Now you are an expert on processes in engineering companies. Who'd have thunk it :rolleyes:

He's been an "Advisor to the Experts" for several years now.

S!

That conversion to new plane is nothing new. Same happened here to our pilots being transferred from older types like Brewster, Curtiss Hawk etc. to the Bf109G..most only got instructions on what whas what and what to check and note and off you go :)

We don't..

Just found this. From the list of mkI serial numbers in M&S...

All spitfires built after the 1/6/1939 were Merlin III. Only 74 were Merlin II

On the 22nd March 1940 a letter from MAC ordered the change of production and specified that all MKI's were to have the Merlin X installed, starting from Serial Number R7023. This was to bring them upto MkIII standard. events overtook this instruction and from R7258 Merlin 45's were fitted, thus bringing the Mk I upto MkV spec. Why would they do this in march

R7023 was built on 28/1/1941 R7258 was completed on 5/4/1941

Every single spitfire produced after that date was a Merlin 45.

Simple fact is there were no operational mkI's around in 1942. Any that had survived that long were in OTU's all the others were converted to MkV's or PR's or whatever..

The first Spitfire into service was delivered to No. 19 Squadron at Duxford on 4 August 1938. The use of 100 octane fuel was approved for Spitfire Squadrons by 24 September 1938.32 Fighter Command noted on 6 December 1938 that Duxford, Debden, Northholt and Digby had received 100 octane fuel.32b As of December 1938 Nos. 19 and 66 were based at Duxford and were the only RAF units then equipped with Spitfires. The Air Ministry noted in a memo dated 12 December 1939 that "100 octane fuel is approved for use in Hurricane, Spitfire and Defiant aircraft, and state that issue will be made as soon as the fuel is available in bulk at the distribution depots serving the Fighter Stations concerned." 32c

24 September 1938
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...t-approval.jpg

6 December 1938
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...octanefuel.jpg

14 November 1939
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit1-12lbs.jpg

12 December 1939
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ct-issue-1.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ct-issue-2.jpg

Spitfire prototype, first flight march 1936, first production Spit delivered to a Squadron, August 1938. They "rushed" that too.

Typical Flight testing regiment:

http://img267.imageshack.us/img267/6...ngregiment.jpg

One thing you will not see in this process is the what is termed the "phase III" testing. That is not done by the service and is the responsibility of the contractor, in this case, Rolls Royce.

Phase I is concept development and is also performed by the contractor.

In 1939 we see the Phase II testing which is a proof of concept type testing and is performed by the service. We don't see the Phase I or Phase III testing as they are not done by the RAF. Any documentation is the sole property of Rolls Royce.

After Phase III testing, the concept will then come back to the service for Phase IV testing.

From:

http://img232.imageshack.us/img232/7...gevolution.jpg


Extra-ordinary...

Outliers are not examples of a mean.

I work with Rolls-Royce and I'm pretty sure they don't use protocol from the 1981 flight testing conference in Las Vegas, let alone had the forsight to use it 42 years before the conference.

One of our lads operates CNC's for RR too, making compressor blades for jet engines. I'll ask him if your stuff has any relevance whatsoever, although I think I know the answer already......

Lovely but absolutely irrelevant, all I have to do is check the dates. What happened happened. I REPEAT, THERE WERE NO OPERATIONAL MKIs IN 1942. Why are they, according to you, still converting them? When by your own admission it was only operational a/c that were converted.

This is another example of you thinking that because you have expertise in engineering and warbirds restoration that whatever you say is right. Well, I'm an expert on the Battle of Britain. I simply wouldn't even entertain the idea of arguing with you about piloting, restoration or engineering because I don't doubt your credentials. Yet in the face of overwhelming evidence both hard and circumstantial you're still arguing. Why? Is it to save face.

Please sum up for me your argument in a concise way, as to why you say that fighter command hadn't completed the changeover in it's frontline Spitfires to 100 octane fuel by the beginning of summer 1940.

Because that's what this is about. You've tried all sorts of different arguments and seem to move stealthily around the subject, but come come, let's cut the crap and cut to the chase.

What have you got to lose?

Edit : changed frontline fighters to frontline spitfires.

Ten years on the Board of Directors for a Warbird Restoration Company, MAS Embry Riddle, BSAS Embry Riddle, FAA Repairman certificate, COMM ASEL IR CFI/II/MEI/Taildragger.

Own and operate two of my own aircraft.

And what are your qualifications, Glider?

First the principles are all the same by convention just as how the Operating Notes are updated.

Second, the AIAA 81-2375 is the history of flight test development!!

If you could access the AIAA library, you could get your own copy.

Maybe on some standard day they might let you in!! Ha ha ha ;)

You have to graduate from an accredited Aeronautical Sciences curriculum for membership.

https://www.aiaa.org/

All those qualifications but no common sense.

According to him, sin 45° = 0.85, and he'll defend that statement. No engineer would. You better doubt his credentials.

Oh... Zzzzzzz...

I don't care. It's irrelevant. You are sidestepping my question. What is your main argument regarding Fighter Commands use of 100 octane in spitfires during the battle of Britain. I've dealt with fuel reserves, I've dealt with operational numbers, I've dealt with the fact that there were no operational Spitfire Mk I s in 1942. I've dealt with the fact that they were bench testing a merlin with 100 octane in 1938, then We've had the pilot's notes discussion. Now you're posting some document I can't even be arsed to read from 1981.
I'm an expert on idiots. My professional opinion is that you are one.
Next...

Thus gentlemen; The Crumpp Effect.

Typical Flight test regiment during World War II for "expediant" testing:

Phase I - Concept development - done by the contractors. Answers questions basic question of concept feasibililty. Rolls Royce/Supermarine/Hawker Sydney will conduct this testing

Phase II - Proof of concept by the accepting authority. The Air Ministry and the RAF will conduct this testing

Phase III - All issues uncovered during Phase II testing are addressed by contractors. In this case, Rolls Royce/Supermarine/Hawker Sydney will test and develop solutions to issues uncovered by the RAF during Phase II.

Phase IV -thorough evaluation of all the aircraft's operating characteristics. All publications are developed and operational testing commences.

Lets examine the documents Glider posted and put them in context of how testing development works to see if they fit.

Phase I testing results:

http://img845.imageshack.us/img845/3...ire100octa.jpg


Phase II testing request for fuel:

http://img209.imageshack.us/img209/5...octanefuel.jpg

Phase II results:

http://img26.imageshack.us/img26/9409/spit112lbs.jpg

Logistical constraints...Fuel must be at all the airfields before any engine is approved operationally. In otherwords, Phase IV testing cannot begin until there is fuel at the airfields:

http://img819.imageshack.us/img819/8...0octissue1.jpg

http://img534.imageshack.us/img534/9...0octissue2.jpg

While the Air Ministry gets the fuel supplies ready for Phase IV testing, Rolls Royce must complete Phase III testing and address all of the issues uncovered during the Air Ministry Phase II testing.

