread about BoB figher performance in the hope to see some new stuff instead of the x-th round in the 100 octane discussion.

Understood; this thread should have ended long ago, but there are some who are so obsessed with disregarding all of the evidence presented by people like Glider and lane who at the very lest have gone to the time, trouble and considerable expense of trawling through the NA and finding and using genuine late '30s early '40s documentation to back up their statements.

Kurfurst (who says he has very little interest in the RAF)'s "evidence" that the RAF used 100 octane fuel in a small minority of its frontline fighters is based on:

* a set of papers that he has not seen or read for himself; these were "summarised" in a posting in a discussion on another forum several years ago, during which the person ("Pips" who is a sometime member of this forum) who introduced these papers admitted that they were probably deceptive.

* an extremely legalistic interpretation of a single, pre-war RAF planning paper, which was transcribed from a meeting held in May 1939, and repeated by Morgan and Shacklady.

Otherwise noting, nada - zip - Kurfurst also repeatedly claims that he does not have to present any evidence to support his claims - yeah right.

Meantime Crumpp has been very busy brewing up their his cockeyed theories and a whole lot of speculative nonsense based on modern FAA regulations or whatever else he can think up.

Too right it's about time this thread come to a natural end.

All the other data was posted in the first few posts. With Barbi's Post #24, the thread became a 100 octane discussion thread.

The Operating Notes are definative and Notes on the Merlin Engine will reflect the changes in the Flight Information Manual version.

If Operating Notes on the Merlin Engine do not specify 100 Octane for all operational units then the transition in Fighter Command was not complete. If Operating Notes on the Merlin Engine does not mention 100 Octane fuel then it was not the most common fuel.

What do you think all those pilots transitioning from Bomber and Coastal Command would be studying?

You can date the transition by the Operating Notes, they are the primary source for technical changes to the aircraft.

The convention is not modern. It has been in place and relatively unchanged since airplanes first started crossing international borders.

Perhaps some research on Aviation Legislation and Aviation Law would help you to gain a more factual outlook.

The Paris Convention and most aviaiton law is based upon the British example. The United Kingdom was the first country to enact these regulations and in 1919, the convention adopted them internationally.

http://specialcollections.wichita.ed...8/92-18-A.HTML

All you have to do is show us proof that RAF FC during the BofB flew at least one, operational squadron, Hurricane/Spitfire 87 octane combat sortie. Just one...

You have presented your thesis and now we want proof.

Crumpp if the British government did break the "law" by not following some peacetime convention. Who would prosecute them? Themselves, ridiculous.

Funny I can't find anything in the Mustang notes about 25lbs of boost either. It did happen however.

This is where you need the guy with the party hat icon.

Yes it did and it was not the standard for the Mustang either. It was an special condition so it is not found in the Flight Information Manual.

In this case, the claim is 100 Octane fuel was the standard fuel of the RAF in July 1940 and throughout the Battle of Britain.

That is just not true. DtD 230, otherwise known as 87 Octane was the standard fuel of Fighter Command in July 1940 and 100 Octane was in the process of introduction on a limited basis.

You have the fuel consumption numbers for 87 fuel and 100 fuel for FC to back up your statement?

What is limited basis? I wouldn't say 20+ squadrons out of 55 squadrons is limited basis.

So this could apply to 100 fuel use then?

Personally I am still waiting for a common sense reply to my previous quite simple and obvious questions. Crumpp responce (as they were not replies) can be summed up as follows :-

a) a shortage of fuel
If there was no shortage then there would be no need to reduce the roll out
There was apparantly a shortage in 1944 and was mentioned by the Allied Oil Committee meetigs Unfortunately we are talking about 1940 not 1944 and the Allied Oil Committee had nothing to do with the BOB. So I am still waiting for any sign of a shortage in the BOB

b) of 16 squadrons
Which squadrons or if you go down the it was 16 squadrons at any one time
All I got was a ticking off for lowering the credibility of the thread and a comment about a pre war paper. Crumpp puts himself forward as an expert on Logistics and would presumably agree that if you have a target to supply 16 FC squadrons, you need to decide where to send the fuel. All I and others have asked him is, Which 16 squadrons

c) of which squadrons or bases
This brings the difficult questions
i) If 100 octane was in short supply when did Drem a small satellite station in Scotland have 100 octane when the priority stations in the South East didn't
ii) At one point in the BOB Duxford had the big wing of five squadrons. Are you really saying that almost a fifth of the RAF supply was in one 12 group station?.
These are I think logical questions. If there was a shortage then did these decisions make sense?. Putting his Logistical hat on again if the theory is that only 16 squadrons used 100 octane at any one time then someone had to decide which stations had the fuel, all I am asking is which stations? also who made the decision?

d) why this isn't mentioned in any official document, book, history
Simple request, why in the most documented air battle in history has no one picked this important factor up. Support your theory with some supporting documentation, not an off the wall conspiracy theory
Again no attempt to adress the question which was quite clear. The best he came up with was establishment vs strength where his definiton is wrong, and a lecture that adaquate supplies had to be at a station before they can use it, something I agree with. The problem is that he ignores later papers saying supplies are adaquate and the roll out can commence.

e) of the process in delivering the fuel
As there is no mention of a any limitation in the distribution of 100 octane fuel in the Oil Committee papers who distributed it

Again a complete failure to reply to the question. As a logistic expert I am sure Crumpp will agree that having decided to issue the fuel you need to agree how to deploy it.The Oil COpmmittee were responsible for the purchase, storage and distribution of fuel. There is no mention of any distribution to FC after May 1940, anywhere. As they didn't do any further distirbution of fuel after May 1940, then as a Logistic expert he must be interested in who did?
I did get a lecture about Units concerned. Its my belief that units concerned means the units that hadn't already been converted. I admit the evidence isn't 100% airtight but
We have the authority to proceed in Dec 1939,
We have papers from Dec 1939 saying which stations should be issued with the fuel In the First Instance,
We know that at the time (Dec 1939) this was for all stations equipped and going to be equipped with Hurricanes and Spitfires.
We know that delivery is prioritised as being operational units and that training units will not get 100 Octane
We know how the fuel was to be distributed, ie as 87 Octane was used up it would be replaced by 100 octane.
We know that in addition to those stations identified in December as being first instance it was used in France and Norway.
We know it started to be used in combat in February.
We know that there was a request in March for Blenhiems and fighters to use 100 Octane.
We know that All No 2 Group were issued with 100 Octane and we know that the process for delivery to FC changed to actively removing it from FC stations speeding up the roll out for those stations.
We know that in May 1940 the Oil Committee considered that change of FC to 100 octane to be complete.


