Yes, there are 100 oct. Spitfires, it's fact. Would be unfair if you can't fly with them. The debate is always with the numbers (iirc the wall of texts :) ) but I think this is irrelevant, when it should be decide to exist in the game or not.

Of course he did, and i support this. But I dont understand you. You was one of the loudest "we need historically accuracy" member here. So, this lasts untill the RAF get the upgades? These types are exist in BoB? Yes, the E-7 enters service in the same month (!) than Spit IIa (Aug '40). The 109's field modifications made impossible to know, how many upgraded aircraft fight in the BOB. Much old version upgraded to E-7 during the battle. I think the principle should the same as the 100 octane fuel.

I assume you don't plan to limit the numbers of Spit I, Spit II, Hurricane (allowed twice the number of Hurri than Spit?) :rolleyes:

I'm waiting for his smoke and mirrors after that one Winny.

I suspect he won't be on for a while though because the 190 owner is not happy with his waxing.

"Is that 3 coats of wax Biff?"
"Yes sir Mr McFly, 3 coats as you said"
"Now now Biff, are you sure? You're not lying to me are you?"
"Err....maybe it was 2, I'll just get started on the 3rd coat now Mr McFly"
"Ahh Biff, what a character!"

http://weeonion.files.wordpress.com/2010/10/biff.jpg

I've not opposed it at all Tom. This is a long story and my comment is more related to Kurfursts reaction, I have nothing against the LW.

We run the server ACG, Air Combat Group, and we have historical missions running. It is early but the more accuracy we can commit to our server the better, so yes, that includes a 2:1 Hurricane:Spitfire ratio by force when we are able to. Our RAF Wing operates 2 Hurricane squadrons and 1 Spitfire squadron so we already fit the ratio.
We also operate a Luftwaffe arm and are pushing to grow this group. It is not in our interests to have any type of bias.

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...67&postcount=5

Ok, I understand. I also hope the new missions will be more interesting because of the new performance (on all servers). And i hope, will be more BoF missions too, not only the boring channel fight :)

What annoys me a bit, the mood of the forum - if you ask something for RAF, you are a patriot, a Hero, who fight for the historically accuracy. If you ask something for LW, you are -at least- Luftwhiner, who just too stupid to fight well with his "superior" a/c. :/

So... where is your +1 vote then? :grin:

Yes it was January 1942. That does not change the fact the transition to 100 Octane is clearly documented in Operating Notes. The transition was not complete in July1940 and is not factual to claim "ALL OPERATIONAL UNITS" in fighter command were using the fuel.

The Operating Notes even transition to 100 Octane Only in later editions of the Hurricane Notes.

Why? Operating Notes are republished periodically and capture all major changes. FACT

It also does not change the fact you cannot look at logisitical documents to prove operational history. If you want to know how to operate the aircraft look at the Operating Notes and not Strategic Fuel Reserves!!!

The transition is clearly outlined in those notes. If the operating limitations (paragraph 1) do not specify "ALL OPERATIONAL UNITS-100 OCTANE" or "100 OCTANE ONLY" then 87 Octane was the predominate fuel on the airfields. It is that simple.

It is not my opinion. It is a fact. It is how aviation publications work by convention.

Prove it. Look through the logs and those units using the fuel will specifically state they are using the fuel, not just converted.

So far you have two squadrons I have seen before July 1940.

The documents do not show they have large stocks. Go back and read my post. They show the RAF does not have a substantial amount of 100 Octane in 1939.

They wanted 800,000 tons on hand at that time and they only have ~1/8th of that.

I generally will only vote for something I know to be absolutely true otherwise I will stay clear. It's not that I don't agree or believe but rather I do not know. I don't blindly vote for RAF items either.

If you are after historical mapping rather than mid-channel furballs then have a go in our server (Air Combat Group). It currently runs the events from August 12th (plus some small random patrols everywhere to keep interest and surprises up) with AI on both sides so you can escort in the 109.

I think you can put this problem down to a small minority (ie Kurfurst) who set a bad example for you. But honestly, the likes of yourself are respected as knowing what you are talking about without bias so items you raise would not be disputed. The problem is that word you use, "superior". This minority seem to believe it and believe the propaganda of the time, they don't like losing to aircraft they think are inferior, so they argue to get what they need to help them. It's a distorted view.

Yawn. I simply gathered the material I have posted here a year ago, the reason I put it up on bugtracker is because you have turned my attention to it. BTW, did you vote for 100 octane 109s and 110s yet? You know, for the sake of historical accuracy you say to be devoted to. I am sure if you want historical accuracy for the RAF, you would not danger your credibility by not supporting the same historical accuracy for the LW. ;)

Stat padding? Last I flew online was some six years ago... Besides the normal 109s are just as good as 100 octane Spits. Its mainly about the 110s as those were the main types running on 100 octane, about half of them were running on it. The 109s had only one Gruppe initially - though thats about the same number as the not-so-common Spit IIs, which already have modelled. The Moscow map will probably have the E-7/N modelled anyways.

ps. I would be more delighted to see a flyable Wellington, which was the main British bomber and a nice counterpart for the 111, or a Hampden modelled.

I know this is going to sound very obvious but I have always believed that pilots notes were there to help the pilot avoid crashing the aircraft, not an historical document showing the roll out of things like fuel.

Now I know why most of my flying experience was in Gliders, none of the smelly stuff that can catch fire.

It is a fact the RAF did not complete conversion to 100 Octane until around January 1942. That is evident in the Operating Notes.

This is total bull, I would love to see you prove it, why not March 1942, or even have a punt at 1943. Why not 1944 as I know there was a shortage of 100 Octane just before the Invasion, maybe they converted some squadrons back to 87 Octane, they didn't, but what the heck, there is more logic for such a move as there was a shortage then.

Its worth remembering that you still haven't shown us the pilots notes for the Spit I you were quoting as being June 1940. So why on earth should we believe that it was as late as 1942

For once I agree with you 100%

I don't think that's the case really, you can see pretty much same amount of bias and agenda on both sides, unfortunately.

As for Battle of Britain - that's what we've got in the sim, summer 1940. I voted in favour of the newer 109E-7 imemdiately btw. But Osprey is right - this is a bit beyond what we see as actual Battle of Britain. Also, this thread is about the aircraft we've already got in the sim (and they do represent the typical liveries of BoB era) and their inaccurate performance - mainly due to 100 octane fuel used widely in the RAF in this era (summer '40) is nonexistent in the sim. If they ever model early post-BoB scenario with E-7s that would be awesome, Hurricanes Mk.IIs, E-7s, then Mk.Vb all the way to the Fw 190.

E-7 entered service in the second half of August 1940. 186 were delivered by the end of October, 1940.

Basically the same case as the Spitfire II.

Oh yes I am aware of that. Spitfire Mk.II was actually ready a bit sooner (early June 1940) than E-7 or Hurricane Mk.II (late August / September and thereofre being quite rare). I guess that's why the Mk.II Spits are present in the game - rare but still quite typical in BoB skies. The other two were absolutely marginal for BoB but important at the later stage. I hope to see them all modelled one day.

Still waiting...

I'm sure, much more E-7 fought in the BoB than G.50 :rolleyes: :grin:

So what we've established is that the 2 100 octane whiners here who can't see what everybody else sees don't even fly IL2 COD. So why are you here? Bugger off and leave us alone, it's none of your business.

PS, Kurfurst, if you could read I explained why I didn't vote for it.