Here we see the Results of Rolls Royce/Supermarine/Hawker Sydney completion of Phase III:

http://img40.imageshack.us/img40/2397/ap1590b.jpg

Logistical constraints restrict conversion to aircraft undergoing cyclic Service Inspection.

The picture becomes much clearer as to why in June of 1940, the Spitfire Mk I Operating Notes, paragraph 1 were not updated to reflect the ability to use 100 Octane fuel operationally.

Guys,

This is all pretty conventional stuff. You claimed that Operating Notes were not updated consistantly to reflect operational reality. That has claim is disproven and we see the Air Ministry followed convention.

The background story also fits perfectly into normal convention for adopting a new concept.

The Spitfire Mk II has already gone through this test convention and from the begining the power plant was designed for 100 Octane fuel.

When the December 1939 the logistical constraints were met in June of 1940 and we see fuel at the airfields (see Table II), the Spitfire Mk II comes into Operational service using 100 Octane fuel.

That has nothing to do with Spitfire Mk I's and Hurricanes operational conversion.

Nah, let's not.

I'd rather hear your argument on why FC were not using 100 octane in frontline spitfires during the battle of britain. You know, the argument that makes you so sure...
That one, that's what I'd like to examine. The one piece (or more) of evidence that makes an educated gentleman, like yourself so convinced. It must be pretty compelling.

In a nutshell.

Can't wait.

EDIT - when I mentioned logistics you came back with "you can't use logistics to work out operational" (I'm paraphrasing) or some other nonsense, now you're using logistics.
That makes you a hypocrite.

EDIT EDIT - While I'm waiting here's a picture of chuck norris - which is as relevant to this thread as a document printed in 1981
enjoy

http://www.adiumxtras.com/images/pic...image_2578.jpg

You are wrong in 2 ways.

1. There was no Section 2 Paragraph 1 "Operating Notes" in June 1940. This was changed later, probably in late 1941. Section 2 Paragraph 1 looked like this:

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/attachm...1&d=1335383627

2. 100 octane fuel was cleared for operational and non-operational flying by A.L.2 for Section 1 (which is dated May 1940 and way before June 1940):

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/attachm...1&d=1335383627

It does not say that Banks.

It says if the aircraft is suitably modified, it may be used.

That is not the question. There is no doubt, the RAF began the process of operational conversion by June 1940 even in the Spitfire Mk I's.

The language is very specific when something is adopted.

If the Spitfire Mk I's were to use only 100 Octane fuel or all Operational Units, even in July 1940 it would state that under Notes Concerning the Merlin Engine:

Spitfire Mk II Notes, July 1940:

http://img259.imageshack.us/img259/6320/spit29.jpg

Spitfire Mk I Notes June 1940:

http://img713.imageshack.us/img713/3...kijune1940.jpg

There is no evidence the conversion was complete until January 1942 when the Spitfire Mk I's Operating Notes are amended to reflect ALL OPERATIONAL UNITS:

http://img838.imageshack.us/img838/3...uary194202.jpg


That is the June 1940 Operating Notes. A.L No.2 was incorporated into Volume I Section 2 the June 1940 republication of the Operating Notes.

Volume I Section II is from May 1940 but as noted, incorporates all the updates available at the time of June 1940 republication.

Looks like they did rearrange the format. That happens and finally by convention we all have the exact same format today. That does not change the fact the principles are all the same by convention.

You can see in the July 1940 Spitfire Mk II notes, the format is the same as the June 1940 Spitfire Mk I notes. If 100 Octane was the fuel for all operational Spitfire Mk I's, Notes Concerning the Merlin Engine would clearly state that fact.

It does not and you can conclude for a fact, 100 Octane was not being used by all operational Spitfire Mk I's at that time.

Don't you think it is a bit far-fetched to use this kind of manuals as a proof for the spread of use of 100 octane fuel? I am pretty sure that no manual was ever issued for all the different field modifications used by either side.

For practical reasons there will have been information notes been delivered to the stations and mechanics as the 100 octane capable spit 1s were phased in - instead of manuals.

You should just read the post because this does not make you look very good to anyone who did read it.

The logistical documents are used to answer logistical questions, "When can will we have the fuel to convert the first operational aircraft?"

Answer - When we have the fuel distributed to all the airfields.

It is not a field modification, it is operational adoption.

Those generally follow convention and the evidence presented aligns with that.

Still waiting...:rolleyes:

Stop waiting and read!! :grin:

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...postcount=1315

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...postcount=1279

I don't care what anyone else on here thinks about me. I'm not here to look good.

Like I said earlier, I'm working out what stations had 100 based on deliveries of Mk II's, but it's a very time consuming process.

So in the meantime, why don't you answer the question I keep having to ask.

What is you argument regarding the non use of 100 octane fuel in frontline spitfires during the battle of Britain?

EDIT: and I was actually referring to this post, the one after I'd posted all of the Oil Production meeting docs..

Who looks bad?
Like I said you're a hypocrite.

EDIT : Help required, I remember someone posted a chart showing the FC squadron movements from the period, I can't find it. It would speed things up a lot. Thanks.

I know quite well. My point is that the manual that you presented was obviously! issued well after the moment when 100 octane became operational. It says nothing about when it became operational. It basically is just the proof that at the moment of its publication 100 octane was already in use.

Neither of these posts demonstrates that RAF FC flew a even single Hurricane/Spitfire combat sortie using 87 octane fuel.

Where are the reports detailing fuelling difficulties because a 100/87 octane aircraft had to land at an 87/100 octane airfield? Where are the Airfield/Squadron commander/pilot reports complaining that their Airfield/squadron/aircraft was one of the unlucky ones not to be converted to 100 octane? Where are the pilot reports or memoirs noting 87 octane fuel use during the battle? Why do numerous sources state 100% conversion to 100 octane prior to the battle? Why did Moelders and Galland beg Goering for higher performing aircraft?

You still haven't shown that even a single Hurricane/Spitfire combat sortie was flown using 87 octane fuel during the battle, yet you contend that the majority of RAF FC was using 87 octane fuel!!! :confused:

Crumpp's condition:

Everbody's Wrong

Crumpp is just arguing for the sake of argument because it makes him feel important. It has nothing to do with 100 Octane and a great deal more to do with ego.