Putting the Logistical Hat on again its interesting to look at the Basic Logistical details we know for the two cases
For the roll out to FC we know
a) Who made the decision
b) That testing was complete in 1939
c) Which stations were to have it issued to IN THE FIRST INSTANCE
d) How it was to be rolled out
e) That the Oil Committee considered the roll out to be complete in May
Note - all the above is supported by official original records held in the NA

For the 16 FC squadrons + 2 Bomber squadrons
a) We don't know who made the decision to continue with this program once war started
b) We don't know that phase IV testing was on going in 1940
c) We don't know which squadrons or which stations were supposed to have the 100 Octane
d) We don't know how it was to be rolled out
e) If this theory is correct, We don't know when the rest of FC had 100 Octane issued
f) We do know that the limit of 2 squadrons of Bombers mentioned in this paper was disregarded, which must question why the fighter limit is supposed to be maintained
None of these is supported by original papers. The best that can be said is that they depend on wild interpretations of some documents while ignoring others

As I said at the start the case for 100% roll out isn't perfect, but its a lot stronger than the case for 16 Fighter squadrons and 2 bomber squadrons

The claim is that 100 octane was the standard fuel for FC in July 1940, not the RAF. The rest of the RAF were using 87 octane hence the consumption figures

You are right, I meant FC.

You can date the transition by the Operating Notes, they are the primary source for technical changes to the aircraft.

It is that simple and elegant, guys. No need to construct elaborate arguments based on circumstance and assumption.

No you cannot. You calculate the dates from when the fuel was delivered and used using official documents. That isn't an assumption, its a fact, its simple and foolproof.

Trying to calculate when it was used based on a 1942 copy of a pilots notes for a plane that isn't in use in operational squadrons, isn't just an assumption, its a pipedream.

PS using your Logistic hat you might want to comment on :-

Putting the Logistical Hat on again its interesting to look at the Basic Logistical details we know for the two cases
For the roll out to FC we know
a) Who made the decision
b) That testing was complete in 1939
c) Which stations were to have it issued to IN THE FIRST INSTANCE
d) How it was to be rolled out
e) That the Oil Committee considered the roll out to be complete in May
Note - all the above is supported by official original records held in the NA

For the 16 FC squadrons + 2 Bomber squadrons
a) We don't know who made the decision to continue with this program once war started
b) We don't know that phase IV testing was on going in 1940
c) We don't know which squadrons or which stations were supposed to have the 100 Octane
d) We don't know how it was to be rolled out
e) If this theory is correct, We don't know when the rest of FC had 100 Octane issued
f) We do know that the limit of 2 squadrons of Bombers mentioned in this paper was disregarded, which must question why the fighter limit is supposed to be maintained

Almost got it correct, but just like Mike, you seem to have missed a small detail mentioned in those "official records in the NA".

And that is all the papers talk of select fighter and bomber stations. I am sorry, I know you would like to forget that part, but that seems to be a major fly in the ointment of your whole thesis. ;)

Sure you can...

I am sure there are other editions out there besides the January 1942 Operating Notes.

Remember, FC was accepting pilots from any branch of service to fill its shortages. Transitioning pilots would have started their journey studying the Flight Information Manual version of the Operating Notes.

No you can't....

You can only answer the question, "When did the RAF get fuel to all of its stations?"

The aircraft have to be modified. That modification is a major alteration that was scheduled to be done at Service Inspection. It is not something performed by the squadron maintenance personnel.

The parts have to be made to do the modification and parts have to be made to support current production as well as sustainment spares.

The only way to answer an operational question is with operational documentation. In this case, the document which details the operation of the aircraft is the Operating Notes. The portion that is a legal document connected to the airworthiness of the aircraft will reflect the latest authorization for the type.

The statement "all Fighter Command was using 100 Octane July 1940" is not backed up by the facts.

The statement "100 Octane was used during the Battle of Britain" is correct and backed up by the facts.

It is clear that Fighter Command was in process of adopting the fuel but it is equally clear that process was not complete in July 1940. There is no agreement on the end dates for the Battle of Britain. So, depending on the dates one chooses for the battle to end, the process was or was not completed during the battle itself.

Nope, you know my understanding of the select fighter units. Its those that hadn't yet converted, you disagree but its nticable that you don't have a position yourself. Neither do you put anything else up to counter my view just mention the one word, on the one paper.

So to help us understand your position, How many squadrons do you believe used 100 octane in the BOB, and how do you support it?

I have made my position perfectly clear several times. Read back in the thread. Just because you pretend I did not and keep asking the same, already answered question does not get you anywhere.

And its not one paper, its the same note of select fighter and bomber stations in each and every paper. If you choose to ignore it like my previous answers, it is not my problem I am afraid.

So am I but we don't know what they say. Besides what is wrong with going by when the fuel was issued and used? That at least we do know

And they went through convsersion training

We have been through this a number of times. The majority of the work was already being incorporeated in new engines and in regular maintanence. What was left wasn't a major job and only involved drilling two holes.

With your degree in aviation and experience why do you find this so hard to understand?
I have posted my position and the documents to support it, post yours. Show me any evidence any at all that says the RAF didn't have the roll out complete by July 1940. I remind you that there is nothing in the Oil Committee after May so the question again, is if they didn't distribute it, then who did?

I notice that you have avoided (again) the logistic questions that I put to you. Can we take it that you have dropped the 16 squadron theory, a yes or no would suffice.

However if No, then I expect you to give some evidence to those questions, if Yes than can I ask you like Hurfurst, how many stations do you believe had 100 octane and how do you support that position

You and I both know that this is the question you have not given a reply too, since you said 145 aircraft in May as per Pips. Someone you haven't mentioned for a while now

Kurfurst would be smart to stay the hell away from that question. It is an opinion at this point and not fact. I was asked the same thing by you and offered my opinion. Go back and read the immature garbage the spouts from certain participants in this thread.