Yes, of course. I was comparing the main forces in the Battle - Luftwaffe and RAF. Italian presence was marginal, but it's cool we've got them in the game. E-7s were as common as Mk.Ib Spitfires in the actual Battle. Don't get me wrong, I'd like to see them all in the sim. I am sure the devis will have this version ready for BoM (both E-7 and F variants I would guess) and having them in Channel scenario is very likely imho... I don't really know what the numbers were and I don't care all that much + it would only lead to further arguements.

On a side note I have the book Luftwaffe Fighters and Fighter-Bombers Over Norway which includes a section on a Bf 109E-7 W.Nr. 3523 "Red 6" of 5./JG5 which was rescued from a Russian lake in 2003. (pages 61-63)

This was manufactured as an E-1 by Arado and was taken into Luftwaffe service on 27 September 1939; in August 1940 it was converted into an E-7. In mid 1941 it was overhauled and became an E-7/Trop, complete with the RLM 78/79 paint scheme before being shipped to Norway in early 1942 and serving in JG5. On 4 April the cooling system was damaged in combat with a Russian Hurricane IIC from 2 GIAP and Red 6 force landed on a frozen lake - from which it was rescued and still exists, at Chino. (The commentary by Brett Green is misleading.)

Interesting video. Was an adventurous journey :)
Thanks for sharing.

All this proves is that Crumpp has become increasingly closed minded and obsessed with his own interpretations of the very limited evidence he has presented:

Crumpp has completely ignored what the "Pilot's Notes General - 1st edition", which was also issued to all pilots, says about operating limits in the Pilot's Notes:*

However, over 70 years later Crumpp knows better: because HIS pilot's notes don't mention 100 Octane, that makes them definitive proof that the RAF wasn't using much 100 octane at all. "Why? Operating Notes are republished periodically and capture all major changes. FACT"

But that wasn't standard Air Ministry practice during the 1940s: When the notes were printed they kept the standard rating the engine was designed for, as shown in "Pilot's Notes General' - when the Pilot's Notes were issued any amendments were included as gummed slips which were pasted in the relevant section or paragraph of the notes, and the additions noted by the pilot on the amendment list printed either on the inner front cover, or on the first two pages and, in some cases, on the inner back cover.

Any subsequent reprints sometimes kept the original publishing date, but the previously pasted in sections were incorporated into the Notes and the amendments were then described in a note on the left upper section of the relevant page eg:

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/attachm...4&d=1334674718 "Revised May 1941: Amended by A.L.No.37"

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/attachm...5&d=1334723739 "January 1942 Issued with A.L.No.24/H"

Look at the front inner flyleaves in the Spitfire V notes and see the table of amendments, then note that some amendments have been ticked. Scroll down to page 4 note top L/H corner "issued with A.L. No. 16/7", which is ticked in the amendments section.

The Spitfire I Pilots manual in its original state, without amendments, specified the original operating limits using 87 Octane fuel, for which the Merlin II and III series were designed - if it had been issued to an operational squadron amendment slips for the new operating limits would have been issued with the book, then pasted in and noted by the pilot - the January 1942 notes incorporate these amendments, but it still says 87 Octane for "Other units" such as OTUs; chances are Crumpp's notes were either issued to an OTU or were never issued to any unit and never amended.

I have in my hand an original set of Pilot's Notes for the Corsair I-IV A.P. 2351A, B, C & D which has the printing date of August 1944, yet amendments were added as supplementary slips in March 1945 and April 1946.

Now this was explained ages ago by 41Sqn_Banks but has since been completely ignored by Crumpp.

1) He still hasn't shown the relevant pages to the June 1940 Pilot's Notes, which according to Crumpp, incorporate the modifications shown in A.P. 1590B/J.2-W;

2) He has not shown us the front and inner covers of his "June 1940" Spitfire Pilot's Notes showing whether they incorporate the addendums which were issued modifying the notes to the latest standards - we don't even know if his notes are original or a photocopied facsimile which came from here.

On another note: On the one hand he says strategic reserves aren't important, then in his last sentence he says "They show the RAF does not have a substantial amount of 100 Octane in 1939."

Except that the RAF issued an inconvenient little document in November 1939 approving the conversion of and use of Merlins for 12 lbs boost and "There are adequate reserves for the purpose". Which, of course, is completely ignored.

*(Note: The Pilot's Notes General 2nd Edition, printed April 1943, no longer incorporates the proviso about fuel types because the matter was no longer relevant by 1943.)

It's actually a little later I think.. 1st SpitII was delivered to 601 Sqn. on 22nd August. There were 195 of them by the end of October. As there were 22 Spitfire squadrons by then, it's the majority of Spitfires in service at the end of the battle. (roughly 22 x 12 = Total operational Spitfires = 264-ish) FC total operational Fighters including Hurricanes peaked at 764.

I'd have to sit down and work out the deliveries for more accurate figures, this is ball park.

No, it wasn't. "The first examples were delivered to No.19 Sqn at Duxford in June 1940, but when the unit went into action two months later its aircraft were plagued with chronic cannon jams, and the Spitfire Ibs were hastily replaced with all-machine gun Spitfire IIa within days". (Osprey Duel 05 - Spit vs 109 p.24)

It can't be called "just as rare" as the E-7. 186 were delivered by the end of October, 1940, and this aircrafts has not been withdrawn at all :rolleyes: As Winny mentioned, it is about the same as the IIa...

When the Hispano has been mentioned anyway, why not in the game, it was not for the reason that it would be rare:
"- Can we have a Spitfire with Hispano Suiza 20mm cannon?
- We discussed this with some members of the community a while ago and decided that it makes no sense. If we make the guns realistically crappy and unreliable no one will fly it. And if we make the weapons unrealistically reliable it will completely shift the balance and give the Allies a huge advantage. We do not need to add another questionable feature to the project and give the fans another thing no one can agree upon, except to say that we suck." (BlackSix's Q&A 12-28-2011)

We dont know, what will be the planeset of BoM. I'm afraid that when we get it, I will be slightly obsolete...

Quite possible, as I say I don't even want to go down that path. Just for the record, my data was from 'The narrow margin' (Wood & Dempster) - ''Although the first Mk II Spitfires were delivered to the RAF on June 3rd 1940, there were still more Mk Is produced than the Mk IIs. In fact the comparison figure was 1,531 to 920.''. Fair enough.

Ok, rare, but not quite like the Spit Mk.Ib, that was just a funny example (I agree on 1c's insight on Ibs btw). I am not sure about the numbers of the subypes in the second half of the Battle - I certainly didn't know that there were 186 E-7 in October over the Channel area. Fair enough. The numbers are very difficult to prove and often contradicting and complicated with subtypes and post-overhaul conversions. Same with propeller types on Spitfires and Hurricanes in the first half...

Anyone with some good data on the topic?

I agree about working out how many E-7s there were; for example W.Nr 3523 was rebuilt from an E-1 in August 1940, but it did not appear to have had an operational life with any Jagdstaffel until reaching JG5 in early 1942. Do you mean delivered or operational?

Just a quick look through The Battle of Britain Then and Now Vol 5: the first E-7 I can find is W.Nr 2029 of I/LG 2 which was shot down at 4:15 pm on September 11. From memory LG2 was one of the first units to use E-7s?

