Clearly this posting (note not a paper) forms the core of the argument that RAF Fighter command were not fully equipped with 100 Octane so I will look at it in detail.

Fighter Command started converting its aircraft before March. An exact date I do not have but attach two documents showing that two squadrons were equipped by 16th February, the probability is that there were others but I cannot confirm that.

The 25% figure by May 1940 I cannot confirm or deny so will not comment, but the rest of this section I do fundamentally disagree with. In December 1939 stocks of 100 Octane were 202,000 tons and by August 1940 stocks were at 404,000 tons (documents are attached). We know that in June – August the average consumption was 10,000 tons a month (document attached).
The questions I suggest that we need to ask are:-
1) If you have what is in effect a three and a half year stockpile, is this a strain, let alone a great strain on the stockpile. In my opinion it isn’t a strain at all, it’s barely noticeable
2) The implication that the RAF fought the BOB with only 25% of its aircraft converted is unbelievable. Think of the practical implications, squadrons with mixed fuels and mixed performances, what are new build aircraft 100 octane or 87 octane, engines are changed and replaced, again are these 100 octane or 87 octane. Why hasn’t anybody mentioned this in all the hundreds of books written on the BOB?


The British War Cabinet didn’t discuss 100 Octane at all in May and as a result no decisions were made. I spent a day in the NA going through all the papers for the meetings, the meeting notes and the actions resulting, and Fuel of any kind was not discussed. I should add that in May 1940 the War Cabinet met almost daily and it was a huge amount of paper, literally hundreds of sheets. There were some interesting unexpected gems, the one I liked most was a decision to take over a number of Swedish Naval vessels by force and include them in the Navy. The First Sea Lord decided that while additional vessels were always welcome, giving Germany an excuse to invade Sweden to protect them from the British was too high a risk.

I am afraid that this is incorrect. The previous paper giving the stocks in 1940 show a strong steady increase, it certainly wasn’t the case that they had to wait until August for additional stocks. There is no indication anywhere that the RAF stopped converting fighters in May, fought the BOB with 125 aircraft modified for 100 Octane and then re started converting the aircraft in late September.
In fact the stocks had reached such a level in August that the rest of the operational aircraft in the RAF were authorised to start using 100 Octane (paper attached on following posting).

I am afraid that no one has seen this paper so cannot comment on the sources for the above posting.

This posting contains the missing document from before and a couple of others that show the anticipated delivery/consumption and stocks.

It is an ambiguity...period.

What else needs to be said?

The rest of the argument is built on speculation. What is the difference on the sides?

What sides are there anyway outside of gamer context?? There is only the facts and a mystery to be solved.

If you have consumption documents, why try to plot FC operations vs consumption of 100 grade.

If you see a the curves correspond, they it is probable the fuel was used by FC.

The level of hypocrisy being put out by the Luftwaffles on this board is astounding.

On one hand they demand forms in triplicate showing every single British fighter aircraft and every single fighter field was provided with unlimited supplies of 100 octane. On the other hand, they put forward claims for the German use of high octane and DB601N engines with a complete lack of documentation.

In the this thread, and the threads from other boards we have had clear and comprehensive documentation for the use of 100 octane presented. This can be summarized as follows: (documentation for all these stages has been provided in this thread or the other threads from other boards which have been linked)

1) As far back as 1937, the RAF and British scientists recognize higher octane fuel provides the opportunity for higher power output and better performance for their fighter and bomber aircraft.

2) The RAF and British government begin planning for the accumulation of stocks of fuel, this begins with the importation of higher octane fuel from the US, but also involves the conversion of British refineries to allow domestic production if the US sources are jeapordized.

3) Testing of 100 octane fuel in the Hurricane, Spitfire and Blenheim aircraft types begins pre-war in March of 1939. Entire Squadrons are converted and standardized to the use of the fuel.

4) As a result of these tests providing successful results in the use of 100 octane, and the accumulation of several 100 thousand gallons of fuel, (more than two years supply) the RAF is given the go ahead to convert the entirety of Fighter Command and selected Blenheim Squadrons to the use of 100 octane. This process is directed to be initiated in March of 1940. The gravity of the strategic situation demands every step be taken. With plentiful supply, there is every reason to move ahead.

5) Reports from both the organizational bodies of the RAF, as well as plentiful Squadron and Pilot reports, during the period May-September 1940, mention the stocking and/or use of +12 boost and 100 octane in Hurricane, Spitfire and Defiant aircraft at all of the sector fields and most of the secondary fields in 10, 11 and 12 Groups, the three RAF Fighter Groups which were most heavily engaged in the Battle. Other Squadron and pilot reports note the use of 100 octane earlier during the Battle of France.

