Fair enuff, I was being sarcastic. And I'm not thick. But my point was kind of that it's hard to tell if a set of pilot's notes were maintained correctly without knowing their history.

S!

Point taken Winny ;) :D

Flanker,

Good points and your experience is obvious. The Curtiss Helldiver is a great example of the measures taken to keep aircraft from falling out of the sky and in safe operation.

It does not make any sense to rush an airplane to destruction and kill people.

According to Morgan and Shacklady ( the very next paragraph after the one you kept quoting) "first trials of the fuel in a Spitfire took place at Rolls-Royce Hucknall on 24th September 1939 when K9788, fitted with a Merlin RM3S made it's first flights"

They also carried out bench tests in April 1938 - the engine failed during it's 100 hour type test. It managed 94 hours including 4 hours of maximum take off power of 1250hp @ 3,000 rpm +12lb boost. I'll repeat that. April 1938

I suppose it all depends on what your definition of "rush" is...

They did rush it!!'

If we take January 1942 as the time the conversion for Spitfire Mk I's was complete that represents about two years and four months between initial flight test and 100% ground operational adoption.

Compare that to the RLM's testing of 1.58ata/1.65 ata as a straight manifold pressure increase in the BMW801D2. The motor was tested at that manifold pressure in May 1942. It was not until July 1944 that we see it in the Flugzueg Handbuch for the FW-190A8. That is a two years and two months lag time. Do you not think the RLM was rushing this improvement, too?

Still trying to trying to work out how you can make such a massive interpretation based on a SPit 1 Manual for 1942, and ignore the official papers that cleared the Spit for use of 100 octane in 1939. Remembering that you agree that all Spit II units were using 100 Octane in mid 1940 and presumably agree that the Spit V would have used 100 Octane.

Clearly original documentation from the NA are not as good as your assumption.

What is your training and background?

S!

Thanks Crumpp, 16 years of active service in military behind with fighters and their systems/armament/maintenance :) I think it gives something to this flying hobby, but I think knowledge just increases the pain in both good and bad :)

Well, if conversion was completed by January 1942 it wasn't done by converting engines but by phasing out the remaining aircraft (if there were any, what I seriously doubt) from operational service ...


The Merlin V was 100 octane only (according to AP1590B, A.L. 4 November 1940). Compare the differences between Merlin II, III and V here), there is no essential difference. This is also confirmed by AP1590B, A.L.4 November 1940 and the fact that only amendments to AP1590B were required to cover the new engine by the same manual (AP1590B without amendments only covers II and III).


Merlin XII, XX and 45 were all 100 octane only. Compare the cylinder block of these engines, which show the largest differences between those marks:

It's obvious that the early engines matured into the XII and the later engines were based on the XII design and most parts were interchangeable.
All these engines were in service by January 1942 and all of them used 100 octane only.

According to Crumpp RAF hesitated to "rush" the introduction of 100 octane fuel for an engine that they started to replace in autumn 1940 with similar engines that were using 100 octane fuel.

Of course Crumpp will now claim that only late production Merlin III which were very similar to Merlin XII were cleared for 100 octane fuel and will take this as a proof for his January 1942 theory. However this will ignore the fact that the Merlin V used 100 octane only by November 1940 and that it was identical to late production Merlin II and early production Merlin III.

That has more to do with the inadequacies of the German aircraft production system ( not my words, Gallands) than anything else.
Ok, what about the Mustang? From drawing board to flight test.. Or any of the German death traps of the late war period.. Again, applying modern standards to a very urgent war time situation is absolutely ridiculous. But I suppose you've made your stand and have to stick to it, no matter how dubious or without taking into account what the reality of war was.

This is another tangent really, when one avenue closes on you you just find another..
Yawn.

You mean like when Don Blakeslee of the 335th in 1943 insisted on swapping his P47's for P51's, but none of the pilots had been converted, but he got them anyway on the agreement that they were in a combat operation within 24hours of receipt. Blakeslee told his men that their conversion would be the actual mission.

Sorry, but needs dictate what happens, do that or help yourselves lose the war.