Actually no you don't. Associate members don't need a degree only an interest in aerodynamics, and from what you have posted I suspect I am afraid that you are at best an associate member.

Hi Winny:
Fwiw, a quick review of Spitfire II squadrons from Rawlings for the period Sept. - Oct. 1940.:
611 Digby
266 Wittering
74 Cottishall & Biggin Hill
19 Fowlmere
66 Kenly, Gravesend, West Malling
41 Hornchurch
603 Hornchurch

From IWM: 19 Squadron, Fowlmere, Sept. 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...01357-1200.jpg

You said:

You claim that that the June 1940 manual does not reflect the ability to use 100 octane fuel operationally. Which is clearly wrong as the June 1940 manual clearly says "it may be used, if the engine has been suitable modified". It doesn't restrict the fuel for operational or non-operational use so it may be used for both.

Is it possible that unders certain 'pressing' needs...like lets say for example 'a war'.....the use of 100 octane could have been pushed into service ahead of beaurocratic schedules?

Thanks for this. What I note of course is the rider at the bottom of the last paper that said that the fuel stocks were probably sufficient. The papers also cover the way fuel is to be distributed i.e by using up what is already issued and replacing it with 100 octane

When you then add the papers in December we have idnetifying the first 23 stations to be issued with the fuel in the first instance. The first combat reports in Feb using 100 octane. This is then followed by:-

1) The note for the 5th meeting of the Oil Committee held in February in the Summary of Conclusions from the ACAS saying that fighter and Blenhiem units are to be equipped with 100 Octane.

2) The papers from the 6th Meeting actioning the request and speed up the process by actively restocking the fuel, not waiting for it to be used up

3) The papers from the 7th Meeting noting that thanks had been expresseed for the completion of the task

I would say its a pretty comprehensive set of papers that support each other.

I also note that none of those papers say testing, or trials as Crumpp would have us believe

Edit - I also forgot the 9th meeting of the Oil committee held on 7th August 1940 when they were told that all operational aircraft in all commands were to use 100 octane

Thanks for your service, Flanker.

I retired 20 years from active US Army and then entered aviation as a full time career.

I don't think associates get library access, not sure though. I have only had student membership and then full after graduation.

Then I withdraw my previous comment.

It is not a bureaucratic schedule.

I know it seems like a bunch of overkill. The convention is really all based on lots of experience, most of it very bad experiences.

Airplanes are not like cars, the engineering safety margins are so much lower just to achieve flight.

NO, I said if it was in use in all operational units, Notes on the Merlin Engine would reflect that.

It does not in June 1940.

I found this page from the Spitfire Mk II Operating Notes.

http://img560.imageshack.us/img560/9863/spit2pnfs3.jpg

mmmmmm

They just about managed to get that through to me at flight school and the 17 years spent as a commercial pilot and flight instructor, but I maintain it is a beaurocratic schedule and most probably the inconvenience of war forced some corners to be cut, one can assume they already knew the aircraft could fly, we're only talking about implementation of simple modifications in order to use a fuel that increases performance, my guess is at least one genius manged to figure out it might be quite handy in a fight.

To add to that, i believe it has been known to take risks in war, like every time you took off in the case of BoB.

People also apparently die.

People also try to do everything they possibly can to help stop that happening to them.

but i digress......

In the spitfire my squad serviced at an airshow , we put 110 octane in the Spitfire (that was the highest grade we could find in 1980 for the airshow),, but I can't tell you how original the engine parts are or how it was tuned.. I can tell you it was fun to be very close to it, push it around the parking spot, and be inches from it as it taxied out and taxied back in after the flying...

It was a very smooth engine,,, no spitting, popping, or no cutting out in rolls...
It wasn't terribly bad on the ears,,, the only time I saw fire out the exhaust was when it first started... I can't say how the exhaust looks in flight because I never flew one..

Ok here's my MkII from June 1940

http://i822.photobucket.com/albums/z...e/fc27877a.jpg

And I'm still waiting for your answer, and an apology would be nice for the operational/logistical thing that you said made me look bad.

It is not a simple modification though.

Your ignorance speaks volumes.

Simple enough.......it wasn't exactly rocket science.

The Merlin II III and IV were already being tested on 100 Octane in 1938:
http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchi...0-%203453.html

Rolls-Royce were able to get Merlin IIs and IIIs running on 100 Octane and 12 lbs boost by November 1939 - for the latter what was needed were the modifications to the boost control capsule; the modifications to the head needed for 100 octane would have been underway well before this.

100 octane "now in use" in April 1940
http://http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1940/1940 - 1142.html

To pretend that it took until 1942 to perfect the use of 100 octane is, as per usual from Crumpp, completely wrong, because Rolls-Royce was already testing engines using 100 octane fuel in 1938.

Timeline:
Merlin 45 (100 Octane Fuel): decision to use it in Spitfire; December 1940; Spitfire V operational February 1941 92 Sqn.

Merlin RM6SM Became Merlin 61: First tested Spitfire III; September 1941; Operational Service Spitfire IX June 1942 611 Sqn.

Crumpp's idea that 2 1/2 years was needed for testing is completely wrong - as per usual. New engines in a standard or modified airframe took less than a year. To declare that it took 2 1/2 years to test and approve 100 Octane in wartime is absolutely idiotic. Again, Crumpp is arguing for the sake of his ego, meaning this will continue forever because Crumpp's Never Wrong.

A couple of observations on both those pilots notes.

Crumpp
If you look at the pilots notes that you put forward you will see that they also include the instructions of how to fire 2 x 20mm cannon and 4 x 303 which I think we can agree isn't viable in June 1940.

The second set. Note that it doesn't allow 12 lb boost in the air it only says 9lb. However it doesn't say that you can or cannot use the boost overide, or have a combat rating. However, in the cockpit diagram the boost overide control is clearly present. An example I think of an early set of pilots notes which were clearly amended as shown by the ones that Crumpp mentioned.

Reason for both fuels being mentioned in the set Crumpp put forward is simple. Clearly these are not BOB notes as shown by the guns on board and these were printed later in the war wehn they were in use for training. Training units were not equipped with 100 Octane

S!

Crumpp, still some 17 years left of service, going for the full service time ;) Anyways, when looking at that Spitfire Mk.II manual June 1940, paragraph 55 (stating it should be carefully noted) clearly says +12lbs up to 1000ft for take-off or maximum 3min. Rest seems to be +9lbs (all-out for 5min) with no alt restrictions. And continuous/max cruise is +7lbs. So that pretty much says it all IMHO.