6) Mid battle, a memo is directed to ALL RAF Squadrons from Air Chief Marshal Dowding, the officer in command of Fighter Command, cautioning all pilots not to over use +12 boost, (only used with 100 octane fuel) in situations which are not emergencies.

7) Consumption of 100 octane fuel rises heavily from the period June to September 1940. Despite this, RAF stocks of the fuel remain plentiful thanks to deliveries from the US.

8 ) All newly manufactured RAF aircraft during the period July-September 1940 are standardized with new equipment which allows them to accept and run 100 octane fuel and higher boost.

With all this documentation, the weight of proof clearly indicates 100 octane fuel was in standardized use by Fighter Command in the 10, 11 and 12 Group areas during the Battle. These Group areas encompass the entire section of Britain represented in the COD map.

Only those who have closed minds and a fixed agenda can continue to against the inclusion of 100 octane fueled aircraft.

Meanwhile these self same naysayers make their claims for the use of high octane German fuel, and DB601N engines, with an infinitely smaller scale of proof.

+1

In regards to the Blenheim, the pilot's notes for the Mk.IV specify use of BOTH 87 and 100 octane fuel.

They wanted extra range so they added two extra fuel tanks (the outboard ones) along with a jettison valve for each one.

This made the aircraft heavier when fully fueled and they needed extra boost to maintain a safe takeoff distance. So they modified the engines to run +9 lbs and installed a boost cut-out.

The extra boost caused detonation so they needed 100 octane, but fighter boys needed it too.

The solution? When loaded for long range, Blenheims used 87 octane fuel in the inboard tanks and 100 octane fuel in the outboard tanks.

Take off was done on 100 octane and +9 lbs, climb was done on 87 octane and +5 lbs (ie, they throttled back and switched tanks right after takeoff), cruise was still on 87 octane with a limit of +3.5 lbs for auto-rich mixture and +1.5 lbs for auto-lean.

The standard operating procedure called for depleting the inboard tanks first because they lacked a jettison valve and their fuel contents couldn't be dumped to lighten up the aircraft in an emergency.

Once the inboard tanks were exhausted they were to fly the rest of the mission on 100 octane from the outboard tanks.

For short range missions they would only load the inboard tanks with 87 octane, because +5 lbs boost was deemed sufficient to takeoff with the reduced fuel load.

At least that's what the Mk.IV pilot's operating handbook states.

Simple blatant lie. See:

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...9&postcount=42
http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...9&postcount=43

And another. The memo is a circular that was of course generally to be circulated to all Groups.

Source please.

Actually, evidence for the use of 100 octane fuel is far more decisive and reliable than in the case of the RAF.

For example, we do not know how many RAF Fighter Stations were issued 100 octane fuel, apart from the 'certain' number 'concerned'. We do not know how many Merlins were converted and were in service use for 100 octane. We do not know how many RAF Fighter Stations were issued 100 octane fuel, apart from the 'certain' number 'concerned'. We do not know even how many FC Squads were using the fuel at the same time.

All we have is a handful of RAF fans who keep screaming hysterically, and showing childish innuendo waving around the same 3 worn pages over and over again, and try to read into them something they wish for but the papers do not say.

All the specifics they managed to dig up that the RAF decided in March 1939 to equip 16 Fighter Squadrons for 100 octane by September 1940, and that the 'certain' Squadrons 'concerned' were equipped so by mid-May 1940. Oh wait - we knew that already from books, just see the Spitfire the History scan...

In contrast, we know all this for the German side and have a much clearer picture without any need of dubious 'interpretation' by biased fanatics. The facts are plainly on the table. We know when, where, and how many planes were flying with DB 601N and in what units. Which is why there's so much less hysteria about it - well apart the aforementioned fanatics. ;) Solid research does that.

Bravo! :)

clarifying the ling Kurfurst
The request from the ACAS is included in the first paper. You will see that its item 9 in the papers giving the summary of the conclusions of the 5th Meeting. This note is direct and simply asks for squadrons armed with fighters and Blenheims be equiped with 100 Octane fuel
The paper you are referring to is also attached for completeness. It is the summary of the actions from the 5th meeting for the 6th meeting. You will see that it specificly refers to item 9 in the Summary of Conclusions. So the paper trail is clear and complete. Now why he says certain I do not know and am not going to guess, but the request from the ACAS was clear and I did not misquote it.

[QUOTE=Kurfürst;298531]Please see your posting 52 and 76 on this thread.