With two fighters constantly being developed and in service throughout the entire war (the 109 and Spit) with various different models and many intrim variants it seems to me that the date of any scenario is of upmost importance. It appears some people like to "stretch" the date of the BoB so as to include the latest variant, more potent model of their favorite fighter.
Personally I dont see a place for the cannon Spit in the BoB. However if it were implemented into CoD I dont think the reliability of the cannon would be an issue as it was caused by icing at high altitude and CoD Spitfires never reach high altitude.

The cannon jammed because due to the thinness of the wing it was mounted on its side, not because of altitude. It was a problem with the ejection of spent cartridges, they simply wouldn't clear properly. They were withdrawn and didn't re- appear until November.

Edit: a little more info on mkIB. First one delivered to 19 squadron on 27 th June serial number R6761.
Armourer Fred Roberts explained " most of the trouble stemmed from the cannons being mounted on their sides, the empty shell cases therefore being ejected sideways from the breach and being deflected back into it. The nose of the shell dropping slightly and striking the breach end of the barrel, buckling the the shell case at the neck caused another kind of stoppage. We fitted various kinds of deflector plates. We altered the angle of the plates, fitted rubber pads to dampen the force of the shell case, but none of these experiments worked. We also had magazine feed troubles, caused by it lying on it's side. To counter this we tried varying the tension applied to the magazine spring but that was unsuccessful".

Yes, very much so. :D :D But if what they say is true and 186 E-7s with 601N engine were present in the Channel area in the last month of the BoB (October), then it should be in the game, too.

My comparsion to the Mk.Ib was only ironical as with 30 made examples, I believed this is pretty much comparable to couple of dozens of German E-7 that actually took part in the battle in September / October. If it was more, I take it back.

As for Ib - not important, but I remember reading about the unsuccesful trials and frustration of the pilots when the cannons malfunctioned. The Squad Leader demanded MG Spitfires back to much unliking of his 'boss' at MoD, and the Squadron got them back eventually - but they were not new Mk.IIs but beaten up Mk.Is with old de Havilland propellers (not sure about names and details I am afraid)

Ah my altitude remark was a bit tongue in cheek. Sometimes I just cant help myself.

Just another quick P.S about the first cannon armed Spitfires.

They didn't have machine guns. Just 2 hispanos.

The ones with the Mg's didn't appear till 11th August, the first one being S/No X4231

They changeover back to the 8 mg version was completed on 4th September by using "some clapped out old things from an OTU" according to Squadron Leader Pinkham, who had campaigned to get the Ib's replaced.

Ironically he was killed in one of these "clapped out" machines the very next day.

I think this need to be clarified a bit - the 186 E-7 delivered means that this much was produced as 'new builds', or Neubau by factories (as opposed to conversion of existing airframes, so conversions are not included in this number). These aircraft went to storage at first, as normal, and a number - not all of them - was issued to the the frontline units as needed.

E-7 had two engines mounted: DB 601Aa (so performance was same as E-4 but more importantly, the E-7 could carry a droptank and boost its range to 1300 km) and 601N. In the latter case its designation is E-7/N. I think its evident that all the early E-7 had 601Aa (since 110s had priority first for this engine and 109s had received priority only in October 1940), the one in the late automn/winter/spring 1941 had the 601N, and a performance between the 109E and F, roughly 590-595 km/h top speed. A number were produced in 1941 as E-7/Z, meaning 601N engine plus GM-1 boost.

I think its interesting to see the production of 109 aircraft in the BoB period (July - October 1940, as the British define it):

New airframes were delivered in the following number (not including conversions). Previous production is thus not inlcuded, just the number produced in the above period.

E-1: 55
E-1/B: 110
Total E-1 variants: 165

E-3a: 75 (export version)

E-4: 47
E-4/N: 20
E-4/B: 211
E-4/BN: 15
Total E-4 variants: 293

E-7: 186

F-1: 9

Total Bf 109: 728

So as a matter of fact the E-7 is the 2nd most produced variant of the BoB period.

Oh, good info. It would be helpful to have a list of aircraft types actually present during the months of the BoB. I am aware that the number is just Neubaus and that only part of the new machines were assigned to the units in the Channel area. Same with E-1s being more common at the early stage - I suppose your list does not include pre BoB production of this subtype.

I agree it's nearly impossible to get the precise data with the amount of conversions and engine variants.

I'm pretty sure that the E-7/N could be distinguished from the E-7 by a small reverse D-shaped air intake in front of the exhaust fairings. This photo is of an E-7/N flown by Oblt. Joachim Müncheberg of 7/JG26 based on Sicily in Feb - late March 1941; the air intake can be seen behind the spinner.

I only have detailed subtype breakdown for 31 August.

On 31 August 1940, fighter units (excluding JG 77) reported 375 E-1s, 125 E-3s, 339 E-4s and 32 E-7s on strength, indicating that most of the E-3s had been already converted to E-4 standard. By July, one Gruppe (Wing) of JG 26 was equipped with the Bf 109 E-4/N model of improved performance, powered by the new DB 601N engine using 100 octane aviation fuel.

As of 1 January 1941, the following 109 / N (DB 601N) subtypes were in service:

Bf 109E-1 : 16 pcs,
Bf 109E-3 : 1 pc,
Bf 109E-4 : 54 pcs,
Bf 109E-6 : 1 pc,
Bf 109E-7 : 34 pcs,
Bf 109E-8 : 2pcs.
Bf 109F-1 : 5 pcs.

Total 112 Bf 109E with DB 601N present in service, plus 5 Bf 109F.

Hooton gives lost % for the subtypes, which confirms that most E-3s were converted into E-4s (a small change in the internal of the MG FF to fire Mineshells, nevertheless the German designation system for a subtype changes when a change was done to radios, guns or engine or similar important internal). By August E-3 loss % were single digit, new-born E-4 losses increased accordingly. E-1 accounted to about 35-40%, E-4 to about 60% and E-7 were the rest.

Indeed conversions can make it difficult, as most early /N conversions were in the field, and by November droptanks were retrofitted. See attached picture of a JG 53 E-1. Given the simplicity of the 109 droptank installation (essentially a rack and compressed air lines from the supercharger, and a fuel line feeding the droptank into the main tank, no fuel pumps etc. involved) I guess most of the latter was made in the field as well.

Thats 'cos they were walloping the German fighters at lower altitudes ;) There were lots of reports late in the battle of 109 Jabos flying at impressive altitudes with RAF fighters struggling to get to them; Don Caldwell, for example, notes: "The raids were exceedingly difficult to intercept, coming over at such high speed and altitudes that only Spitfires had a chance to reach them. Park formed a special reconnaissance flight (this was 421 Flight which later became 91 Sqn) with new Spitfire IIs....The defense never solved the problem to its satisfaction, and German fighter losses were low; JG26 lost only seven pilots during October." (JG26 Top Guns of the Luftwaffe, 1991 p. 63)

So basically I was not too far from the truth saying that meeting a E-7 in the BoB was as likely as meeting a Spitfire Mk.Ib ;) 30 vs. 32 pieces and that information is for January.

E-4/Ns also listed in January at 54 pcs, one Gruppe of JG26 used them quite early, that might be cca 40 aircraft in the Summer already (makes sense). I guess Perez's aircraft was part of this Gruppe. It seems that 100 octane fuel and 601N engines were more relevant for Bf 110s Squadrons in the sim. In the actual Battle of Britain, these subtypes were present at rather marginal numbers - at 31.8.1940 we've got 871 Bf 109s in service, let's say some 1é or less % were fighters with DB 601N.