Cleared for +12lbs but not for 5min or at any altitude. As that note says 5min is for +9lbs. Out of curiosity how different is the Merlin III used in Spitfire Mk.I being able to use+12lbs for 5min than Merlin XII on Spitfire Mk.II only cleared for take-off up to 1000ft / 3min? Devil is in the details it seems..

This topic becomes endless. The posters are repeating the same things ad infinitum, name calling etc. No more info can be found here.

The moderatores should lock this topic. All the info is already here. Let the readers decide for themselves.

I thing this is a good start: http://www.jshawmsc.f2s.com/merlin.htm

Not much different from late production Merlin III.

Note that the Merlin XX, which is also very similar to the XII (except of course supercharger, which is single gear in XII and two gear in XX) was cleared for +12 emergency boost (5 min, not altitude restriction) was cleared in November 1940.

Flanker - as discussed previously in great detail - this does not account for BCC-O, feel free to read posts by Banks (and others) to see how it worked and how it has been used. This is in fact explained in the same manual you mention. It seems we're turning in circles for 135 pages :grin:

Good luck in your service, S!

However contrary to the Spitfire I manual the Spitfire II manual does not state that the boost control cut-out will provide +12 boost and that it is authorized for short time and emergency.

That the cut-out will provide +12 boost is obvious, it has the same boost control as the Merlin III and it is also proven by the later amendments.
The question that remains is when it was authorized.

S!

Will check the link, thanks Banks :) Been more into the DB6XX-series engines as they really were ahead of their time with fuel injection and many automated things. But never hurts to learn about RR engines either :)

Just found another contemporary source.
Flight Magazine - April 1940

http://i822.photobucket.com/albums/z...eApril1940.jpg

An interesting clip on building the Merlin:
Building the Merlin

Wish the original soundtrack had been kept instead of adding the usual muzak

I'd just like to add a little example of how procedures differed during the war when compared to peacetime/modern times.

Spitfires suffered from a couple of problems that would today result in the grounding of the fleet. Namely the "Skew Gear problem" in Merlins where the skew gear would fail randomly and catastrophically, (this happened to Alex Henshaw a number of times) and the Piston seizures on Packard Merlins - caused by the fact that the piston heads were not machined, to save time, and were left to wear to shape, or in some cases seize as the push rods got bent. Neither of these problems would be acceptable today. They simply could not afford to halt production to find the source of the skew gear problem, so they continued making the engines as was, up until the point that they fixed it. This almost certainly cost lives and certainly cost aircraft.

Yeah it seems pretty evident this Crumpp chap is not familiar with the concept of 'can do', its more like 'could do subject to subclause B paragraph 8 having gone through all the correct channels to get a facilitation to arrange several meetings, the minutes of which will be copied in triplicate and sent for further approval'.

What Crumpp is conveniently ignoring is that Rolls-Royce were already
A) Testing a Merlin at 18 lbs boost and generating 1,536 hp on a special blend of gasoline, benzol, methanol tetraethyl lead in August 1937. (Price Spitfire Story 2010 p. 107) But then Price, like most aviation historians, is an ignorant -non engineering- dweeb who knows nothing about aircraft.

B) testing Merlins IIs on 100 Octane in 1938.

Whatever Crumpp might think Rolls-Royce had been working on modifying Merlins to run on 100 Octane and high boost well before 1940, and with their engineering capabilities would have known what sort of modifications would be needed to get the Merlin II & III series running reliably at higher ratings - the modified cylinder heads would have been developed and ready to use as soon as the go ahead was given in November 1939 to allow Merlins to run at +12 lbs.

If Crumpp had been in charge at R-R at the time nothing would have been done because Crumpp would want every single tiny detail thrashed out at length, and he would know better than everyone else that at least 30 months would be needed for intensive operational testing and development before production engines could be cleared to use 100 octane fuel.

In place of email distribution: "Alright chaps, shut your cake holes and gather 'round....."

The paperwork would follow later.

In short, we'd have lost the war if Crump had been in charge.

Imagine D-Day on Omaha beach, Crump leading the first wave in Dog Green sector with a clipboard in his hand pointing out all the hazards to the commanders before ordering a full retreat because of failures in Health and Safety policy.

Yes, I suspect that's his agenda...

"Oi.. You.. Where do you think you're going with that bayonet? You could have someone's eye out with that!"

Which inevitably leads to..

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o5gqI...e_gdata_player

Unlike your car, dvd player, or your standard military manual.....

Pilot Operating Notes are part of the airworthiness of the aircraft and a legal document. They carry the weight of law by convention.

Don't confuse the articles discussion of the GAMA changes in 1975 that put all convention signers on the same format. Manufacturers of light civil aircraft tried to save a few dollars during one of the darkest periods in General Aviation by cutting corners on the POH's. The result was the GAMA changes which standardized POH for all convention signers and everyone adopted the same format.


http://ezinearticles.com/?Pilots-Ope...101&id=6521261

It has been that way since 1919!!

As for for the "engine parts" conforming during operation, that is normal for all engines. In fact it is called the "break in"!! :grin:

No engineer looked at a part on the assembly line that would destroy the engine and said "keep churning em out boys!! We can win the war with our airplanes that won't fly".

That is really stupid. He looked at it and said, "Yes it is bent but it is still within tolerenances and won't effect anything, keep working"

Happens all the time in aviation and does not violate any convention.

The Military is a good career. I did all of my time in Special Operations. Started out in Rangers and then went to Special Forces.

I agree with your interpretation on the Spitfire Mk II Notes.

It is a fact the Spitfire Mk II was using 100 Octane in June 1940 because the Notes On the Merlin engine specify that as the only option. The emotional investment in this issue so high that many participants confuse In use with all operational units.

The Operating Notes are a followed and the proceduresYou cannot say "all operational" Spitfire Mk I's or Hurricanes were using 100 Octane in June of 1940.

The USAAF did the same thing when they converted to 100 Octane (100/130 grade). They published instructions to use 91 Octane for training and OCONUS and 100 Octane for operations. The Pilots Operating Handbooks reflect the fuel changeover after that Technical Order was published.

You don't see the Notes on the Merlin Engine being updated until January 1942.

Again, where's the evidence for combat sorties flown with 87 octane fuel? We have numerous sources that state full conversion to 100 octane and a complete lack of documentary evidence of 87 octane fuel use by Spitfire/Hurricane operational squadrons during the BofB.

Crumpp
This is all very interesting but everyone I am sure is still waiting for you to try to support your belief about 16 squadrons.

All I have seen is a pre war statement of intent to have 16 squadrons of fighters and two of bombers.

