Pstyle,

I was refering to fact a military fuel must carry a specification approved by that organization.

It will not become the standard fuel without a full specification. The completion of the specification IS the process of adoption. A provisional specification gets it into the system so it can be tested.

Understand?

This is yet more meaningless technobabble, and yet another red herring: fact is 100 Octane was always called 100 Octane in RAF service, right throughout the war; the relevant designation was B.A.M (British Air Ministry) 100, but it was seldom referred to as such.

D.T.D = Directorate of Technical Development, which dealt with developing equipment, aircraft and stores for the RAF. Because 100 Octane fuel was developed outside of the RAF and Air Ministry's direct control as a private venture by oil companies it was never allocated a DTD number.

The first plant to be able to produce 100 Octane fuel cheaply and quantity did not come into operation until right before the war started. There was a shortage of 100/130 grade through most of the war that is discussed in Allied Oil Committee meetings. Specifically it is mentioned in a 1944 meeting on adopting a higher octane grade as a limitation to the production of the more powerful fuel. The refineries cannot meet the current requirements and have never been able to meet them with the exception of a few short months in 1943. Therefore they do not want to devote any refinery capability to production other than the amount required for testing purposes.

That shortage of 100 Octane is why domestically, the United States used 91 Grade CONUS and the RAF used 87 grade for non-operational purposes for most of the war. 100 grade was in short supply and reserved for operations.

Glider, the document you post from December 1938 very clearly states that all stations will recieve an adequet supply of 100 Octane before the first aircraft is converted. If stations were not getting fuel then that is proof the operational adoption did not occur until all stations had it. Think about it, it just makes sense. You cannot easily switch fuels back and forth. If you add a lower knock limited performance fuel to the tanks, you must use lower operating limits or you will experience detonation which can end a flight very quickly.

This is the kind of thing that undermines the credibility of the posters in this thread.

All one needs to do is look the immaturity exhibited in this thread. Do you really think the evidence has been sifted through with a mature outlook and placed in context? I certainly don't think so at all. More effort has been devoted to finding cartoons and taking opinion polls than looking objectively at the evidence.

If you are going to use logistical documents, then you better have a good understanding of the logistical system and how the accounting process works. One should understand things like "Estabilishment vs Strength", how a fuel becomes specified, how does the testing process work, and what are the constraints.

All one has to do is look at the projections for fuel requirements for a week of operations in the 18 May 1940 document in order to support just four squadrons. You need almost 3000 tons of fuel in the tanks forward of the logistical node to support a week of operations!! That is to burn ~230 tons a week in their fuel tanks.

Compare that with Table II fuel at the airbases for June thru August of 10,000 tons.

What are you talking about? Glider, I use the documents provided in this thread. I just don't read into them and fit them in the context of how things work.

I just read what the document says.......Establishment vs. Strength.....All stations have to receive an adequate supply of 100 Octane before the first unit is converted....

Now, I believe that constraint of all stations receiving 100 Octane as applying to operational adoption and not Phase IV testing. Phase IV testing would continue using the provisional specified fuel. It is impossible to move forward with operational adoption if Phase IV testing is not complete. In Phase IV testing, you would see handfuls of squadrons using the fuel in order to fulfill the requirements of that test phase. You do realize that the fact we only see a few squadrons using the fuel before September very much supports that notion. Occam’s razor, Glider....


Sure there is and the language is "units concerned". That tells us there is a limitation. We don't know if it is self-imposed as part of Phase IV testing or a supply issue. It really is irrelevant though in determining if all operational units were using the fuel in July 1940 as the fact remains there was a limitation in place. The Oil Committee was aware of it.

When did FC fully convert? That is question we are trying to answer. The evidence seems to suggest sometime after October 1940. I think it is very likely there is another edition of the Operating Notes for the Spitfire Mk I and Hurricane series we don't have at the moment.