Same with droptanks coming in November - this is very important for next stage of the war (the Blitz as the British call it).

Again, there's E-7 (601Aa) and E-7/N (601N).

Now there was 32 E-7 in the end of August, I agree not very significant, according to the paper they entered service and went on operation just a few days earlier. I think the Ib analogy doesn't stands, it was a single Squadron, and a completely unsuccessful one. Personally I wouldn't mind having it, I just consider it a compete waste of time of developer resources to model a completely useless plane (because of insta-jams). I think Galland's own Gruppe flew the E-4/N and I would bet a leg on it they ranked up quite score during BoB.

Probably because their production just started (none listed as produced as of end of June 1940 yet, so production just started in July or early August). Following that however a total of 186 were produced until the end of October (these would be certainly with 601Aa, again the priority of 601N distribution to 109s did not come into effect until November), so I would expect that in September-October there were fair numbers of them around. Say, 80-90 or more? Pretty much like Mk IIs (was it 5 or seven operational Sqns?).

In any case, I do not see why a Spitfire II, which saw service in similiar numbers and time (1-2 Sqns in August and best, and about half a dozen Sqns by the end of the Battle, is a more justified as an aircraft model than E-4/Ns or E-7s, which at the minimum equipped 2 Gruppen (Six Squadrons), by late August, and probably more in the automn.

The second strenght return list from January only list E-7/N, so its additional to 'normal' E-7.

The absolutely correct historical way would be to model separately an E-4/N (601N) and an E-7 (early 601Aa variant), both were there but in small numbers, say about a hundred or so combined by the late Battle.

What I think would actually make sense and fit into the sim nicely is to model an E-7/N straight away. This is sort of a hybrid but can represent the number of E-4/N and E-7 participating in the battle economically with modelling resources, moreover the E-7/N can be re-usable for 1941 scenarios (North Africa, Malta, Moscow, France 1941), since in 1941 it was the main type and the only 109E type remaning in production, with several hundred produced (ie. all late E-7 seems to have been E-7/N). Its probably being done for the Moscow sim anyway.. and would require little more than a minor change in the external model (pointed spinner, spark plug cooling holes on the cowl, drop tank rack) and FM of existing E-4.


Absolutely agree. Its important for the 110s, since about half of them had the 601N, and its a real performance boost for them, being much faster. A BoB sim without 110/Ns is pretty much like a BoB sim without Hurricanes, given their historical force ratios... or +12 boosted variants for that matter.

Glider,

Of course the Operating Notes provide a chronological order to technical changes. We know that technical updates are first published they become supplements to the Operating Notes. It is the operators responsibility to keep the Operating Notes up to date with the latest changes. However, the problem is in dissemination of technical updates. Somebody always does not get the word when updates are published. That is why for major changes like changing fuel a new edition with updates to paragraph 1, Operating Limitations would be published.

Look at all the issues with trying to find a replacement for 100LL in todays fleet!

Technically it was not a quick and easy change over to convert a Merlin from running 87 Octane only to having the ability to use 100 Octane fuel at +12lbs. It involved major modifications and was service level maintenance as noted in the technical order.

No it is true according the Operating Notes. It is a fact. The National Archives probably has multiple copies of the various editions of the Spitfire Mk I Operating Notes.

You can check there to see if an early edition notes changes to paragraph 1, Operating Limitations. Otherwise, January 1942 is the first edition to note 100 Octane is in use for all operational units. If the Operating Notes only mention 100 Octane in Paragraph 7 without changes to paragraph 1, Operating Limitations, then you know the fuel is not being used for all operational aircraft! It is really that simple.

Crumpp your theory require that in January 1942 at least one operational squadron used at least one Spitfire I aircraft.
Otherwise the restriction for operational units to 100 octane noted in the Pilot's Notes would be obsolete and by your theory would have been instantly removed and changed to "all units 87 octane fuel".
Please name at least one operational Squadron that used at least a one Spitfire I aircraft at that time.

Hi all, does anybody here have membership to oxford journals?

http://ehr.oxfordjournals.org/conten...en007.full.pdf
Might help....

The guy who wrote that has already been on here..

Unless you can provide a print run history for the manual it's all guess work.

What we really need is a list of all the vol.II leaflets issued as these over rode the manual it's self.

Anyone live near kew?

Well, i don't, but i am planning to go quite soon, because i want to get 92 squadrons operational reports for 1941 for a online il2 1946 campaign i'm going to do for my squad (can only find 1940 on the web).

Could have a look at this as well, won't be for a month or so though.

For the purposes of CloD, does it matter if ALL operational RAF units were using 100?

Does it not only matter if units operating from the airfields in the south east, as mapped in game were using it?

No.

Yes. And you'd have to be mad to think they weren't, after reading this thread.

From the point of view of CloD.....

Fruitbat, agreed on both accounts.

Winny, it is not guesswork. It is what the Operating Notes say for every edition until we get to January 1942.

That would be nice if you could do that and let us know what you find.

Why does that matter?

It is a fact the manual was reprinted in January 1942 and it is a fact the fuel changeover to "All Operational Units" is important enough to be added to Paragraph 1, Operating Limitations.

The 100 Octane fuel changeover is important enough to make it into every Operating Notes, Paragraph 1, Operating limitations when it occurred.

For example, the Hurricane II Operating Notes dated September 1943 clearly list 100 Octane as the ONLY fuel to be used:

http://img201.imageshack.us/img201/2949/hurr14fuel.jpg

It will note in paragraph 1 the fuel options when 100 Octane becomes common and it will note when all operational units will use the fuel, and when it is the only choice.

It is the operational documentation and not logistical!!

Now, it might not be the exact month because there is some lag time and technical orders will cover that short time period.

you will not see technical orders that are applicable to operational units that do not make it into the new edition.

It is really simple. We have a 1939 edition and we have a June 1940 edition with no changes to paragraph 1, Operating Limitations. That fact tells you 100 Octane was not in common use. It was in use but it was not the most common operational fuel in the RAF at that time.

In between that time we have a technical order to AP1590 which is the engine series and not the airframe series. It makes a difference in aviation and there are plenty of engines that modifications are not approved in specific airframes. There will be an order approving that engine modification for the specific airframe.

For example:

http://www.autofuelstc.com/autofuels...Mogas_FAQ.html

I don't know the specific explaination in the case of 100 Octane as too why the large lag time between the engine approval and the airframe operating limitations but I do know that is a flag to anyone knowledgeable in airplane maintenance for claims of widespread general use.

I would get the editions to the Operating Notes and throw away any squadron logs that do not specifically state "100 Octane Fuel in use".

You will have good factual picture on the timeline for the fuels operational use if you do that.

No, It was claimed in this thread that all operational units were using the fuel by June 1940 and that is not correct.

It is correct, only a total fool would argue against such a weight of evidence.

Ok fine, that's certainly debatable, but not strictly relevant to the game.... Not unless they model the whole UK and every RAF unit.

How many editions are there and what dates were they printed?
And what about the vol.II's?

As I've mentioned unfortunately the notes are not 'gospel'

FC's total fighter strength during BoB (operational) peaked at around 750 aircraft, Spitfires, hurricanes and all other types. And was around 350 at the start.
We are talking less than a 3rd of the whole RAF. At around the same time they had 220,000 tons of 100 octane.
It makes no sense for them not to use it. Morgan and shacklady say the conversion started in march, there was a team of rolls-Royce engineers running around the airfields showing the mechanics how to do the conversion, in the field. Geoff Wellum says he was using 100 octane "just before" the battle of britain, tim viggors was putting it in his car in June 1940. All Deere says it was in use "just in time for the BoB". Peter brothers also says that they converted in the spring of 1940. All these pilot's, and more...