Or am I right in thinking that this is now something in the past, like your belief that 1940 was about operational testing and you now simply believe it was less than 100% of fighter command.

I've checked a few manuals and some lag behind in terms of amendments by up to half a year.

What they actually said was "we don't know what is causing the engines to break appart mid air, until we find the problem you're just going to have to deal with it.. Test pilots lost thier lives because of this, testing factory fresh Spitfires.

Alex Henshaw said about the "Skew Gear problem" that you strangley ignored
"In any other situation this problem would have grounded the fleet, but because of the circumstances they couldn't. It was war and we just got on with it" He knew that at any moment he was testing Spitfires there was a chance it would happen to him. It did on 11 occasions. What happened happened.

Now you're telling me you know more about it than he does.

That sums you up.

Anyway it's irrelevant, the 87 octane reference is there because they used it for OTU's, so they had to put it in the notes, apparently it's the law.

So what's your main argument about the non use of 100 oct in frontline squadrons during the BoB?

EDIT: Sorry to those who thought this thread had died... I'm not going away. Go and read one of raaaids threads instead :)

This just proves your ignorance. Please go and google the Packard-Merlin seizure problem on Spitfires. You'll find out that what you said didn't happen, did, exactly, they kept churning them out. Or google the sudden loss of Magnetos problem, same thing, kept building them with the fault until they located the fault, seems like it was almost Standard Operating Procedure..

The piston problem resulted in a full engine failiure, not some 'bent within acceptable amounts" push rods.

Jeez there's even a painting of it happening showing Henshaw bailing out of a Spitfire... A painting..

You apply modern standards to WW2 situations, without even bothering to look to see what actually happened.

I'm still very interested in seeing proof for use of 87 octane fuel in operational units. I'll keep checking the topic as long as it is alive.

may take some time...........;)

The only one who has the "emotional investment" on being right in this thread is Crumpp, who has been ignoring anything which is inconvenient to his case, including placing me on his ignore list. Look at how much his arguments have changed and look at how inconsistent everything he says has become.

The timeline of the Merlin's adaptation for using 100 Octane fuel:

1937 Merlin II developed 1,536 hp at +18 lbs on special blend of fuel;

1938 Figures for Merlin II and III using 100 Octane fuel presented at Paris airshow, albeit no mention of +12 lbs boost; clearly whatever redesign of the cylinder heads was needed Rolls-Royce would have had the job well in hand.

1939 Merlin II & III tested and approved for +12 Lbs boost; September 1940; Blenheim IVs of BC cleared to use 100 Octane fuel in outer wing tanks. November decision that reserves of 100 octane fuel adequate to allow all Merlins to be modified to use the fuel.

1940 February - first squadrons converted to use 100 octane; March A.P1590B/J.2-W specifically states conversions well underway; May - 100 Octane used by Hurricanes and Blenheims based in France during combat ops....etc etc etc.

Again, Crumpp is arguing for the sake of argument because he's always right, no matter what.

I came in here for an argument

Crumpp
You might be interested to know that in December 1938 the Air Ministry were planning to ensure that there were adaquate supplies of 100 Octane should war break out. There were two main factors, The Hartley Committee which recommended the size of the RAF in war and once you know the proposed size of the RAF, you can start estmating the demand for fuel.

The PLans were put forward

Plan F 124 squadrons with 1,736 front Line Aircraft
Plan L (intermediate) 161 squadrons with 2,541 front line aircraft
Plan L (Unltimate) 163 squadrons with 2,549 front line aircraft

It was estimated that it would take two years to get to Plan L which was the reccomendation put forward. so you are talking about the end of 1940.

It was estimated that this would need between 670,000 - 735,000 tons of 100 Octane a year and plans were put in place to deliver this capacity by the end of 1940.

What is interesting is that in Dec 1938 plans were in place for the support of 2,500 front line aircraft with 100 octane by the end of 1940. When you remember that in Aug 1940 all RAF front line commands were authorised to use 100 Octane, you can see that these plans although modified as circumstances unfolded, were basically kept to. The modification was of course, mainly that the war started before anyone expected it to

Its also worth remembering that we have a summary paper from Nov 1940 saying that the UK were well ahead of their plans iro fuel stocks

I should acknowledge that I believe Kurfurst was the first person to post the paper outlining the RAF 1938 plans on a different forum.

Glider,

Operating Note instructions are pretty definative. If it does not appear in the Notes on Operating the Merlin Engine, it was not common at the time of Note Publication.

Hi JtD.

Sorry, I've not found any operational use of 87 octane in Spitfires, Hurricanes and Defiants beyond spring 1940. There is quite a lot of documentation available on 100 octane use for Spitfires, Hurricanes and Defiants during the Battle of France, the Dunkirk evacuation and the Battle of Britain, however, to be found throughout this thread. The best I can offer is operational Lysanders and Battles using 87 octane during May 1940 - see links below. Sorry, but the Hurricanes were using 100 octane by then - also see links.

H.Q. A.A.S.F. 7 May 1940. Reserve Stocks of Aviation Fuel, Bombs and S.A.A. - Policy

H.Q. R.A.F. Component, 10 May 1940. Petrol and Oil requirements for R.A.F. Component on 15th May 1940.

An obvious question I admit, but if these Instructions were so limiting, how do you explain the combat reports and other documentation confirming the use of the fuel in these engines? You have a theory that the engines couldn't be used with the fuel, but we have firm evidence that it was, not a thoretical point which is all you have. There is a clear difference.

I take this chance to remind you of a simple clarification that I am unsure of Crumpp. We are still waiting for you to try to support your belief about 16 squadrons.

All I have seen is a pre war statement of intent to have 16 squadrons of fighters and two of bombers.

Or am I right in thinking that this is now something in the past, like your belief that 1940 was about operational testing and you now simply believe it was less than 100% of fighter command.

I only ask this of you as I do not know what your current view is.

Glider,

Documentation like that is useful but one can hardly make the conclusion all operational units were using the fuel. You are making a leap of logic that just is not there. If someone presented Combat reports from November 1945, would you make the conclusion the entire Luftwaffe was using the FW-190D9? Of course not, the report would have to be placed in context in order to be understood.

All the combat report tells you is that on that day and time, that single airplane was using the fuel.

The combat reports must be put in a timeline and in context just like the squadron log books.

Once more, period magazine articles the fuel was "in use" is not all operational units and niether is logistical documentation.

For example:

Making the conclusion Hurricanes were using 100 Octane in the Battle of France based off some logistical projections for future war is amatuerish and clumsey. It is a paper tiger. That document is a calculation of projected needs written on 7 May 1940. The British Expeditionary Force was on the Beaches of Dunkirk 18 days later.