Thing about opinion is everyone has one and in the western world the idea of free speech says we all can have one too.

However when presents an opinion on such a subject as the exact number of squadrons at a specified point in time and backs up with the relevant facts, the personal assaults begin. Why? That is good tactic when your argument is based on emotion, circumstance, and assumption.

Thing about the facts on this point is we don't have all of them to make a pinpoint determination. We can only make general statements.

The only document that will give us an approximate time for the completion of the transition is the operating notes. If you find an earlier edition that lists 100 Octane in Operating Notes on the Merlin Engine then you will know within a few weeks when the transition was completed.

Why are you trying to force an answer on this issue without all the facts?

Why do you insist that you know all the facts and the only operational document that definately tells us is wrong while you are right?

We happen to be lucky enough that the Operating Notes is a legal document published by the Air Ministry and will reflect how the type was operated.

The regular squadron maintenance personnel did not handle this and that is why the order specifies Service Inspection. RAF squadron did not perform that inspection. RAF squadron personnel performed daily and routine maintenance. The CRO performed major alterations.

In NEW engines but the RAF already had ~700 Hurricanes and Spitfires in the inventory during the time the instructions came out. Consider that meant some ~1400 to 2100 engines in maintenance stocks that also had to be modified.

The new production also has to cover maintenance stocks, too.

You would be hard pressed to find an insult from me on this thread despite being on the receiving end of a number of barbs from others including you.

The operating notes are useless for what you intend, what counts is when it was issued and used.

Can I take it that you have dropped the 16 squadron theory?

Personally I am happy to leave the situation as being that FC was effectively equipped with 100 Octane during the BOB. I cannot prove that every station was equipped, I do believe it but know that I cannot prove it without a huge amount of time.

Speak in you own name only and do put words into my mouth. It has proven pointless to answer you 'questions', to which you do not know the answer yourself. You have shown that you ignore the answer, ask the same question a few days, month, years later, and pretend you have not seen the answer earlier. As said, I have already answer that at the beginning of the thread.

I am tired of your pointless mind games.

We don't know when the changes were first installed on new engines, we do know that the changes were already in place so a number of the 700 would already have them. We also know that the engines in service would have already gone through service inspection, so that would account for a number more.
In the three months following the issue of the paper a high proportion of the engines would be serviced or in the case of Hurricanes, newer arcraft would have replaced the ones in the squadrons in March.

I personally consider combat reports and station/squadron records as official documents, you may not but I do on that we will have to differ

Priceless

I'm still waiting for proof.

Glider, the document does not say the Merlin engine has been produced with the changes in place, it says the NEWER ENGINES will already have the modifications.

That sentence could mean:

1. That could mean all existing merlin engines from ~mid april 1940 or so would have the changes incorporated in production. Along with those production engines a maintenance stock of the new parts would have to be produced. That is a massive production undertaking and would take some time to implement.

2. It could also mean the NEWER production engines, ie the Merlin IIX would incorporate the changes in their design. That makes the most sense and is exactly what we see in the Operating Notes!!!

Production priority would go to the newer designs and older ones would be upgraded over time on a schedule that the manufacturer could meet. We do see that schedule listed as older models will be upgraded during their service maintenance.

Production resources are not infinite. The Spitfire Mk II was coming online and expected to replace the Spitfire Mk I. The Operating Notes are very clear in the fact 100 Octane was the only fuel approved for the Mk II.

There goes your word again could. It could mean this and it could mean that.
We know from station, squadron and combat reports, backed up by a number of documents, histories, personal stories, that SPit 1 did use 100 Octane in the BOB. . How can you ignore this!!
Lets not forget the Hurricane and Defiant which had the same engine or are you saying that they didn't use 100 octane either!!!
So I believe it means what it says, that the newer production engines have the changes built into them.

Edit I also note that the paper outlining the changes says that the changes are already incorporated into the servicing. As we can safely assume that Spit II's are not in service in March 1940, if it isn't SPitfire I and Hurricane's which according to your theory didn't use 100 Octane, what do you think they are making the changes too?

Glider,

Where in the world do you think I am claiming that Spitfire Mk I and eventually Hurricanes not use 100 Octane? They did not have 16 squadrons worth of Spitfire Mk II's by September.

It is in the Operating Notes that they were capable if equipped.

The above explains the process, it does not eliminate the Spitfire Mk I from using 100 Octane.

It says they are being done AS service maintenance. It is not a modification that is done by the squadron maintenance personnel. That is telling you the modification will happen the next time the aircraft goes for Service Inspection.

There are three modifications that add .020 inches to the spigot depth of the cylinder head top joint. The Service level maintenance personnel can choose which method of compliance meets their needs based on the parts on hand.

1. Modification Number Merlin/64 (requires no new piston rings)

2. Modification Number Merlin/77 (requires NEWLY designed piston rings to be installed)

3. Modification Number Merlin/138 - This is the one being done by the factory on NEWER engines.

Refers to Modification Number Merlin/138. The other two modifications ARE NOT being done by Rolls Royce production. They or their subcontractors are only producing the parts to accomplish the modification No. Merlin/64 and Merlin/77 to the aircraft in service as well as the maintence stock required. The work is being done as service level maintenance.

Now it is Spitfire IIs. :rolleyes:

Spitfire IIs did not appear til around July, so it had to be Spitfire Is and Hurricanes. You spent pages and pages worth of posts deniging the use of 12lb boost and 100 fuel. Is this your way of admitting you were wrong?

Which ever way Crumpp tries to argue, fact is there are twice as many squadrons known to be using 100 Octane fuel by September 1940 than both he and Morgan and Shacklady say...

What Kurfurst and Crumpp have both conveniently missed is that the March 1939 plan for 16 Fighter Squadrons and 2 bomber was provisional: right down the page para 8 says:

"A.M.D.P asked that D.D.C(3) should keep him informed of the rate of output of 100 octane fuel in order that the rate of change-over of squadrons to this fuel could be kept under review in the light of any [I]diminution or acceleration in supplies.[/U]" (attachment 1) Should the rate of fuel supply increase, the rate and numbers of squadrons changing over to its use could increase as well.

Supplies of 100 octane fuel continued to increase from 202,000 tons in December 1939, which was the time specified for the change over.