I contacted Dilip Sarkar, and asked the question. He said it was done in the spring of 1940. Bungay and Holland say the same thing. Then there's you...

The notes are gospel Winny. For a short period of time a technical order will override them until the next edition of the Operating Notes is published.

Yes.....with a total of 16 squadrons converted to 100 Octane sometime in September.

That is exactly what I said I believed happenend. Both the Operating Notes and Table II showing fuel at the airfields point to that same conclusion.

For the last 20 pages I have been called every name in the book for stating that!!

No, you guys pay for your game and the developers should give you what you want to enjoy it.

Honestly, a "simulation" would not be very much fun of this stuff. Ask the survivors how much fun they had in it.

FACT: The RAF issued amendment slips with the Pilot's Notes before reprinting the notes with the amendments included - just because the June 1940 Pilot's Notes do not have the required amendments does not mean the RAF wasn't using 100 octane fuel - it simply means the Pilot's Notes continued with the convention of noting limitations for the fuel for which the Merlin II/III series was designed; to wit 87 Octane. Even in January 1942 Pilot's Notes stated 100 Octane for Operational Units 87 for "Other units".

you will not see technical orders that are applicable to operational units that do not make it into the new edition.

Wrong - as long as the engine was originally designed and rated for 87 Octane fuel the Pilot's Notes did not incorporate anything else until 1943. Any amendments to the engine's ratings continued to be issued as supplementary slips. The Hurricane notes of 1943 say 100 Octane because the Merlin XX was designed to use 100 octane.

The Pilot's Notes General 2nd ed printed in April 1943 dropped the convention because most engines which were originally designed to use 87 octane fuel were well out of frontline service.

We know the changes to the aircraft to enable it to be used with 100 octane and the changes are minimal. Please tell me what is so difficult in drilling two holes. The other changes were already incorporated in new engines or were being done as part of normal maintanence in March. By the time the BOB started in anger around June, you would be hard pushed to find any Spit or Hurricane that hadn't had maintanence in the previous three months.

Unfortunately they don't hold any copies of Spit 1 prior to 1941 or any Hurricane I notes which are the ones we need. The only person I know who has a copy of these is you, and you have not been willing to share what you have.

I know that when I used pilots notes I didn't give a damn about when a change had been used, I just wanted to make sure that the notes and its updates matched the plane I was going to fly in.

Either way the date of the notes is clearly not a given as to accuracy of the implementation of the change. I am confident that your notes dated June 1940 are not for the varient of the Spitfire I with the updates CSP, Armour, Tank protection and so on, in service in June 1940. Your 1942 notes saying all operational units is another example, show me a Spitfire Unit operational in June 1942 flying the Spit I.

You have done nothng to prove your theory of 16 squadrons, or the bases that would have held the fuel. You have no evidence of any fighter combat using 87 octane apart from some I gave you iro OCU units who woldn't have had 100 octane. There is no evidence from any participant or historian to support your theory. You have no evidence to support your theory from the oil committee who would have been involved in the disribution of said 100 octane fuel, unless you believe that we fought the entire war with 16 squadrons on 100 octane in the UK. I say this as after May 1940 there is nothing more in the papers about increasing or extending the roll out of 100 octane at any time.

There is no suggestion from any report or status paper from any source, be it Cabinet Meetings, Oil Committee or Air Ministry to support the idea that there was a shortage of 100 Octane fuel, again apart from my finding that there was a shortage in May 1944.

Your faith that a pre war proposal was maintained despite war starting and despite everything else we have shown is almost desperate. I have asked before that you find any pre war plan, on any topic from any nation that remained unchanged when the firing started.

NO, changing cylinder heads is major repair.

http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text....0.1.1&idno=14

By Convention, improperly installing a cylinder head or misadjusted valves will effect powerplant operation and is a major repair by itself.

Glider,

I am not argue with you anymore. The facts are plain.

Crumppquote: you will not see technical orders that are applicable to operational units that do not make it into the new edition.

Wrong - as long as the engine was originally designed and rated for 87 Octane fuel the Pilot's Notes did not incorporate anything else until 1943. Any amendments to the engine's ratings continued to be issued as supplementary slips.

The Pilot's Notes General 2nd ed printed in April 1943 dropped the convention because most engines which were originally designed to use 87 octane fuel were well out of frontline service.

Rubbish The major work is already covered in the new production engines or in routine maintanence. What is left is minor and easily done. How many front line aircraft wouldn't have been maintained in the three months from March to June?

You say you have experience in this field but I must say I seriously doubt this. I strongly urge you to show some of the engineers you have worked with the paper outlinging the changes and ask them how long it would take to drill two holes and reassemble the piece as described.
.On that I totally agree with you

i.e. I agree
You have done nothng to prove your theory of 16 squadrons, or the bases that would have held the fuel. You have no evidence of any fighter combat using 87 octane apart from some I gave you iro OCU units who woldn't have had 100 octane. There is no evidence from any participant or historian to support your theory. You have no evidence to support your theory from the oil committee who would have been involved in the disribution of said 100 octane fuel, unless you believe that we fought the entire war with 16 squadrons on 100 octane in the UK. I say this as after May 1940 there is nothing more in the papers about increasing or extending the roll out of 100 octane at any time.

There is no suggestion from any report or status paper from any source, be it Cabinet Meetings, Oil Committee or Air Ministry to support the idea that there was a shortage of 100 Octane fuel, again apart from my finding that there was a shortage in May 1944.

Changing the Cylnder head in this case is not classed as a 'repair'. It was completed as part of the Merlin engines service maintenance.

To me this implys that the cylnder head modification would have already been performed on aircaft scheduled for that service before the change over. This would have sped up the conversion process conciderably.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/ap1590b.jpg


Luckly the RAF had very competent and well trained mechanics and maintenance personel to perform the task.
Cheers!

Firstly the meeting was held before the war started at a point when nobody, not even Hitler thought the war would start until 41 at the earliest, the British were looking at '42 as the probable start. This meeting was followed by other meetings that are again documented here that superseded the original meeting due to the minor inconvienience of Hitler deciding to risk war and invade Poland.
There were meetings held in '39 that were specifically held to secure and produce 100 octane without having to rely on the USA. In 1939 the government spent the most amount of money on any single production facility for the entire war when they contracted TRIMPELL to build the Heysham iso-octane plant, who's specific purpose was to convert 87 into 100. Why would they do this if they were expecting the total consumption to be 10,000 tons per annum, as Morgan and shacklady say, when they already had 100,000 tons in stock.. 10 years supply according to that meeting. See next point.

Morgan and shacklady states that the same meeting decided that the change over would result in "consumption of 10,000 tons per annum" the reserve of 800,000 tons was, if you look at the relevant documents already posted in this thread, for the entire RAF as projected for 1943.

I noticed you gloss over the fact that Deere, Wellum, Brothers, Hillary, Lane, Viggors, Page, Malan and a few others mention in their memoirs that the changeover happened in the Spring of 1940.

At the end of the day I don't give a shit what you think. I value people who were there, and who were writing diaries at the time over your desperate clinging to a meeting that was held when Britain was in the process of re arming for a war they were expecting in 2 or 3 years. I mean.. Who exactly are you? Actually don't answer that, I don't care.

