I'm still very interested in seeing proof for use of 87 octane fuel in operational units. I'll keep checking the topic as long as it is alive.

may take some time...........;)

The only one who has the "emotional investment" on being right in this thread is Crumpp, who has been ignoring anything which is inconvenient to his case, including placing me on his ignore list. Look at how much his arguments have changed and look at how inconsistent everything he says has become.

The timeline of the Merlin's adaptation for using 100 Octane fuel:

1937 Merlin II developed 1,536 hp at +18 lbs on special blend of fuel;

1938 Figures for Merlin II and III using 100 Octane fuel presented at Paris airshow, albeit no mention of +12 lbs boost; clearly whatever redesign of the cylinder heads was needed Rolls-Royce would have had the job well in hand.

1939 Merlin II & III tested and approved for +12 Lbs boost; September 1940; Blenheim IVs of BC cleared to use 100 Octane fuel in outer wing tanks. November decision that reserves of 100 octane fuel adequate to allow all Merlins to be modified to use the fuel.

1940 February - first squadrons converted to use 100 octane; March A.P1590B/J.2-W specifically states conversions well underway; May - 100 Octane used by Hurricanes and Blenheims based in France during combat ops....etc etc etc.

Again, Crumpp is arguing for the sake of argument because he's always right, no matter what.

I came in here for an argument

Crumpp
You might be interested to know that in December 1938 the Air Ministry were planning to ensure that there were adaquate supplies of 100 Octane should war break out. There were two main factors, The Hartley Committee which recommended the size of the RAF in war and once you know the proposed size of the RAF, you can start estmating the demand for fuel.

The PLans were put forward

Plan F 124 squadrons with 1,736 front Line Aircraft
Plan L (intermediate) 161 squadrons with 2,541 front line aircraft
Plan L (Unltimate) 163 squadrons with 2,549 front line aircraft

It was estimated that it would take two years to get to Plan L which was the reccomendation put forward. so you are talking about the end of 1940.

It was estimated that this would need between 670,000 - 735,000 tons of 100 Octane a year and plans were put in place to deliver this capacity by the end of 1940.

What is interesting is that in Dec 1938 plans were in place for the support of 2,500 front line aircraft with 100 octane by the end of 1940. When you remember that in Aug 1940 all RAF front line commands were authorised to use 100 Octane, you can see that these plans although modified as circumstances unfolded, were basically kept to. The modification was of course, mainly that the war started before anyone expected it to

Its also worth remembering that we have a summary paper from Nov 1940 saying that the UK were well ahead of their plans iro fuel stocks

I should acknowledge that I believe Kurfurst was the first person to post the paper outlining the RAF 1938 plans on a different forum.

Glider,

Operating Note instructions are pretty definative. If it does not appear in the Notes on Operating the Merlin Engine, it was not common at the time of Note Publication.

Hi JtD.

Sorry, I've not found any operational use of 87 octane in Spitfires, Hurricanes and Defiants beyond spring 1940. There is quite a lot of documentation available on 100 octane use for Spitfires, Hurricanes and Defiants during the Battle of France, the Dunkirk evacuation and the Battle of Britain, however, to be found throughout this thread. The best I can offer is operational Lysanders and Battles using 87 octane during May 1940 - see links below. Sorry, but the Hurricanes were using 100 octane by then - also see links.

H.Q. A.A.S.F. 7 May 1940. Reserve Stocks of Aviation Fuel, Bombs and S.A.A. - Policy

H.Q. R.A.F. Component, 10 May 1940. Petrol and Oil requirements for R.A.F. Component on 15th May 1940.

An obvious question I admit, but if these Instructions were so limiting, how do you explain the combat reports and other documentation confirming the use of the fuel in these engines? You have a theory that the engines couldn't be used with the fuel, but we have firm evidence that it was, not a thoretical point which is all you have. There is a clear difference.