By November 1939 it was considered that there were "adequate reserves" of 100 octane fuel to go ahead with the modification of all Hurricane and Spitfire Merlin engines to use 12 lb boost.

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit1-12lbs.jpg

Squadrons did not, and could not hold their own fuel supplies, to require them to do so would be an operational and logistical nightmare: it was airbases that were supplied with fuel, not individual squadrons. In the 6 May 1940 paper (Item 9 7th Meeting Summary...) "Units concerned" cannot be talking about individual squadrons, it is referring to bases which, depending on their importance, (eg; Sector Station) hosted up to three squadrons. 18 squadrons = 8-10 airbases.

The December 7 1939 letter, which sets out a process for supplying 100 Octane fuel starts:

"I have the honour to refer to my letter...dated 27 October 1939, regarding the issue of 100 Octane Fuel for use in Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft in this Command." (attachment 2)

25 Fighter Stations were listed as requiring 100 octane fuel "in the first instance", including non-operational Kenley, Usworth and Hendon, with a further 17 non-operational bases which required supplies for visiting aircraft, but "which have no Hurricane or Spitfire aircraft at the moment."

Squadrons that were to use 100 octane fuel were not selected by Squadron number but by the type of aircraft used. Bases that hosted these aircraft types were accordingly supplied with 100 octane fuel. Same for the Bomber squadrons, namely Blenheims. The only Blenheim capable of using 100 octane fuel was the Mk IV the first of which emerged in March 1939. The Defiant was not listed in December because it was not yet operational.

All of the 11 Group Sector stations were listed, plus Filton which, in June 1940, became part of the new 10 Group; 4 out of 5 12 Group sector stations, 2 out of 5 13 Group sector stations, and 11 other airfields, including 6 of 11 Group were listed.

The May 18 1940 memo expresses satisfaction that the units concerned - viz Hurricane and Spitfire Squadrons - had "NOW been stocked with the neccesary 100 octane fuel."

In May 1940 stocks of 100 Octane fuel were 294,000 tons, while stocks of "other grades" were 298,000 tons (attachment 3). Far from there being a crisis in the supply, of 100 Octane preventing a continued change over of units (according to the famous Pips document) for the next two months, 100 Octane fuel was becoming the dominant fuel type being stocked; by August 404,000 tons was being held, cf 230,000 tons of "other grades". Between December 1939 and December 1940 the overall increase in 100 Octane stocks was 297,000 tons, in spite of the fact that some 93,000 tons had been consumed between June and December 1940.

Fact is Luftwaffe fuel stocks were lower or almost the same in 1940 as those of the RAF

It would also seem that the Luftwaffe had provisional pre-war plans for fuel stocks which changed once war had been declared: Kurfurst can stick to the phrase "selected" as much as he likes - it is a purely provisional phrase in a pre-war plan, and the 16 + 2 squadrons was conditional based on fuel supply. This was all explained long ago but completely ignored by Kurfurst and Crumpp.

Nice lie. The very document you have just posted mentions select Spitfire and Hurricane units having been stocked with 100 octane. This document is from May 1940, it is not a pre-war plan, and there is no word of 16+2 Squadrons noted in March 1939, though it's quite clear that the same was carried through, as only a 2 or 3 Blenheim units were 'concerned', in the May 1940 document, same as the March 1939 document.

I guess that puts back your 'credibility' to the shelf it belongs. You were known for manipulating sources long ago on Wikipedia (if anyone doubts it see Minor's latest falsifying attempts on 109 related articles on Wiki), and you have carried this over to this board.

You have also lied when you have stated that the LW fuel reserves were lower than those of the RAF; again, according to the very sources you have posted, the LW aviation fuel reserves stood at around 680,000 tons, compared to about the 600,000 tons contained in Britain. The interesting part is how much more aviation fuel the Germans consumed compared to the British in the period - 80 to 100 000 tons per month.

http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/images/ussbs/fig22.gif

BTW, you were claiming before and swore to the heavens that you will ignore me. Not a man of your word, are you? :D

If this is true then someone needs to explain how 2 squadrons of Blenhiems were split between 4 stations of No 2 Group that were 100% stocked with 100 octane.
That same person needs to explain why if the basic premise was that 5/6ths of the fuel at the other No 2 Group bases was 100 Octane, why should they only use the 1/6th that was 87 octane for operations.
Finally that same person may want to explain to everyone why when he knows about these documents doesn't he ever, ever mention them.

And as an aside, that same person might want to let us know what his version of Select is and how he supports it?

Read the 18 May paper again Barbi; not a mention of "select" units it says the "...fact that Units concerned -ie; Hurricane & Spitfire units - had been stocked with the necessary 100 octane fuel".

Paragraph 8 on the March 1939 paper (your favourite) makes the 16 + 2 squadrons by September 1940 conditional, based on supply. You can call people "liar" all you like - the only one lying is your good self. :grin:

Not withstanding that the Blenheim squadrons shared bases with fighter squadrons. Brian Kingcombe talks of his friendship and rapport 92 had with the Blenheim crews (610?) they shared with, how they helped turn the fighters around between sorties etc.

Means someone is not concerned, in otherwords it refers to a select group.

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/concerned

And here we have the units concerned......

@ Kurfurst, here we go again with the "lie" thing. It's such a give away as to your mindset.

Oh, and on the subject of credibility.. You have to be joking, right?

Wikipedia... You've got the cheek to accuse someone else of doing exactly what you've been banned from wiki for doing? Hypocrite.

Stick to facts.

So I guess the only real question is, since the patch has come out is the Spitfire and Hurricane performance in the sim closer to their real life non-virtual selves?

I'ld like to do some tests, but since the patch has been released I'm getting launcher errors! :()

Just reinstalling the sim to se if it makes any difference.

Cheers!

Once again ignoring the later documents that contradict your theory


Which leaves us with the logistical questions which you have so far avoided. You have requently said that logistics are critical, something I agree, so I would expect you to have put some effort into looking at the logistical questions your theory raises. To do otherwise as you have said, is to be amaturish and lower the tone of the thread.