It is a fact that in July 1940, all of FC was not using 100 Octane.
The rotation of squadrons does put a restraint on the ability to determine just how many squadrons were using it at one time without a timeline and further research.

non-operational and training units prob used 87 octane while the 100 was diverted to the operational units, simple solution and nobody is wrong.

100LL for example has a specification by convention. It also has a defence specification for NATO as it is in the supply inventory.

http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarti...ontentId=57723

All approved aviation fuels must recieve a full specification from the aviation authority in place by convention. 100 Octane is no different and the provisional specification has already been posted in this thread.


That being said.......

If you have not picked up on it, I pretty much ignore you NzTyphoon.

If you learn how things work in aviaton, you will be far more successful in interpreting original documentation.

That's ok, but you're still wrong :grin:

I agree at least as far as Hurricanes are concerned, as the policy was to convert Hurricanes first, Spitfires later. In May, Spitfires had at least been partially converted, meaning Hurricanes had to be complete. Necessary modifications were started in late 1939, so it adds up.

From POWE 33/1363, Report of actual production 100/130 and 100/150 gasolines and components. 1 bbl (barrel) = 35 imp gallons, 1 ton = 2240lbs

1944 150 grade 150 grade as a % 130 grade
February 24908 tons 221400 bbls 61.5% 15570 tons 138400 bbls
March 35483 tons 315400 bbls 69.6% 15491 tons 137700 bbls
April 4928 tons 43800 bbls 7.4% 52988 tons 471000 bbls
May 8033 tons 71400 bbls 17.3% 38329 tons 34700 bbls
June 24446 tons 217300 bbls 64.8% 13286 tons 118100 bbls
July 38790 tons 344800 bbls 71.7% 15300 tons 136000 bbls
August 31376 tons 278900 bbls 66.1% 16110 tons 143200 bbls
September 35640 tons 316800 bbls 66.6% 17910 tons 159200 bbls
October 24154 tons 214700 bbls 50.4% 23749 tons 211100 bbls
November 19384 tons 172300 bbls 54.8% 15964 tons 141900 bbls
December 33165 tons 294800 bbls 61.5% 20801 tons 184900 bbls

1945
January 31984 tons 284300 bbls 77.1% 9484 tons 84300 bbls
February 33525 tons 298000 bbls 70.1% 14310 tons 127200 bbls
March 23569 tons 209500 bbls 48.9% 24671 tons 219300 bbls
April 50141 tons 445700 bbls
May 56914 tons 505900 bbls

Total 150 production, February 44 to March 45:- 369,385 tons, 3,283,400 bbls, 114,919,000 gallons.

Total 130 production, February 44 to March 45:- 293,963 tons

Total aero fuel production:- 663,348 tons of which 55.7% was 150 grade.

You were saying Eugene.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...roduction.html

We are all still waiting for you to ID the 16 squadrons that were the only squadrons that used 12lb boost/100 octane fuel in Sept 1940.

What the hell has NATO got to do with world war 2 and the Battle of Britain, what history books have you got?

There was no shortage of 100 Octane in the UK until May 1944. Find any quote to support your theory that there was a shortage of 100 Octane in the UK during the BOB.

US engines were not designed for 100 octane in 1940 also the main reason for the RAF using 87 octane for non operational purposes was cost. That is a recurrent theme in a number of the papers. Bomber Command wanted all thier stations to have 100 octane 100% but they were turned down on cost. You did reead the papers didn't you?


Actually on the whole I do think the case for the use has been presented well, with a wealth of original documentation. Just look at what you have just posted. No evidence just a lot of assumptions. Everything I have posted is supported by documents, if you belive that certain = 16 squadrons then support it, its as simple as that.
I agree with that 1938 paper but why do you ignore the dec 1939 paper that said that fuel reserves were sufficient and that the roll out could commence? I believe that its this blatent dismissal of original documents that undermines any debate.

I have a very good understanding as to logistics, I also know the meaning of current or actual establishment and authorised establishment they differ.

Show me any document that says 1940 is for testing, another example of a theory and nothing to support it.