How much of those calculation and projections for future war do you really think became ground reality in 18 days?

*Naturally Crumpp cannot or will not explain in straight terms exactly what did happen to over 60,000 tons of 100 Octane fuel consumed between February 1940 and the end of October 1940, except to spout some totally nonsensical rubbish about it not actually being consumed, but disappearing into some administrative oblivion based on his huge experience as a modern civilian pilot in the US of A.

*"That document is a calculation of projected needs written on 7 May 1940" Utter Rubbish Crumpp - READ IT PROPERLY; Paragraph 3 "Present Establishment of Aviation Fuels are..."

It states how much 100 Octane fuel was actually in various locations in France on that date!

*Naturally Crumpp cannot, or will not explain why it is those pesky pilots like Paul Richey, Edgar Kain, John Gleed, Roland Beamont, John Bushell and lots of other noted using +12lbs boost in combat while flying in France in early May 1940. Tsssk tsssk it's jolly inconvenient and they obviously didn't know that an expert like Crumpp would one day be micro-analysing the issue and proving they were all wrong. Time: Early May 1940 context: Several squadrons in Combat in France. :roll:

*Naturally Crumpp seems to think that because one aircraft just happened to be using the fuel on that day it doesn't mean the entire squadron was using it. Crumpp has not provided one single solitary piece of documented evidence to explain how the RAF did this.

So tell us Crumpp, how did the RAF ensure that individual or just a few aircraft per squadron used 100 Octane, while the rest went without? How was this allocated? How were the pilots briefed "Sorry chaps X Y and Z get the 100 Octane today, the rest of you stick with 87"? Have you ever heard of "scrambles" Crumpp, where the entire squadron takes off? Happened a lot during the battle, for some reason. How about you provide some documentary evidence Crumpp, showing that frontline fighter squadrons were using 87 octane fuel on a consistent basis throughout the battle - you are such an expert it should be easy.

Crumpp assumes that everyone, apart from his good self, and maybe a couple of others who agree with his POV, are idiots because only Crumpp has the knowledge and technical training to explain how things worked in the RAF in 1940. All of those aviation historians who have written about 100 Octane are amateurs who have no idea of how to research such deep topics properly, and ALL need Crumpp's guidance and enlightenment to show the true way to aviation history.

Using Crumpp logic the ancient Romans didn't exist, the Battle of Waterloo didn't happen and American soldiers of the South didn't actually win Bull Run because Jackson was a figment of someone's imagination. Honestly, why bother arguing with Mr Right? He should be busy rewriting history instead of arguing with us ignorant dweebs.

Estabilishment is not strength, it is only what is presently authorized or projected.

You are confusing a projection with what is one hand.

Crumpp, why not present your full argument instead of the ridiculous nit picking of every minor detail, including just making stuff up without checking?

Go on, do it. Next post.

You're now clinging on to the pilot's notes.. is that it?

So hit me with the one bit of evidence thats so compelling that you still think FC were not using 100 oct during BoB

Or are we still doing this because you think that because your're an expert in flying/engineering, that just makes whatever you say right...?

I can go back through this thread and prove that there are lots of things that you've said that are simply wrong.

You show me your argument and then I (or one of the others) will show you ours.

I get the feeling you long since stopped arguing the point and are just arguing the man.. Why? What's your motivation?

Prove it with documentary evidence; show us ignoramus' that this meant that there was no 100 octane fuel in France in May 1940.

- in fact provide documentation that proves anything you say:

Provide documentation that the RAF used hardly any 100 Octane fuel throughout 1940.

Provide documentation proving that 56,000 tons of 100 Octane fuel consumed between July and October 1940 was not "consumed" but was in fact put back into reserves without being consumed.

Provide documentation that the RAF authorised 16 squadrons only to use 100 octane fuel and provide documentation to prove when this happened, apart from using a pre-war planning paper as a crutch for your lame theories.

Provide documentation showing how the RAF ensured that only individual aircraft within squadrons were allowed to use 100 Octane fuel, and provide documentation showing how this was done.

Provide documentation showing that the RAF did not use 100 Octane fuel during the Battle of France.

Provide documentation showing that the RAF used 87 Octane fuel for its frontline Merlin engined fighters during the Battle of Britain.

Provide documentation that the RAF stuck to its pre-war target of reserves of 800,000 tons of 100 Octane fuel no matter what.

Provide documentation proving that it took 2 1/2 years from the start of WW2 for the Rolls-Royce Merlin II & III series to be approved and modified for 100 Octane and +12 lbs boost.

Provide documentation proving that Rolls-Royce had not already modified and tested Merlin engines to use 100 Octane fuel between 1938 and 1939.

Provide documentation that historians such as A A Rubbra, who helped design the Merlin and Alec Harvey-Bailey who had access to Rolls-Royce records were wrong when they wrote that the Merlin II and III were using 100 octane fuel in early 1940. I presume you categorise them as enthusiastic amateurs?

Because you know that you're right and everybody else is wrong you should have all of the evidence you need at hand and ready to post asap.

Context, timeline...lol, sure no problem, we'll start with these:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ct-issue-1.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ct-issue-2.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...rb-16feb40.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...100-octane.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o.../1940-0897.jpg

Emergency +12 lbs./sq. in. Boost Operation: Pilot's Notes, Merlin II, III and IV, 4th Edition, April 1940, page 6.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...erlin3-pg6.jpg

These documents relating to fuel requirments of the the Advanced Air Stiking Force and the Air Component, both in France during May 1940, give some idea of consumption, stocks, and how fuel requirements were calculated. As can be seen the Hurricanes used 100 octane, the Blenheim used a mix, while the Battle and Lysander used 87 octane, as did any transport, liason, visiting types etc.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...cks-7may40.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...stocks-pg1.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...stocks-pg2.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...stocks-pg3.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...stocks-pg4.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...nt-15may40.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ay40-app-a.jpg

To underscore the above documentation of Hurricanes using 100 octane fuel in France please note the following:

S/L J. O. W. Oliver, 85 Squadron, 10 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...er-10may40.jpg

P/O John Bushell, 151 Squadron, 18 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...dn-18may40.jpg

S/L E. M. Donaldon, 151 Sqdn., 18 May 1940

F/O Paul Richey, 1 Squadron, 11 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ichey-pg76.jpg

F/O E. J. Kain, 73 Squadron, 14 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...monks-pg98.jpg

P/O D. W. A. Stones, 79 Squadron, 14 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...tones-pg32.jpg

Sgt. R. C. Wilkinson, 3 Squadron, 14 may 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ne/rcw-pg6.jpg