Putting the Logistical Hat on again its interesting to look at the Basic Logistical details we know for the two cases
For the roll out to FC we know
a) Who made the decision
b) That testing was complete in 1939
c) Which stations were to have it issued to IN THE FIRST INSTANCE
d) How it was to be rolled out
e) That the Oil Committee considered the roll out to be complete in May
Note - all the above is supported by official original records held in the NA

For the 16 FC squadrons + 2 Bomber squadrons
a) We don't know who made the decision to continue with this program once war started
b) We don't know that phase IV testing was on going in 1940
c) We don't know which squadrons or which stations were supposed to have the 100 Octane
d) We don't know how it was to be rolled out
e) If this theory is correct, We don't know when the rest of FC had 100 Octane issued
f) We do know that the limit of 2 squadrons of Bombers mentioned in this paper was disregarded, which must question why the fighter limit is supposed to be maintained
None of these is supported by original papers. The best that can be said is that they depend on wild interpretations of some documents while ignoring others

As I said at the start the case for 100% roll out isn't perfect, but its a lot stronger than the case for 16 Fighter squadrons and 2 bomber squadrons


PS I don't expect a reply to these questions but it highlights that you cannot support your theory and whilst you may disagree with what I put forward, I do at least try to support my belief with documents not theories.
-----------------------------------------------------

Sadly no, even on 87 octane figures the Spits are 50 MPH too slow at sea level and no better at altitude, haven't really tested the hurri.

I just came across the Blenheim IV Pilot's Notes from September 1939 and according to this the outer fuel tanks are restricted to 100 octane fuel and inner fuel tanks to 87 octane fuel.

Hi 41Sqn_Banks,

That's interesting. Can you please share a scan if possible and convenient? Thanks. The following document from April 1940 would seem then to be in agreement with the September 1939 Blenheim IV Pilot's Notes:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...-14april40.jpg

Interesting that it says ALL

Logistics are critical but they do not answer operational questions.

The only way to answer an operational question is with operational documentation. In this case, the document which details the operation of the aircraft is the Operating Notes. The portion that is a legal document connected to the airworthiness of the aircraft will reflect the latest authorization for the type.

The statement "all Fighter Command was using 100 Octane July 1940" is not backed up by the facts.

The statement "100 Octane was used during the Battle of Britain" is correct and backed up by the facts.

Nothing more needs to be said until you find an earlier dated version of the Operating Notes that specify all operational units.

Agreed. The Pilot's Notes don't support it, however they also doesn't speak against it. They simply don't tell anything about how widespread the use was.

It was certainly well over the 16 squadron you claim.

I have a question to all major participants of this thread. When I ask it, I want you to please bear in mind that I am not trolling and do not have an agenda against anyone (except perhaps Osprey... that selective quoting a few pages back really destroyed any credibility you might have had).

Why is it important?

Should there not be 87- and 100-octane variants in the sim regardless?

octane rating choice should be available yes, particularily for mission builders, regarding online it is unlikely anyone would choose anything other than 100 octane.

Why is it important?.....mainly because this is meant to be a BOB simulator and therefore it should accurately represent the state of affairs at the time and not a game for some people to act out an 'alternate version of history' fantasy.

Osprey makes one selective quote and his credibility is destroyed, Kurfurst can dedicate his entire online existense to selective quoting and bias and people take him seriously?

Hard to say for me if the Hurricanes had their props replaced with CSP's before the changeover to 100 octane fuel was done. Imho, a CSP Hurricane with 87 octane fuel would be unhistorical and doesn't need to be modelled. Effort would better go elsewhere.

Well, there should definatly be 100 octane, as all the evidence from pilots etc shows in this thread. As to 87 octane, no actual evidence has shown one operational flight using that fuel during bob, despite the endless arguments

I guess they would be nice to simulate 1939 though.

Still i think most people would settle for both, not holding my breath that we will see 100 octane spit1's and hurris though.

Don't forget that there were some Spitfire and Hurricane (?) that were equipped with Rotol propellers well before the DH props were modified to CSP.

Assuming they're available. What if someone wants to do a Battle of France scenario?

An accurate BOB sim would have 87 and 100 octane variants available. Your beef ought to be with mission designers, it seems.

I haven't said a single thing about Kurfurst in my previous post. The fact that Kurfurst edits wikipedia etc etc doesn't magically mean Osprey is exempt from criticism. That was a pretty blatant attempt to misrepresent the facts.

Well I'd agree there, but what about a Hurricane with the 2-stage De Havilland prop for Battle of France scenarios?

I don't see where my post argues aginst that issue, my point is we just don't have accurate choice right now.

I made no suggestion that it should be only 100 octane, it's just the way things are going we don't have even sifficiently accurate performance for 87 octane, my beef is with whoever is convincing 1C to give us the innacuracy.

Here's my thing: It just seems like an incredible waste of time and energy to argue about whether ALL or MOST or SOME of Fighter Command was on 100 Octane. I mean.... why is that figure important? Why is it important to know if all or some of fighter command was on 100 octane?

The sim should have both aircraft available IMO. Shouldn't we all be arguing for that?

If the CloD map included the whole of the British Isles then 87 and 100 fuel should be available. Since the CloD map is basically 11 Group only 100 fuel should be available.

There was quite a few Hurricane squadrons in France using 100 fuel. (posted in this thread)

There have been hundreds of magazine articles, books, memoirs, journal articles, pilot reports, combat reports...etc, etc. I've read dozens and not one has mentioned the use of 87 octane during combat sorties. 87 octane is a big lie, it is THE BIG LIE perpetrated by people who have an agenda to promote Luftwaffe superiority.

Kurfurst/Crump can't stand the fact that the RAF had massive stocks of 100 octane fuel and converted all their front line fighters to it prior to the battle, while the Luftwaffe didn't. It's that simple.

In this case, the document which details the operation of the aircraft is the Operating Notes. The portion that is a legal document connected to the airworthiness of the aircraft will reflect the latest authorization for the type

This is where we differ. It my belief that if I have an official document that says that 100 octane was intalled at a station or that it was in use in a combat report then it was by definition, in use, at that station or in that squadron.
If your manual is dated later, then all that proves is that your manual is later. It doesn't mean that the fuel wasn't used until the date of the manual

The real waste of time and energy is from those arguing that 100 octane should not be availabe, of course I would settle for seeing both fuels.
can't you see the reason for this debate is to get 100 octane included?