Dear Crumpp,

I just can't find these arguements compelling where you compare current peacetime FAA (US) procedures and definitions to the RAF in 1940, then state conclusions that are held and argued no-matter how they are contradicted by the rest of the evidence. I understand you have some background in (today's) civil aviation, it may be a good place to start but it is not producing very compelling arguments.

Plus there a lot of assumptions being put into your mix. Your current argument rests on implying new cylinder heads are needed (with consequent large requirements for time and materials), where AP1590/J.2-W (which you posted) refers to a rather more mundane "cylinder head spigot depth modification" (elsewhere referred to as a "top joint modification") which has aleady been done in routine maintainance or at the factory for new engines as Glider and others have said (document from March 40). It would be nice to see some more info on what exactly Merlin Mods 64,77 and 136 entailed (these are the cylinder head mods), but there are a lot of posted documents detailing that the airfield conversions were done very quickly.

The nature of the boost control modification itself rather argues against the relevance of comparing today's civil aviation standards with the 1940 RAF. Drilling extra air channels to convert an existing boost control cutout into a boost pressure setpoint control? Brilliant, ingenious, very seat of the pants. I have a little background in civil aviation too (Australia) and I can't see it happening today ;)

I am not saying the devil's advocate role is not useful. I loved it when you totally offended the Spitfire purists by saying that according to a college course you did, the Spitfire fails control stability design standards developed in the US at the end of the war. There was an interesting point there that the pre 1940s belief that instability was necessary for manouverability was wrong...US engineers figured out that you can have both. This (correct) technical detail about changes in standards does miss the point though that pilots of the time (and today) found the Spitfire a delightful aircraft to fly.

There was also the time when you offended an ex-RAAF fast jet pilot (who also flew Yak 50s) by contradicting him repeatedly on flying in the "buffet", when you stated (correctly) that flight in the buffet regime is wrong because it represents a loss of aerodynamic efficiency and hence turn efficiency. But this (correct) technical detail misses the point that military or aerobatic pilots have often used the first point they can detect the onset of buffet (i.e flying in the "buzz") to stay in proximity to their maximum AoA...any slight deterioration in performance is offset by the ability to detect the point of departure and stay near it.

Bolding text and making statements that "this is a FACT" and "anyone that knows about aeroplanes would know this" I (and I suspect others) find very unconvincing. Generally you have used them to make statements that are correct within a narrow technical context or definition but then become misleading in the historical application to which they have been put.

Cheers, camber

There have been other conventions since but 1919 was the first. Aviation is the same around the world for the most part.

Yes, the Air Ministry of the United Kingdom follows the same rules and concepts as the FAA. Those principles are exactly the same. Once more, the instructions found in every Air Ministry Operating Notes reflect this practice.

Do you know what a cylinder head spigot is on an engine?

It is not routine maintenance; it is done at Service Inspection. Do you know the difference?

You misrepresent this completely. The statement was not using the buffet to find maximum turn performance. He flat stated that maximum turn performance occurs in the buffet. That is not correct and once he clarified that we had no issue.

Up until the moment they died from it! ;) What the engineer likes and what the pilot likes are not always the same thing. Why let a pilot take a plane someplace it cannot fly?

How can it be technically correct and then wrong in some imagined historical application? Sounds like horse-puckey to me. What I have passed on is true and how it works. There is no point in arguing the same information over and over. Problem is that most aviation historians have no practical aviation experience. In fact, the vast majority of books on aviation history are written by interested amatures who don't have a background in either history or aviation.

What I have said about the Operating Notes is technically, historically, and whatever else you want to attach to the word, "CORRECT". I don't care if you believe it, hate it, or love it.

Cheers,

Crumpp

Is there any evidence of 87 octane fuel used by operational fighter units during BoB by now?

Quote:
There was also the time when you offended an ex-RAAF fast jet pilot (who also flew Yak 50s) by contradicting him repeatedly on flying in the "buffet", when you stated (correctly) that flight in the buffet regime is wrong because it represents a loss of aerodynamic efficiency and hence turn efficiency.

You misrepresent this completely. The statement was not using the buffet to find maximum turn performance. He flat stated that maximum turn performance occurs in the buffet. That is not correct and once he clarified that we had no issue.

-----------------------------


Just to keep the record straight (and not wanting to re enter the engagement or add to thread drift) on what I actually said. My very last post in that thread regarding Max performance turning and using the Buzz for AOA cueing was:

CRUMPP you said above:

"As for the original premise of this discussion, the effect of a hard buffet for stall warning on turn performance:"

The premise of the discussion was NOT flying in Hard Buffet at all ! but on the very first indication i.e. The "Buzz" or the "Nibble" or the "Burble" ... what ever you want to call it. In a previous post you erroneously said the Buzz and Buffet I described was in fact the stickshaker going off even though in these aeroplanes no stickshaker system was fitted, you also told me that it was only valid technique in FBW aircraft ... even though we were talking about coventional cable/pushrod flight control systems ! You fail to accept that flying on the Buzz was/is a technique practised by Fighter pilots the world over and examples provided in this thread from at my count by 4 independent people/references ... by those that have actually used the technique....including a Spitfire pilot from the Battle Of Britain. "

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showthr...=Yak52&page=17

With regard to the pilot notes, RAF Air Publication (AP) amendments are well known for being behind the times as far as up-to-date common practise at the front line is concerned. It may be many months and over a year or so before an AP is fully updated to reflect what is actually taking place on the ground and in the air.

A fighting force does not wait for the AP to be updated before taking actions that are operationally required to provide an advantage in combat (AP amendments are not a priority when fighting a war). In the mean time, RAF personnel may be informed and corporate knowledge developed by other means of authorised advanced information contained in a variety of communication methods, such as signals, memos, letters, advanced information leaflets (destroyed once formal amendment leaflet is incorporated into the AP), briefings and local training.

The date an Amendment Leaflet is issued is not an indication of when the subject practise was first authorised or carried out. Moreover, the vast number of aircraft AP copies in existence would not have all been amended with updated changes on the same date; different copies of the same AP held across the RAF at squadron and flight level will have different dates recorded on the amendment leaflet record for the incorporation of the amendment. Also, it is not unusual for amendment leaflets to go missing in transit and for a unit to receive an amendment leaflet out of sequence, or for the AP to have a number of missing amendment leaflets; no system is perfect.

In short, I do not believe that it is logical or wise for us or the CloD dev team to treat a set of war time pilot notes as gospel for an exact time frame without taking account of the wider historical context and associated issues (reality check).

No.
Just a few suggestions that it was logically possible.

In order: wrong, as I have explained to Crumpp - twice- but I'm probably on his "ignore" list (awww I'm devastated!) :grin:

Crumpp shows that "having practical aviation experience" doesn't make for a good historian - just someone who thinks he's right about everything, and Crumpp clearly has no idea of what good historical research entails because he doesn't know how to handle anything that goes against his own beliefs.

Wrong - again - in so many ways. Crumpp cannot be bothered with other people's opinions and cannot be bothered re-examining his own predetermined POV in spite of everything that has been presented in this exceedingly lengthy thread; there is no point trying to reason with this ahistorical chump because he just repeats the same arguments over and over, regardless of any inconvenient facts that happen to get in the way.