P/O R. P. Beamont, 87 Squadron, 15 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...nt-15may40.jpg

P/O F. B. Sutton, 56 Squadron, 18 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...utton-pg80.jpg

F/Lt. I. R. Gleed, 87 Squadron, 18 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ed-18may40.jpg

F/O C. F. G. Adye, 17 Squadron, 18 May 1940

F/O C. F. G. Adye, 17 Squadron, 19 May 1940

F/Lt. I. R. Gleed, 87 Squadron, 19 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ed-19may40.jpg

Sgt. L. H. B. Pearce, 79 Squadron, 20 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...ce-20may40.jpg

Sgt. J. C. Harrison, 229 Squadron, 28 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...on-28may40.jpg

P/O C. M. Simpson, 229 Squadron, 29 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...on-29may40.jpg

P/O K. B. McGlashan, 245 Squadron, 28 May 1940
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...an-28may40.jpg

Great post lane:cool:

Yeah, section 3 subparagraph B that in your pipe and smoke it....:grin:

I did all of my time in Special Operations. Started out in Rangers and then went to Special Forces.

"Special *bleepin* Needs" more like, on the evidence of this thread. *falls off chair laughing* :grin:

You'll find out in time that there is scarcely a subject matter on earth that Crumpp is not a World Authority upon (in his head). One would have thought that a Special Forces Soldier of the caliber of Crumpp would be cognizant of the fact that no plan survives contact (especially 18 month old provisional ones) and its well known that a modicum of common sense and ability to improvise and adapt to rapidly changing circumstances (IE BoB) are usually prerequisites for selection. Crumpp does not understand that red tape and SOP's are often overlooked or neglected in times where it is efficacious, necessary, and prudent to do so.

Crumpp is also a renowned expert on explosives, Air Combat Manoeuvres, Modern history, Physics, Engineering, Aerodynamics and Mathematics. Wunderkind. Nietzsches 'Overman'. He even finds the time in his hectic schedule to obsessively stalk computer game forums of games he apparently doesn't even play, to put all of us simpletons to rights with the irrepressible power of his ferocious intellect. Fear him! :grin:

Great post Lane. I think that's what we in the trade call a "definitive, catastrophic smackdown". :grin: Not that this thread has not been full of them. Not that this will stop Crumpp. Think "T-1000". He cannot be stopped! :grin:

Still waiting for all the reams of 87 octane combat reports circa the battle of Britain, a list of the 16 squadrons, and details of their supply. Still waiting for a certain party to understand the basic requirement of qualifying a statement with actual evidence. Should be an absolute cinch, given the alleged predominance of 87 octane! Where are they? Why can't they be found? Hmmmm, its a tough one.:grin:

Carry on, out. :)

But it is documentation, documentation that shows it was in use. You as have been pointed out have no documentation. NOthing that says that 87 octane was in use in front line units.

Which gives us over 34 squadrons using the fuel as we have reports for that. However we have none that show 87 octane in use.

Again you forget that we have the logistical background for the use of 100 octane in France, the combat reports that show it in use in France, plus as a final kicker, the evidence from at least one crashed German fighter that the Germans were using captured RAF 100 octane fuel stocks. Finally you need to read the papers before you quote them. The &th May gives a present establishment of 100 Octane i.e. it was already in place in serious quantaties

Now if that is amaturish then I plead guilty.
Now how does that compare to a theory based on a 1942 Pilots Notes of an aircraft that wasn't in the front line in 1942 from which you decide that the aircraft wasn't using 100 Octane two years before. Does that strike you as detailed research, double checking and of course you do have documentation to support it don't you?.

Clearly more than you think.

Finally can I remind you that you still havn't said how many RAF fighter squadrons you believe were using 100 Octane in the BOB or how many Blenhiem squadrons were using it.
You also believed that the period of 1940 was operational testing, with unfortunately nothing to support. This trend of having wild theories and no support is my definition of an Amaturish.

PS After your claim of 20 years in special forces I have serious doubts as to your experience iro aviation.

Wrong
A present establishment of X is what you currently have.
An Authorised establishment of X, is what you theoretically should have or are authorised to have.

Well I am glad to see you guys are finally coming around to seeing Eugene's 'song and dance' routine (get 'busted' on a subject and change the subject).

He will NEVER admit he is wrong.

As for him being a Green Beret (ie SF), they need pencil pushers as well.

Well lane, you win.
I didn't think much of it, considering the partisan nature of the debate.
Your post though seems definitive.
Good job. Heres hoping its implemented.

The "partisan nature of the debate" comes entirely from the fact that people such as lane and Glider have gone to considerable time, effort and expense to provide evidence that the RAF used 100 octane fuel for its frontline fighters throughout the Battle of Britain, while the naysayers, chiefly Kurfurst and Crumpp, have failed to provide any evidence whatsoever for their argument that the RAF used the fuel for a small, select portion.

In the meantime Crumpp in particular has driven the thread with lots of bluster and smokescreens while evading evidence and awkward direct questions asking him to provide documentation to prove his "case" - whatever the hell it is, because his story keeps changing - or disprove the case for 100 octane.

Lane,

Even if we took every shred of evidence you have as gospel, it is not all operational units. That is the claim being made. The RAF had not converted to 100 Octane even in July 1940. There is not any 100 Octane in any quantity at the airfields until that then. That is the big logistical constraint noted in the very first memo you post.

You have a handful of Hurricane squadrons, most of them taken from sources that belong alongside "First and the Last" by Adolf Galland. I have no doubts in May of 1940, the RAF was heavily into Phase IV testing.

You have an order to convert with a huge logisitical constraint placed upon it. Fuel has to be at every airfield in quantity to support operations before any aircraft are converted.

You also are using a projected calculation of fuel needs required to fight a future war that did not occur. Estabilishment is a logisitical term for quantity authorized. It has nothing to do with supplies on hand or available fuel.

Here is estabilishment vs strength for RAF personnel:

http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/...03-10c.54882.h

When I get my computer back and get off this laptop, I can post the Estabilishment vs Strength for the RAF in the Battle of Britain.

Lastly, the Operating Notes is definative. It is part of the aircraft airworthiness and is followed as instructed. The Notes on the Merlin Engine clearly documents when all operational units converted to 100 Octane.

You can call me every name in the book, post whatever cartoon's you like but it does not change that fact.

Which pilot notes?

FYI, The engine manual is not the aircraft installation. Just because an engine is approved does not mean an aircraft is approved. Each installation is unique.

That is why the RAF throughly tested all of the airframes using the Merlin engine when they made the conversion.