I feel it's important for me personally to make a stand, purley from a historical point of view. As far as Cliffs goes, you're right, have both variants. Problem solved.

This is more about 1 mans personal crusade to change history, it just happens to have moved to here. Maybe it's not the 'right' place to do it.

All you need to do is Google "100 octane fighter command" and the same person shows up, name calling, character assasinating, arguing, cherry picking and obviously has an agenda that has nothing to do with history.

My problem with this is the motivation. If it's historic then it's opposite to his obvious bias. Kufurst is basically saying that the RAF performed better during the BoB, as they managed to repel the LW using mainly 87 octane. If I was just some RAF fanboy then surley I'd quite happily accept that.

My problem lies in the fact that his motivation must be related to Simulations. It's the only reason I can think of for repeatedly arguing that 87 was the main fuel (remember that he's invested a lot of his time into a 109 site).

It's the manipulation of history to achieve this that I personally am standing up against.

The accepted view is that fighter command converted in the Spring of 1940.
I challange anyone to find me a book on the subject of the BoB that states otherwise. Yet K keeps on with his repeated attempts to challange this. I have yet to see one really convincing piece of contemporary evidence.

This isn't about Cliffs for me, at the end of the day it's just a game. (I own a copy but am unable to play it on my current set up)

Nobody has to read this thread, there's always the circular argument about fanboy/whiners going on in the main forum to keep you entertained :)

I'm actually quite proud that a few individuals of this much crticised 'community' feel the same way I do.

I whole heartily agree with the first part, but disagree with the second part.

That's exactly where the effort could go.

Honestly and truly I really can't. The reason for this 160-page thread appears to be proving each other wrong.

yeah...that too :).....I mean no it's not, youre wrong.

Shhhhh!!!

http://youtu.be/kQFKtI6gn9Y

Or proving each other right ??

I blame Willy and Reginald. Why couldn't they have forseen the internet chaos that their designs have caused?


Best Regards,
MB_Avro.

Thanks 41Sqn_Banks!

24 September 1938:

The report goes on to explain that 100 octane was useful as a means of improving take off power, particularly with the Hurricane on some airfields, and the operational limits in Merlin engines would have to be strictly observed. This is evidence that the adoption of 100 octane was well underway nearly a year before the war started albeit its use was temporarily restricted as a measure to improve take off performance; this was also before increased boost pressures were adopted.

The Operational Notes for Pilots on Merlin II and III from January 1939 fit that time frame and are an good indicator for the restrictions at that time.

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/attachm...0&d=1334682385

This plane is 10 miles slower than in real, baahhh, the developers are biased.
That plane had super 007 fuel and performed better than in game, bahhh, the developers are biased.
This planes gun doesn't make big enough holes, bahhh, the developers are biased.
That planes DM is wrong, I looked at it twice and it did not fell apart, baaahhh, the developers are sooo biased.
And so on...

As the Captain says, both planes should be in the game.
However they aren't.
Developers are sure aware of it by now. They might include it at one point - or they might not.
In the meantime get over it and take what is given to you. Like those fighter jocks did back in the days. And they had to survive.
You are having fun.
+++++

thank you!

Didn't you know that Willy and Reginald met in secret and planned the whole thing? It's a plot I tell you...

The Plot

Hey, as a developer I would even go so far to put in the most optimisitc modeled top plane for both sides, making sure that both are slightly better than I real life.
Sort of a test-plane under optimum conditions.
That way the fanboys have their Ueberplanes to play with.

For everybody else there would be a realism option called 'variable preformance' where all planes of same type vary in terms of performance by a certain degree, the worse the condition (plane age, maintenance quality) the worse the performance.
Now I would LOVE that option - and it would be way more realistic than all those people who scream foul play because the in-game performance curve does not match exactly the (various) real life performance curves.

If one looks for realism variable performance would be what you want.
Not perfectly matching performance curves.
+++++

Good one 41Sqn_Banks, thanks again!

Reality check...

100 Octane Fuel - Issue of., 12th December, 1939
A.P.1590B/J.2-W, Merlin II and III--Use of +12 lb./sq.in. Boost Pressure--Alterations, 20 March 1940
Emergency +12 lbs./sq. in. Boost Operation: Pilot's Notes, Merlin II, III and IV, 4th Edition, April 1940, page 6.
Air Chief Marshal H.C.T. Dowding, Handling of Merlin in Hurricane, Spitfire and Defiant Aircraft, 1st August, 1940