Perhaps instead of looking at the issue of pilot notes and revisions through the lens of a civilian "expert", maybe one should ask someone in the military how the "TO" (the US equivalent) system really works. Or better yet, someone with service time in the RAF. Still, from reading this on and off, it will make no difference because he has determined that he's right and reality be damned.

Even then, we will be dealing with "modern" procedures.

Note especially that these are all post the 1974 Health and Safety Act. (and the 1987 repeal of sections 61 to 76), this does not necessarily make for good historical analysis.

The BoB period RAF cannot be analyised in the absence of reference to photos, pilot notes aand combat reports from the period, which indicate widespread use of 100, and at this stage there is no positive evidence of 11 group or even 12 group use of 87 in spits or hurricanes after may/june 1940.

Crumpp:

Actually, no. One of the advantanges of such a long discussion is that a lot of great documents have been posted. However looking back I can't find any technical references to what precisely these Merlin head mods entailed. Anyone? Crumpp, you posted a while back that it was a modification to change vibration harmonics. Where did that information come from? Although I think the mods are interesting I doubt they would change the conversion story as already discussed.

IvanK:

Was a bit relieved re-reading that thread that my memory of it was correct (though I should have said "hard buffet" and not just "buffet"), I was a bit lazy to not check it and link to it. Assuming my assumption about your past activities is correct and considering tomorrow's date, thank you for your service to this country.

Cheers, camber

He is Biff, and he hates manure.

http://popchassid.com/wp-content/upl...iff_manure.jpg

In the Merlin engine, it is my understanding that, the spigots were on the cylinder liners. The Cylinder Head had recesses that accepted the spigots (presumable to ensure accurate alignment).

I don't think any other spigots (if any) on the cylinder head have anything to do with the modification.

Cheers!

IvanK,

This was my reply to you on the buffet subject. I would encourage people to read that thread. Some good information and some good insight. Stability and control is just about my favorite subject when I was in school. It always amazed me how much of difference it makes in the outcome of an aircraft. you can have the best performance on paper that is unrealizable in the air, all due to stability and control issues. It was such a new thing during WWII, too.

http://forum.1cpublishing.eu/showpos...&postcount=174

I told you the truth. I was not disrespectful. I just backed up what I had to say and did not back down.

It was not "technically correct but historically inaccurate". It was just correct.

:(

Is that like a new classification of information? Ha ha ha!! While this is correct, it is not historically correct, historically, they were wrong but right as I see it because technically they were not correct.

:-P

All I said was this:

From CAA Flight Instructors Guide:

http://www.caa.govt.nz/FIG/advanced-...ate-turns.html

You are very close. There are lots of spigots on an engine. They can be plugs, cylinders, etc...

You are also right in the cylinder liners form the spigot on many engines.

Crumpp's conundrum

Everbody's Wrong

[QUOTE=NZtyphoon;414492]Crumpp's conundrum

Well put...

:grin:

Not the point. The point being that military regs are often supplemented. These supplements can take several forms in that entire pages can be replaced, paragraphs, lines down to individual words stricken or added. Depending on who was in charge of updating the pages could be removed, pen and ink changes made, etc. Or they could have been shoved in the back. The point being that new printed manuals including the latest revisions ARE NOT CONSTANTLY CHURNED OUT LIKE SAUSAGES just because something has changed. Maybe now. Maybe in the civilian world. Not in the military world. Not during wartime and certainly not now. Someone is hanging their hat on the utter dreck that is doesn't say in his particular version of the pilots notes that the operational changes for 100 octane use don't seem to be included. Nor would they if the changes were made after the printing of that series. That's what supplements are for. Spewing some arcane nonsense about some 1919 treaty or something is just more noise trying to justify an position based on what he knows in the civilian aviation world and not based on wartime exigencies or military operation.

Well I already contributed to re-derailing a many times derailed thread so I will persist :)

To me this seems an example of taking a correct technical fact and using it it go somewhere misleading. In a black and white world that would be impossible, but bear with me.

Crumpp:
Yes, any buffet, even the mildest "buzz" represents some flow separation and a degradation in turn performance. This is true even though it is referenced in a New Zealand CAA website and we are very suspicious of those in Australia :-P

So why do historical military pilots and aerobatic pilots (not talking FBW here) seem to think flying at the onset of just detectable buffet a good idea? Are they all misguided and should be told the truth?

Perhaps instead they know what they are doing and do it because it is a practical tool to stay as close as possible to the AoA for a maximum rate turn. In theory some turn performance is lost this way but there is no comparable signal to tell them how far they are under the optimum (so they can apply more pitch input). Of course the aircraft design plays a part in terms of buffet "depth"...if the aircraft departs very soon (with further pitch input) after the buffet onset is felt, or buffet was immediately "hard" it would not be a good idea to se this technique. Another technique would be to continuously detect flow separation, back off then redetect, but this doesn't seem very practical to me. But unfortunately I feel sick for hours after doing just an (approx) 2G turn for 360' so I don't know:(

Of course a plane design that will take a maximum pilot stick deflection and apply exactly the optimum elevator deflection to achieve optimum AoA without any flow separation is good, but we need the microprocessor in avionics to get there I think.

But to me that covers how context is important for technically correct "facts" to be useful in the discussion.

Cheers, camber

Couple of reasons....

1. If you don't have a stall warning device or AoA indicator then flying to the nibble and backing off is the correct technique. Read my last post in that thread and you will see once IvanK clarified his statement, we agreed.


2. See point #1 for most aerobatic aircraft.

That is exactly what you do.

You can read the Spitfire Mk I notes and see that it is in fact....correct.
http://img513.imageshack.us/img513/2048/spit26.jpg


Notice in paragraph 38 turning circle it instructs to not buffet the aircraft for a minimum radius turn and relax the stick pressure (move the stick forward)!!


The RAF republished sections as needed. That is a fact. The incorporated Amendment List was noted at the top of the reprinted section so that the operator could confirm he had the latest updates.

For example, the Hurricane II Volume I shown here incorporates Amendment List Number 42:

http://img198.imageshack.us/img198/4...ndmentlist.jpg

The amendment list's that are published but not incorporated are the responsibility of the operator to add to the Operating Notes.

Those amendments are to be logged in the space provided at the front of the Operating Notes:

http://img829.imageshack.us/img829/8300/hurr02.jpg

To complete the update, the operator is instructed to paste in and replace the old text with the changes noted in the Amendment.

Here you can see that an amendment was properly added to the Operating Notes by the Operator:

http://img687.imageshack.us/img687/2...ember19402.jpg

The only operational evidence of full conversion to 100 Octane presented in the thread is the January, 1942 Operating Notes for the Spitfire Mk I.

That being said, I can also tell you for a fact ALL Spitfire Mk II's were using 100 Octane in June of 1940.

BTW, the RAF does the same with their Operating Notes that the FAA requires of any certified General Aviation Aircraft in use today.

It is what was agreed upon by convention!!

:)

S!

Just to say about update intervals on technical literature. We do get some that are dated some time ago and have gone thru the whole process or whatever before being published. But also get urgent ones that are released very quickly and have to be done or added to the literature so safety is not compromised. So I would guess that especially during wartime if something critical came up then info would be passed to the troops fast in a way or another to prevent losses because of lack in information. I do not think RAF or any other air force waited a year before publishing stuff, even during war ;)

An example would be also the Curtiss representative that went to study the Helldiver planes having strange losses due control failures. Reason was a pulley/linkage in the wing and in the end he ended up machining these things of better materials on a CV! All this during war time and in the field. So info came out fairly fast don't you think. So would it feasible to think that the pilot/technical literature was updated fairly quickly and urgent information was passed to troops in form of a bulletin or other means before the amendment could be added to the official literature? Just a thought.