I take this chance to remind you of a simple clarification that I am unsure of Crumpp. We are still waiting for you to try to support your belief about 16 squadrons.

All I have seen is a pre war statement of intent to have 16 squadrons of fighters and two of bombers.

Or am I right in thinking that this is now something in the past, like your belief that 1940 was about operational testing and you now simply believe it was less than 100% of fighter command.

I only ask this of you as I do not know what your current view is.

Glider,

Documentation like that is useful but one can hardly make the conclusion all operational units were using the fuel. You are making a leap of logic that just is not there. If someone presented Combat reports from November 1945, would you make the conclusion the entire Luftwaffe was using the FW-190D9? Of course not, the report would have to be placed in context in order to be understood.

All the combat report tells you is that on that day and time, that single airplane was using the fuel.

The combat reports must be put in a timeline and in context just like the squadron log books.

Once more, period magazine articles the fuel was "in use" is not all operational units and niether is logistical documentation.

For example:

Making the conclusion Hurricanes were using 100 Octane in the Battle of France based off some logistical projections for future war is amatuerish and clumsey. It is a paper tiger. That document is a calculation of projected needs written on 7 May 1940. The British Expeditionary Force was on the Beaches of Dunkirk 18 days later.

How much of those calculation and projections for future war do you really think became ground reality in 18 days?

*Naturally Crumpp cannot or will not explain in straight terms exactly what did happen to over 60,000 tons of 100 Octane fuel consumed between February 1940 and the end of October 1940, except to spout some totally nonsensical rubbish about it not actually being consumed, but disappearing into some administrative oblivion based on his huge experience as a modern civilian pilot in the US of A.

*"That document is a calculation of projected needs written on 7 May 1940" Utter Rubbish Crumpp - READ IT PROPERLY; Paragraph 3 "Present Establishment of Aviation Fuels are..."

It states how much 100 Octane fuel was actually in various locations in France on that date!

*Naturally Crumpp cannot, or will not explain why it is those pesky pilots like Paul Richey, Edgar Kain, John Gleed, Roland Beamont, John Bushell and lots of other noted using +12lbs boost in combat while flying in France in early May 1940. Tsssk tsssk it's jolly inconvenient and they obviously didn't know that an expert like Crumpp would one day be micro-analysing the issue and proving they were all wrong. Time: Early May 1940 context: Several squadrons in Combat in France. :roll:

*Naturally Crumpp seems to think that because one aircraft just happened to be using the fuel on that day it doesn't mean the entire squadron was using it. Crumpp has not provided one single solitary piece of documented evidence to explain how the RAF did this.

So tell us Crumpp, how did the RAF ensure that individual or just a few aircraft per squadron used 100 Octane, while the rest went without? How was this allocated? How were the pilots briefed "Sorry chaps X Y and Z get the 100 Octane today, the rest of you stick with 87"? Have you ever heard of "scrambles" Crumpp, where the entire squadron takes off? Happened a lot during the battle, for some reason. How about you provide some documentary evidence Crumpp, showing that frontline fighter squadrons were using 87 octane fuel on a consistent basis throughout the battle - you are such an expert it should be easy.

Crumpp assumes that everyone, apart from his good self, and maybe a couple of others who agree with his POV, are idiots because only Crumpp has the knowledge and technical training to explain how things worked in the RAF in 1940. All of those aviation historians who have written about 100 Octane are amateurs who have no idea of how to research such deep topics properly, and ALL need Crumpp's guidance and enlightenment to show the true way to aviation history.

Using Crumpp logic the ancient Romans didn't exist, the Battle of Waterloo didn't happen and American soldiers of the South didn't actually win Bull Run because Jackson was a figment of someone's imagination. Honestly, why bother arguing with Mr Right? He should be busy rewriting history instead of arguing with us ignorant dweebs.

Estabilishment is not strength, it is only what is presently authorized or projected.

You are confusing a projection with what is one hand.