56 Squadron Combat Report, 9 May 1940: twelve boost
S/L J. O. W. Oliver, 85 Squadron, 10 May 1940: pulled the plug
F/O Paul Richey, 1 Squadron, 11 May 1940: boost-override pulled
F/O E. J. Kain, 73 Squadron, 14 May 1940: pulling his boost cut out
P/O D. W. A. Stones, 79 Squadron, 14 May 1940: pulled out the emergency boost-plug
Sgt. R. C. Wilkinson, 3 Squadron, 14 May 1940: 12 P.S.I.
P/O R. P. Beamont, 87 Squadron, 15 May 1940: I pulled the tit'* for over-boost... *Emergency boost over-ride on the Merlin engine
P/O F. B. Sutton, 56 Squadron, 18 May 1940: I had to pull the tit... Emergency boost control giving extra power
F/Lt. I. R. Gleed, 87 Squadron, 18 May 1940: pull the tit *; a jerk as my supercharger goes up to twelve boosts
P/O John Bushell, 151 Squadron, 18 May 1940: I used full 12 lb boost (pulled the plug)
S/L E. M. Donaldon, 151 Sqdn., 18 May 1940: I pulled the plug and climbed at 10 lbs boost
F/O C. F. G. Adye, 17 Squadron, 18 May 1940: pulled emergency boost control
F/O C. F. G. Adye, 17 Squadron, 19 May 1940: pulled emergency boost
F/Lt. I. R. Gleed, 87 Squadron, 19 May 1940: Here goes with the tit. A jerk - the boost's shot up to twelve pounds
Sgt. L. H. B. Pearce, 79 Squadron, 20 May 1940: Pulled tit
P/O John Freeborn, 74 Squadron, 24 May 1940: boost cut-out
P/O Colin Gray (NZ), No. 54 Squadron, 25 May 1940: I pressed the emergency boost tit
P/O Colin Gray (NZ), No. 54 Squadron, 25 May 1940: +12 lbs.
P/O Al Deere, No. 54 Squadron, 26 May 1940: 12 boost
F/LT Brian Lane, 19 Squadron, 26 May 1940: automatic boost cut-out
F/LT Brian Lane, 19 Squadron, 26 May 1940: 12 lb. boost
Sgt. J. C. Harrison, 229 Squadron, 28 May 1940: I pulled the emergency boost
P/O K. B. McGlashan, 245 Squadron, 28 May 1940: We’d boost an extra four pounds, from eight to twelve
P/O C. M. Simpson, 229 Squadron, 29 May 1940: with boost out and pulled
P/O T. D. Welsh, 264 Squadron, 29 May 1940: pulled boost cut-out
F/Sgt. G. C. Unwin, 19 Squadron, 1 June 1940: 12 Boost
Sgt. P. Ottewill, 43 Squadron, 1 June 1940: automatic boost cut-out pulled
P/O M. P. Brown, 611 Squadron, 2 June 1940: opened the boost cut-out
F/O D. H. Watkins, 611 Squadron, 2 June 1940: emergency boost
F/Lt. John Webster, No. 41 Squadron, 19 June 1940: 12 lbs boost
F/Lt. R. G. Dutton, 145 Squadron, 1 July 1940: pulled the plug
P/O G. Page, 56 Squadron, July 1940 "Pulling the "Tit"*... *An emergency knob for supplying additional power to the engine.
F/Lt D. P. Kelly, 74 Squadron, 28 July 1940: boost cutout
F/Lt. John Webster, No. 41 Squadron, 28 July 1940: 12 boost
F/Lt. John Webster, No. 41 Squadron, 28 July 1940: twelve boost
P/O George Bennions, 41 Squadron, 28 July 1940: emergency boost
P/O Art Donahue, 64 Squadron, 5 August 1940: emergency throttle
F/Lt. John Webster, 41 Squadron, 8 August 1940: 12 boost
F/O R.W. Wallens, 41 Squadron, 11 August 1940: 12 lbs boost
Composite Combat Report, 41 Squadron, 15 August 1940: 12 lbs boost
P/O Jeffrey Quill, 65 Squadron, 12 August 1940: boost control cut-out
F/Lt A. C. Deere, 54 Squadron, 12 August 1940: 12 Boost
F/Lt George Gribble, 54 Squadron, 15 August 1940: 12 boost
F/Lt Robert F. Boyd, 602 Squadron, 18 August 1940: My Spitfire easily outdistanced Me 109's at 10 lbs boost 2800 r.p.m.
P/O G. E. Goodman, 1 Squadron, 18 August 1940: pulled the plug
F/O D. H. Watkins, 611 Squadron, 21 August 1940: emergency boost
P/O James Morton, 603 Squadron, 28 August 1940: pressed the tit
P/O Wicks, 56 Squadron, 30 August 1940: emergency boost
P/O Ronald Berry, 603 Squadron, 31 August 1940: press the emergency boost
P/O Colin Gray (NZ), No. 54 Squadron, 31 August 1940: emergency boost
Sgt Jack Stokoe, 603 Squadron, September 1940: pushed in boost override
P/O Roger Hall, 152 Squadron, 4 September 1940: pushed the red half-lever forward
F/O Robert Oxspring, 66 Squadron, 6 September 1940: emergency power
P/O J. R. B. Meaker, 249 Squadron, 6 September 1940: pull the plug
P/O R. D. Elliott, 72 Squadron, 9 September 1940: MAX Boost (12 lbs)
F/Lt J. A. Kent, 303 Squadron, 9 September 1940: I pulled the boost override plug
P/O T. F. Neil, 249 Squadron, 18 September 1940: Plug pulled
F/O Brian Macnamara, 603 Squadron, 27 September 1940: In fine pitch, with full throttle and the red lever pressed
P/O R. G. A. Barclay, 249 Squadron, 27 September 1940: automatic boost cutout
P/O Bob Doe, 234 Squadron: I would 'pull the plug', which was the release so that we could get extra boost
Geoffrey Wellum, 92 Squadron: Press the emergency boost override.
P/O David Crook, 609 Squadron, 30 September 1940: 'pulled the plug', i.e. pushed the small handle on the throttle quadrant that cuts out the automatic boost control thus allowing one to use emergency power
P/O K. W. MacKenzie, 501 Squadron, 5 October 1940: tit pulled for absolute full power
S/L A. A. McKellar, 605 Squadron, 7 October 1940: pulled my boost control
F/O D. McMullen, 222 Squadron, 15 October 1940: 12 boost

56 Squadron Combat Report, 9 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...qdn-9may40.jpg


S/L J. O. W. Oliver, 85 Squadron, 10 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...er-10may40.jpg

F/O Paul Richey, 1 Squadron, 11 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ichey-pg76.jpg

F/O E. J. Kain, 73 Squadron, 14 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...monks-pg98.jpg

P/O D. W. A. Stones, 79 Squadron, 14 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...tones-pg32.jpg

Sgt. R. C. Wilkinson, 3 Squadron, 14 may 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ne/rcw-pg6.jpg

P/O R. P. Beamont, 87 Squadron, 15 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...nt-15may40.jpg

P/O F. B. Sutton, 56 Squadron, 18 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...utton-pg80.jpg

F/Lt. I. R. Gleed, 87 Squadron, 18 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ed-18may40.jpg

P/O John Bushell, 151 Squadron, 18 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...dn-18may40.jpg

S/L E. M. Donaldon, 151 Sqdn., 18 May 1940

F/O C. F. G. Adye, 17 Squadron, 18 May 1940

F/O C. F. G. Adye, 17 Squadron, 19 May 1940

F/Lt. I. R. Gleed, 87 Squadron, 19 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ed-19may40.jpg

Sgt. L. H. B. Pearce, 79 Squadron, 20 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ce-20may40.jpg

P/O John Freeborn, 74 Squadron, 24 May 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/freeborn-24-5-40.jpg

P/O Colin Gray (NZ), No. 54 Squadron, 25 May 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/5...-25may40-2.jpg

P/O Colin Gray (NZ), No. 54 Squadron, 25 May 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/54-gray-25may40.jpg