Actually it's good example. You describe how it should be in theory. And this is how it was in reality for this particular manual:

The incorporated amendments were not logged by the operator in the A.L. overview in the front of the manual.
Some amended paragraphs were cut out of the amendment list and placed (not always taped or pasted, some only slipped in) above or below the old paragraphs. Some amendments were written into old paragraphs by a pencil.
About 4-5 pages of the amendment list were slipped in the front of the book and the old paragraphs didn't even contain a note that there are amendments in the front for it.

Also you will find some instances where a subject was amended in one section of the manual but the same subject is not amended in another section.

You are simply putting to much weight into the single sentences of the manual, you must look at the context.
Do you think the ground crew always read a manual before the fueled up the aircraft? They simply painted a small "100" next to the fuel tank cap and everyone knew what to do.

The clearance of 100 octane fuel for Spitfire I, which definitely is something urgent and important, was added by A.L. 2 to the May 1940 section of the manual.
The additional restriction of 100 octane fuel to operational units is definitely nothing urgent. And this restriction was simply ruled out by Pilot's Notes General that allowed the use of lower octane fuel if really necessary (of course lower operational limits applied in this case).

Biff just keeps on digging that hole for the stupid doesn't he? lol

S!

Banks, good points. I know from experience too that things are done outside books as they are a routine. But this can cause a danger too as you can miss things an addition or change can bring so I am sure ground crews were informed on important changes and schooled for a professional and safe working procedure.

I've done heaps of changes to literature when they come. It is realy interesting and rewarding to compare these changes to the older version and see the reasons behind it. At the same time you learn more from the plane you work on. I think this applies to every AF today, now and in the past. Thanks for great discussion :)

Tsk.. Those damn RAF pilot's, never filling in their bloody paperwork, dunno why. Maybe all that getting killed nonsense had something to do with it.
I dunno, any excuse.

From what I've read, the last thing they wanted to do having just seen their mates explode 20 feet off the port wing was effin paperwork.

To apply modern standards to a life or death situation in 1940 is ridiculous.

By modern standards none of them would be able to fly because most of them were still drunk from the night before. What's the FAA got to say about that? Or 4 hours sleep, clinically exhausted are you son.. Tough, get up there and fight for your life.

An interesting doco here:
Oops - it says the RAF used 100 octane fuel - although the Fw 190 didn't appear during the battle.
http://http://www.youtube.com/watch?...eature=related

And an interesting one here
http://http://www.youtube.com/watch?...eature=related

About testing the Spitfire at Castle Bromwich

Oh good, now we're getting somewhere.

So, if I sit down with my copy of Spitfire the history, I'll be able to work out where all the mkII's went from the factory, therefore I'll be able to tell which stations had 100 octane. Cool. I'll get back to you.

S!

Winny..war or not the technical staff did work by the a certain order and did use literature. Claiming these guys just did it without any supervision or literature is just thick. The base how an unit work is doing things, how professional it is performing it's tasks..all those are trained and done before the war. RAF or any other AF did not switch mode because of war..sure they had to improvise in the field but it was based on something. And belive me even in war superiors ask for paperwork because it is essential for the big picture if you get the drift.

Fair enuff, I was being sarcastic. And I'm not thick. But my point was kind of that it's hard to tell if a set of pilot's notes were maintained correctly without knowing their history.

S!

Point taken Winny ;) :D

Flanker,

Good points and your experience is obvious. The Curtiss Helldiver is a great example of the measures taken to keep aircraft from falling out of the sky and in safe operation.

It does not make any sense to rush an airplane to destruction and kill people.

According to Morgan and Shacklady ( the very next paragraph after the one you kept quoting) "first trials of the fuel in a Spitfire took place at Rolls-Royce Hucknall on 24th September 1939 when K9788, fitted with a Merlin RM3S made it's first flights"

They also carried out bench tests in April 1938 - the engine failed during it's 100 hour type test. It managed 94 hours including 4 hours of maximum take off power of 1250hp @ 3,000 rpm +12lb boost. I'll repeat that. April 1938

I suppose it all depends on what your definition of "rush" is...

They did rush it!!'

If we take January 1942 as the time the conversion for Spitfire Mk I's was complete that represents about two years and four months between initial flight test and 100% ground operational adoption.

Compare that to the RLM's testing of 1.58ata/1.65 ata as a straight manifold pressure increase in the BMW801D2. The motor was tested at that manifold pressure in May 1942. It was not until July 1944 that we see it in the Flugzueg Handbuch for the FW-190A8. That is a two years and two months lag time. Do you not think the RLM was rushing this improvement, too?

Still trying to trying to work out how you can make such a massive interpretation based on a SPit 1 Manual for 1942, and ignore the official papers that cleared the Spit for use of 100 octane in 1939. Remembering that you agree that all Spit II units were using 100 Octane in mid 1940 and presumably agree that the Spit V would have used 100 Octane.

Clearly original documentation from the NA are not as good as your assumption.

What is your training and background?

S!

Thanks Crumpp, 16 years of active service in military behind with fighters and their systems/armament/maintenance :) I think it gives something to this flying hobby, but I think knowledge just increases the pain in both good and bad :)

Well, if conversion was completed by January 1942 it wasn't done by converting engines but by phasing out the remaining aircraft (if there were any, what I seriously doubt) from operational service ...


The Merlin V was 100 octane only (according to AP1590B, A.L. 4 November 1940). Compare the differences between Merlin II, III and V here), there is no essential difference. This is also confirmed by AP1590B, A.L.4 November 1940 and the fact that only amendments to AP1590B were required to cover the new engine by the same manual (AP1590B without amendments only covers II and III).


Merlin XII, XX and 45 were all 100 octane only. Compare the cylinder block of these engines, which show the largest differences between those marks:

It's obvious that the early engines matured into the XII and the later engines were based on the XII design and most parts were interchangeable.
All these engines were in service by January 1942 and all of them used 100 octane only.

According to Crumpp RAF hesitated to "rush" the introduction of 100 octane fuel for an engine that they started to replace in autumn 1940 with similar engines that were using 100 octane fuel.

Of course Crumpp will now claim that only late production Merlin III which were very similar to Merlin XII were cleared for 100 octane fuel and will take this as a proof for his January 1942 theory. However this will ignore the fact that the Merlin V used 100 octane only by November 1940 and that it was identical to late production Merlin II and early production Merlin III.

That has more to do with the inadequacies of the German aircraft production system ( not my words, Gallands) than anything else.
Ok, what about the Mustang? From drawing board to flight test.. Or any of the German death traps of the late war period.. Again, applying modern standards to a very urgent war time situation is absolutely ridiculous. But I suppose you've made your stand and have to stick to it, no matter how dubious or without taking into account what the reality of war was.

This is another tangent really, when one avenue closes on you you just find another..
Yawn.

You mean like when Don Blakeslee of the 335th in 1943 insisted on swapping his P47's for P51's, but none of the pilots had been converted, but he got them anyway on the agreement that they were in a combat operation within 24hours of receipt. Blakeslee told his men that their conversion would be the actual mission.

Sorry, but needs dictate what happens, do that or help yourselves lose the war.