The instructions for boost cut out would have been published as part of Phase IV testing. In fact, that is one of the main purposes of Phase IV testing to publish instructions, manuals, and conduct operations.

A good example of that is auto fuel STC's. Just because the engine can run autofuel does not mean an airframe that mounts that engine can use autofuel.

Operating Notes are definative. They carry the weight of law.

This pilot might face criminal charges. Why? In the Operating Handbook for the AH-64 Apache, it notes all the precautions for high altitude operation. He violated those precautions. If they do get charged after the investigation, that will be the legal basis used to bring UCMJ.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BcTDwJcO_os

But really, where are your facts?

I have to say they have done a great job of presenting a lot of evidence, circumstantial though much of it may be, in support of their case.

For me the final straw was the pilots themselves writing about using 12lbs and "pulling the tit."
I highly doubt that these men are liars, though most of veterans are prone to exaggeration.

With the lack of definitive evidence, such as a list of which units used how much of what type of fuel each week in the BoB, I think it is fair to say that these aircraft should be modeled for 12lbs given the circumstantial evidence here and the pilots accounts.
Hell we even had one in IL2 for Pete's sake!

EDIT: Come on! Your really reaching with that last post! Lol!
Ive seen people court marshaled/UCMJ'd, and violation of a tech manual was never one of the serious charges. Ancillary at best.

http://img213.imageshack.us/img213/8...ightmanual.png

By international convention estabilished in 1919 of which the United Kingdom's Air Ministry is a signatory the Operating Limitations are definitive and Notes on the Merlin Engine will state exactly what is authorized, including the fuel.

If it does not, then the aircraft is operating under a special issuance condition.

See above post....

It is a fact that 100 Octane will be included in the Notes on the Merlin Engine section of the Operating Notes when it becomes the standard. Until then, any aircraft using the fuel will be operating under a special issuance Notes on the Merlin Engine for that specific aircraft.

That is how it worked then and how it works today.

By convention, all flight manuals include a single page reference to the engine operating limits.

Keep in mind, we are looking at what is called an Information Manual on these aircraft. Every aircraft has a set of Operating Notes issued with it by serial number that covers that specific aircraft. They stay with that aircraft throughout its lifespan. It is the pilots and maintenance personnel's job to keep that serial numbered Operating Notes updated for that specific airframe.

The information manual is republished periodically to incorporate all updates for the type but is not specific to an airframe.

When the information manual reflects 100 Octane, then all operational aircraft of the type can use it.

Yes, it sounds like its basically the -10 for the aircraft, correct?
Pilots must abide by the placards/warnings in the cockpit.
Ok, sounds like all the warnings inside Army vehicles with the "Crew required to wear double hearing protection during operation" Ill give you three guesses as to how often that happens.
Fact is that many times the manuals are rewritten based on what the troops in the field have invented in order to accomplish the mission at hand, and that many times the official manuals and their additions simply cant keep up with the operational realities of the equipment.

Now what we have here is a "They are supposed to operate this way".
That's all well and good, but anyone who has had their ass in the grass knows that isn't the way things happen much of the time. Mission needs trump the manuals objections.

If they had it available, at all, they would have used it. If it needed to be refit for use then crews would have been dispatched to make it happen in the field.
That's how it is now, and I have to assume that the realities of combat haven't changed.
What you have there in bold print has absolutely nothing to do with how those aircraft operated in combat. It was written 20 years before the aircraft in question even flew.

So can you post anything substantive, relating to the aircraft/time in question?
I understand that you are away from home?

Once again Crumpp is talking absolute nonsense - It has been very carefully explained and finally acknowledged by Crumpp, that the Pilot's Notes were issued with supplementary slips which the pilot's then pasted into the relevant sections of the Notes.

The PILOT'S NOTES GENERAL first edition (issued to each pilot along with the Pilot's Notes for each aircraft type) is very specific - Section 8 says that the operating limits for engines relate to the fuel type that engine was designed for ie; for Merlin II and III series, because they were designed to use 87 Octane fuel those were the operating limits printed in the Pilot's Notes. This complies with Crumpp's "Section II" - any changes made to the operating limits were made by the supplementary slips issued to the pilot with the Pilot's Notes. If the Pilot's Notes do not have the new operating limits pasted into them it is because;

A: The Pilot's Notes were never issued and were left in storage - or

B: The Pilot's Notes were not issued to an operational frontline unit - this is acknowledged by the Spitfire I Pilot's Notes from January 1942 which state that aircraft of "other units" used 87 octane fuel. (The Pilot's Notes General second ed was printed in 1943 and dropped this provision because no frontline aircraft were using 87 octane fuel.)

Do we believe Crumpp or the Pilot's Notes General? Your choice...

Crumpp knows this is true: it has been explained to him several times but still he persists with this crap. Crumpp also knows that Rolls-Royce had already tested Merlin IIs on 100 Octane fuel in 1938, and had at least 18 months to redesign and tool-up for the increased power rating needed.

The timeline of the Merlin's adaptation for using 100 Octane fuel:

1937 Merlin II developed 1,536 hp at +18 lbs on special blend of fuel;

1938 Figures for Merlin II and III using 100 Octane fuel presented at Paris airshow, albeit no mention of +12 lbs boost; clearly whatever redesign of the cylinder heads was needed Rolls-Royce would have had the job well in hand.

1939 Merlin II & III tested and approved for +12 Lbs boost; September 1939; Blenheim IVs of BC cleared to use 100 Octane fuel in outer wing tanks. November decision that reserves of 100 octane fuel adequate to allow all Merlins to be modified to use the fuel.

1940 February - first squadrons converted to use 100 octane; March A.P1590B/J.2-W specifically states conversions well underway; May - 100 Octane used by Hurricanes and Blenheims based in France during combat ops....etc etc etc.

So who do we believe? Someone who claims to be all sorts of things, but has provided no documentary evidence to back up any of his statements about 100 octane fuel, or someone who has recorded the history of one of the oil refineries which produced 100 Octane fuel, having examined the records? (Attach 3)

Do we believe an historian who has studied Squadron records and interviewed pilots, or do we believe someone who has provided no evidence to support his case? Your choice...

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/603-ross-pg125.jpg

Do we believe someone who says that there is no evidence that 100 octane fuel was used because a set of Pilot's Notes don't show the relevant operating limits, or do we believe the pilots who used 100 Octane in combat. Your choice...

BTW: The forms issued for each aircraft were form 700s which were used by the ground crews during the daily maintenance checks conducted on each aircraft by the ground crews - these forms were signed by the various ground crew specialists, then countersigned by whatever pilot next flew the aircraft. Form 700