P/O Al Deere, No. 54 Squadron, 26 May 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/deere-26-5-40.jpg

F/LT Brian Lane, 19 Squadron, 26 May 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/1...-26may40-2.jpg

F/LT Brian Lane, 19 Squadron, 26 May 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/lane-26-5-40.jpg

Sgt. J. C. Harrison, 229 Squadron, 28 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...on-28may40.jpg

P/O K. B. McGlashan, 245 Squadron, 28 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...an-28may40.jpg

P/O C. M. Simpson, 229 Squadron, 29 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...on-29may40.jpg

F/Sgt. G. C. Unwin, 19 Squadron, 1 June 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/1...-1june40-2.jpg

Sgt. P. Ottewill, 43 Squadron, 1 June 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ll-1june40.pdf

P/O M. P. Brown, 611 Squadron, 2 June 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/6...wn-2june40.jpg

F/O D. H. Watkins, 611 Squadron, 2 June 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/6...ns-2june40.jpg

F/Lt. John Webster, No. 41 Squadron, 19 June 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/4...19june40-1.jpg

F/Lt. R. G. Dutton, 145 Squadron, 1 July 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...on-1july40.pdf

P/O G. Page, 56 Squadron, July 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...age-july40.jpg

F/Lt D. P. Kelly, 74 Squadron, 28 July 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/kelly-28july40.jpg

F/Lt. John Webster, No. 41 Squadron, 28 July 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/webster-28-7-40.jpg

F/Lt. John Webster, No. 41 Squadron, 28 July 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/Webster-29july40.jpg

P/O George Bennions, 41 Squadron, 28 July 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/bennions-28-7-40.jpg

P/O Art Donahue, 64 Squadron, 5 August 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/6...hue-5aug40.jpg

F/Lt. John Webster, 41 Squadron, 8 August 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/4...ter-8aug40.jpg

F/O R.W. Wallens, 41 Squadron, 11 August 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/4...on-11aug40.jpg

Composite Combat Report, 41 Squadron, 15 August 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/41-15aug40-2.jpg

P/O Jeffrey Quill, 65 Squadron, 12 August 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/65-quill-12aug40.jpg

F/Lt A. C. Deere, 54 Squadron, 12 August 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/54-deere-12aug40.jpg

F/Lt George Gribble, 54 Squadron, 15 August 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/gribble-12lbs.jpg

F/Lt Robert F. Boyd, 602 Squadron, 18 August 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/boyd-18-8-40.jpg

P/O G. E. Goodman, 1 Squadron, 18 August 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...an-18aug40.jpg

F/O D. H. Watkins, 611 Squadron, 21 August 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...-21aug40-1.jpg

P/O James Morton, 603 Squadron, 28 August 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/6...on-28aug40.jpg

P/O Wicks, 56 Squadron, 30 August 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ck-30aug40.pdf

P/O Ronald Berry, 603 Squadron, 31 August 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/berry-31-8-40.jpg

P/O Colin Gray (NZ), No. 54 Squadron, 31 August 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/54-gray-31aug40.jpg

Sgt Jack Stokoe, 603 Squadron, September 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/stokoe-1-9-40.jpg

P/O Roger Hall, 152 Squadron, 4 September 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/152-hall-pg86.jpg

F/O Robert Oxspring, 66 Squadron, 6 September 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/92-oxspring-p59.jpg

P/O J. R. B. Meaker, 249 Squadron, 6 September 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...er-6sept40.jpg

P/O R. D. Elliott, 72 Squadron, 9 September 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/elliott-9-9-40.jpg

F/Lt J. A. Kent, 303 Squadron, 9 September 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...nt-9sept40.jpg

P/O T. F. Neil, 249 Squadron, 18 September 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...l-18sept40.jpg

F/O Brian Macnamara, 603 Squadron, 27 September 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/M...a-27sept40.jpg

P/O R. G. A. Barclay, 249 Squadron, 27 September 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...y-27sept40.jpg

P/O Bob Doe, 234 Squadron
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/234-doe.jpg

Geoffrey Wellum, 92 Squadron
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/92-wellum-pg147.jpg

P/O David Crook, 609 Squadron, 30 September 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/609-crook-p80.jpg

P/O K. W. MacKenzie, 501 Squadron, 5 October 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...enzie-pg50.jpg

S/L A. A. McKellar, 605 Squadron, 7 October 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ler-7oct40.pdf

F/O D. McMullen, 222 Squadron, 15 October 1940
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/McMullen-15oct40.jpg

Did this huge post actually add any information to this thread??
Everything there was already posted at least once!
Waste of space ant bits'n'bytes, imo.

Reality check.

And because lanes excellent posts can't go unanswered, and balance is needed, here's all the evidence that's been shown so far in this thread, that a single fighter in 11 group flew ops with 87 octane fuel during the BoB.

http://i7.photobucket.com/albums/y29...87evidence.jpg

Feel free to add to this, although as you can see the case is overwhelming....:rolleyes:

Did this tiny post actually add any information to this thread?
Waste of space and bits'n'bytes.

It is supposed to make up for the fact that none could produce a single document showing. So the same papers are posted over and over again, preferably in extreme size so that they would create an overwhelming impression. Clear cut facts do not need such machinations, a single paper can be usually produced which would report the facts, without any 'explanation' and 'interpretation' needed.

Its a sign of desperation, since it is impossible to produce something that doesn't exist.. hence the desperation, since despite the efforts to convince them otherwise, the developers of the sim and most of the readers took disinterest and disbelief in his thesis. It would appear that not even Glider or Al believes it any more that it must have been every and all Squadrons, so I guess for the most of us the positions are getting closer, we all seem to believe this boost was used by many Squadrons, personally I believe in progressively increasing numbers after August 1940 (it is clearly noticable that most Squadrons begin to report it in the late summer first). Thus lane's thesis remained an in-bred insanity for a few to share and believe.

BTW a reality check from lane is kind of a self-contradiction. He should check his site first for such, see silly claims about the 1-minute rating of the DB 601A not having been introduced until 1942, that 601N variants have only appeared towards the end of the battle of britain and so on. A 'reality check' from a guy who has become famous for such manipulations sounds a bit incredible to me.

Overwhelming indeed!